Eruvin 71a (עא.) — the Talmud in English

Behold,

even though [

as will be explained below]

another Jew took possession of his property—

he prohibits

the first Jew.

If he died

after nightfall, even though another Jew had not taken possession—

he does not prohibit!

We first explain the beraita, and afterward raise an objection from it:

This matter itself is difficult: You said,

a convert died

while it was still day, even though

a Jew had taken possession, and he prohibits.

And it follows:

and it is not necessary to state that when the Jew had not taken possession,

he prohibits.

But

on the contrary, when the Jew had not taken possession

of his property,

he did not prohibit!

And this is how it should have been taught: Once another Jew took possession of his property, he prohibits?!

Rav Pappa said: Say instead: Even though he had not taken possession

while it was still day, but took possession only after nightfall, he likewise prohibits. And we do not say: Since it was permitted for part of Shabbat, it is permitted for the entire Shabbat [and the reason is explained below].

We nevertheless continue to question this:

But: “even though he had taken possession”—

it teaches this!

And we answer: The beraita is incomplete, and

this is what it says:

A convert died while it was still day—

even though a Jew had not taken possession

of his property

while it was still day, but only after nightfall,

so that the dwelling had already become permitted at the onset of Shabbat, since a Jew had been living there alone; nevertheless, once a second Jew took possession of it, he prohibits.

Since it was possible for him [

he could have]

to take possession while it was still day [

and this is the meaning of “had taken possession”]—

he prohibits.

Since from the beginning of Shabbat this domain was dependent on whether they would take possession of it, it is therefore not considered “permitted” for part of Shabbat, such that one could say, “It is permitted for the entire Shabbat.”

We further question that which is taught in the beraita:

“After nightfall, even though another Jew had not taken possession, he does not prohibit.”

From the fact that it teaches

“even though another Jew had not taken possession,”

it follows:

and it is not necessary to state that when he had taken possession,

he does not prohibit.

This is difficult.

On the contrary, when he had taken possession—

he prohibited!

That is to say: If there is a circumstance in which he should prohibit, it is specifically when he took possession [the Rishonim]. How, then, did you say: “Even though he had not taken possession, he does not prohibit”?!

Rav Pappa said: Say instead: Even though he had taken possession,

he does not prohibit. Since it had been permitted for part of Shabbat, and it had not been dependent, before Shabbat, on this person taking possession of it, since he died only after nightfall.

We nevertheless continue to question this:

But it teaches: “Even though he had not taken possession”?!

And we answer: The beraita is incomplete, and

this is what it says:

He died after nightfall,

even though a Jew had taken possession

while it was

after nightfall,

he does not prohibit,

since it was not possible for him [

he could not]

to take possession while it was still day [

and this is the meaning of “had not taken possession”]—

he does not prohibit.

We now raise an objection:

In any event, the first clause teaches:

If the convert died while it was still day, and he took possession of it after nightfall,

he prohibits.

And

why does he prohibit

the one who took possession of the convert’s property?

But since you said that an heir, and anyone who takes the place of the deceased, is considered like the “foot” of the deceased, and can revoke,

let this one revoke

the one who took possession?!

And we answer: Yes, that is indeed so.

What does “he prohibits”

the one who took possession,

which it teaches mean?—

Until he revokes.

Rabbi Yohanan

answers the two teachings from which we raised the objection based on the fact that they teach “he prohibits” rather than “he revokes,” and

said:

The teaching [

Gaon Yaakov]

is whose?—

It is the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say: There is no revocation of domain on Shabbat.

As

this is

what we learned

in our Mishna [above, on page 69b]:

From when [

when]

may one grant permission?

Beit Shammai say: While it is still day; and Beit Hillel say:

even

after nightfall.

Ulla said: What is the reason of Beit Hillel,

who say that one may revoke and grant permission even on Shabbat, and do not consider the transfer of domain on Shabbat to be similar to buying and selling, which is prohibited?

Ulla explains it as follows: Since he now revoked his domain, he reveals that from the outset, on the eve of Shabbat, he was amenable to the eruv of the other members of the courtyard, but he forgot and did not participate in the eruv, and they acted as his agents [Ritva]; consequently, there was no transfer of domain on Shabbat.

