Eruvin 71a — the Talmud in English

Behold,

even though [

as will be explained below ]

another Israelite took possession of his property—

he forbids

the first Israelite.

If he died

after nightfall, even though another Israelite had not taken possession—

he does not forbid!

We first explain the beraita, and afterward raise an objection from it:

This itself is difficult: You said,

a convert died

during the day, even though

an Israelite had taken possession, he forbids.

And it is implied:

And it is not necessary to say that when he had not taken possession

an Israelite, he forbids.

But

on the contrary, when he had not taken possession

an Israelite of his property,

he did not forbid!

And this is what it should have taught: Once another Israelite took possession of his property, he forbids?!

Rav Pappa said: Say: Even though the Israelite did not take possession during the day, but took possession only after nightfall, he also forbids. And we do not say: Since it was permitted for part of Shabbat, it is permitted for all of Shabbat [and the reason is explained below].

And still we are astonished:

But:

“Even though he had taken possession”—

it teaches!

And we answer: The beraita is deficient in its wording, and

this is what it says:

A convert died during the day—

even though he had not taken possession

an Israelite of his property

during the day, but after nightfall,

and it follows that the dwelling had already become permitted at the onset of Shabbat, for an Israelite had been dwelling in it alone; nevertheless, once a second Israelite took possession of it, he forbids.

Since it was possible for him [

that he could ]

to take possession during the day [

and this is the explanation of “who took possession” ]—

he forbids.

Because this domain, from the beginning of Shabbat, remains dependent on whether they will take possession of it; therefore it is not considered “permitted” for part of Shabbat, so that one could say, “It is permitted for all of Shabbat.”

We again are astonished concerning what the beraita teaches:

“After nightfall, even though another Israelite had not taken possession, he does not forbid.”

Since it teaches

“even though another Israelite had not taken possession,”

it is implied:

And it is not necessary to say that when he had taken possession

he does not forbid.

And this is difficult, for

on the contrary, when he had taken possession—

he forbade!

That is to say: If there is a place to forbid, it is specifically when he took possession [Rishonim]; how, then, did you say: Even though he had not taken possession, he does not forbid?!

Rav Pappa said: Say: Even though he had taken possession

he does not forbid. Since it had become permitted for part of Shabbat, and from the eve of Shabbat it had not remained dependent on this person taking possession of it, for he died after nightfall.

And still we are astonished:

But it teaches: “Even though he had not taken possession”?!

And we answer: The beraita is deficient, and

this is what it says:

He died after nightfall,

even though he had taken possession

an Israelite

after nightfall,

he does not forbid,

since it was not possible for him [

that he could not ]

to take possession during the day [

and this is the explanation of “had not taken possession” ]—

he does not forbid.

And now we raise an objection:

In any event, it teaches at the beginning:

If the convert died during the day and he took possession of it after nightfall,

he forbids.

And

why does he forbid

the one who took possession of the convert’s property?

But since you said that an heir, and everyone who comes in the place of the deceased, is like the “foot of the deceased,” and he is able to renounce,

let this one who took possession renounce

!

And we answer: Indeed, that is so.

What does “he forbids”

the one who took possession

which it teaches mean?—

Until he renounces.

Rabbi Yohanan

answers these two teachings from which we raised an objection from the fact that it teaches “he forbids” and does not teach “he renounces,” and

said:

The teaching [

Gaon Yaakov ]

whose view is it?—

It is the view of Beit Shammai, who say: There is no renunciation of domain on Shabbat.

For

so

we learned

in our Mishna [above, page 69b]:

From when [

when ]

do they grant permission?

Beit Shammai say: During the day; and Beit Hillel say:

also

after nightfall.

Ulla said: What is the reason of Beit Hillel,

who say that one renounces and grants permission even on Shabbat, and they do not consider the transfer of domain on Shabbat to be like buying and selling, which is forbidden?

And Ulla explains it: Since now he renounced his domain, he reveals his intention that already beforehand, on the eve of Shabbat, he was pleased with the eruv of the other members of the courtyard, but he forgot and did not establish an eruv, and they acted as his agents [Ritva]; thus there was no transfer of domain on Shabbat.

