Text version of this daf: original and translation

Eruvin 70a — the Talmud in English

And we explain it: lest you say: Just as one individual cannot nullify the authority of two people who did not participate in an eruv, so too two people cannot nullify the authority of one…

Original text — Eruvin 70a

ומשנינן:

מהו דתימא

: כשם שאין היחיד מבטל לשנים שלא עירבו, כך אין השנים מבטלין ליחיד, דהוה אמינא

ליגזר

עלה

דילמא אתי

היחיד

לבטולי להו

, ולא מהני, שהרי שנים אוסרין זה על זה.

קא משמע לן

שלא גזרו, ונותנין השנים רשות ליחיד.

שנינו במשנה: שנים נותנין רשות

ואין נוטלין רשות

:

ותמהינן:

למה לי

למיתני "ואין נוטלין רשות"?

הא כבר תנא ליה: "היו שנים - אוסרין זה על זה"?!

ומשנינן:

לא צריכא

משנה יתירה דקתני שאין נוטלין השנים רשות, אלא להשמיענו, ד

אף על גב דאמרי ליה

שאר בני החצר כשביטלו לו רשותן:

קני

רשותנו בחצר

על מנת

לחזור ו

להקנות

לחבירך, אפילו הכי לא מהני שיחזור ויבטל לחבירו.

דלא אמרינן שליחא שוויוהו להקנות לחבירו, אלא הורו לו עצמו לקנות ולחזור ולהקנות לחבירו. וכיון שלא קנה הוא עצמו כשביטלו לו שיהא מותר בחצר, לא מצי לאקנויי לחבירו, וכדאמרן.

בעא מיניה אביי מרבה: חמשה

דיירים

ששרויין בחצר אחת

, ועירבו ארבעה מהן,

ושכח אחד מהן ולא עירב

.

הרי מצד אחד יש לומר שדי בכך שיבטל האחד שלא עירב כלפי אחד מהם, ודי בכך לפי שאותו האחד שביטל כלפיו הרי הוא מעורב עם השאר מערב שבת.

אך מאידך יתכן לומר, שאדעתא של החלק שהתבטל אליו עתה הוא לא עירב, דההיא שעתא לאו דידיה הוא [רש"י לעיל דף כו ב].

ולפיכך שאל אביי מרבה:

האם

כשהוא

, אותו אחד שלא עירב,

מבטל רשותו

האם

צריך

הוא

לבטל

רשותו

לכל אחד ואחד

מבני החצר.

או

דילמא,

לא

צריך לבטל לכל אחד ואחד, דכיון שעירבו שאר בני החצר, כאחד הם חשובין, ודיו שיבטל לאחד מהם [רש"י לקמן].

אמר ליה

רבה לאביי:

צריך לבטל לכל אחד ואחד.

איתיביה

מהא דשנינו בברייתא:

אחד

מבני חצר

שלא עירב, נותן

אם רצה -

רשותו לאחד שעירב

[מפרשינן לה לקמן, ומהכא מוכחינן].

ו

שנים שעירבו

ואחד לא עירב,

נותנין

אם רצו -

רשותן לאחד שלא עירב

, כדי שיהיה הוא מותר והן אסורין.

ושנים שלא עירבו,

נותנין רשותן לשנים שעירבו,

או לאחד שלא עירב.

אבל לא אחד שעירב

עם חבירו

נותן רשותו לאחד

[לשלישי]

שלא עירב

, דלא מהני מידי, שהרי עדיין רשות חבירו אוסרת.

ואין שנים שעירבו נותנין רשותן לשנים שלא עירבו

, כיון שהשנים שלא עירבו אוסרין זה על זה.

ואין שנים שלא עירבו נותנין רשותן לשנים שלא עירבו

, דאותן שנים אוסרין זה על זה.

[ולקמן מפרש בגמרא, כולהו הנך בבי למאי איצטריך].

והשתא מותבינן:

קתני מיהת

ב

רישא: אחד שלא עירב נותן רשותו לאחד שעירב

.

היכי דמי?

אי דליכא אחרינא בהדיה

בחצר כלל, ואינם אלא שנים, אם כן

בהדי מאן עירב?!

אלא פשיטא, דאיכא אחרינא בהדיה

, שהיו שלשה בחצר ועירבו שנים ואחד לא עירב.

ו

עלה

קתני

: נותן רשותו

לאחד שעירב

בלבד.

