Gittin 19b (יט:) — the Talmud in English

It was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rav:

Witnesses who do not know how to sign: a blank sheet is torn for them, and they fill the tears with ink.

And this supports Rav.

And the Gemara also cites the continuation of that beraita:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what circumstance are these matters stated—

that the paper is torn for them?

With regard to bills of divorce,

and because of the plight of a woman whose husband has disappeared.

But with regard to bills of manumission and all other documents—

if they know how to read and sign, they sign; and if not, they may not sign.

And we raise a difficulty: Why did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel mention in his statement, “if they know how to read”—

“read”—

who mentioned it!?

Who was speaking about witnesses who do not know how to read? And we answer:

the beraita is incomplete

in its wording,

and this is what it teaches

in it:

Witnesses who do not know how to read: others read before them

the contents of the document,

and

then they

sign.

And those who do not know

how to sign—the paper is torn for them.

And

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said to him: In what circumstance are these matters stated? With regard to bills of divorce.

But with regard to bills of manumission and all other documents—

if they know how to read and sign, they sign; and if not, they may not sign.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that the solution for witnesses who do not know how to read—having the document read before them—applies only to a bill of divorce and not to other documents. Likewise, the solution for witnesses who do not know how to sign—tearing the paper for them—applies specifically to a bill of divorce and not to other documents.

Rabbi Elazar said: What is the reason for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s opinion,

who, although with regard to other documents he maintains that only witnesses who know how to read and sign may read and sign, nevertheless permitted in the case of bills of divorce that witnesses who do not know how to read have the document read before them, and that for witnesses who do not know how to sign the paper be torn before them?

Because

the daughters of Israel should not remain agunot,

and therefore Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was lenient with regard to bills of divorce.

Rava said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

And Rav Gamda said in the name of Rava: The halakha does not follow

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

And we raise a difficulty:

If so, in accordance with whose opinion?

In accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis!?

Do they maintain that even with regard to other documents, a document is read before witnesses who do not know how to read, and paper is torn for witnesses who do not know how to sign?

But there was that man who performed an act,

who wished to have witnesses who did not know how to sign sign a document, and was lenient by having the paper torn before them; and this was

with regard to other documents, and Rav Kahana flogged him

and punished him

Rav Kahana.

This proves that the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, according to whom these leniencies apply only to bills of divorce.

And we answer:

Interpret

what Rav Gamda said in the name of Rava, that the halakha does not follow Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

with regard to the reading

of the document. With regard to witnesses who do not know how to read, we are lenient like the Rabbis: Whether with regard to bills of divorce or other documents, if the witnesses do not know how to read, the document is read before them. But with regard to witnesses who do not know how to sign, the ruling follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: Only with regard to bills of divorce are we lenient and tear paper before them.

And therefore Rav Kahana flogged the man who tore paper for witnesses who did not know how to sign in the case of other documents.

Rav Yehuda,

when he grew old and his eyes became dim, if he needed to sign a document, would

strain himself and

and

read

what was written in the document,

and sign

the document.

Ulla said to him: You need not

exert yourself to read.

For Rabbi Elazar, the master of Eretz Yisrael, has the document read before him—

what was written in the document—

and he signs

without reading it himself.

And

likewise,

Rav Naḥman has the court scribes read the document before him, and he signs

without reading it himself.

And we say: The possibility of signing a document without reading it and relying on what was read to him applies

specifically

to

Rav Naḥman,

who was a judge and an important person,

and court scribes

—expert scribes—read it to him,

as they were in awe of him

and feared Rav Naḥman. Certainly they would not lie to Rav Naḥman, and they would tell him precisely what was written in the document.

But

even

Rav Naḥman and other scribes

—ordinary scribes—may not rely on this.

Or, if they are

court scribes

—expert scribes—

and

they read the document to

another person,

no,

one may not rely on the assumption that they will certainly read truthfully what is written in the document. Rather, only when there is a combination of circumstances—court scribes reading the document to someone like Rav Naḥman—may one rely on those reading it and sign on that basis.

When Rav Pappa was presented with a document

written by

a Persian, which was executed

—which was drawn up—

in the courts of the gentiles,

such a monetary document having been explained earlier, on page 10a, to be valid. However, Rav Pappa could not read what was written in the document, since it was written in Persian.

So Rav Pappa would

have it read to them,

reading it

to two gentiles, one not in the presence of the other

so that they would not coordinate with each other and tell him what was written in the document. And what he asked them was also

“as one speaking casually,”

as he engaged them in conversation about other matters until they casually told him what was written in the document;

and he collected with it

from the document

from liened property.

Rav Ashi said: Rav Huna bar Natan told me that Ameimar said as follows: With regard to this Persian document,

written in the Persian language,

on which Jewish witnesses signed,

we collect with it

from the document

from liened property!

And we raise a difficulty: How can we rely on these witnesses?

But

the witnesses

do not know how to read!

Since the document is written in Persian.

And we answer:

When they know

the Persian language.

And we raise a difficulty:

But we require

in a document

writing that cannot be forged,

and in a Persian document presumably

there is not

such writing.

And we answer:

When it was processed with gallnuts.

The document was treated with gallnuts, and consequently it cannot be forged.

And we raise a difficulty:

But we require

that the document satisfy the rule that

the subject of the document must be repeated in the final line, and it does not

appear in this document! And we answer:

When it is repeated.

The final line of the document repeated the entire subject of the document.

And we raise a difficulty: If so, if everything was done in accordance with the law, it is obvious that this is a valid document. What did Ameimar come to teach us?

Rather, what is he informing us,

lest you say that Ameimar came to teach us

that every language is valid

for a document—this too is not a novel teaching.

For

we learned

below:

A bill of divorce that one wrote in Hebrew while its witnesses signed in Greek,

or a bill of divorce written in

Greek while its witnesses signed in Hebrew, is valid.

And we answer:

Had I derived it from that

Mishna below,

I would have said,

I would have said that a document written in Greek is valid

only in the case of bills of divorce,

because of the enactment for agunot.

But with regard to other documents, it is not

the case that the Sages validated them in every language. Ameimar therefore comes to teach us that an ordinary document is also valid in every language.

Shmuel said: If he gave her

—his wife—

a blank sheet and said to her: This is your bill of divorce!

she is

divorced.

This is because

we are concerned that he wrote it with invisible ink,

and the gallnut solution was absorbed into the paper without leaving a visible mark, so that there is an invisible bill of divorce.

A challenge was raised

to Shmuel from a beraita in the Tosefta [chapter 6], as it was taught: If he said to his wife,

“This is your bill of divorce,” and she took it and threw it into the sea or into a fire

—into a fire—

or into anything that destroys

—that destroys the bill of divorce—

and

the husband

returned and said

after the bill of divorce had been destroyed:

“It is a document of appeasement,

or

it is a document of trust!”

It was never a bill of divorce. The husband now claims that he gave his wife such a document, and not a bill of divorce.

The ruling is that the woman is

divorced,

since

he has no power

after initially saying, “This is your bill of divorce,” to retract his statement and say that it was not a bill of divorce, and

render her forbidden

to marry anyone outside the marriage bond.

We now infer from this beraita a difficulty against Shmuel:

The reason is that there is writing

and he claims that this is not the writing of a bill of divorce but a document of appeasement; nevertheless, she is divorced, as we had presumed until he came and said that this was the document.

But if there is no writing,

if he gave her only a blank sheet, showed it to her, and claimed that he had not given her a bill of divorce but a blank sheet, he would certainly be believed to say that he had not given her a bill of divorce, and

not

presume her to be divorced.

For if even in such a case he is not believed, and we presume her to be divorced, the tanna should have stated the greater novelty: Even when he claims with regard to a blank sheet, “It was always like this; I did not give her a bill of divorce,” we likewise do not believe him. Rather, we presume that it was initially a bill of divorce and that the sheet he now shows is blank because the writing faded and disappeared.

Since the tanna did not state the case of a blank sheet, it is evident that in such a case the husband is believed, because it is unlikely that the writing faded. Therefore, we believe the husband that this was never a bill of divorce.

If so, this is difficult for Shmuel, who said that if there is a blank sheet and he says that it is a bill of divorce, he is believed. Yet it is unlikely that there was writing that faded. Why, then, do we say that there is certainly a bill of divorce here?

And we answer:

When Shmuel says

that he is believed to say that it was a bill of divorce, this is because

we examine it with water of nara

—a special solution that causes the letters to emerge from the paper and become visible—and we examine it with this water:

If it emerges

it emerges,

and this is a bill of divorce.

And if it does not emerge,

it necessarily

is nothing!

And we raise a difficulty:

But if it emerges, what of it!?

Why do we presume that it is certainly a bill of divorce?

It is possible that only

now it emerged,

whereas at the time the bill of divorce was given the letters were absorbed, and this was not considered a bill of divorce.

And we answer:

Shmuel, too, was saying that we are concerned

that she is divorced

.

Since it is uncertain whether the letters were visible when the bill of divorce was given or whether they had already faded, she is not certainly divorced.

Ravina said: Ameimar told me that Marimar said in the name of Rav Dimi as follows: These two witnesses, before whom he gave the bill of divorce,

who are the delivery witnesses,

must read

the bill of divorce.

A challenge was raised

from the words of the beraita in the Tosefta mentioned above:

“This is your bill of divorce,” and she took it and threw it into the sea or into a fire

—into a fire—

or into anything that destroys

—that destroys the bill of divorce—

and he returned and said,

after the bill of divorce was lost:

“It is a document of appeasement, or it is a document of trust,”

and it was never a bill of divorce—he is not believed, and the woman is

divorced, and he has no power

to say that this was not a bill of divorce and

render her forbidden

as his wife.

This beraita is difficult for Marimar’s statement that the delivery witnesses must read the bill of divorce, since the beraita indicates that there is a dispute as to what was written in the document: a bill of divorce or a document of appeasement.

And if you say that they must

—the witnesses—

read

the bill of divorce, then

after they read it,

the bill of divorce,

could he say this to her,

that it is not a bill of divorce but a document of appeasement!? The witnesses read it and ascertained that it was a bill of divorce.

And we answer:

No, it is necessary

to state this ruling in a case

where, after he read it,

after the witnesses read the bill of divorce,

he concealed it

—the husband concealed the bill of divorce—

in his hands,

between his hands beneath his garments,

and took it out

and gave it to her, without the witnesses reading again what he gave her.

The ruling is that she is divorced, since we presume that he gave her the bill of divorce and not a document of appeasement.

And the novelty is this:

Lest you say, he exchanged it,

and after the witnesses read the bill of divorce he exchanged it and gave her a document of appeasement,

it teaches us

that we presume he did not exchange it, but gave her the bill of divorce.

There was a certain man who threw a bill of divorce to his wife among the barrels

—between the barrels. And when they went to search for the bill of divorce,

a mezuzah was found

there, and not a bill of divorce.

Rav Naḥman said: A mezuzah among barrels

—between the barrels—

is not common.

If it was found there, presumably the husband threw this mezuzah, and did not throw her a bill of divorce; therefore, she is not divorced.

And this applies

when she is not divorced, because we presume that the husband threw her a mezuzah,

when

there was found

one

mezuzah there.

But

if there were found there

two

or

three

mezuzot, the woman is divorced. In that case we presume that the husband threw her a bill of divorce and not a mezuzah. As for the mezuzot found there, we say that just as the two mezuzot found there had certainly already been there, since even if we say that the husband threw her a mezuzah, he threw only one mezuzah, we are necessarily compelled to say that the other two mezuzot had already been there,

and from the fact that these

two mezuzot

were

there

—this

third mezuzah

was also there.

All three mezuzot had already been there, and the husband threw her a bill of divorce and not a mezuzah. The reason we do not find the bill of divorce is that

the bill of divorce,

mice

took it

—they took it away.

There was a certain man who entered a synagogue. He took a Torah scroll and gave it

—the Torah scroll—

to his wife

—to his wife—

and said to her: Here is your bill of divorce!

Rav Yosef said: Why should we be concerned?

It is certain that she is not divorced, and there is no reason to suspect that this is a bill of divorce.

And

if

because of invisible ink,

we should be concerned that perhaps he wrote a bill of divorce for her with invisible ink, whose mark is not apparent, on the outer surface of the parchment of the Torah scroll, and the writing was absorbed into the parchment so that the bill of divorce is not visible—

this is not a concern, because even if he wrote a bill of divorce on the outer side of the Torah scroll with invisible ink, it is not a bill of divorce, since

invisible ink

is not considered writing

on top of invisible ink.

The Torah scrolls in their time were treated with gallnuts, and if one wrote on them with invisible ink, this is not considered writing. Therefore, there is no concern that this is a concealed bill of divorce written with invisible ink.