Eruvin 82b (פב:) — the Talmud in English

He said

in explanation,

Rav Yehoshua, son of Rav Idi: In fact, he does not leave with his mother's eruv without her granting it to him; rather, this applies only to a minor who requires his mother—that is, until the age of four or five, as explained in tractate Sukka.

And

when Rav Asi said

that he leaves with his mother's eruv, even until the age of six, it is only in a case where his mother granted him the eruv.

[The sentence continues from the preceding segment.]

Rather, it is discussing a case

such as one in which his father established an eruv for him

through granting him a share

to the north.

And

if

his mother

established an eruv for him

to the south, and this is the novelty Rav Asi teaches us: He leaves specifically with his mother's eruv!

[The sentence continues from the preceding segment.]

Because

even

a minor

of six as well—

in the company of his mother

[in his mother's company]

is amenable to him, and his mother's eruv is considered a benefit for him, while his father's eruv is considered a detriment to him.

[The sentence continues from the preceding segment.]

And we follow his mother. From the age of six onward, he follows his father [Ritva].

And now we raise the opposite objection:

The Gemara raises an objection

to Rav Yehoshua, son of Rav Idi, who holds that from “the age of five” he does not leave with his mother's eruv unless she granted it to him:

As it is taught in a beraita:

A minor who requires his mother—

leaves with his mother's eruv until the age of six!

For until the age of six he is considered one who requires his mother.

We see, then, that even if his mother did not grant him a share, he leaves with her eruv until the age of six.

Later, the Gemara asks: If so, this beraita contradicts the earlier beraita, according to the amoraim mentioned above who said that from “the age of five” he is called one who does not require his mother.

But initially it raises another difficulty against Rav Asi:

Shall we say that this constitutes

beraita

a refutation of Rav Asi, who said that even a six-year-old leaves with his mother's eruv, whereas here it states “until” the age of six, implying that a child who is six himself—that is, in his sixth year—does not leave with his mother's eruv?!

[The sentence continues from the preceding segment.]

And we answer:

Rav Asi could say to you: “Until”

the age of six, as stated in the beraita, means

and the endpoint is included, for he leaves with his mother's eruv only until he enters his seventh year.

[The sentence continues from the preceding segment.]

And now we return to raise a difficulty:

Shall we say that this constitutes a refutation of Rabbi Yannai and Reish Lakish,

who said above that a five-year-old is called one who does not require his mother, while the earlier beraita taught that when he does not require his mother, he does not leave with his mother's eruv? Yet here the beraita states that until the age of six he leaves with his mother's eruv?!

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This

case, in which we consider him one who does not require his mother from the age of five and he does not leave with his mother's eruv, is

when his father

is

in the minor's

city

[that is, his father is present in the city], and the minor enters and leaves with him. From the age of five, his father suffices for him, and he does not require his mother.

And

this

case, in which the beraita states that until the age of six he is called one who requires his mother and leaves with his mother's eruv, is

when his father is not

in the minor's

city

and he requires his mother until the age of six. Therefore, he leaves with his mother's eruv.

The Sages taught: A person may establish

an eruv techumin

through

[on behalf of]

his minor son and daughter, even if they are not dependent on his table [and even if they protested that he should not establish an eruv for them, or if they themselves established another eruv on the other side of the city, Shulchan Arukh and the Gemara below].

[The sentence continues from the preceding segment.]

The reason is that it is an established principle that one establishes an eruv only for the sake of a mitzva, and therefore he always establishes one on their behalf—that is, he grants them the eruv through another person—in order to train them in mitzvot.

And likewise, a person may establish an eruv [and need not grant them a share—Gaon Ya'akov]

through

[on behalf of]

his Canaanite slave and maidservant, whether with their knowledge or without their knowledge, because their hand is like his hand

[Bach].

And they cannot protest, as will be explained below.

However, he may not establish an eruv through his Hebrew slave or maidservant,

nor

through his adult son or daughter, nor through his wife, except with their knowledge.

