Gittin 19b — the Talmud in English

It was taught in accordance with Rav’s opinion:

Witnesses who do not know how to sign: one cuts for them a blank sheet of paper, and they fill the cuts with ink.

And this proves in accordance with Rav.

And the Gemara also cites the continuation of that baraita:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: When are these words spoken

that one cuts the paper for them?

With regard to women’s gittin,

and because of the plight of an aguna.

But with regard to slave-release documents and all other documents—

if they know how to read and sign, they sign; and if not, they do not sign.

And we challenge this: Why did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel mention in his words, “if they know how to read”—

“reading”—

who mentioned it!?

Who spoke about witnesses who do not know how to read? And we answer:

The baraita is incomplete

in its wording,

and this is what it teaches

in it:

Witnesses who do not know how to read: others read before them

the contents of the document,

and

then they

sign.

And those who do not know

how to sign—one cuts for them a blank sheet of paper.

And

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said to him: When are these words spoken? With regard to women’s gittin.

But with regard to slave-release documents and all other documents—

if they know how to read and sign, they sign; and if not, they do not sign.

For Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the solution for witnesses who do not know how to read—that one reads before them—applies only to a get, and not to other documents. And likewise, witnesses who do not know how to sign—that one cuts the paper for them—this applies specifically to a get, and not to other documents.

Rabbi Elazar said: What is the reason of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

who, although with regard to other documents he holds that only witnesses who know how to read and sign may read and sign, nevertheless permitted with regard to gittin witnesses who do not know how to read, that one read before them, and witnesses who do not know how to sign, that one cut paper before them?

Because

the daughters of Israel should not be agunot;

therefore Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was lenient with regard to gittin.

Rava said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

And Rav Gamda said in the name of Rava: The halakha is not

in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

And we challenge this:

But if so, in accordance with whom?—

In accordance with the Rabbis!?

And even with regard to other documents, one reads before witnesses who do not know how to read, and one cuts paper for witnesses who do not know how to sign?

But there was that one who performed an act,

who wished to have witnesses who did not know how to sign sign, and was lenient, allowing paper to be cut before them, and this was

with regard to other documents, and Rav Kahana flogged him

and gave him lashes,

Rav Kahana.

And it follows that the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, for only with regard to gittin do these leniencies apply.

And we answer:

Interpret it—

interpret what Rav Gamda said in the name of Rava, that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

with regard to reading—

with regard to witnesses who do not know how to read, in which matter we are lenient in accordance with the Rabbis: whether with regard to gittin or with regard to other documents, if the witnesses do not know how to read, one reads before them. But with regard to witnesses who do not know how to sign, in this matter the ruling is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that only with regard to gittin are we lenient by cutting paper before them.

And therefore Rav Kahana flogged the person who cut paper for witnesses who did not know how to sign with regard to other documents.

Rav Yehuda

when he grew old and his eyes became dim—if he needed to sign a document, he would

strain himself

and

read

what was written in the document,

and sign

the document.

Ulla said to him: You do not need

to exert yourself and read.

For Rabbi Elazar, master of the Land of Israel, had it read before him—

what was written in the document—

and he signed

without reading it himself.

And

likewise,

Rav Naḥman had the court scribes read before him, and he signed

without reading it himself.

And we say: The fact that it is possible to sign a document without reading it and to rely on what was read to him applies

specifically

to

Rav Naḥman,

who was a judge and an important person,

and court scribes—

expert scribes—read it to him,

as they feared him

and would certainly not lie to Rav Naḥman and would state exactly what was written in the document.

But

even

Rav Naḥman and other scribes—

ordinary scribes—

or

court scribes—

expert scribes—

and

read it to

another person—

it is not

possible to rely on them and say that they will certainly read the truth—what is written in the document. Rather, it is specifically when there is a combination of court scribes reading to someone like Rav Naḥman that it is possible to rely on the readers and sign on their basis.

When a document came before Rav Pappa

written by

a Persian, who had it made

—which was made

in the courts of the gentiles,

and it was explained above, on page 10b, that such a monetary document is valid. But Rav Pappa did not know how to read what was written in the document, since it was written in Persian.

Then Rav Pappa would

read it to them,

reading

to two gentiles, one not in the presence of the other—

so that they would not coordinate with one another to tell him what was written in the document. And also what he asked them was

“while engaging in casual conversation,”

for he spoke with them about other matters until they casually told him what was written in the document,

and he collected through it

from the document

from liened property.

Rav Ashi said: Rav Huna bar Natan said to me, thus said Ameimar: This Persian document,

written in the Persian language,

on which Jewish witnesses signed—

we collect through it

from the document

from liened property!

And we challenge this: How can we rely on these witnesses?

But

the witnesses

do not know how to read!

For the document is written in Persian.

And we answer:

When they know

the Persian language.

And we challenge this:

But do we not require

in a document

writing that cannot be forged,

and in a Persian document, presumably,

there is not

such writing?

And we answer:

When it was processed with gallnuts.

The document was processed with gallnuts, and through this it cannot be forged.

And we challenge this:

But do we not require

that the document fulfill the law that

one must repeat the substance of the document on the last line, and it is absent

from this document! And we answer:

When it repeats it.

On the final line of the document they repeated all the substance of the document.

And we challenge this: If so, since everything was done in accordance with the law, it is obvious that this is a valid document; what did Ameimar come to teach?

But rather, what does he teach us,

lest you say that Ameimar came to teach us

that every language is valid

for a document—this too is not a novelty.

For

we learned

below:

A get that one wrote in Hebrew, while its witnesses are in Greek.

Or a get that is written in

Greek, while its witnesses are in Hebrew, is valid.

And we answer:

If it were from that—

from the Mishna below—

I would have said,

I would have said that when a document written in Greek is valid,

that statement applies to gittin,

and because of the ordinance for agunot.

But with regard to other documents, it does not

that the Sages validated them in every language. Ameimar comes to teach us that an ordinary document is also valid in every language.

Shmuel said: If he gave her

—his wife—

a blank sheet of paper and said to her: This is your get!

she is

divorced.

And because

we are concerned that he wrote it with invisible ink,

and the gallnut liquid was absorbed into the paper without leaving writing visible to the eye, and there is here an invisible get.

We raise an objection

to Shmuel from a baraita in the Tosefta [chapter 6], as it was taught: He said to his wife,

“This is your get,” and she took it and threw it into the sea or into the fire

—into the fire—

or into anything that destroys

—that destroys the get.

And the husband returned

—the husband—

and said

after the get had been destroyed:

“It is a document of appeasement,”

or

“It is a document of trust!”

And it was never a get. And the husband now claims that he gave his wife such a document, and not a get.

The law is that the woman is

divorced,

since

he has no power,

after initially saying, “This is your get,” to retract and say that this was not a get, and

forbid her

to marry outside.

And now we infer from this baraita against Shmuel:

The reason is that there is writing—

and he claims that this is not the writing of a get but rather a document of appeasement; she is divorced, as we maintained until he came and said that this was a get.

But if there is no writing,

if he gave her only a blank sheet of paper, and he shows it and claims that he did not give her a get but only a blank sheet of paper, he would certainly be believed to say that he did not give her a get, and

not

would we maintain that she is divorced.

For if even in such a case he were not believed, and we would maintain that she is divorced, the tanna should have stated the greater novelty: that even when he claims regarding a blank sheet of paper, and says, “This was always so, and I did not give her a get,” we likewise do not believe him; rather, we maintain that at first it was a get, and that what he now shows is a blank sheet of paper because the writing faded and disappeared.

And since the tanna did not state a case of a blank sheet of paper, it follows that in such a case the husband is believed, because it is a remote possibility to say that the writing faded. Therefore we believe the husband that this was never a get.

And if so, this is difficult for Shmuel, who said that if there is a blank sheet of paper and he says that it is a get, he is believed. But it is remote to say that there was writing and that it faded. And why do we say that there is certainly a get here?

And we answer:

When Shmuel says

that he is believed to say that this was a get, it is that

we examine it with mei denara

—special water that causes the letters to emerge from the paper and become visible—and we examine it with this water:

if it emerges—

it emerges,

and this is a get.

And if it does not emerge,

necessarily

it is nothing!

And we challenge this:

But if it emerges, what of it!?

Why do we determine that this is certainly a get?

It is possible that only

now it emerges,

and at the time the get was given the letters were absorbed, and this was not considered a get.

And we answer:

Shmuel too, we are concerned

that she is divorced,

is what he said.

And because it is uncertain whether at the time the get was given the letters were recognizable or whether they had already faded, she is not certainly divorced.

Ravina said: Ameimar said to me, Marimar said the following in the name of Rav Dimi: These two, before whom he gave a get,

and they are the delivery witnesses,

must read

the get.

We raise an objection

from the words of the baraita in the Tosefta mentioned above:

“This is your get,” and she took it and threw it into the sea or into the fire

—into the fire—

or into anything that destroys

—that destroys the get—

and he returned and said,

after the get was lost:

“It is a document of appeasement, or it is a document of trust,”

and this was never a get—he is not believed, and the woman is

divorced, and he has no power

to say that this was not a get, and

forbid her

as his wife.

And this baraita is difficult for what Marimar said, that the delivery witnesses must read the get, because the baraita indicates that there is a dispute about what was written in the document: a get or a document of appeasement.

And if you say that they must

—the witnesses—

read

the get, if so,

after they read it,

the get,

could he say this to her,

that it was not a get but a document of appeasement!? The witnesses read it and became aware that it was a get.

And we answer:

No, it is necessary

—here it is referring

to a case where, after he read it,

after the witnesses read the get,

he concealed it

—the husband concealed the get—

in his hands,

between his hands beneath his clothes,

and took it out

—and brought it out again—and gave her the get, without the witnesses again reading what he gave her.

The law is that she is divorced, for we maintain that he gave her the get, and not a document of appeasement.

And the novelty is

lest you say, he exchanged it,

and after they read the get, he exchanged it and gave her a document of appeasement.

It teaches us

that we attribute to him not having exchanged it, but having given her a get.

There was a certain man who threw a get to his wife among barrels

—between the barrels. And when they went to search for the get,

a mezuzah was found,

it was found there, and not a get.

Rav Naḥman said: A mezuzah among barrels

—between the barrels—

is not common.

And if it was found there, apparently the husband threw this mezuzah, and he did not throw a get to her, and she is not divorced.

And this applies

that she is not divorced, because we attribute it to the husband’s having thrown a mezuzah,

when there was found

there

one

mezuzah.

But

if there were found there

two

or

three

mezuzot, the woman is divorced. For then we maintain that the husband threw her a get, and not a mezuzah. And as for the mezuzot that were found there, we say that just as the two mezuzot found there certainly had already been there, because even if we say that the husband threw her a mezuzah, he threw only one mezuzah, necessarily we must say that the other two mezuzot had already been there. And

from the fact that these

two mezuzot

were

there

—this

third mezuzah

also was. All three mezuzot had already been there, and the husband threw her a get, and not a mezuzah. And the reason we do not find the get is that

the get,

mice

took it

—

they took it.

There was a certain man who entered the synagogue. He took a Torah scroll and gave it to her

—the Torah scroll—

to his wife

—to his wife—

and said to her: Here is your get!

Rav Yosef said: What is there to be concerned about?

It is certainly the case that she is not divorced, and there is no reason to be concerned that this is a get.

And

if

because of invisible ink,

and we should be concerned lest he wrote a get for her with invisible ink, whose writing is not recognizable, on the outer side of the parchment of the Torah scroll, and it was absorbed into the parchment, and the get is not visible—

this is no concern, because even if he wrote a get on the outer side of the Torah scroll with invisible ink, it is not a get, since

invisible ink

is not considered writing

upon invisible ink.

And Torah scrolls in their time were processed with gallnuts, and if one wrote on them with invisible ink, it is not writing. Therefore, there is no concern that there is here a concealed get written with invisible ink.