Eruvin 82b — the Talmud in English

He said,

explaining,

Rav Yehoshua, son of Rav Idi: In truth, he does not go out through his mother's eruv without her giving him possession of it; rather, [this applies to] only a minor who needs his mother, that is, until four or five, as it explains in Sukka.

that in fact a child does not go with his mother’s eruv without her granting him a share in it; rather, this applies only to a child who needs his mother—that is, until four or five, as explained in tractate Sukka.

And

when Rav Asi said

that he goes out through his mother's eruv even until the age of six — it is only in a case where his mother gave him possession of the eruv.

Rather, it is speaking of a case

such as where his father made an eruv for him — through giving him possession —

to the

to the north.

And

if

his mother

made an eruv for him

to the south, and in such a case Rav Asi taught us that he goes out specifically through his mother's eruv!

The reason is

Because

even

a minor

of six years also —

in the company of his mother [in his mother's company]

[in the company of his mother]

is pleased, and his mother's eruv is considered a benefit for him, while his father's eruv is considered a detriment for him.

And we associate him with his mother. From the age of six onward, he follows his father [Ritba].

And we assign him after his mother. And from the age of six onward he is drawn after his father [Ritva].

And now we raise the opposite objection:

An objection was raised against Rav Yehoshua, son of Rav Idi, who held that from “four or five” he does not go out through his mother's eruv unless she gave him possession of it:

For it was taught in a source:

For it was taught:

A minor who needs his mother —

goes out through his mother's eruv until the age of six!

For until the age of six he is considered “one who needs his mother.”

We see from this that even if his mother did not grant him a share, he may go with her eruv until the age of six.

And later in the Gemara it asks: If so, this beraita contradicts the earlier beraita, according to the amoraim above who said that from “four or five” he is called one who does not need his mother.

Rather, initially it raises another difficulty against Rav Asi:

Let us say that this constitutes

this beraita

a refutation of Rav Asi,

for he said that even one who is six years old goes out through his mother's eruv, while here it states “until” six years old. This implies that one who is six himself — that is, in his sixth year — does not go out through his mother's eruv?!

And we answer:

Rav Asi can say to you: “Until”

six years old, as the beraita states, means

and this includes [the age mentioned], for it is only from when he enters his seventh year that he does not go out through his mother's eruv.

And now we return to raise a difficulty:

And now we return to raise a difficulty:

Let us say that it constitutes a refutation of Rabbi Yannai and Resh Lakish,

who said above that a five-year-old is called one who does not need his mother, while the earlier beraita taught: When he does not need his mother, he does not go out through his mother's eruv. Yet here the beraita states that until six he goes out through his mother's eruv?!

And we answer:

There is no difficulty.

This

where we consider him one who does not need his mother from the age of four or five, and he does not go out through his mother's eruv, is

when his

father is present

of the minor

in the city [that his father is in the city], and the minor enters and leaves with him. And from the age of five his father is sufficient for him, and he does not need his mother.

case, in which the source says that until six he is considered to need his mother and goes with her eruv, applies

And

this

which the beraita states, that until the age of six he is called one who needs his mother and goes out through his mother's eruv, speaks

when his father is not present

of the minor

in the city, and he needs his mother until the age of six. Therefore he goes out through his mother's eruv.

[for]

The Sages taught: A person may make an eruv

of boundaries

through [on behalf of]

[on behalf of]

his minor son and daughter,

even if they do not eat at his table [and even if they protested that he should not make an eruv for them, or they made another eruv themselves toward another side of the city, Shulhan Arukh and Gemara below].

And the reason is that we hold that one makes an eruv only for a matter of mitzva, and therefore he always makes one for them; that is, he gives them possession of the eruv through another person, in order to educate them in mitzvot.

And likewise a person may make [and need not give them possession — Gaon Yaakov]

through [on behalf of]

[for]

his Canaanite male and female slaves, whether with their knowledge or without their knowledge, because their hands are like his hand [Bach].

[Bach].

And they cannot protest, as it will state below.

But he does not make an eruv through his Hebrew male and female slaves, [

nor ]

through his adult son and daughter, nor through his wife, except with their knowledge.