הרי חזינן בהדיא, דסגי בנתינת רשות לאחד מן המערבים ואין צריך לבטל לשניהם!

ורבה

דאמר צריך לבטל לכל אחד ואחד, אמר לך:

הכא במאי עסקינן, דהוה

אחרינא בהדיה [עם המערב] מערב שבת, ועירבו,

ו

הדר

מית

.

ומשום הכי מבטל זה שלא עירב לזה שעירב, דהשתא הוי יחיד. ותמהינן עלה:

אי דהוה, ומית, אימא סיפא

:

אבל אין אחד שעירב

עם חבירו,

נותן רשותו לאחד שלא עירב

, מפני שחבירו אוסר.

ואי

תימא, דהא דקתני "אחד שעירב" היינו שעירב עם אחד

דהוה, ומית

-

אמאי לא

סגי שיתן רשותו לחבירו, כיון דליכא השתא אחר, שהרי מת?!

אלא פשיטא

, דסיפא מיירי ב

דאיתיה

השתא לאותו שעירב עמו, ולא מת.

ומדסיפא

בד

איתיה, רישא נמי

מיירי בד

איתיה

, ולא מית?!

ומשנינן:

מידי איריא?

הא

סיפא דברייתא -

כדאיתא

, דמיירי דלא מית.

ו

הא

רישא -

כדאיתא

, דמיירי בהוה, ומית.

תדע

שצריך לבטל לכל אחד ואחד, ורישא מיירי בדהוה ומית:

דקתני סיפא דרישא

: ו

שנים שלא עירבו

-

נותנין רשותן לשנים שעירבו

או לאחד שלא עירב.

ודייקינן:

לשנים

-

אין,

אבל

לאחד

מאלה שעירבו

לא

סגי שיבטל לו, משום שצריך לבטל לכולן.

ועל כרחך רישא מיירי בדהוה ומית.

ואביי אמר

אהאי "תדע":

לעולם אין צריך לבטל לכל אחד ואחד. ו

מאי

"נותנין רשותן

לשנים

שעירבו"?

לאחד מ

ן ה

שנים

שעירבו.

ותמהינן עלה:

אי הכי, ליתני

כדתני ברישא:

לאחד שעירב

[וממילא ידעינן שהיו שנים]

או לאחד שלא עירב?!

ומסקינן:

קשיא!

והשתא מפרשינן לכולה ברייתא למאי איצטריך:

"אחד שלא עירב, נותן רשותו לאחד שעירב"

"

לאביי

דסבר אין צריך לבטל לכל אחד - מיירי ב

דאיתיה

לזה שעירב עמו,

וקא משמע לן דאין צריך לבטל רשות לכל אחד ואחד

, וסגי בנתינת רשותו "לאחד שעירב".

לרבה

דסבר צריך לבטל לכל אחד ואחד - מיירי

דהוה, ומית

אותו שעירב עמו.

ואם תאמר: אם כן פשיטא, ומאי קא משמע לן?!

הא קא משמע לן:

ולא גזור

שלא לבטל לאחד שעירב אף על גב דחבירו מית, משום

זימנין דאיתיה

לחבירו, ויבואו לבטל רק לאחד.

"ושנים שעירבו, נותנין רשותן לאחד שלא עירב"

:

ותמהינן:

פשיטא?!

ומפרשינן:

מהו דתימא, כיון דלא עירב

-

ליקנסיה

שלא יבטלו לו כדי להתירו.

קא משמע לן

שלא קונסים.

"ושנים שלא עירבו, נותנין רשותן לשנים

שעי רבו"

:

לרבה

, להכי

תנא

הך

סיפא

-

לגלויי ארישא

, דקתני: נותן רשותו לאחד שעירב, דמיירי בהוה ומית.

[וכדמוכחינן להך פירושא - לעיל - מדקתני בהך סיפא שצריך לבטל לשניהם, ועל כרחך רישא בדהוה ומית, ומשום הכי סגי שיבטל לאחד].

לאביי

דמפרש לעיל, דהא דקתני "לשנים שעירבו" היינו לאחד משנים, דהוה ליה הך דקתני: "נותנין רשותן לשנים שעירבו", מילתא דלא צריכא, דהא תנא כבר דאחד שלא עירב נותן רשותו לאחד משנים, והוא הדין שנים שלא עירבו נותנין רשותן לאחד משנים - רישא דהך בבא:

"שנים שלא עירבו" איצטריכא ליה

, לחדש שיכולין לבטל.

