Eruvin 80a — the Talmud in English

Rav said: ![](pamud.bmp "

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Everything

that we see

the attendants of an idolatrous worship object guard it, and they do not taste its produce—

clearly, if they had not performed worship for it, they would not have refrained from tasting its produce.

And Shmuel said: This is referring to

those who guard its produce,

saying: These dates—

are for beer,

for making

for the people of Bei Natzarfei, who drink it on their festival [These dates we are guarding in order to make beer from them, to drink it on the festival of the idolatrous worship object called “Bei Natzarfei,” which is known to be an asheira, a tree used for idolatrous worship [this has been explained based on the Shulchan Arukh. And this is all the more so true of Rav’s case. Sha"kh]].

И сказали мне [Амемар завершает свои слова]

And they told me [A0016]]Ameimar was concluding his statement,

Теперь мы возвращаемся к тому, что сказали: получающий должен поднять [предмет] на ладонь от земли, и возражаем против этого:

the Elders of Pumbedita: The halakha is in accordance with Shmuel.

Now we return to what we said earlier: that the person who acquires the food must lift it one handbreadth from the ground. And we raise an objection to this:

The Sages raise an objection from a source: How does one establish a partnership in a mavoi?

They bring a barrel of wine

or

of oil, or of dates, or of dried figs, or of other types of produce.

If it is his own—

the barrel belongs to one of the residents of the mavoi—

he must confer ownership of it

on all the residents of the mavoi.

But if

he takes it

from theirs,

he need not confer ownership of one person’s share on another.

However,

he must inform

the person from whom he takes it that everyone may eat the food that is part of the partnership; and he must ascertain whether those participating in the eruv are agreeable to this.

For perhaps they are particular about their eruv, so that the residents of the mavoi should not eat it; and an eruv about which one is particular is not a valid eruv.

And

when he confers ownership of his own food on the residents of the mavoi through another person,

the person acquiring it lifts

the food

from the ground, even slightly.

We see, then, that a lifting of one handbreadth is not required?!

And we answer:

What does the term “even slightly,” which it also says

in the beraita,

mean? One handbreadth.

It was stated:

With regard to a partnership of alleyways

which one of the residents of the mavoi provides from his own food:

Rav said: He need not confer ownership

on the residents of the mavoi [and this is not as stated in the Mishna].

“Since

they prohibit it to him—the other residents of the mavoi—he has resolved to transfer ownership to them, and no formal act of acquisition is necessary.”

And Shmuel said: He must confer ownership

on them.

With regard to boundary eruvin

which one person establishes on behalf of another:

Rav said: He must confer ownership of it to him,

because here the other person does not prohibit it to him, and he has nothing through which to transfer ownership.

And Shmuel said: He need not confer ownership

of it to him. [See Tosafot and Ritva, which offer several explanations of Shmuel’s reasoning.]

And we ask:

Granted, according to Shmuel,

his reasoning is understandable, since the two Mishnayot differ in their wording.

For

here,

with regard to a partnership of alleyways,

we learned

in our Mishna: “And he confers ownership of it to them.”

Whereas

here,

with regard to boundary eruvin,

we did not learn

that he must confer ownership of it to him. Rather, we learned below: “He places the barrel and says: This is for all the residents of my city.”

This indicates that the difference is deliberate, and that for boundary eruvin it is not necessary to confer ownership [Ritva].

But according to Rav, what is the reason

that he holds that for boundary eruvin one must confer ownership?

Yet in the Mishna it is not mentioned that he must confer ownership [according to Ritva, in Rashi’s understanding of the passage]?!

And we answer:

It is the subject of a dispute between tannaim

who disagree about whether ownership must be conferred for boundary eruvin. There is a tanna who disagrees with the Mishna and holds that ownership must be conferred, and Rav ruled in accordance with that tanna.

As Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: There was an incident involving the daughter-in-law of Rabbi Oshaya, who went

on Friday

to the bathhouse

which was outside the boundary of her city,

and darkness fell upon her,

so that there was not enough time for her to return within the boundary of her city before nightfall.

And her mother-in-law established

a boundary eruv for her, so that she would be able to reach her home.

And the incident came before Rabbi Hiyya, and he prohibited

her from relying on the eruv. The Gemara will soon explain why he prohibited it.

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to Rabbi Hiyya,

who was from Babylonia:

Babylonian! Are you so stringent regarding eruvin [said rhetorically]?!

And yet

my father said this [A0097]]Rabbi Yosei:

[Rabbi Yosei]:

Whenever you have grounds to be lenient regarding eruvin—

be lenient!

And they raised a question [these are the words of the respondent, according to Rav]:

What exactly was the incident?

Was it that

she established the eruv using her mother-in-law’s property,

the mother-in-law,

and

the reason Rabbi Hiyya prohibited it was

because she had not conferred ownership of the eruv on her

?

Or perhaps, she established the eruv using her own property [A0110]]the daughter-in-law’s property,

[the daughter-in-law’s property],

and

the mother-in-law established the eruv for her.

And

the reason he prohibited it was

because

she established the eruv

without her knowledge

the daughter-in-law’s knowledge.

And

one of the Sages said to them,

these were the words of the respondent,

and his name was Rabbi Yaakov

one of the Sages,

and Rabbi Yaakov was his name:

For me, it was explicitly explained by Rabbi Yohanan [A0126]]I heard Rabbi Yohanan explain it]:

[I heard Rabbi Yohanan explain it]:

She established the eruv using her mother-in-law’s property, and it was because she had not conferred ownership of it on her

that he prohibited it!

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yaakov, son of the daughter of Yaakov [A0131]]the son of Yaakov’s daughter. Since his father was not worthy, his name was not mentioned]:

[the son of Yaakov’s daughter. Since his father was unworthy, his name is not mentioned]:

When you reach there,

when you go to Babylonia,

go around and travel by way of the Ladder of Tyre [A0135]]I ask you to lengthen your route to Babylonia by traveling by the road of Tyre. And there

[I ask you to lengthen your route to Babylonia by way of the road through Tyre]. And there

ask

and inquire of

Rav Yaakov bar Idi,

about the question we mentioned: What exactly was the incident?

Rabbi Yaakov went around by way of the Ladder of Tyre, and

asked

Rav Yaakov bar Idi:

Was it that

she established the eruv using her mother-in-law’s property, and

the eruv was ineffective

because she had not conferred ownership of it on her?

Or perhaps, she established the eruv using her own property, and

it was ineffective

because she established it without her knowledge

the daughter-in-law’s knowledge.

He said to him,

Rav Yaakov bar Idi said to Rabbi Yaakov:

She established the eruv using her mother-in-law’s property, and

it was ineffective

because she had not conferred ownership of it on her.

Rav Naḥman said: We have received the tradition [A0157]]a tradition from our ancestors and a practice from our teachers, Rashi above, 5a]:

[a tradition from our ancestors, a practice transmitted by our teachers; Rashi above, 5b]:

Both boundary eruvin and partnerships of alleyways—

require conferring ownership.

очевидно, что он не слышал

Rav Naḥman raised a question: With regard to eruv tavshilin

which is established to permit cooking from a Festival day for the adjacent Shabbat—does one

need to confer ownership

of it on the person for whom it permits cooking,

or is it not necessary to confer ownership?

Rav

asked in astonishment,

Yosef: And why did he raise this question?

Yet

did he not hear the statement that Rav Naḥman bar Rav Adda said in the name of Shmuel: An eruv tavshilin requires conferring ownership!

he did not hear what Rav Naḥman bar Rav Adda said in the name of Shmuel: An eruv of cooked dishes must be acquired?

Abaye said to

Rav Yosef:

It is obvious that Rav Naḥman did not hear

this statement of Shmuel,

because if he had heard it, why would he raise the question?

He said to him,

Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Do not prove from this that he did not hear it!

Because

is it so

that with regard to

boundary eruvin, Shmuel did not say: Ownership need not be conferred?

And yet he himself said [A0184]]Rav Naḥman, as we stated,

[Rav Naḥman, as we stated],

that ownership is required,

contrary to Shmuel?!

Here too, perhaps, although he heard that Shmuel said that ownership is required, he nevertheless raised the question.