And below we explain: Is this specifically when they protested, or even in an unexpressed case does their knowledge remain necessary?

Another [teaching] was taught: A person should not make an eruv through his adult son and daughter, nor through his Hebrew male and female slaves, nor through his wife, except with their knowledge.

But he does make one through his Canaanite male and female slaves, and through his minor son and daughter, whether with their knowledge or without their knowledge, because the hands

of his male and female slaves

are like his hand, [Tosafot].

And all of them

And all of them

[this is explained below, referring to the entire latter clause of this beraita]

who made an eruv [even if they made an eruv] toward one side of the city,

and their master established an eruv for them

and their master made an eruv for them

toward the other side —

go out through their master's [eruv].

Except for the woman, because she can protest.

And it might have entered our minds that what it states in the latter clause, “and all of them,” also applies to his Hebrew male and female slaves and his adult son and daughter, and this is what the tanna of the beraita says: That which was taught at the beginning, that one does not make an eruv for these without their knowledge, applies specifically when they protested against him. But in an unexpressed case, or even if they made an eruv themselves toward another side from the eruv of their father or master, thereby revealing their דעת that they were not pleased with his eruv, even so they go out through his eruv, until they explicitly protest.

And all the more so Canaanites and minors, for his eruv benefits them even if they made an eruv toward another side.

And therefore we raise a difficulty:

A woman —

what is different

that you say “except for the woman,” that her law is not like the law of his Hebrew male and female slaves and his adult son and daughter, when their law is the same: One does not make an eruv for them except with their knowledge?!

He said,

explaining,

Rabba: “And all of them” does not refer to his Hebrew male and female slaves and his adult son and daughter, for their law is like the law of the woman.

And when the source says “except for the woman,” the tanna intended to say:

And that which it states, “except for the woman,” the intention of the tanna is to say:

A woman and anyone similar to her,

for one does not make an eruv for them without their knowledge.

And the latter clause refers only to those for whom one makes an eruv without their knowledge, and teaches that even when they revealed that they did not desire the eruv for the place toward which he had placed it, even so they go out through the eruv that he made for them [and likewise when they explicitly protested, Shulhan Arukh].

And we raise a difficulty against the beraita from within itself:

This itself is difficult [Bach]:

you said: “Except for the woman, because she can protest.”

On the one hand,

you said: Except for the woman, because she can protest.

The reason is that she protested,

the woman explicitly, or that she made an eruv toward another side and revealed that she did not want an eruv toward the second side of the city; in that case she does not go out through her husband's eruv.

But in an unexpressed case,

when she did not protest and did not reveal her דעת [Rashi] —

she goes out through

the eruv

of her husband.

And

yet the beginning states:

A person should not make an eruv through his adult son and daughter, nor through his Hebrew male and female slaves, nor through his wife

except with their knowledge.

What, is it not that they say

explicitly:

“Yes,”

that they expressly stated their consent? But in an unexpressed case one does not make an eruv for them, and the beginning contradicts the latter clause?! And we reject this:

No,

it is not as you said, that “with their knowledge” means that they say “yes,” excluding an unexpressed case, in which it is not effective.

Rather,

what does “except with their knowledge” mean —

even

when they remained silent

it is also effective for them.

And “with their knowledge” serves only

to exclude a case where they say: “No,”

we do not want this eruv.

And we raise a difficulty: How did you say that in an unexpressed case the eruv that he made for them is effective for them?

And

yet

the beraita states:

And all of them [his Canaanite male and female slaves and his minor sons]

[his Canaanite slave and maidservant and his minor children]

who made an eruv, and their master made an eruv for them —

go out through their master's [eruv].

For it is an unexpressed case, and

concerning it

it states

“except for the woman,”

for

in such a case

they do not go out [she and anyone similar to her].

[she and anyone similar to her].

It follows that we see that even in an unexpressed case it is not effective until they say “yes”?!

Rava said: Since they made an eruv

toward another side [even if they did not know that he made an eruv for them toward another side, Gaon Yaakov],

you have no greater protest than this.

