Gittin 20a (כ.) — the Talmud in English

If it is due to the section on severance that it contains,

which is the Torah’s written passage concerning divorce, and you might think that we must be concerned that when a man gives his wife the passage concerning divorce written in the Torah, for the sake of divorce, she will be divorced [even though he did not write his name and her name in it].

This concern, too, is not a concern, because

here we require “and he shall write for her,”

and the Sages have already expounded “and he shall write for her”

for her sake.

But the writing of the Torah scroll was not done for the sake of divorcing this particular woman.

And if you say, let us be concerned lest

it was written for her sake, when

I preceded

the husband at the time of the writing of the Torah scroll,

and he gave the scribe money beforehand,

that is, the husband paid the scribe so that he would write the Torah’s passage concerning divorce for the sake of divorcing his wife.

There is still no concern that this is a bill of divorce, because

here we require

that the bill of divorce contain

his name and her name, the name of his city and the name of her city, and they are absent.

The Torah scroll does not contain their names, and it is certainly not a bill of divorce; there is no concern about divorce, and it is obvious that she is not divorced.

And we raise a difficulty:

And as for Rav Yosef,

who said, “One who gives a Torah scroll to his wife is not divorced,”

what does he teach us?

It is obvious, for there is no reason to be concerned that it is a bill of divorce at all!

And we answer: Rav Yosef comes to teach

that invisible writing

is not considered writing

over invisible writing.

Therefore, there is no concern lest it happened that he first wrote a bill of divorce in invisible ink on the back of the Torah scroll.

For even if he wrote this, it is not writing, since a Torah scroll is processed with gallnuts.

Rav Ḥisda said: If one wrote a bill of divorce not for its sake, and passed a quill over it

again, over every letter, with the intention

of writing it for its sake, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis,

whether it thereby becomes valid for divorce.

As it was taught in a beraita: If one needed to write the Divine Name

in a Torah scroll, but he erred

and intended to write “

Yehuda.”

And he erred

in writing it

and did not add the letter dalet

to the name Yehuda; rather, he wrote the Divine Name. The Name was therefore written without the proper intention and is invalid—

he passes a quill over it

again, with the intention of writing it for the sanctity of the Name,

and sanctifies it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

It would seem difficult: behold he erases the lower Name!? But from here is proof that a Name that was not sanctified in writing has no prohibition of erasure. The printed Gemara chapter of the laws of siyudot is brought in the writings of the Gra"ch. And in Pnei Yehoshua he wrote the opposite, for they said in the Sages "it is not from the preferred," that is, although the Sefer Torah is invalid, nevertheless regarding erasure there is sanctity upon it that it is forbidden to erase.

And the Sages say: The Name is not of the best quality!

Thus, the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda disputed whether new writing written over old writing is considered as though one is now writing anew or not; and the same applies to a bill of divorce.

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: Perhaps that is not so.

There is no proof that they also disagree with regard to a bill of divorce.

Rather,

the Rabbis stated their opinion there only

because the Divine Name is invalid due to

our requirement of “

This is my God and I will glorify Him,”

meaning that one must beautify oneself before God through the mitzvot,

and that is absent;

such a Name is not written beautifully.

But here,

with regard to a bill of divorce, which is not a matter of a mitzva,

no.

Rather, even the Rabbis would agree that it is valid when one passes a quill over it for its sake.

Rav Ḥisda said: I can invalidate all bills of divorce in the world!

I can render invalid every bill of divorce in the world.

Rava said to him: What is the reason?

If you say it is because it is written: “

And he shall write

for her a scroll of severance, and he shall place it in her hand,” which implies that the husband must give the bill of divorce from his own property,

but here she writes it for herself,

because the custom is that the woman pays the scribe’s fee for writing the bill of divorce. This is because the Sages instituted that the woman pay the scribe, so that the husband would not be able to keep his wife in limbo by failing to pay the scribe’s fee. Consequently, the bill of divorce becomes hers, and it is therefore invalid, since the bill of divorce must belong to the husband.

That is no reason to invalidate the bill of divorce!

For

perhaps the Sages transferred ownership of it to him!

The Sages transferred to the husband ownership of the money that the woman pays the scribe, for they have the power to do this based on the principle, “The property of the court is ownerless property,” so it is as though the husband paid the scribe, and the bill of divorce belongs to him.

Rather,

if you say that all bills of divorce are invalid for

the reason that it is written: “

And he shall place

it in her hand,” which implies that the bill of divorce must be fit for “placing”—that is, worth a peruta—

but here he gives her nothing,

because the paper of the bill of divorce is not worth a peruta!

This, too, is no reason to invalidate it.

For

perhaps “

and he shall place” means—

the placing of the bill of divorce!

It does not imply that the bill of divorce must be worth a peruta!

Know this, as they sent from there:

an instruction from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia:

Write

a bill of divorce

on items prohibited for benefit, and it is valid.

Items prohibited for benefit are worth nothing, yet this proves that the bill of divorce need not be worth a peruta.

The essential matter: They sent from there: Write a bill of divorce on items prohibited for benefit, and it is valid.