And

this becomes

like

a

householder who

says

to one who separated his produce without his knowledge:

“Go to the better ones” [go and separate better ones than those which you separated], for we learned: “If better ones than them are found, his separation is a valid separation.” Since the householder revealed his intention that he was pleased, we say that it is as though he had made him an agent from the outset.

He said,

astonished,

questioning

Abaye

at this reason:

When a gentile dies on Shabbat,

for we maintain that one renounces on Shabbat [Ritva]—

what “Go to the better ones” is there?

For they did not establish an eruv yesterday, so that we could say that he was pleased with yesterday’s eruv.

Rather, here,

in our Mishna,

this is what they disagree about:

For Beit Shammai hold: Renunciation of domain is acquisition of domain.

And acquiring domain on Shabbat is forbidden,

for it is similar to buying and selling.

And Beit Hillel hold: It is merely withdrawal from domain.

And withdrawal from domain on Shabbat is entirely permissible.

Mishna:

A householder,

one of the members of the alleyway,

who was a partner with his neighbors [

with his neighbors ] in food or drink, merely as a partnership and not for the purpose of a shituf mevo'ot, and the partnership was with all his neighbors concerning that food or drink—for example, he was a partner

with this one,

his one companion in the alleyway,

in wine, and

also

with this one,

his other companion who was with him in the alleyway, he was a partner

in wine—

again,

they do not need to establish an eruv!

For they do not need to make a shituf mevo'ot in order to carry out from the courtyard into the alleyway, since a shituf is also called an eruv [Tosafot below, page 85b], and his partnership with his two companions joins all three of them.

But if he was a partner with his neighbors [not for the purpose of a shituf] in different things, for example,

with this one in wine and with this one

in oil,

then although generally, when they collect for the purpose of an eruv, all liquids join together, here, since they did not join together for the purpose of an eruv, [Tosafot]

they need to establish an eruv.

Rabbi Shimon says: Both this one and that one—

they do not need to establish an eruv,

and the Gemara explains Rabbi Shimon’s view.

Gemara:

Rav said:

This that we say, that if he was a partner with his neighbors in wine he does not need another eruv, applies specifically when he was a partner with them in wine

in one vessel.

And although elsewhere an eruv placed in two vessels is valid according to the words of Beit Hillel, in certain circumstances [as above, page 49a], here, since initially it was not for the purpose of a shituf, only when it is in one vessel is it considered an eruv.

Rava said: It is also precise

from this

which it teaches

in our Mishna:

“With this one in wine and with that one in oil”—

they need to establish an eruv.

Granted, if you say that the first clause is referring to one vessel,

since it is one type, they place it in one vessel,

and

in the

last clause

it is ineffective, since they are two types, they place them

in two vessels [

and the essential distinction depends on the vessels and not on the types, but it states the usual case—Ritva ]—

it is well

to distinguish between when the partnership was in one vessel and when it was in two vessels.

But if you say that the first clause

is dealing with one type, it is effective even

in two vessels, and the last clause

is also dealing

with two vessels—

what difference is there between wine and wine and wine and oil?!

For certainly one would not permit two vessels even with wine and wine except because, according to you, it is effective in two vessels since the householder, who is a partner with this one and a partner with that one, joins them. If so, the same should apply to wine and oil [Ritva]?!

He said,

he rejected

Abaye

him: From here do not infer [Ritva]. For it can be said that the first clause is always dealing even with two vessels, and nevertheless one type is preferable to two types.

For

wine and wine are fit to be mixed

together as one. Therefore, even though he did not mix them, we rely on him.

But

wine and oil are not fit to be mixed

together as one, and therefore the mixing is indispensable in it.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Rabbi Shimon says: Both this one and that one do not need to establish an eruv”:

And we inquire about it: Does Rabbi Shimon hold that

even when with this one it is wine and with that one

it is oil—which presumably are placed in two vessels and are not fit to be mixed in one vessel—it is also effective?!

Rabba said

another explanation of the entire Mishna:

Our Mishna is not speaking about a member of an alleyway who joins in partnership with his neighbors in one alleyway.