And below the Gemara explains whether this applies specifically when they protested, or whether even in an unspecified case their consent is required.

Another beraita was taught: A person may not establish an eruv through his adult son or daughter, nor through his Hebrew slave or maidservant, nor through his wife, except with their knowledge.

But he may establish one through his Canaanite slave or maidservant and through his minor son or daughter, whether with their knowledge or without their knowledge, because the hand

of his slave or maidservant

is like his hand,

[Tosafot].

And all of them

[the Gemara will explain below that this refers to the entire latter clause of the beraita]

who established an eruv

[even if they established it] on one side of the city

and their master established an eruv for them

on the other side—

they leave with their master's eruv.

Except for the wife, because she can protest.

And it initially enters our mind that the statement in the latter clause, “and all of them,” also applies to his Hebrew slave and maidservant and to his adult son and daughter. Thus, the tanna of the beraita is saying: The fact that the first clause taught that one does not establish an eruv for these individuals without their knowledge applies specifically when they protested against him. But in an unspecified case, or even if they themselves established an eruv on the other side of their father's or master's eruv, thereby revealing that they are not amenable to his eruv, even so they leave with his eruv until they explicitly protest.

[All the more so, in the case of Canaanite slaves and minors, his eruv is effective for them even if they established an eruv on the other side.]

Therefore the Gemara asks:

The wife—

what is different

that you said “except for the wife,” that her law is unlike the law of his Hebrew slave and maidservant and his adult son and daughter, when their law is the same: one establishes an eruv for them only with their knowledge?!

He said

in answer,

Rabba: “And all of them” does not refer to his Hebrew slave and maidservant and his adult son and daughter, for their law is like that of the wife.

[The sentence continues from the preceding segment.]

And the statement “except for the wife” is intended by the tanna to say:

the wife and anyone similar to her,

for one does not establish an eruv for them without their knowledge.

And the latter clause applies only to those for whom one may establish an eruv without their knowledge, teaching that even when they revealed that they did not desire the eruv for the place where it was established on their behalf, they nevertheless leave with the eruv established for them [and likewise when they explicitly protested, Shulchan Arukh].

And the Gemara raises an objection from the beraita itself:

This itself is difficult

[Bach]:

On the one hand,

you said: “Except for the wife, because she can protest.”

The reason is that she protested

that the wife explicitly protested, or that she established an eruv on the other side and revealed that she did not desire the eruv on the other side of the city; only then does she not leave with her husband's eruv.

But in an unspecified case,

in which she did not protest and did not reveal her view [Rashi]—

she leaves with

the eruv

of her husband.

And

yet the first clause teaches: One may not establish an eruv through his adult son or daughter, nor through his Hebrew slave or maidservant, nor through his wife,

except with their knowledge.

[The sentence continues from the preceding segment.]

What, is it not that they say

explicitly:

“Yes,”

that they expressly stated their consent? But in an unspecified case one may not establish an eruv for them, presenting a difficulty from the first clause to the latter clause?! And we reject this:

No,

it is not as you said—that “with their knowledge” means that they say “yes,” excluding an unspecified case, in which it is not effective.

Rather,

what does “except with their knowledge” mean?

Even

if they remained silent,

it is effective for them.

And “with their knowledge” serves only

to exclude a case in which they say: “No,”

we do not want this eruv.

The Gemara asks: How can you say that in an unspecified case the eruv established for them is effective?

And

yet

the beraita teaches:

And all of them

[his Canaanite slave and maidservant and his minor children]

who established an eruv, and their master established an eruv for them—

they leave with their master's eruv.

For this is an unspecified case, and

concerning it

it teaches

“except for the wife,”

for

in such a case

they do not leave

[she, and anyone similar to her].

This shows that even in an unspecified case it is not effective until they say “no”?!

Rava said: Since they established an eruv

on the other side [even if they did not know that an eruv had been established for them on the other side, Gaon Ya'akov],

you have no greater protest than this.

