Eruvin 80a (פ.) — the Talmud in English

Rav said:

Any

that we see

that the attendants of idolatry guard it and do not taste of its fruit—

for it is certain that had they not served it, they would not have refrained from tasting its fruit.

And Shmuel said: It is referring to

those who guard its fruit,

who say: These dates—

are for beer,

for making

for the household of Netzarfai, which they drink on their festival [these dates we are guarding in order to make beer from them, to drink it on the festival of the idolatry called “the household of Netzarfai,” which is known to be an Asheira [a tree worshipped as idolatry] [explained according to the Shulchan Arukh. And certainly this is true of Rav’s case. Shakh]].

(these dates we keep in order to make from them a drink to be drunk on the festival day of avoda zara called "Beit Netzrafi", which is known to be an Asherah [explained according to Shulchan Aruch. And all the more so that of Rav. R' Shach]).

And they told me [Amemar is concluding his statement],

(Amemar concludes his words)

the elders of Pumbedita: The halakha is in accordance with Shmuel.

And now we return to what we said earlier, that the one who acquires the food must lift it a handbreadth from the ground, and we raise an objection to this:

Meytivi: How does one establish a partnership in a mavוי?

One brings a barrel of wine

or

of oil, or of dates, or of dried figs, or of other types of fruit.

If it is from his own property—

the property of one of the residents of the mavוי—

he must acquire it

for all the residents of the mavוי.

But if

he takes

from theirs,

he need not acquire one person’s share for another.

But

he must inform

the one from whom he takes it that everyone may eat what is included in the partnership, and he must ascertain whether those participating in the joining of objects agree to this.

For perhaps they are particular about their partnership, not wanting the residents of the mavוי to eat it; and one who is particular about his partnership, his partnership is invalid.

And

when he acquires from his own property for the residents of the mavוי through another person,

the acquiring person lifts

it

from the ground, even a little.

We see, then, that lifting it a handbreadth is not required?!

And we answer:

What does the baraita also mean when it says “even a little”

in the baraita? It means

a handbreadth.

It was stated:

With regard to a joining of alleyways

which one of the residents of the mavוי contributes from his own property:

Rav said: It is not necessary to acquire it

for the residents of the mavוי [and not as stated in our Mishna]. “

Since the other residents of the mavוי prohibit it to him—

he has resolved to transfer ownership to them, and no formal acquisition is necessary.”

And Shmuel said: It is necessary to acquire it

for them.

With regard to an eruv of boundaries,

which one person establishes on behalf of another:

Rav said: He must acquire it for him,

since here the other person does not prohibit it to him, and he has nothing through which to transfer ownership to him.

And Shmuel said: It is not necessary to acquire it

for him. [See Tosafot and Ritva, which offer several explanations of Shmuel’s reasoning.]

And we ask:

Granted, according to Shmuel,

his reasoning is understandable, since the Mishnayot differ in their wording.

For

here,

with regard to a joining of alleyways,

we learned

in our Mishna: “And he acquires it for them.”

Whereas

here,

with regard to an eruv of boundaries,

we did not learn

that it must be acquired for him. Rather, we learned below: “He places the barrel and says: This is for all the residents of my city.”

This indicates that the wording is precise, and that with an eruv of boundaries it is not necessary to acquire it [Ritva].

But according to Rav, what is the reason

that he holds that with an eruv of boundaries it is necessary to acquire it?

But it is not mentioned in the Mishna that it must be acquired [according to the Ritva, in Rashi’s understanding of the passage]?!

And we answer:

It is the subject of a tannaitic dispute,

as they disagree concerning an eruv of boundaries whether it must be acquired, and there is a tanna who disagrees with our Mishna and holds that it must be acquired; and Rav ruled in accordance with that tanna.

As Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: There was an incident involving the daughter-in-law of Rabbi Oshaya, who went

on the eve of Shabbat

to the bathhouse

which was outside the boundary of her city,

and it became dark for her,

as there was not enough time for her to return within the boundary of her city before nightfall.