כי

סלקא דעתך אמינא, לגזור דילמא אתו לבטולי להו

[לשנים שלא עירבו], דהא לא אפשר, וכדאיתא במתניתין ששנים אין נוטלין רשות [אבל לשנים שעירבו נותנין רשות, וכדאיתא במתניתין].

קא משמע לן

דלא גזרינן.

והא דקתני "ושנים שלא עירבו נותנין רשותן לשנים שעירבו

או לאחד שלא עירב"

:

למה לי?!

לאשמועינן:

מהו דתימא, הני מילי

דמועיל ביטול,

היכא דמקצתן עירבו ומקצתן לא עירבו

ככל הני בטולין דקתני בברייתא.

אבל היכא דכולן לא עירבו

-

ליקנסינהו

דלא לבטל כלל,

כדי שלא תשתכח תורת עירוב

.

קא משמע לן

שלא קונסים.

"אבל אין אחד שעירב, נותן רשותו לאחד שלא עירב"

:

לאביי,

להכי

תנא

הך

סיפא

דמילתא דפשיטא היא - לאשמועינן שכל הברייתא מיירי דאיתיה לאותו אחד, שעירב עמו.

ו

לגלויי ארישא

דקתני "נותן רשותו לאחד שעירב" דבהכי מיירי. ומכל מקום, סגי שיבטל לאחד ואין צריך לבטל לשנים, וכדדייקינן מינה לעיל.

לרבה

, דסבירא ליה שאין צריך לבטל לכל אחד ואחד [ואדרבה מהך סיפא תמהינן עליה דמפרש לרישא בדהוה ומית],

איידי דתנא רישא

: אחד שלא עירב נותן רשותו לאחד שעירב.

תנא נמי

הך

סיפא

, דאיפכא לא [ואפילו הכי, רישא מיירי בדהוה ומית, וסיפא מיירי בדאיתיה, וכדאמרינן לעיל].

"ואין שנים שעירבו, נותנין רשותן לשנים שלא עירבו"

:

הא תו למה לי

, והרי פשיטא שאוסרים זה על זה?

לא צריכא

אלא לאשמועינן, דהיכא

ד

הדר ו

בטיל ליה חד מינייהו

[מאלו שנתבטל להם]

לחבריה

רשותו, וחלקו במה שנתבטל להם.

מהו דתימא לשתרי ליה

[לזה שנתבטל לו עכשיו],

קא משמע לן, כיון דבעידנא דבטיל

לגביה רשות השנים שעירבו,

לא הוה ליה שריותא בהא חצר

-

לא מצי מבטל

, וכמו שנתבאר לעיל דף סט ב בגמרא.

"ואין שנים שלא עירבו נותנין רשותן לשנים שלא עירבו"

:

הא תו למה לי

, מה לי שנים שעירבו - שאין נותנין רשות לשנים שלא עירבו - מה לי שנים שלא עירבו?!

לא צריכא

הך משנה יתירא אלא להשמיענו, שאין אחד מהשנים שנתבטל להם יכול לבטל לחבירו, ואף על גב

דאמרי

ליה המבטלים הראשונים:

קני על מנת להקנות

לחבירך, וכמו שנתבאר לעיל ריש עמוד זה בגמרא.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן

: שכח אחד מבני החצר לערב ואף לא ביטל רשותו, ומת בשבת והשאיר בן,

יורש

זה -

מהו שיבטל רשות?

Translation

And we explain it:

lest you say:

Just as one individual cannot nullify the authority of two people who did not participate in an eruv, so too two people cannot nullify the authority of one individual. One might have said

that we should decree

concerning this

lest

the individual

come to nullify their authority,

but it would not help, since two people prohibit one another.

It teaches us

that the Sages did not make such a decree, and the two people may grant their authority to the individual.

We learned in the Mishna: Two people grant authority

but they do not receive authority.

And we ask:

Why do I need

to teach: “but they do not receive authority”?

It was already taught: “If there are two people, they prohibit one another”?!

And we explain:

It is necessary.

The extra wording of the Mishna, which teaches that the two people do not receive authority, is needed only to teach us that

even though the other residents of the courtyard say to them when they nullify their authority for them:

Acquire

our authority in the courtyard

on condition that you return and

that you return and

transfer it

to your fellow,” even so, it is ineffective for them to return and nullify their authority to their fellow.

For we do not say that they made him their agent to transfer the authority to his fellow. Rather, they instructed him personally to acquire the authority and then transfer it to his fellow. Since he himself did not acquire it when they nullified their authority to him, so that he would be permitted in the courtyard, he cannot transfer it to his fellow, as we stated.

Abaye asked Rava: If five

residents

are staying in one courtyard,

and four of them joined in an eruv,

but one of them forgot and did not join.

On the one hand, it may be said that it is sufficient for the one who did not join to nullify his authority toward one of the others, since that individual toward whom he nullified his authority was already joined in an eruv with the others before Shabbat.

But on the other hand, it is possible to say that he did not join with regard to the portion of authority that has now been transferred to him, because at that time it did not belong to him [Rashi, above, page 26b].

Therefore Abaye asked Rava:

Does

when he,

that one who did not join,

nullifies his authority—

does

he need

to

nullify

his authority

to each and every one

of the residents of the courtyard?

Or

perhaps,

no,

he does not need to nullify his authority to each and every one, because once the other residents of the courtyard have joined in an eruv, they are considered as one group, and it is sufficient for him to nullify his authority to one of them [Rashi, below].

He said to him

Rava said to Abaye:

He must nullify his authority to each and every one.

They raised an objection from a source

from what we learned in a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna:

One

of the residents of a courtyard

who did not join may grant—

if he wishes—

his authority to one who joined [

This will be explained below, and we derive the proof from here].

And

two who joined

and one did not join

may grant—

if they wish—

their authority to one who did not join,

so that he will be permitted while they are prohibited.

And two who did not join

may grant their authority to two who joined

or to one who did not join.

But one who joined

with his fellow

may not grant his authority to one [

a third person]

who did not join,

because it accomplishes nothing, since the authority of his fellow still prohibits.

And two who joined may not grant their authority to two who did not join,

because the two who did not join prohibit one another.

And two who did not join may not grant their authority to two who did not join,

because those two prohibit one another. [

And below the Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna, will explain why all these clauses are necessary.]

And now we challenge this:

In any event, it teaches

in

the first clause: One who did not join may grant his authority to one who joined.

What are the circumstances?

If there is no other person with him

in the courtyard at all, and there are only two of them, then

with whom did he join an eruv?!

Rather, it is obvious that there is another person with him,

that there were three people in the courtyard, two joined and one did not join.

And

concerning this

it teaches:

He grants his authority

to one who joined

.

We clearly see that it is sufficient to grant authority to one of those who joined; he does not need to nullify his authority to both of them!

And Rava,

who said that he must nullify his authority to each and every one, would say to you:

Here, what are we dealing with? It was

another person together with the one who joined [with the group] before Shabbat, and they joined in an eruv,

and

then

he died.

That is why the one who did not join nullifies his authority to the one who had joined, because now he is an individual.

And we challenge this:

If he was present and then died, say the latter clause:

But one who joined

with his fellow

may grant his authority to one who did not join,

because his fellow prohibits.

And if

you say that what it teaches, “one who joined,” means that he joined with one

who was present and died—

why would it not

be sufficient for him to grant his authority to his fellow, since there is now no other person, as he has died?!

Rather, it is obvious

that the latter clause is referring to a case in which the one with whom he joined

is present

now and did not die.

And since the latter clause

is referring to one who

is present, the first clause as well

must be referring to one who

is present,

and did not die?!

And we answer:

Are the cases necessarily alike?

This—

the latter clause of the beraita—

is as it stands,

referring to a case in which he did not die.

And

this—

the first clause—

is as it stands,

referring to a case in which he had been present and died.

Come and see

that he must nullify his authority to each and every one, and that the first clause refers to a case in which the person had been present and died:

For the latter clause of the first section teaches:

And

two who did not join—

may grant their authority to two who joined

or to one who did not join.

And we infer:

To two—

yes,

but

to one

of those who joined

no,

it is not sufficient for him to nullify his authority to that one, because he must nullify his authority to all of them.

And necessarily, the first clause refers to a case in which the person had been present and died.

And Abaye said

in response to this “come and see”:

Actually, he does not need to nullify his authority to each and every one. And

what does it mean when it says: “They may grant their authority

to two

who joined”?

To one of

the

two

who joined.

And we challenge this:

If so, let it teach

as it taught in the first clause:

to one who joined [

and we would know automatically that there were two]

or to one who did not join?!

And we conclude:

This is difficult.

And now we explain why each clause of the entire beraita is necessary:

“One who did not join may grant his authority to one who joined”

According to Abaye

who holds that he need not nullify his authority to each and every one, this is referring to a case in which the one who joined with him

is present

and did not die.

And it teaches us that he need not nullify his authority to each and every one,

and it is sufficient for him to grant his authority “to one who joined.”

According to Rava

who holds that he must nullify his authority to each and every one, this is referring to a case in which the one who joined with him

was present and died.

the one who had joined with him.

And if you would say: If so, it is obvious; what does it teach us?!

It teaches us this:

And they did not decree

that he may not nullify his authority to one who joined, even though his fellow died, because

at times his fellow is present,

and people will come to nullify their authority only to one.

“And two who joined may grant their authority to one who did not join”:

And we ask:

Is this obvious?!

And we explain:

Lest you say, since he did not join—

we should penalize him

so that they may not nullify their authority to him in order to permit him.

It teaches us

that we do not impose such a penalty.

“And two who did not join may grant their authority to two

who joined”:

According to Rava,

for this reason

the tannaitic source teaches

this

latter clause—

to clarify the first clause,

which teaches: He grants his authority to one who joined, referring to a case in which the person had been present and died. [

And as we demonstrate for this interpretation above: Since this latter clause teaches that he must nullify his authority to both of them, necessarily the first clause refers to a case in which the person had been present and died, and therefore it is sufficient for him to nullify his authority to one.]

According to Abaye

who explained above that “to two who joined” means to one of the two, this clause, which teaches: “They may grant their authority to two who joined,” is unnecessary, since it was already taught that one who did not join may grant his authority to one of two people; and the same applies to two who did not join, who may grant their authority to one of two people. The first part of this clause,

“two who did not join” is necessary,

to teach that they may nullify their authority.

For

you might have thought that we should decree lest they come to nullify their authority [

to two who did not join], since that is impossible, as it is taught in the Mishna that two people do not receive authority [but they may grant authority to two who joined, as it is taught in the Mishna].

It teaches us

that we do not make such a decree.

And concerning what it teaches: “And two who did not join may grant their authority to two who joined

or to one who did not join”:

Why do I need this?!

It teaches us:

Lest you say, this applies only

when nullification is effective,

where some of them joined and some of them did not join,

as in all the cases of nullification taught in the beraita.

But where none of them joined—

we should penalize them

so that they may not nullify their authority at all,

so that the law of the eruv will not be forgotten.

It teaches us

that we do not impose such a penalty.

“But one who joined may not grant his authority to one who did not join”:

According to Abaye,

for this reason

the tannaitic source teaches

this

latter clause—

although it is obvious—to teach that the entire beraita is referring to a case in which the person with whom he joined is present.

And

to clarify the first clause,

which teaches: “He grants his authority to one who joined,” that it is referring to such a case. Nevertheless, it is sufficient for him to nullify his authority to one person; he does not need to nullify it to two, as we inferred from it above.

According to Rava,

who holds that he does not need to nullify his authority to each and every one [and, in fact, the latter clause is what led us to challenge his explanation that the first clause refers to a case in which the person had been present and died],

since it taught the first clause:

One who did not join grants his authority to one who joined,

it also taught

this

latter clause,

but not the reverse [and even so, the first clause refers to a case in which the person had been present and died, while the latter clause refers to a case in which he is present, as we said above].

“And two who joined may not grant their authority to two who did not join”:

Why do I need this further statement,

since it is obvious that they prohibit one another?

It is necessary

to teach that where

one

then

again nullifies his authority

[of those to whom the authority was nullified]

to his fellow

and shares with him in the authority that had been transferred to them,

lest you say that he should be permitted

[the one to whom it has now been transferred].

It teaches us that since, at the time when he nullified

the authority of the two who had joined, toward him,

he did not have any permission in this courtyard—

he cannot nullify his authority,

as was explained above, page 69b, in the Gemara.

“And two who did not join may not grant their authority to two who did not join”:

Why do I need this further statement,

since what difference is there between two who joined—who may not grant their authority to two who did not join—and two who did not join?!

It is necessary

only to teach that neither of the two to whom authority was transferred can nullify his authority to his fellow, even though

the

original people who nullified their authority

said: “Acquire it on condition that you transfer it

to your fellow,” as was explained above, at the beginning of this page, in the Gemara.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman

about the following case: One of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join an eruv and also did not nullify his authority, and he died on Shabbat, leaving a son,

an heir

of his—

what is the law: may the heir nullify the authority?