Eruvin 79b — the Talmud in English

And Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Even if you say

it is speaking

of a house

that is

ten [handbreadths] high, ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

and the straw

is

seven handbreadths and something high, since anything less than three

handbreadths

is considered joined by the principle of lavud, as though the partitions reach the ceiling [and shortly afterward the Gemara raises a difficulty against this].

And we raise a difficulty:

We can understand, according to Abaye; this is why it teaches

in the beraita: The straw became less

than

“ten”

handbreadths, since at first it had been ten handbreadths high.

But according to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua—

who establishes the case as one in which it was initially less than ten handbreadths high—

what does “less than ten” mean?

And we answer: The intention of the beraita is that it became less

“in terms of the status of ten.”

At first, it had the status of a ten-handbreadth partition through the principle of lavud, but now it became less than that.

It was taught in a beraita: If the straw became less than ten handbreadths,

both are prohibited.

And we raise a difficulty:

Come and hear

from this

beraita that residents who come

into a courtyard

on Shabbat

[are prohibited]

[and prohibit]

the other residents of the courtyard from carrying into the courtyard.

And this is so even though, when Shabbat began, carrying in the courtyard had been permitted, since those who lived there had made an eruv. We do not say: “Once Shabbat has begun and it was permitted, it remains permitted.”

This is implied by the following: If the straw became less than ten handbreadths and the residents of one courtyard—who had controlled only half of their house on the eve of Shabbat—entered the other half of the house, they prohibit the house to the residents of the other courtyard.

But this is difficult, since Rav Huna and Rav Yitzhak disputed this very matter—whether we say, “Once Shabbat has begun and it was permitted, it remains permitted”—earlier, on page 17b. It is difficult according to Rav Huna, who holds that once Shabbat has begun and it was permitted, it remains permitted.

Earlier, they disputed this with regard to an enclosure made with a partition that is not made of vertical and horizontal poles. Such an enclosure is permitted only when its area is calculated according to the number of residents within it, and if the number of residents decreases on Shabbat, Rav Huna and Rav Yitzhak disputed the matter. Rav Huna likewise said there that if two courtyards had made one joint eruv because there had been a doorway or window between them, and it was sealed on Shabbat, we say: “Once Shabbat has begun and it was permitted, it remains permitted.”

And we reject this:

Perhaps

the statement taught in the beraita—“If the straw became less than ten handbreadths, both are prohibited”—is not speaking of a case in which it became less on Shabbat, but rather

that it had become less since the previous day.

It was taught in a beraita:

What does he do? He locks his house and renounces his rights to the domain.

And we raise a difficulty:

Is that not two [requirements]?

That is, does he really need both of them, so that locking must be added to the renunciation of rights? Renouncing his rights alone should be sufficient, as in the case of other courtyards where one person forgot to join in the eruv [Ritba].

And we answer:

This is what it means: Either he locks his house,

and by locking it he demonstrates that he has withdrawn from this place, and that is his renunciation of rights [see Keren Ora],

or he renounces his rights.

And if you wish, say instead: Actually,

indeed

both

.

However, in order to permit the other person to use that house, renouncing his rights alone is sufficient.

Rather, the Sages imposed a safeguard for the person who renounced his rights—who is prohibited from using the house between them—that he must also lock the door [Ritba; see also Rashi’s wording].

For otherwise,

since he is accustomed to using it

[since he regularly carries into the house], he

will come

now as well, after renouncing his rights,

to carry

into the house.

It was taught in a beraita:

He is prohibited

from using the house,

but his fellow is permitted.

And we raise a difficulty:

It is obvious,

since this is the law in every case where a person renounced his rights, as we learned earlier, on page 69b.

And we answer:

It is necessary

to teach this

only where,

after one person renounced his rights to the other,

the other then returned

[the person to whom the rights had been renounced returned, after using the house for his needs],

and renounced to his fellow

the rights that he had in the house.

And this teaches us

that one should not say that now the first person, who had renounced his rights, becomes permitted, while the person to whom the rights had initially been renounced becomes prohibited. Rather, the first person, to whom the rights had initially been renounced, remains permitted, and his fellow is prohibited.

And because

one does not renounce his rights to this person

and

then renounce them back

on that same Shabbat

to him, so that a rabbinic enactment should not become a laughing matter [Gemara above, page 68b].

It was taught in a beraita:

And you can likewise say this with regard to a haystack located between two Shabbat domains.

And we raise a difficulty:

It is obvious,

since why should the laws of Shabbat boundaries be more stringent than those of courtyards? In both cases, the prohibition is rabbinic! And we answer:

It is necessary

to teach that this is permitted

even

according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that the laws of Shabbat boundaries

—

from the Torah; even so, it is permitted.

One might have said:

Perhaps we should decree lest he come to confuse the two,

and take an object from one person’s domain into the other person’s domain.

It teaches us

that we are not concerned about this.

Mishna:

How does one join together in an alleyway?

If he wishes, he need not collect each courtyard’s share for the joint participation. Instead,

he places the barrel

of wine or oil that belongs to him,

and says: “This is”—

for all the residents of the alleyway,

so that they will all become partners in the joint participation of the alleyway.

And he grants them

their share in the barrel

through his

son or

his adult daughter.

He says to them: “Take this barrel and acquire it on behalf of all the residents of the alleyway.”

And

he may likewise grant it to them

through his Hebrew male or female slave,

even if they are minors.

And

he may likewise grant it to them

through his wife.

But he cannot grant it

to them

through his minor son or daughter,

when they are dependent on his table [Shulchan Arukh],

nor through his slave

or

his Canaanite female slave.

Because their hands—

those of his minor son and daughter and of his Canaanite male and female slaves—are

like his own hand.

Consequently, he has not removed the barrel from his possession, and it is as though they did not acquire it on behalf of the others.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said: With regard to the barrel used for the joint participation of an alleyway,

when he grants the residents of the alleyway a share from his own property through another person,

that

other person

must lift

the barrel

one handbreadth from the ground.

As long as the barrel remains in the possession of the person granting it, the acquisition is not valid [Rashi].

Rava said: These two statements—

the elders of Pumbedita said them

[the elders of Pumbedita—that is, Rav Yehuda and his academy—said them]:

One: This

is the statement we cited in the name of Rav Yehuda.

The other: One who recites the blessing over wine for Kiddush

on Shabbat and Festivals,

if he tastes

from the wine

the amount that fills his cheek,

meaning an amount that, if moved to one side of his mouth, would appear to fill his cheek [Rabbeinu Tam and Ritba],

has fulfilled his obligation.

But if not, he

has not fulfilled his obligation.

Rav Haviva said: This

halakhic ruling

also—

the elders of Pumbedita said it:

As Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One may make a bonfire

[a large fire]

for a woman who has given birth

[a woman in childbirth] for all thirty days

on Shabbat,

if she is suffering from the cold.

They thought

[the members of the academy thought] that only

for a woman who has given birth, yes,

a bonfire may be made for her, but

for a sick person,

even if he is dangerously ill and cold,

no.

And for the woman who has given birth herself, it is permitted only

during the rainy season, but not

during the

summer season.

But

it was actually stated

not in this manner:

Rav Hiyya bar Avin said in the name of Shmuel: If one had blood let and became chilled,

since bloodletting is ordinarily dangerous for him—and the same applies to any dangerously ill person who is cold [Mishna Berura]—

one may make a bonfire for him on Shabbat, even during the season of Tammuz.

Ameimar said: This

too was said by the elders of Pumbedita.

For it was stated: What is an asheira by default,

that is, which tree do we presume to be an asheira, a tree that was worshipped,

even though we did not see it with our own eyes?