And her mother-in-law established an eruv for her

an eruv of boundaries on her behalf, so that she would be able to reach her home.

And the incident came before Rabbi Hiyya, and he prohibited

her from relying on the eruv. The Gemara will soon explain why he prohibited it.

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to Rabbi Hiyya,

who had come from Babylonia:

Babylonian! You are so stringent with regard to eruvin [rhetorically]?!

And yet

so said Father

[Rabbi Yosei]:

Whenever you have grounds to be lenient with regard to eruvin—

be lenient!

And they raised a dilemma [these are the words of the respondent, according to Rav]:

what was the incident?

Was it that

she established an eruv from her mother-in-law’s property,

the mother-in-law,

and

the reason Rabbi Hiyya prohibited it was

because she had not acquired it for her

the eruv?

Or perhaps, she established it from her own property

[the daughter-in-law’s property],

the mother-in-law established it for her,

the mother-in-law.

And

the reason she prohibited it was

because

she had established the eruv

without her knowledge,

the daughter-in-law’s.

And

a certain one of the Sages said to them

[these are the words of the respondent],

whose name was Rabbi Yaakov

[one of the Sages],

and Rabbi Yaakov was his name:

I heard it explicitly from Rabbi Yohanan

[I heard Rabbi Yohanan explain it]:

She established it from her mother-in-law’s property, and it was because she had not acquired it for her

that he prohibited it!

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yaakov, son of the daughter of Yaakov

[the son of Yaakov’s daughter. Since his father was unworthy, his name is not mentioned]:

When you reach there,

when you go to Babylonia,

go around and travel by way of the Ladder of Tyre

[I ask you to lengthen your route to Babylonia by way of the road through Tyre]. And there

ask

[and inquire of him]

Rav Yaakov bar Idi,

this dilemma that we mentioned: What exactly was the incident?

Rabbi Yaakov went around by way of the Ladder of Tyre, and

asked

Rav Yaakov bar Idi:

Was it that

she established the eruv from her mother-in-law’s property, and

the eruv was ineffective

because she had not acquired it for her?

Or perhaps, she established it from her own property, and

it was ineffective

because she established it without her knowledge,

the daughter-in-law’s.

He said to him,

Rav Yaakov bar Idi to Rabbi Yaakov:

She established it from her mother-in-law’s property, and

it was ineffective

because she had not acquired it for her.

Rav Naḥman said: We have received the tradition

[a tradition from our ancestors, a practice transmitted by our teachers; Rashi above, 5b]:

Both an eruv of boundaries and a joining of alleyways—

must be acquired.

And likewise regarding eruvin chazirot (courtyard eruvs), see Tosafot and Rabbeinu Yehonatan.

Rav Naḥman raised a dilemma: With regard to an eruv of cooked dishes

—which is made to permit cooking from a festival day for the adjacent Shabbat—does one

need to acquire

it for the person on whose behalf it permits cooking,

or is it not necessary to acquire it?

Rav

said in astonishment:

And what is he asking about

Rav Naḥman himself, that is, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak [Rashi, Gittin 31b]?

And is it that

he did not hear what Rav Naḥman bar Rav Adda said in the name of Shmuel: An eruv of cooked dishes must be acquired?

Abaye said to Rav Yosef:

Rav Yosef:

It is obvious that he did not hear it

the statement of Shmuel,

for if he had heard it, what would he be asking?

Rav Yosef said to him

to Abaye: You cannot prove from this that he did not hear it!

For

is it so

with regard to

an eruv of boundaries that Shmuel did not say: It is not necessary to acquire it?

And yet he himself said

[Rav Naḥman, as we stated],

it must be acquired,

contrary to Shmuel?!

Here too, perhaps although he heard that Shmuel said that it must be acquired, he nevertheless raised the dilemma!