But in an unspecified case, when they did not reveal their view at all and did not explicitly protest, the eruv established for them is effective.

Mishna:

What is its measure,

the measure of an eruv techumin?

The food of two meals for each and every person

among those participating in the eruv.

With what type of food did they say this?

They measure with

his weekday food, and not with his Shabbat food, the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

They measure with

his Shabbat food and not with his weekday food.

And the Gemara explains how much this is, according to both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

And the Mishna explains:

Both this one

[Rabbi Meir]

and this one

[Rabbi Yehuda]

intend to be lenient,

requiring less than the measure!

According to Rabbi Meir, weekday food is less than Shabbat food, because on Shabbat the cooked dishes are tastier and therefore one eats more of them, and one also increases his consumption of bread [Meiri].

Rabbi Yehuda, by contrast, holds that on Shabbat one eats less, because one eats three meals and does not eat a great deal at each meal.

Their dispute applies both when one establishes the eruv with bread and when one establishes it with other foods.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says:

The measure of food for two meals—when one establishes an eruv techumin with bread—is

from a loaf

[a loaf of bread; see Rashash] purchased from a baker

for one pundion,

when the price of

four se'a

of wheat

is one sela.

And this will be explained further in the Gemara.

Rabbi Shimon says:

The measure of food for two meals with bread is:

two portions

[two-thirds]

of a loaf,

which is one

of three

loaves

per kav

of wheat.

That is: two-thirds of a loaf, of such a measure that three loaves of this size can be made from one kav of wheat.

We have an established principle: One who enters a house afflicted with leprosy becomes impure immediately upon entering. But his garments do not become impure [requiring laundering] until he remains in the afflicted house for the time needed to eat a peras [half a loaf] of wheat bread.

And the anonymous Mishna states: The time required to eat

half of it

[a peras]—of that same loaf mentioned by Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka and Rabbi Shimon—is the measure used to determine the duration of the stay of one who enters

an afflicted house,

causing the garments he is wearing to become impure.

And half of half of it

[half a peras] of that same loaf—according to Rabbi Yohanan in accordance with his view, and according to Rabbi Shimon in accordance with his view—is the measure of impure food whose consumption was decreed

to disqualify the body,

so that the body of the person who eats it is thereby disqualified from eating teruma.

For the Sages decreed that a person who eats impure food, although he does not become impure, since food does not render a person impure by Torah law, nevertheless becomes disqualified by rabbinic decree from eating teruma until he immerses himself.

Gemara:

And how much

is

the food of two meals—

according to Rabbi Meir and according to Rabbi Yehuda, when one establishes the eruv with bread?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Two farmer's loaves

[loaves of bread carried by farmers—ox drivers—with them to the field] are the measure of food for two meals of bread. This is what an average person customarily eats on a weekday, according to Rabbi Meir, and on Shabbat, according to Rabbi Yehuda.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Two loaves

[two loaves] customarily used in the place called

“Nehar Pappita”

[the Pappa River].

These measures are the measure of the amount eaten by an average person. An elderly or ill person is assessed according to his own consumption. However, even one who eats more need use only this measure [Ritva].

Rav Yosef said to Rav Yosef, son of Rabba: Your father

Rabba

follows which opinion in the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, who disagree whether one assesses according to the food consumed on a weekday or according to the food consumed on Shabbat?

in the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, who disagree about whether the measure is determined according to weekday food or Shabbat food?

Rav Yosef, son of Rabba, said to Rav Yosef: My father

follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

Rav Yosef said to him:

I too follow the opinion of Rabbi Meir,

because weekday food is less than Shabbat food, and therefore one assesses according to it.

For if he follows Rabbi Yehuda—

who holds that on Shabbat one eats less—

then this statement that people say, “There is room for something sweet,”

is common.