And

this becomes

like

a

householder who

says

to one who separated his produce without his knowledge:

“Go to the superior ones” [

go and separate produce of better quality than that which you separated], as we learned: “If better ones than these were found, his teruma is teruma.” For since the householder revealed that he was pleased, we say that it is as though he had initially appointed him as his agent.

He said,

questioning

Abaye

this reasoning:

If a gentile dies on Shabbat,

as we hold that one may revoke on Shabbat [Ritva]—

what relevance is there to “Go to the superior ones”?

After all, they did not participate in an eruv yesterday, so that we could say that he was amenable to yesterday’s eruv.

Rather, here,

in our Mishna,

they disagree about this:

Beit Shammai hold: Revocation of domain is an acquisition of domain.

And acquiring a domain on Shabbat is prohibited,

since it is similar to buying and selling.

And Beit Hillel hold: Revocation of domain is merely relinquishing domain.

And relinquishing domain on Shabbat is entirely permissible.

Mishna:

A householder,

one of the members of the mavoy,

who was a partner with his neighbors [

with his neighbors] in food or drink, as an ordinary partnership and not for the purpose of a shituf mavoyot, and the partnership with all his neighbors was in the same food or drink—for example, he was a partner

with this one,

his one fellow member of the mavoy,

in wine, and

also

with this one,

his other fellow member of the mavoy, he was a partner

in wine—

then

they need not establish an eruv!

For they need not make a shituf mavoyot in order to carry from a courtyard into the mavoy, since a shituf is also called an eruv [Tosafot below, page 85b], and his partnership with his two colleagues joins all three of them.

But if he was a partner with his neighbors [not for the purpose of a shituf] in different things, for example,

with this one in wine and with this one

in oil,

then, although ordinarily, when contributions are collected for an eruv, all liquids combine, here, since they did not join together for the purpose of an eruv, [Tosafot]

they need to establish an eruv.

Rabbi Shimon says: Both this and that—

they need not establish an eruv, and the Gemara explains Rabbi Shimon’s position.

The Gemara explains Rabbi Shimon’s position.

Gemara:

Rav said:

This statement that if he was a partner with his neighbors in wine, he does not need another eruv, applies specifically when he was a partner with them in wine

in a single vessel.

And although ordinarily an eruv placed in two vessels is valid according to Beit Hillel, under certain circumstances [as above, page 49a], here, since the partnership was not initially established for the purpose of a shituf, it is considered an eruv only when it is in a single vessel.

Rava said: This too can be inferred

from

that which it teaches

in our Mishna:

“With this one in wine and with this one in oil”—

they need to establish an eruv.

Granted, if you say that the first clause refers to a single vessel,

since it is one type, it is placed in a single vessel,

and

in the

last clause

it is ineffective, since they are two types, they are placed

in two vessels [

and the essential distinction depends on the vessels and not on the types; the type was mentioned merely because that is the usual circumstance—Ritva]—

it is well

to distinguish between a partnership that was in a single vessel and one that was in two vessels.

But if you say that the first clause

deals with one type, and it is effective even

in two vessels, and the last clause

also deals

with two vessels—

what difference is there between wine and wine and wine and oil?!

After all, it is certainly not permissible in two vessels even in the case of wine and wine except because, according to your view, it is effective in two vessels since the householder, who is a partner with this one and a partner with that one, joins them together. If so, the same should apply to wine and oil [Ritva]?!

He said,

rejecting

him, Abaye:

You cannot infer this from here [Ritva]. For it can be said that the first clause indeed deals even with two vessels, and nevertheless one type is preferable to two types.

Since

wine and wine are fit to be mixed

together as one. Therefore, even though he did not mix them, we rely on this fact.

But

wine and oil are not fit to be mixed

together as one, and therefore the mixing is indispensable in this case.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon says: Both this and that need not establish an eruv:

And we examine this: Does Rabbi Shimon hold that

even with this one in wine and with this one in oil—

which presumably are placed in two vessels and are not fit to be mixed together in a single vessel—this arrangement is also effective?

Rabba said

a different explanation of the entire Mishna:

Our Mishna is not speaking of a member of a mavoy who participates with his neighbors in a single mavoy.