But in an unexpressed case, when they did not reveal their דעת at all and did not explicitly protest, the eruv that he made for them is effective for them.

Mishna:

How much is its measure,

of an eruv of boundaries?

Food for two meals for each and every one

of those participating in the eruv.

With what food did they say [this]?

They measure with

his weekday food, and not for Shabbat, the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Judah says:

They measure with

his food for Shabbat and not for weekdays.

And in the Gemara it explains how much this is, both according to Rabbi Meir and according to Rabbi Judah.

And the Mishna explains:

This one [Rabbi Meir]

[Rabbi Yehuda]

and this one [Rabbi Judah]

that is, to require less than the standard amount!

intend to be lenient,

with the lesser measure!

According to Rabbi Meir, weekday food is less than Shabbat food, because on Shabbat the cooked dishes are tasty, and therefore one eats more of them, and one also adds to the eating of bread [Meiri].

Whereas Rabbi Judah holds: On Shabbat one eats less, since one eats three meals, one does not eat much at each meal.

Their dispute applies both when one makes an eruv with bread and when one makes an eruv with other things.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says:

The measure of food for two meals — when one makes an eruv of boundaries with bread — is

from a loaf

[a loaf of bread; see Rashash] that is purchased from a baker

for a pundion,

when the price of

four seahs

of wheat is

a sela.

And it will be explained further in the Gemara.

Rabbi Shimon says:

The measure of food for two meals in bread is:

two-thirds

[two thirds]

of a loaf,

which is one

of three

loaves

per a kav

of wheat.

That is to say: Two thirds of a loaf, of such a measure that three loaves of its size can be made from one kav of wheat.

We hold as follows: One who enters a house afflicted with leprosy becomes impure immediately upon entering. But his garments do not become impure [so as to require laundering] until he remains in the afflicted house for the amount of time needed to eat a peras [half a loaf] of wheat bread.

And the anonymous Mishna states: The time for eating

half of it [a peras] — of that same loaf about which Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka and Rabbi Shimon spoke — is the measure by which one measures the duration of the stay of one who enters

[a half-loaf] of that loaf mentioned by Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka and Rabbi Shimon is the measure used to determine the length of time a person entering

the house afflicted with leprosy,

to render the garments upon him impure.

And half of half of it [half a peras] — of that loaf, according to Rabbi Yohanan according to his view, and according to Rabbi Shimon according to his view — is the measure of impure food whose eating they decreed

[half a loaf] of the loaf—according to Rabbi Yohanan in accordance with his view, and according to Rabbi Shimon in accordance with his view—is the measure of impure foods whose consumption the Sages decreed

to disqualify the body,

whereby the body of the person who eats it is disqualified from eating teruma.

For so the Sages decreed: A person who eats impure food, even though he does not become impure, since food does not render a person impure by Torah law, nevertheless becomes disqualified by rabbinic law from eating teruma until he immerses.

Gemara:

And how much

is

food for two meals — according to Rabbi Meir and according to Rabbi Judah — when one makes an eruv with bread?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Two loaves carried by field laborers

Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: Two rippetei of the field laborers [loaves of bread carried by the farmers — ox drivers — with them to the field] is the measure of food for two meals of bread. For this is how an average person customarily eats on a weekday, according to Rabbi Meir, and on Shabbat, according to Rabbi Judah.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Two loaves

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Two loaves [two loaves] customary in the place called

“the Pappaita River”

“Nehar Pappita”

[Pappa River].

And these measures are the measure of the eating of an average person. And an elderly person or a sick person is measured according to himself. But even one who eats more needs only this measure [Ritva].

Rav Yosef said to Rav Yosef, son of Rabbah: Your father

Rabbah

—according to whom does he hold in the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, who dispute whether one measures with the food of a weekday or with the food of Shabbat?

in the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, who disagree about whether the measure is determined according to weekday food or Shabbat food?

Rav Yosef, son of Rabbah, said to Rav Yosef: My father

—he holds in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

Rav Yosef said to him:

I too hold in accordance with Rabbi Meir,

for the food of a weekday is less than that of Shabbat, and therefore one measures with it.