For a person's intestines expand to make room for something sweet, and it follows that on Shabbat people eat more.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says

and so on; Rabbi Shimon says and so on:

It was taught: And their statements are close

[their measures]—those of Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Shimon—

to being equal.

We raise an objection to this:

Are they comparable—

the measure of one to the measure of the other?

For according to the measure of

Rabbi Yohanan,

there are

four meals per kav!

For from one kav of grain one produces four meals.

And the calculation is as follows:

A. There are six kav in every se'a.

There are twenty-four kav in four se'a, which are forty-eight half-kav measures.

B. There are four dinar in every sela, six ma'a in a dinar, and two pundeyon in a ma'a.

Thus, one sela contains forty-eight pundeyon.

C. It follows that if the price of four se'a [which are forty-eight half-kav measures] is one sela [which is forty-eight pundeyon], then with one pundeyon one buys one half-kav.

It follows that Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka's measure for two meals, stated in the Mishna—“a loaf purchased from a baker for one pundeyon, when four se'a are purchased for one sela”—is one half-kav.

And if half a kav contains food for two meals, then a full kav contains food for four meals.

But according to the measure of

Rabbi Shimon

for two meals—which is two-thirds of a loaf made from one-third of a kav—each meal amounts to only one-third of one-third of the kav. If so,

there are nine meals per kav,

whereas according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka there are four meals in a kav.

If so, how could you say that their statements are close to being equal?!

And we answer: What we said according to Rabbi Yohanan—that a loaf purchased for one pundeyon contains half a kav of wheat purchased for one pundeyon—is not so.

For the shopkeeper [the baker] does not sell loaves made from half a kav of grain for only one pundeyon, because the pundeyon is the price that he himself paid for the grain, and he needs to make a profit from his baking.

And his remuneration is as follows [unclear: the source appears truncated].

Rav Hisda said: Remove from them—

subtract from every amount that the baker takes—

one-third,

as profit

for the shopkeeper.

It follows that the shopkeeper takes for himself one-third of the half-kav [which he purchased for one pundeyon], and in the loaf that he sells for one pundeyon he gives only two-thirds of the half-kav, which is one-third of a kav. Since two meals are sustained by this loaf, it follows that there are more than four meals in each kav.

And

there is still cause for wonder: For

still,

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka's measure does not reach Rabbi Shimon's measure.

For according to one master—

Rabbi Shimon—

nine

meals are contained in a kav, as we said.

And

if

according to the other master—

Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that a loaf of one-third of a kav contains food for two meals—you find

six

meals in a kav?!

Rather,

this is how it should be answered:

According to the other

statement

of Rav Hisda.

For he said: Remove from them—

from every amount that the baker takes—

half for the shopkeeper.

It follows that the shopkeeper takes half of the half-kav that he purchased for one pundeyon as his wage, and puts one-quarter of a kav into a loaf, which he sells for one pundeyon. A person is sustained by this for two meals; thus, in a full kav there are more than six meals.

We raise an objection:

And still

their measures are not equal.

For

according to one master—

Rabbi Shimon—

nine

meals are contained in a kav, whereas

according to the other master—

Rabbi Yohanan—

eight

meals are contained in a kav, for he makes two meals from one-quarter of a kav?!

And we answer:

This is what the tanna

of the beraita

meant when he said: “And their statements are close to being equal,”

but they are not completely equal.

We raise an objection:

There is a difficulty from Rav Hisda,

who said: Remove from them one-third for the shopkeeper—

against Rav Hisda,

who said: Remove from them half for the shopkeeper?!

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This

statement of Rav Hisda, that he takes only one-third as his wage, applies when

the owner provides the wood

[the wood] to the baker so that he can bake with it.

And

this

statement of Rav Hisda, that he takes half as his wage, applies when

the owner does not provide the wood

[and this is also the case discussed by the beraita], since the cost of the wood is included in the price, and the baker takes its cost as his wage.

We learned in the Mishna:

Half of it is for a house afflicted with tzara'at, and half of that half is to render the body unfit: