Eruvin 70b — the Talmud in English

Are we saying that only

where, if he had wanted to establish an eruv on the previous day, he could have done so, he can also renounce his rights?

But this

heir,

since, if he had wanted to establish an eruv on the previous day, he could not have done so,

because the courtyard did not yet belong to him,

cannot renounce his rights.

Or perhaps, an heir—

is considered the equivalent of his father

(he has the same legal status as his father).

That is, he has the legal status of the person from whom he inherited, and takes his place; he is therefore considered as though he could have established an eruv on the previous day—Ran.

Rav Naḥman said to

Rava:

I say:

an heir

can renounce his rights.

And

if

the students of the house of Shmuel

(the members of Shmuel’s academy)

taught

a beraita (a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna):

an

heir

cannot renounce his rights.

They raise an objection from a source

against Rava, who said that an heir can renounce his rights:

As it was taught:

This is the general rule: Anyone who is permitted to carry during part of Shabbat—

is permitted to do so throughout Shabbat.

And anyone who is prohibited from carrying during part of Shabbat—

is prohibited throughout the entire Shabbat, except for one who renounces his rights.

First, we explain the entire beraita, and afterward we raise the conclusive refutation:

“Anyone who is permitted during part of Shabbat is permitted throughout Shabbat”:

For example,

two courtyards with an entrance between them, and

an eruv was established through the entrance

[by virtue of the entrance,] permitting the residents to carry from one courtyard to the other, and

the entrance became blocked

on Shabbat, while it was still possible to transfer objects from one courtyard to the other by throwing them, or through small openings measuring less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths, which are not considered an “entrance.”

Or,

an eruv was established through a window

measuring four handbreadths by four handbreadths, and

the window became blocked

on Shabbat—[see illustration]. It is permitted to carry from one courtyard to the other, since it was permitted during part of Shabbat.

And regarding what the beraita teaches:

“This is the general rule”:

anyone who is permitted during part of Shabbat is permitted throughout Shabbat:

This comes to include an alleyway

where carrying is prohibited without repairing it with a side post or a crossbeam, since it lacks a fourth wall; the side post or crossbeam had been installed before Shabbat, and

its

side posts or

crossbeams were removed

on Shabbat. Even though it now lacks walls as well, we nevertheless say: Once the day of Shabbat was permitted, it remains permitted.

And regarding what the beraita teaches:

“Anyone who is prohibited during part of Shabbat is prohibited throughout the entire Shabbat”:

For example, two houses on opposite sides of a public domain,

and

gentiles surrounded them with a partition on Shabbat—

the public domain between the houses has thereby become like a “courtyard” shared by the houses, and the residents prohibit one another from carrying into this “courtyard.” Even if one of them renounces his rights in favor of the other, the other is not permitted to carry from his house into the courtyard, because since he could not have established an eruv on the previous day, had he wished to do so, he likewise cannot renounce his rights.

Nevertheless, carrying there is not prohibited as it was in the public domain before Shabbat, because a partition constructed on Shabbat is legally a partition. Therefore, if there was only one house within the partition, its resident may carry from his house into the public domain that is enclosed by the partition.

And regarding what the beraita teaches:

“This is the general rule”:

anyone who is prohibited during part of Shabbat is prohibited throughout the entire Shabbat—[that is, since the first clause teaches “This is the general rule,” it also applies to the latter clause]:

What does this come to include?

It comes to include

a courtyard in which there is one gentile and two Jews, who could not establish an eruv before Shabbat unless they rented the gentile’s rights, and

the gentile died on Shabbat.

They cannot renounce their rights to one another, since they could not have established an eruv on the previous day.

This is a greater novelty than the case of a public domain enclosed by gentiles. For here, if they had wished to establish an eruv on the previous day by means of a rental, they could have done so; nevertheless, since they could not establish an eruv without a rental, they now cannot renounce their rights.

And regarding what the beraita teaches: “except for one who renounces his rights”:

This means that one who forgot to establish an eruv before Shabbat may renounce his rights on Shabbat, and the other residents of the courtyard are thereby permitted, even though they were prohibited during part of Shabbat.

The Gemara now raises the objection:

And it teaches

in the beraita:

“except for one who renounces his rights”—

“he,” but not an heir—

[this phrase is deleted in the Bach], and it does not teach: “except for one who renounces his rights and an heir.”

Conclude from this that an heir cannot renounce his rights.

The Gemara rejects this:

Say instead: except for the legal category of renouncing rights.

That is, anyone who has the legal capacity to renounce rights includes an heir, because he is considered the equivalent of his father, and the legal category of renouncing rights applies to him [Ritva, according to Rashi].

They raise another objection from a source

against Rava, who said that an heir can renounce his rights:

If one of the residents of a courtyard who

had established an eruv

died and left

[inherited]

his rights to an outsider,

if he died

during the day—before the eruv of the person from whom he inherited took effect—then the heir

is

prohibited.

Even though he does not live there, this is like someone who has a hay storehouse and a cattle barn in the courtyard, who prohibits the residents according to the Sages, as stated in the beraita below, on page 72b.

But if he died

after nightfall,

after he had established an eruv,

he does not prohibit them,

because once they were permitted during part of Shabbat, they are permitted throughout the entire Shabbat.

And an outsider,

who owns a dwelling in the courtyard but does not live there, and therefore does not ordinarily establish an eruv with the other residents of the courtyard [Tosafot],

who died and left his rights to one of the residents of the courtyard

who participates in the eruv—if he died

during the day,

then

he does not prohibit

the person who inherited from him.

That is, although he would ordinarily prohibit the residents, the heir establishes an eruv, and his eruv permits him.

But if he died

after nightfall,

since the deceased had not established an eruv,

he prohibits

the heir [and even though the heir established an eruv because he too lives in the courtyard, he did not establish it with the intention of including what he would inherit on Shabbat].

The difficulty for Rava, who said that an heir can renounce his rights, is now clear:

Why

does the latter clause teach that if he dies after nightfall,

he prohibits

the residents—the heir?

Let him renounce

on Shabbat what he inherited?!

The Gemara answers:

What is meant by “he also prohibits,” as it is taught? It means: until he renounces his rights.

Come and hear a proof: A Jew and a convert reside in one storehouse

(a granary),

one

divided into rooms, with each room having an entrance to the courtyard, and they prohibit one another,

and the convert dies during the day,