Even unto those that require burning. And we do not say "you shall measure a measure of its quantity," for that is said only regarding that which requires a measure, such as a shofar or a lulav. But a get does not require a measure. However according to one who says "anyone who stands to be burned is deemed as if burned," it is not a get, for the generality of those matters are "as if." The Raan according to the variant of the three Rabban Elazar, Ohel Etz? ch.124 s.1. And the Ketzot HaChoshen ch. 271 wrote that even though there is no law of acquisition at all in items forbidden to benefit, nonetheless it is effectual for divorce, because in a get we do not demand that she acquire it by acquisition and gaining, for it is effected even by a husband against [the wife's] will, and there is no acquisition against one's will. Rather we require only "and he gave it into her hand," even if she does not acquire it thereby. And the Gra"shash objected: how is this different from "this is your get and this is my paper," which is explained later on page b that it is not divorced, and yet here the paper remains the husband's, because there is no acquisition in items forbidden to benefit. And in Kehillot Yaakov ch.8 he resolved that only when the paper remains for himself, because from the husband's side she is prevented from acquiring it, then it is not counted as giving. But where from his act of giving there is no prevention — that he gives her the paper as a full and absolute gift, only that from the object's nature or from the woman's side (when she is acquired by coercion) it is not in the realm of acquisition — there it is a case of simple giving, since in any event it is from him, and he certainly gave her the paper. And further one may say that even when he divorces her by coercion or upon items forbidden to benefit, in any event the woman validly acquires the get ipso facto. For the Torah vindicated her that husband by coercion divorces her, and the condition of divorce is to entitle her to the paper like every instrument of acquisition, whose foundation is by buying the paper. Otherwise it would be "letters flying in the air," from which we learn that any get that is given for divorce, the woman acquires the writing without her consent, and since it is a kinyan ipso facto, without intention, the woman acquires even on items forbidden to benefit, like an inheritance which also belongs even on items forbidden to benefit.

Rav Ashi said: We, too, have learned this

in our Mishna: “One writes on anything,”

even on an olive leaf,

although it is worth nothing. The same applies to items prohibited for benefit.

And we reject this:

Perhaps an olive leaf is different, as it is fit to be joined with others.

Although it is not worth a peruta, it can be joined with many leaves, on which one can lie or which one can give as food to an animal, and it has the value of being usable. Items prohibited for benefit, by contrast, are fit for no use whatsoever.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi says: If one wrote it on items prohibited for benefit, it is valid.

Levi went out and expounded it in the name of Rabbi, but they did not praise him.

The statement was not accepted in the beit midrash, because it had been transmitted in the name of a single individual.

Levi went and expounded it

in the name of the Sages, and they praised him!

This proves that Levi exerted himself so greatly to have Rabbi’s statement accepted,

apparently, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion!

The Sages taught: “

And he shall write”—

but not ‘he shall engrave’!”

One may not engrave the letters of the bill of divorce with a knife on a tablet.

And we discuss this:

Does this mean

that the Sages intend to say

that engraving is not writing?!

One could have objected from the tablets of the covenant whose writing was engraved and called "writing" in several places in Scripture, but it suffices to object from a get aget. Tosafot s.v. "lemimra."

And we raise a contradiction

from another beraita.

As it was taught:

A slave who went out

with a bill of manumission

with writing that was

engraved

on a tablet

[a sheet of parchment]

or a writing tablet

[several tablets bound together and spread with wax, used by merchants, who engraved their accounts in the wax on the tablets with an iron stylus],

went free.

But not with writing on a felt cap,

a woolen hat,

or an andokhteri,

a type of ornament on which various designs are embroidered.

And if he embroidered the letters of the bill of divorce on them, it is not valid, because embroidered writing is not written and fixed in the garment in the manner that writing is fixed in paper or parchment. Rather, the thread lies upon the garment, attached to it by two stitches, with its two ends inserted into it.

Thus, this beraita holds that engraving is considered writing with regard to a bill of divorce, which contradicts the previous beraita!

Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: It is not difficult:

This

first beraita, which says that engraving is invalid, is referring to a case of

engraving the interiors,

where he did not write or engrave the letter itself; rather, he engraved the empty space inside the letter, and likewise engraved around the letter, thereby leaving the letter itself raised. Such a thing, although a raised letter resulted, is not considered writing, since he did not write the letter itself, but only engraved within the empty space of the letter and around it.

That

second beraita, which says that engraving is valid, is referring to

engraving the contours,

where he engraved the letters themselves and recessed them; this is considered writing.

And we raise a difficulty:

But

what about “engraving the

interiors”—is it not

considered writing?

And we raise a contradiction

from another beraita, as it was taught:

The writing was not

of the tzitz, the headplate of the High Priest,

recessed, but raised, like

the raised writing on

gold dinars.

But the letters

of the writing on

gold dinars are

“engraved in the

interiors.”

For the form of the seal on a dinar is produced by pressing an iron die onto the coin. The die contains a recessed form of the writing on the coin, and thus the metal surrounding the letters is pressed down, while the form of the letters on the dinar remains within the recess, raised above the rest of the coin. The tzitz was made in the same manner.

But concerning the tzitz it is stated: “And they shall write upon it writing, engraved like a seal.” Thus, writing in the form of “engraving the interiors” is considered writing!

And we answer: The beraita means

like gold dinars but not like gold dinars.

Although the tzitz was made

like gold dinars,

in that its writing was raised,

not

literally

like gold dinars.

For there,

with regard to gold dinars, it is engraving of the

interiors,

as explained.

Whereas

here,

with regard to the tzitz, it is engraving of the

contours.

The tzitz was thin, and they pressed the forms of the letters themselves from its reverse side, until the letters became raised on the front of the tzitz.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: The seal,

the impression on the coin,

does it merely cut around,

meaning, is the form produced only by pressing down the inside and the area surrounding the form, while the form itself remains raised within the recess in the die on its own?

Or does it gather inward,

meaning, through striking around and within the form, the gold is pressed and forced into the recessed form, so that the form is made by human action and not on its own?

The practical difference is whether, if one writes a bill of divorce by engraving with a die onto an iron plate, the result is considered writing and is valid, or not.

He said to him,

Rav Ashi:

It merely cuts around,

and this is not considered human writing.

Ravina raised an objection

to Rav Ashi from that which was taught with regard to the tzitz:

Its writing was not recessed, but raised like the writing on gold dinars.