We reject Rav Yosef’s argument:

That is not comparable!

Granted, there,

with regard to boundary eruvin, where Rav Naḥman said that ownership must be conferred,

they disagree

about this matter,

Rav and Shmuel.

And Rav Naḥman teaches us

that we act

according to the stringencies of this Master [A0198]]Rav: with regard to boundary eruvin, ownership must be conferred,

[Rav], and with an eruv of boundaries it must be acquired.

and according to the stringencies of this Master

Shmuel: with regard to partnerships of alleyways as well, ownership must be conferred.

But here,

with regard to eruv tavshilin,

if it is true that he heard

Rav Naḥman heard that Shmuel said that ownership must be conferred, he certainly would not have raised the question, since

is there anyone who disagrees

with Shmuel?!

He must therefore not have heard it.

The following passage is explained according to the Chazon Ish, section 99, subsections 5–6.

A certain weapons officer [A0210]]an official responsible for weapons used to guard the city and fight those who besieged it,

[an official in charge of weapons used to protect the city and fight those who attacked it],

who was in the neighborhood

near

Rav Yehuda bar Oshaya,

was a gentile.

And we have established that a gentile prohibits the residents of a courtyard and the residents of a mavoi from carrying there, until he leases them his right of residence [as explained at the beginning of chapter “Hadaran”].

They said to him,

his neighbors who lived with him in the same courtyard or mavoi:

Lease us your right of residence [A0219]]in the courtyard or mavoi!

[rent us your rights in the courtyard or mavוי]!

He did not lease it to them.

The neighbors came

to

Rav Yehuda.

He said to them,

Rav Yehuda bar Oshaya said to them:

This is what Shmuel said: A person’s wife may establish an eruv

using her husband’s property

without his knowledge.

не запрещает

They raise an objection from a source

to this statement of Shmuel:

Women who established an eruv

or formed a partnership

using their husbands’ property

without their husbands’ knowledge—

their eruv is not a valid eruv, and their partnership is not a valid partnership!

And we answer:

This is not difficult.

This

statement of Shmuel, that she may establish an eruv without his knowledge, is referring to a case

where he does prohibit

them if he does not establish the eruv and participate.

And that

Mishna, which teaches that she may not establish an eruv without his knowledge, is referring to a case

where he does not prohibit

them even if he does not establish the eruv and participate.

For example, his house or courtyard opened onto two domains, and he was accustomed to entering and leaving through one of them. Consequently, he did not prohibit the residents of the second domain from carrying from their domain into the shared domain.

Therefore, if his wife came to establish an eruv with the second domain, in order to permit carrying from his domain into the domain with which she was joining, she may not do so.

This too is evidently reasonable

that Shmuel agrees when he does not prohibit them:

For if so,

if Shmuel does not agree,

there is a difficulty with Shmuel’s statement

which permits his wife here to establish an eruv without his knowledge,

from another statement of Shmuel

.

For Shmuel said: If one of the residents of a mavoi, who is accustomed

every Shabbat

to participate with the residents of the mavoi

because he prohibits them,

and

on this Shabbat

he did not participate,

because he intends to prohibit them,

:

with his wife’s consent [this is an established assumption of the Gemara, Ritva],

and take their partnership contribution from him against his will.

And we infer: If he was

“accustomed”

to participate, meaning because he prohibited them,

yes, they may do so.

But if he was

not accustomed

to participate with them, because he had another entrance to another mavoi, through which he entered and exited, and he did not prohibit them,

no, they may not do so.

And this is so even though it was his wife who came to participate!

This creates a difficulty between one statement of Shmuel and another.

And

come and hear a proof

from here that, as we said, Shmuel said that a wife may establish an eruv without her husband’s knowledge only when he prohibits them.

Let us say that this supports

Shmuel:

We compel him to contribute [A0286]]to the expenses

[to participate in the expenses]

for a side-post and crossbeam for the mavoi

to permit carrying in it.

It follows that he is likewise compelled to participate in a partnership of alleyways so that he will not prohibit them. And since this is so, his wife may establish the eruv without his knowledge, because she does so by virtue of the rule of compulsion [explained according to the Chazon Ish].