For if he held in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda—

that on Shabbat one eats less—

this statement that people say would be difficult: “There is room for a sweet thing”—

is common.

For a person’s intestines expand in order to make room for a sweet thing, and it is found that on Shabbat they eat more.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says

and so on; Rabbi Shimon says and so on:

It was taught: And their statements are close

[their measures]—those of Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Shimon—

to being equal.

And we raise an objection against it:

Are they comparable,

the measure of this one and the measure of that one?

For according to the measure of

Rabbi Yohanan—

there are

four meals per kav!

For you extract four meals from a kav of grain.

And this is the calculation:

A. In every se'a there are six kav.

In four se'ah there are twenty-four kav, which are forty-eight half-kav.

B. In every sela there are four dinar, in a dinar six ma'ah, and in a ma'a two pondi'on.

Thus you have in a sela forty-eight pondi'on.

C. It follows that if the price of four se'ah [which are forty-eight half-kav] is a sela [which is forty-eight pondi'on], then with one pondi'on one buys one half-kav.

It follows that Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka’s measure for two meals, stated in the Mishna, “a loaf purchased from a baker with one pondi'on, when four se'ah are purchased for a sela,” is one half-kav.

And if in half a kav there is food for two meals, then in a whole kav there is food for four meals.

But according to the measure of

Rabbi Shimon

for two meals—which is two-thirds of a loaf, made from one-third of a kav—it follows that each meal is only one-third of one-third of the kav. And if so, behold you have

nine meals per kav,

whereas according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka there are four meals in a kav.

If so, how did you say that their statements are close to being equal?!

And we answer: What we said according to Rabbi Yohanan, that in a loaf purchased with a pondi'on there is half a kav of wheat for the price of a pondi'on, is not so.

For the shopkeeper [the baker] does not sell loaves made from half a kav of grain for the price of only one pondi'on, because the pondi'on is the price that he himself paid for the grain, and he needs to profit from his baking.

And his wage is as [unclear: the source is truncated]

Rav Hisda said: Deduct from them—

take out from every quantity that the baker takes—

one-third,

as profit

for the shopkeeper.

And it follows that the shopkeeper takes for himself one-third of the half-kav [which he bought with a pondi'on], and in the loaf that he sells for a pondi'on he gives only two-thirds of the half-kav, which is one-third of a kav. And from this loaf two meals are nourished; it follows that in each kav there are more than four meals.

And

there is still cause for astonishment: for

still

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka’s measure does not reach Rabbi Shimon’s measure.

For according to this master—

Rabbi Shimon—

nine

meals per kav, as we said.

And

if

according to this master—

Rabbi Yohanan, who says that in a loaf of one-third of a kav there is food for two meals—you find

six

meals per kav?!

Rather,

this is how it should be answered:

according to the other

statement

of Rav Hisda.

For he said: Deduct from them—

from every quantity that the baker takes—

half for the shopkeeper.

And it follows that the shopkeeper takes from the half-kav that he took for a pondi'on half of it as his wage, and he puts in the loaf one-quarter kav and sells it for a pondi'on, and from this a person is nourished for two meals; thus you have in a whole kav more than six meals.

And we raise an objection:

And still

their measures are not equal.

For

according to this master—

Rabbi Shimon—

nine

meals per kav, and

according to this master—

Rabbi Yohanan—

eight

meals per kav, for he makes two meals from one-quarter kav?!

And we answer:

This is what the

tanna of the beraita

was saying: “And their statements are close to being equal,”

but they are not entirely equal.

And we raise an objection:

The statement of Rav Hisda is difficult,

who said: Deduct from them one-third for the shopkeeper—

against the statement of Rav Hisda,

who said: Deduct from them half for the shopkeeper?!

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This

that Rav Hisda said that he takes only one-third as his wage speaks of a case where

the householder gives wood

[wood] to the baker so that he will bake with it.

And

this

that Rav Hisda said that he takes half as his wage speaks of a case where

the householder does not give wood

[and the beraita also speaks of this], for the wood too is included in the price, and the baker takes its value as his wage.

We learned in the Mishna:

Half of it for a house afflicted with leprosy, and half of that half to render the body invalid: