Gittin 20a — the Talmud in English

If you say that this is because it contains the passage concerning severance,

the passage concerning divorce that is written in the Torah, and you might think that when a man gives his wife the Torah’s written passage concerning divorce, for the sake of divorce, she would be divorced even though he did not write his name and her name in it.

This concern is also not a concern, because

we require the phrase, “And he shall write for her,”

and the Sages already interpreted the words, “And he shall write for her,”

to mean: for her sake.

The writing of the Torah scroll was not done for the sake of divorcing this particular woman.

And if you would say: Let us be concerned lest

it was written for her sake, when

he preceded

the husband, at the time the Torah scroll was being written,

and gave the scribe money in advance,

that is, the husband paid the scribe to write the Torah’s passage concerning divorce for the sake of divorcing his wife.

There is still no concern that it is a bill of divorce, because

we require

that the bill of divorce contain

his name and her name, the name of his city and the name of her city, and those are absent.

The Torah scroll does not contain their names, and it is certainly not a bill of divorce. There is therefore no reason to be concerned about divorce, and it is obvious that she is not divorced.

And we raise a difficulty:

But as for Rav Yosef,

who said, “One who gives a Torah scroll to his wife does not divorce her,”

what is he teaching us?

It is obvious, since there is no reason at all to be concerned that it is a bill of divorce!

And we answer: Rav Yosef comes to teach something new:

invisible writing

is not considered writing

over invisible writing.

Therefore, there is no concern that perhaps he first wrote a bill of divorce on the back of the Torah scroll in invisible ink.

For even if he wrote this, it is not considered writing, since the parchment of a Torah scroll is processed with gallnuts.

Rav Ḥisda said: If someone wrote a bill of divorce not for its own sake, and passed a pen over it again

over every letter, with the intention

of writing it for its own sake, this depends on the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages

as to whether it thereby becomes valid for divorce.

As it was taught in a beraita: If one needed to write the Divine Name

in a Torah scroll and made a mistake,

and intended to write

“Yehuda,”

but made a mistake

while writing it

and did not insert the letter dalet

into the word “Yehuda,” but instead wrote the Divine Name. The Name was thus written without the proper intention and is invalid. He then

passes a pen over it

again, with the intention of writing it for the sanctity of the Divine Name,

and sanctifies it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

And the Sages say: The Divine Name is not written in the most excellent manner!

Thus, the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether new writing written over old writing is considered as though one is now writing anew. The same applies to a bill of divorce.

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: Perhaps that is not so.

There is no proof that they also disagree with regard to a bill of divorce.

Rather,

the Sages made their statement only there,

that the Divine Name is invalid, because

we require

“This is my God, and I will glorify Him,”

meaning that one must beautify one’s performance of the commandments before God,

and that is absent,

as such a Name is not written in a beautiful manner.

But here,

in a bill of divorce, which is not a matter of a commandment,

it is not so.

Rather, even the Sages would agree that it is valid when the pen is passed over it for its own sake.

Rav Ḥisda said: I could invalidate all the bills of divorce in the world!

I can invalidate every bill of divorce in the world.

Rava said to him: What is the reason?

If you say it is because it is written,

“And he shall write

for her a document of severance, and he shall place it in her hand,” which implies that the husband must give the bill of divorce from his own property,

but here she writes it for herself,

since the practice is that the woman pays the scribe’s fee for writing the bill of divorce. The Sages instituted this so that the husband could not keep his wife chained to him by refusing to pay the scribe’s fee. Consequently, the bill of divorce becomes hers, and is therefore invalid, since the bill of divorce must belong to the husband.

That is not a reason to invalidate the bill of divorce!

For

perhaps the Sages transferred ownership of the money to him!

The Sages transferred to the husband ownership of the money that the woman pays the scribe, since they have the authority to do so under the principle that “the property of the court is ownerless.” It is therefore as though the husband paid the scribe, and the bill of divorce belongs to him.

Rather,

if you would say that all bills of divorce are invalid for the following reason:

because it is written

“and he shall place it”

in her hand, implying that the bill of divorce must be an object of legal value, meaning worth at least one peruta,

but here he gives her nothing,

since the paper of the bill of divorce is not worth a peruta!

This too is not a reason to invalidate the bill of divorce.

For

perhaps “and he shall place it” means

“placing the bill of divorce”

itself!

It does not imply that the bill of divorce must be worth a peruta.

Know this, for they sent from there,

a ruling from the Land of Israel to Babylonia:

Write

a bill of divorce

on an object from which deriving benefit is forbidden, and it is valid.

Such objects are not worth anything, and this proves that the bill of divorce need not be worth a peruta.

The substance of the matter: They sent from there: Write a bill of divorce on an object from which deriving benefit is forbidden, and it is valid.

Rav Ashi said: We too have learned this

in our Mishna: “Everything may be used for writing,”

including an olive leaf,

even though it is worth nothing. The same applies to objects from which deriving benefit is forbidden.

And we reject this:

Perhaps an olive leaf is different, because it can be combined with others.

Although it is not worth a peruta, it can be joined with many other leaves, on which one could lie or which one could give as food to an animal, so it has some practical value. Objects from which deriving benefit is forbidden, by contrast, are not fit for any use.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi says: If one wrote a bill of divorce on an object from which deriving benefit is forbidden, it is valid.

Levi went out and taught this in the name of Rabbi, but they did not praise him.

The statement was not accepted in the house of study because it had been stated in the name of a single authority.

Levi went and taught it

in the name of the Sages, and they praised him!

This proves that Levi exerted himself so greatly to ensure that Rabbi’s statement would be accepted,

apparently, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion!

The Sages taught:

“And he shall write”—

but not “he shall engrave”!

One may not carve the letters of the bill of divorce with a knife onto a tablet.

And we inquire about this:

Does this mean

that the Sages intend to say

that engraving is not writing?

And we raise a contradiction,

from another beraita.

As it was taught:

A slave who went out

with a document of emancipation

whose writing was

engraved

onto a tablet

a sheet of parchment

or a writing board

several boards bound together and coated with wax, used by merchants who engraved their accounts in the wax with an iron stylus

goes free.

But not with writing on a felt cap,

a woolen hat,

or on an andokhteri,

a type of ornament on which various designs are embroidered.

If he embroidered the letters of the bill of divorce on them, it is invalid, because embroidered writing is not written and fixed in the garment as writing is fixed in paper or parchment. Rather, the thread lies on the garment, attached to it by two stitches, with its two ends inserted into the garment.

Thus, this beraita maintains that engraving is considered writing with regard to a bill of divorce, contradicting the earlier beraita!

Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: This is not difficult:

This

statement of the first beraita, that engraving is invalid, refers to a case such as

engraving the interior of the letters,

where he did not write or engrave the letters themselves. Rather, he engraved the empty spaces inside the letters and around them, and as a result the letters themselves remained raised. Although this produces raised letters, it is not considered writing, since he did not write the letters themselves, but only engraved the empty spaces within and around them.

This

statement of the second beraita, that engraving is valid, refers to

engraving the sides of the letters,

where he engraved the letters themselves and recessed them. This is considered writing.

And we raise a difficulty:

But

is it really the case that engraving the

interior of the letters is not

considered writing?

And we raise a contradiction

from another beraita, as it was taught:

The writing

on the forehead-plate of the High Priest

was not recessed, but was raised like

the raised writing on

gold coins.

But the letters

of the writing on

gold coins

are

engraving the interior of the letters.

The design on a coin is made by pressing an iron die onto the coin. The die contains a recessed form of the coin’s writing, so the metal surrounding the letters is pressed down, while the form of the letters remains within the recess, raised above the rest of the coin. The forehead-plate was made in the same way.

And with regard to the forehead-plate, it is stated: “They shall engrave upon it the engraving of a signet.” Thus, writing in the form of engraving the interior of the letters is considered writing!

And we answer: The intention of the beraita is to say:

like gold coins, but not like gold coins.

Indeed, the forehead-plate was made

like gold coins,

in that the writing was raised,

but not

actually

like gold coins.

For there,

with gold coins, it is engraving the

interior of the letters,

as explained.

But

here,

with the forehead-plate, it is engraving

the sides of the letters.

The forehead-plate was thin, and they pressed the forms of the letters themselves from its reverse side until the letters became raised on the front of the plate.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: The seal,

the die on the coin,

does it cut deeply,

meaning, is the design formed only by pressing down the interior of the design and its surroundings, while the design itself remains raised within the recess of the die on its own?

Or does it gather and draw in,

meaning that by striking around and within the design, the gold is pushed into the recessed form, so that the design is made by human action and not on its own?

The practical difference would be this: If one writes a bill of divorce by using a seal to engrave it onto an iron plate, is this considered writing and therefore valid, or not?

He said to him,

Rav Ashi:

It cuts deeply,

and this is not considered writing performed by a person.

Ravina raised an objection

to Rav Ashi from the following beraita concerning the forehead-plate:

Its writing was not recessed, but was raised like the writing on gold coins.