Rather,

with what are we dealing here? With a courtyard situated between two alleyways,

and the Mishna is not discussing permission to carry from one alleyway to the other, but permission to carry from the courtyard in the middle into both alleyways, and from the alleyways into the courtyard. [See illustration.] And this is the explanation of the Mishna:

The first Tanna holds that it is not sufficient for the owner of the courtyard to join in partnership with all the members of each alleyway separately in order to permit carrying from his courtyard to each of the alleyways, and from each of the alleyways to it.

Rather, the two alleyways on the two sides of the courtyard must also be joined in partnership with each other. For we decree lest they come to carry vessels that spent Shabbat in this alleyway into the other alleyway through the courtyard between them. And this is forbidden, since the two alleyways are not joined by an eruv with each other.

Therefore, if the owner of the middle courtyard was a partner with each alleyway separately in the same type, these partnerships are effective also to join the two alleyways together, and it is entirely permissible to carry among all of them.

But if the partnership of the owner of the courtyard with each alleyway was in two types, which do not join together into one partnership, it follows that the alleyways are forbidden to one another; therefore it is also forbidden to carry from the courtyard to either of the alleyways.

But

Rabbi Shimon

follows

his position

there, for he holds that the owner of the courtyard can join in partnership with each alleyway separately, and he will be permitted with each alleyway and they will be permitted with him, even though the two alleyways are forbidden to one another,

for Rabbi Shimon did not decree

lest they come to carry from one alleyway to the other through the courtyard [Bach].

Therefore, here too, they are permitted in the courtyard and the courtyard is permitted with them, even though the alleyways are forbidden to one another. Therefore, it does not matter to us that the owner of the courtyard establishes a separate partnership with each alleyway in two types.

For

so

we learned: Rabbi Shimon said:

Three people who were outside the city’s boundary, and had not acquired a place of residence, but each had only his four cubits.

And they were standing one beside the other, with the four cubits of the middle one overlapping the four cubits of the two beside him, while the two at his sides were separated from one another by more than four cubits.

And it is permitted for the middle one to take to himself, into the middle area, objects belonging to either of the two who are beside him, since they are within his four cubits, but it is forbidden to transfer an object belonging to the one standing at his one side to the one standing at his other side.

Nevertheless, they did not decree that the middle one may not carry at all, lest he come to transfer from the first to the second. For:

To what is this comparable? To three courtyards that open into one another and that are open

each of them

to the public domain,

for if

the two outer ones joined with the middle one,

but the outer ones did not join with one another [having placed each eruv in a different house, or in a different vessel—Ritva]—then

it,

the middle one,

is permitted

to carry

with them, and

so

they are permitted with it.

And

if

the two outer ones are forbidden to one another,

we do not decree concerning the middle one lest he come to carry from one outer courtyard to the other outer courtyard through the middle courtyard.

Abaye said

to Rabba:

Are they comparable?

There, it teaches

explicitly:

“The two outer ones”—

are forbidden

to one another.

But

here,

in the Mishna, it

teaches

in the words of Rabbi Shimon: Both this one and that one

do not need to establish an eruv at all!

Because their partnership with the owner of the courtyard benefits them as though they had joined in partnership with one another.

And this is possible only with members of the same courtyard or of the same alleyway.

But it does not follow that such a partnership of two separate alleyways with the owner of the courtyard between them would be effective to join them together, when the members of this alleyway are partners with the owner of the courtyard in wine, while the members of the second alleyway are partners with him in oil, and the partnership was in two different vessels!

And if Rabba explains it as he did, they need to establish an eruv with one another if they wish to carry from one alleyway to the other through the courtyard.

And Rabba answers:

What does “they do not need to establish an eruv”

which it teaches in the Mishna mean?—That they do not need to establish an eruv, the

neighbors

of the householder, from the two alleyways on his sides,

together with the householder,

in order to permit carrying among them, since they are partners with him, these in wine and those in oil.

But neighbors with one another [

among themselves ]

do need to establish an eruv, if they wish to carry from one alleyway to the other, since their partnership with the householder was in two types and in two vessels.

if they wish to carry from one mavoy to the other, since their partnership with the householder was in two types and in two vessels.