We reject Rav Yosef’s statement:

How can these cases be compared?

Granted, there—

with regard to an eruv of boundaries, where Rav Naḥman said that it must be acquired—

they disagree

on this matter,

Rav and Shmuel.

And Rav Naḥman teaches us

that we act

in accordance with the stringencies of this master

[Rav], and with an eruv of boundaries it must be acquired.

And in accordance with the stringencies of this master

[Shmuel], with regard to a joining of alleyways it must likewise be acquired.

But here,

with regard to an eruv of cooked dishes,

if it were the case that he had heard

Rav Naḥman that Shmuel said it must be acquired, he certainly would not have raised the dilemma, since

is there anyone who disagrees

with Shmuel?!

It must therefore be that he had not heard it.

The following passage is explained according to the Ḥazon Ish, section 99, subsections 5 and 6.

There was a certain Turkzena

[an official in charge of weapons used to protect the city and fight those who attacked it],

who was in the neighborhood

[in the vicinity]

of Rav Yehuda bar Oshaya,

and he was a gentile.

And it is established law that a gentile prohibits the residents of a courtyard and the residents of a mavוי from carrying, until he rents them his rights in the domain [as explained at the beginning of chapter “Hader”].

They said to him,

his neighbors who lived with him in the same courtyard or mavוי:

Rent us your rights

[rent us your rights in the courtyard or mavוי]!

He did not rent them his rights.

They came

the neighbors

before Rav Yehuda.

He said to them,

Rav Yehuda bar Oshaya:

So said Shmuel: A man’s wife may establish an eruv

from her husband’s property

without his knowledge.

And likewise when one rents his permission [Ritva].

Meytivi,

an objection to Shmuel’s statement:

Women who established an eruv

or entered into a partnership

from their husbands’ property

without their husbands’ knowledge—

their eruv is not an eruv, and their partnership is not a partnership!

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This

statement of Shmuel, that she may establish an eruv without his knowledge, applies when he

prohibits

them if he does not establish an eruv and enter into the partnership.

And that

which we learned, that she may not establish an eruv without his knowledge, applies when he

does not prohibit

them even if he does not establish an eruv and enter into the partnership.

For example, his house or courtyard opened onto two domains, and he was accustomed to entering and leaving through one of them; in such a case he does not prohibit the residents of the other domain from carrying from their domain into the shared domain.

Therefore, if his wife came to establish an eruv with the other domain in order to permit carrying from his domain into the domain with which she was joining, she may not do so.

This too is evidently so,

that Shmuel agrees when he does not prohibit them:

For if so—

that Shmuel does not agree—

Shmuel’s statement

that permits a wife here to establish an eruv without her husband’s knowledge

would conflict with another statement of Shmuel.

.

For Shmuel said: One of the residents of a mavוי who is accustomed

every Shabbat

to join with the residents of the mavוי

because he prohibits them,

and

on this Shabbat

did not join

because he intends to prohibit them—

the residents of the mavוי enter his house

with his wife’s consent [this is an established tradition of the Gemara, Ritva],

and take the partnership from him against his will.

And we infer: If he was

“accustomed”

to join, meaning because he prohibits them,

yes, they may do so.

But if he

is not accustomed

to join with them, because he has another entrance to another mavוי, through which he enters and leaves, and he does not prohibit them,

no, they may not do so.

Even though it is his wife who came to join!

This would raise a contradiction between one statement of Shmuel and another.

And

take it from here

that, as we said, Shmuel said that a wife may establish an eruv without her husband’s knowledge only when he prohibits them.

Let us say that this supports

Shmuel:

We compel him to contribute

[to participate in the expenses]

for a side post and crossbeam for the mavוי

in order to permit carrying in it.

And consequently, the same law applies: we compel him to participate in a joining of alleyways so that he will not prohibit them. Since this is so, his wife may establish an eruv without his knowledge, since she does so by virtue of the law of coercion [explained according to the Ḥazon Ish].