Eruvin 79b (עט:) — the Talmud in English

And Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: You may even say

that it is speaking

of a house

ten

high

and the straw

seven

and a bit high, since anything less than three

handbreadths

is considered lavud, as though the partitions reach the ceiling [and shortly afterward the Gemara challenges this].

And we raise a difficulty:

We can understand, according to Abaye; this is why it teaches

Granted, according to Abaye, this is why it teaches

in the beraita: If the straw diminished

“from ten”

handbreadths, since at the outset it had been ten handbreadths high.

But according to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua—

who establishes that initially it was less than ten handbreadths high—

what does “from ten” mean?!

And we answer: The intention of the beraita is that it diminished

“from the status of ten.”

Initially, it had the status of a ten-handbreadth partition by means of lavud, but now it has diminished.

We learned in a beraita: If the straw diminished from ten handbreadths,

both are prohibited:

And we raise a difficulty:

This proves

from this beraita that

residents who come

into the courtyard

on Shabbat

(are prohibited)

[make it prohibited]

for the other members of the courtyard to carry into the courtyard.

And even though when Shabbat began the courtyard was permitted, since those who lived there had made an eruv, we do not say: “Once Shabbat was permitted, it remains permitted.”

For this is what is implied by the statement: If the straw diminished and the residents of one courtyard—who had control only over half of the house belonging to them on the eve of Shabbat—came into the other half of the house, they render the house prohibited for the members of the other courtyard.

But this is difficult, for Rav Huna and Rav Yitzḥak disputed this very matter—“Once Shabbat was permitted, it remains permitted”—earlier, on page 17b. It is difficult according to Rav Huna, who maintains that once Shabbat was permitted, it remains permitted.

[Earlier they disputed this with regard to an enclosure made with a partition that is not composed of upright and horizontal elements, which is permitted only when the enclosure corresponds to the number of residents within it. If the number of residents diminished on Shabbat, Rav Huna and Rav Yitzḥak disputed the matter. And Rav Huna likewise said there: If two courtyards had made an eruv together because there had been an entrance or a window between them, and these were sealed on Shabbat, we say: Once Shabbat was permitted, it remains permitted.]

And we reject this:

Perhaps

when the beraita teaches, “If the straw diminished from ten handbreadths, both are prohibited,” it is not speaking of a case in which it diminished on Shabbat, but rather

that it had diminished from the previous day.

We learned in a beraita:

What does he do? He locks his house and renounces his domain:

And we raise a difficulty:

Two requirements!?

That is, does he need both of them, so that a lock must be added to the renunciation? Renunciation alone should suffice, as in the case of other courtyards where one person forgot and did not participate in the eruv [Ritva].

And we answer:

This is what it is saying: Either he locks his house,

and by locking it he demonstrates that he has withdrawn from here, and that is his renunciation [see Keren Ora],

or he renounces his domain.

And if you wish, say:

indeed,

two requirements

are necessary.

However, if the purpose is to permit the other person to use that house, renunciation alone suffices.

But the Sages instituted a preventive measure for the one who renounces his domain—who is prohibited from using the house between them—that he must also lock it [Ritva; and see Rashi’s wording].

For otherwise,

since he is accustomed to it

[having been accustomed to carrying into the house], he

will come

also now, after the renunciation,

to carry

into the house.

We learned in a beraita:

He is prohibited

from using the house,

but his fellow is permitted:

And we raise a difficulty:

It is obvious,

for this is the law in every case where one renounced his domain, as we learned earlier, on page 69b.

And we answer:

It is necessary

to teach us

only in a case

where, after one person renounced his domain to the other,

the other then returns

[the one to whom the domain had been renounced returns after attending to his needs in the house]

and renounces to his fellow

the domain that he has in the house.

And this teaches us

that you should not say that now the first one, who had renounced his domain, will be permitted, while the one to whom it was initially renounced will become prohibited. Rather, the first one, to whom the domain was initially renounced, remains permitted, and his fellow is prohibited.

And because

one does not renounce

to this person

and then renounce again

on that same Shabbat

to that person, so that a rabbinic ordinance should not become a laughingstock [Gemara earlier, page 68b].

We learned in a beraita:

And you can likewise say this with regard to a haystack located between two Shabbat domains.

And so you likewise say with regard to a haystack situated between two Shabbat boundaries:

And we raise a difficulty:

It is obvious,

for what greater force do boundaries have than courtyards? Is not the prohibition in both cases rabbinic?! And we answer:

It is necessary,

rather, even

according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that boundaries

are

of Torah origin,

even so, it is permitted.

Lest you say that we should issue a decree, because perhaps one will come to confuse the two,

and one will take from the other’s boundary.

It teaches us

that we are not concerned about this.

Mishna:

How does one participate in a shared alleyway?

If he wishes, he need not collect from each courtyard its portion for the partnership. Rather,

he places the barrel

of wine or oil that belongs to him,

and says: “This is—

for all the residents of the alleyway,”

so that they will all be partners in the alleyway partnership.

And he grants them

their share in the barrel

through his

or

her adult son or daughter.

He says to them: “Take this barrel and acquire it on behalf of all the residents of the alleyway.”

And

he may likewise grant it to them

through his Hebrew male or female slave,

even if they are minors.

And

he may likewise grant it to them

through his wife.

But he may not grant it

to them

through his minor son or daughter,

when they are dependent on his table [Shulḥan Arukh],

nor through his slave

or

his Canaanite female slave.

Because their hand—

that of his minor son and daughter, and of his Canaanite male and female slaves—is

like his hand.

It follows that he has not removed the barrel from his possession, and it is as though he did not acquire it on behalf of the others.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said: With regard to a barrel for a partnership of alleyways,

when he grants the residents of the alleyway a share from his own property through another person,

that

other person

must lift

the barrel

one handbreadth from the ground.

For as long as the barrel remains in the possession of the one granting the acquisition, the acquisition is not valid [Rashi].

Rava said: These two statements

were stated by the elders of Pumbedita

[the elders of Pumbedita—that is, Rav Yehuda and his academy—stated them]:

One:

the statement we cited in the name of Rav Yehuda.

The other: One who betroths

with wine on Shabbat and Festivals,

if he tasted

from the wine

a cheekful,

that is, an amount that, if he moved it to one side of his mouth, would appear to fill his cheek [Rabbeinu Tam and Ritva]—

he has fulfilled his obligation.

But if not—

he has not fulfilled his obligation.

Rav Ḥaviva said: This

halakha

also

was stated by the elders of Pumbedita:

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One may make a bonfire

[a large fire]

for a woman after childbirth

[a woman who has given birth] throughout the first thirty days

on Shabbat,

if she is suffering from the cold.

They understood from this

[the members of the academy understood] that only

for a woman after childbirth—no,

a bonfire may be made for her alone, but

for a sick person,

even if he is dangerously ill and cold,

no.

And for the woman after childbirth herself, only

during the rainy season—yes.

But

during the hot season—no.

But

it was stated

otherwise:

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said in the name of Shmuel: If one had blood let and became chilled,

since bloodletting is presumed dangerous for him, and the same applies to any illness that involves danger, and he is cold [Mishna Berura]—

one may make a bonfire for him on Shabbat, even during the season of Tammuz.

Ameimar said: This

too was stated by the elders of Pumbedita.

For it was stated: What is an asheira by default,

which tree do we presume to be an asheira, one that was worshipped,

even though we did not see it with our own eyes?