Rather,

with what are we dealing here? With a courtyard situated between two mavoyot,

and the Mishna is not discussing permission to carry from one mavoy to the other, but permission to carry from the courtyard in the middle to both mavoyot, and from the mavoyot into the courtyard. [See illustration.] And this is the explanation of the Mishna:

The first tanna holds that it is insufficient for the owner of the courtyard to participate separately with all the members of each mavoy in order to permit carrying from his courtyard to either of the mavoyot, and from either mavoy to it.

Rather, the two mavoyot on the two sides of the courtyard must also be joined with each other. For we decree lest they come to carry utensils that had rested in one mavoy into the other mavoy through the courtyard between them. This is prohibited, since the two mavoyot are not joined with each other.

Therefore, if the owner of the middle courtyard was a partner with each mavoy separately in the same type of food or drink, these partnerships are effective also to join the two mavoyot together, and it is entirely permissible to carry among all of them.

But if the partnership of the owner of the courtyard with each mavoy was in two different types, which do not combine to form a single shituf, it follows that the mavoyot are prohibited with respect to one another. Therefore, it is also prohibited to carry from the courtyard to either of the mavoyot.

But

Rabbi Shimon

follows

his reasoning

there, as he holds that the owner of a courtyard can participate with each mavoy separately, so that he is permitted with each mavoy, and they are permitted with him, even though the two mavoyot are prohibited with respect to one another,

as Rabbi Shimon does not decree

lest they come to carry from one mavoy to the other through the courtyard [Bach].

Therefore, here too, they are permitted in the courtyard, and the courtyard is permitted with them, even though the mavoyot are prohibited with respect to one another. Consequently, it does not matter to us that the owner of the courtyard establishes a separate shituf with each mavoy using two different types.

As

this is

what we learned: Rabbi Shimon said:

Three people who were outside the city’s teḥum, and had not acquired a place of residence, but each had only his four cubits.

They were standing next to one another, with the four cubits of the middle person overlapping the four cubits of each of the two people beside him, while the two people on his sides were more than four cubits apart from one another.

The middle person is permitted to bring to himself, to the middle area, objects belonging to either of the two people beside him, since they are within his four cubits; but he is prohibited from transferring an object belonging to the person on one side to the person on the other side.

Nevertheless, they did not decree that the middle person may not carry at all, lest he come to transfer an object from the first person to the second. For:

To what is this comparable? To three courtyards that open into one another, and that each open

separately

into the public domain,

for if

the two outer courtyards established an eruv with the middle courtyard,

but the outer courtyards did not establish an eruv with each other [because each eruv was placed in a different house, or in a different vessel—Ritva]—then

it,

the middle courtyard,

is permitted

to carry

with them, and

so

they are permitted with it.

And

if

the two outer courtyards are prohibited with respect to one another,

we do not decree concerning the middle courtyard lest one come to carry from one outer courtyard to the other through the middle courtyard.

Abaye said

to Rabba:

Are the cases comparable?

There,

it teaches explicitly:

“The two outer courtyards—

are prohibited

to one another.”

But

here,

in the Mishna,

it teaches

in the words of Rabbi Shimon: “Both this and that”—

need not establish an eruv at all!

Because their partnership with the owner of the courtyard is effective as though they had joined with one another.

This is possible only with the members of the same courtyard or of the same mavoy.

But it does not seem that such a partnership of two separate mavoyot with the owner of the courtyard between them can be effective to join them together, when the members of this mavoy are partners with the owner of the courtyard in wine, whereas the members of the other mavoy are partners with him in oil, and the partnership was in two different vessels!

And if Rabba’s explanation is correct, they must establish an eruv with one another if they wish to carry from one mavoy to the other through the courtyard.

Rabba answers:

What does “they need not establish an eruv

which the Mishna teaches mean? It means that the

neighbors

of the householder, from the two mavoyot on his sides, need not establish an eruv

with the householder

in order to permit carrying among them, since they are partners with him, these in wine and those in oil.

But the neighbors with one another [

among themselves]

must establish an eruv

if they wish to carry from one mavoy to the other, since their partnership with the householder was in two types and in two vessels.