Eruvin 70b (ע:) — the Talmud in English

Do we say: only

where, if he had wanted to establish an eruv on the previous day, he could have established one, he can likewise renounce his rights?

But this

heir,

since, if he had wanted to establish an eruv on the previous day, he could not have established one,

for the courtyard had not belonged to him,

he cannot renounce his rights.

Or perhaps, an heir—

is considered as his father’s leg

(he is considered as his father’s leg).

That is to say: He is considered as standing in the place of the bequeather, and is regarded as though he had been able to establish an eruv on the previous day—Ran.

Rav Naḥman said to

Rava:

I say:

an heir

can renounce his rights.

And

if

the students of the school of Shmuel

(the members of Shmuel’s academy)

taught

a beraita:

An

heir

cannot renounce his rights.

He raised an objection

to Rava, who said that an heir can renounce his rights:

As it was taught:

This is the principle: Anything that is permitted for part of Shabbat—

is permitted for the entire Shabbat.

And anything that is prohibited for part of Shabbat—

is prohibited for the entire Shabbat, except for one who renounces his rights.

First we explain the entire beraita, and afterward we raise the objections:

“Anything that is permitted for part of Shabbat is permitted for the entire Shabbat”:

For example,

two courtyards with an entrance between them, and

they established an eruv through the entrance

(by virtue of the entrance), permitting the transfer of objects from one courtyard to the other, and

the entrance became blocked

on Shabbat, while it remained possible to transfer objects from one courtyard to the other by throwing them, or through small openings measuring less than four by four handbreadths, which are not considered an “entrance.”

Or

they established an eruv through a window

measuring four by four handbreadths, and

the window became blocked

on Shabbat—in this case, it is permitted to transfer objects from one courtyard to the other, since it had been permitted for part of Shabbat.

And with regard to what the beraita teaches:

“This is the principle,”

anything that is permitted for part of Shabbat is permitted for the entire Shabbat:

It comes to include a mavוי—

where it is prohibited to transfer objects without establishing a rectification with a side-post or a crossbeam, since it lacks a fourth partition; they rectified it on the eve of Shabbat, and

its

side-posts or

crossbeams were removed

on Shabbat. Even though it no longer has any partitions, nevertheless we say: Since it was permitted at the beginning of Shabbat, it remains permitted.

And with regard to what the beraita teaches:

“Anything that is prohibited for part of Shabbat is prohibited for the entire Shabbat”:

For example, two houses on opposite sides of a public domain, and

the

gentiles surrounded them with a partition on Shabbat—

and the public domain between the houses thereby became like a “courtyard” belonging to the houses, so that the residents prohibit one another from transferring objects into the “courtyard.” Even if one of them renounces his rights to the other, the latter is not permitted to transfer objects from his house to the courtyard, since, had he wanted to establish an eruv on the previous day, he could not have established one; therefore, he likewise cannot renounce his rights.

However, there is no prohibition of a “public domain” here as there had been on the eve of Shabbat, since a partition erected on Shabbat is nevertheless a valid partition. Therefore, if there was only one house within the enclosure, it is permitted to transfer objects from the house to the enclosed public domain.

And with regard to what the beraita teaches:

“This is the principle,”

anything that is prohibited for part of Shabbat is prohibited for the entire Shabbat—and this means that, since “This is the principle” was taught at the beginning, it also applies to the latter clause:

What does it come to include?

It comes to include

a courtyard in which there is one gentile and two Jews, who could not have established an eruv on the eve of Shabbat without renting the gentile’s rights, and

the gentile died on Shabbat.

They cannot renounce their rights to one another, since on the previous day they had been unable to establish an eruv.

This is a greater novelty than the case of a public domain enclosed by gentiles. For here, had they wished to establish an eruv on the previous day by means of a rental, they could have done so, and nevertheless, since they cannot establish an eruv without a rental, they cannot now renounce their rights.

And with regard to what the beraita teaches: “except for one who renounces his rights”:

This refers to one who forgot to establish an eruv on the eve of Shabbat: He can renounce his rights on Shabbat, and the other residents of the courtyard become permitted to use it, even though they had been prohibited for part of Shabbat.

Now we raise the objection:

And it teaches

in the beraita:

“except for one who renounces his rights”

(He, yes; an heir, no—

deleted, Bach), and it does not teach: “except for one who renounces his rights and an heir.”

Conclude from this that an heir cannot renounce his rights.

And we reject this:

Say instead: except for the laws of renunciation of rights.

That is to say: Anyone to whom the laws of renunciation of rights apply—including an heir, since he is considered as his father’s leg—is subject to the laws of renunciation of rights [Ritva, according to Rashi].

He raised an objection

to Rava, who said that an heir can renounce his rights:

One of the residents of a courtyard who

established an eruv and

died, leaving

(bequeathing)

his rights to an outsider,

if he died

during the day—

before the eruv of the bequeather took effect—this heir

prohibits the use of the courtyard.

And although he does not live there, he is like one who has a granary and a cattle shed in the courtyard, who prohibits its use according to the opinion of the Sages, as stated in the beraita below, on page 72b.

But if he died

after nightfall,

after he had established an eruv,

he does not prohibit its use,

since, once it was permitted for part of Shabbat, it was permitted for the entire Shabbat.

And an outsider,

who has a dwelling in the courtyard but does not live there, and therefore does not ordinarily establish an eruv with the other residents of the courtyard [Tosafot],

who died and left his rights to one of the residents of the courtyard

who participates in the eruv—if he died

during the day,

and

he does not prohibit the use of the courtyard by

the one who inherited his rights.

That is to say: Although he would otherwise prohibit its use, the heir establishes an eruv, and his eruv permits it.

But if he died

after nightfall,

since the deceased had not established an eruv,

he prohibits its use,

to the heir [and although the heir established an eruv because he too lives in the courtyard, he did not establish it with the intention of including what he would inherit on Shabbat].

Now this presents a difficulty for Rava, who said that an heir can renounce his rights:

Why

does the latter clause teach: If he died after nightfall,

he prohibits

its use—the heir?

Let him renounce

now, on Shabbat, the rights that he inherited!

And we answer:

What does it mean when it also teaches “he prohibits”? Until he renounces his rights.

Come and hear: A Jew and a convert residing in one storehouse

(a threshing floor)

,

divided into rooms, with each room having an entrance to a courtyard, and they prohibit one another’s use of it,

and the convert died during the day,