Eruvin 69b (סט:) — the Talmud in English

until he becomes an apostate with regard to idol worship –

for one who transgresses it is suspected with regard to the entire Torah, as the Master said: Idol worship is particularly severe, for whoever acknowledges it is like one who denies the entire Torah. As it is written concerning the transgression of idol worship: “And when you unwittingly fail to perform all these mitzvot.”

But to desecrate Shabbat publicly—not!

Said

Rabbi Nahman bar Yitzhak, explaining:

Rav Huna’s statement that he is an apostate

does not mean that he is an apostate with regard to the entire Torah. Rather, it applies only with regard to

granting permission [

that is, when he says: “My domain is ‘acquired’ by you,” thereby permitting carrying as with the renunciation of domain ]

and renouncing a domain [

when he says: “My domain is ‘renounced’ to you” ] on Shabbat.

For when he desecrates Shabbat publicly, he cannot grant permission or renounce a domain.

And as it was taught

that when he does not desecrate Shabbat “publicly,” he can renounce his domain:

As it was taught:

An Israelite

who is

an apostate [

with regard to the entire Torah – Gaon Yaakov ], but

observes Shabbat in public

and desecrates it only privately,

may renounce his domain.

One who does not observe Shabbat

even

in public cannot renounce his domain!

Because they said:

Only

an Israelite may take possession of a domain.

That is, one can transfer a domain to him or have him renounce it,

whereas

if it were

a gentile—

until he rents out

the gentile’s domain to an Israelite.

And an apostate who desecrates Shabbat publicly has the status of a gentile.

How

does an Israelite renounce his domain?

He says to him: “My domain is ‘acquired’ by you; my domain is ‘renounced’ to you.”

And then

the other acquires it;

the second party

does not need to acquire it

through a kinyan sudar, since this is merely the removal of a domain: he removes himself from his domain so that he will not prohibit carrying for them – Mishnah Berura.

Rav Ashi

raised another explanation and

said:

Actually, Rav Huna considers him an apostate for every matter, and not specifically with regard to the renunciation of a domain on Shabbat. And he actually agrees with the Rabbis that one suspected with regard to one matter is not suspected with regard to the entire Torah. However, Shabbat is different, for Rav Huna’s statement

follows this tanna, who holds that Shabbat is as severe for him as idol worship.

Just as one who is an apostate with regard to idol worship is an apostate with regard to the entire Torah, so too one who is an apostate with regard to desecrating Shabbat.

As it was taught

that there is a tanna who holds this way:

It is written: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: When a person among you brings an offering to the Lord, from animals, from cattle or from the flock, you shall bring your offering.”

And we derive:

“Among you” [

some of you ]

but not all of you

bring an offering—

to exclude an apostate.

And since it is written, “Speak to the ‘children of Israel’”—

“among you,”

we learn:

Among you—

among the children of Israel—

I distinguished

between an apostate and one who is not an apostate,

but not among the nations.

And offerings are accepted from all of them, even from apostates.

“From the animals”—

to include human beings

who are wicked,

who resemble animals,

which do not recognize their Creator.

From here they said: Offerings are accepted

of a voluntary nature

from the sinners of Israel [

this is explained below ]

so that they may repent,

for if we do not accept offerings from them and drive them away forcefully, they will never again repent.

Except for an apostate and one who pours wine

for idol worship,

and one who desecrates Shabbat publicly.

We first explain the beraita, and then derive support from it:

This itself is difficult.

You said: “Among you but not all of you”—

to exclude an apostate.

And then it teaches: Offerings are accepted from the sinners of Israel,

yet he is an apostate?!

This is not difficult.

The first clause—

which excludes an apostate—deals

with one who is an apostate with regard to the entire Torah.

The middle clause—

which teaches that offerings are accepted from the sinners of Israel—deals

with one who is an apostate with regard to one matter.

And now we derive from this beraita that an apostate with regard to Shabbat is like an apostate with regard to idol worship.

For the beraita still presents a difficulty.

Come and hear the final clause:

“Except for an apostate and one who pours wine”.

And

this apostate

in the final clause—

what are the circumstances?

If he is an apostate with regard to the entire Torah—

that is the same as the first clause

of the beraita, which teaches that an offering is not accepted from an apostate; why do we need both?

And

if

the final clause deals with an apostate

with regard to one matter—

the middle clause is difficult,

as it teaches there that voluntary offerings are accepted from the sinners of Israel.

Rather, is it not saying as follows: Except for one who is an apostate with regard to pouring

wine for idol worship, that is, an apostate with regard to idol worship,

and with regard to desecrating [

or one who is an apostate with regard to desecrating ]

Shabbat publicly,

for these two are considered like apostates with regard to the entire Torah.

Apparently,

we see that this tanna of the beraita holds:

Idol worship and Shabbat are equivalent.

And one who is an apostate with regard to them is like an apostate with regard to the entire Torah.

And we conclude:

Conclude from it!

Mishna:

a.

If the members of a courtyard forgot to establish an eruv, and one of them forgot

and renounced to them his domain in the courtyard, then

his house,

the house of the one who forgot,

is prohibited for bringing in and taking out, for him [

the one who forgot ]

and for them [

the other members of the courtyard ].

For the courtyard belongs to the other members of the courtyard, while his house—which he did not renounce to them—belongs to him. Therefore, it is prohibited for everyone to take objects from his house into the courtyard.

But

their house,

theirs, is

permitted

for bringing in and taking out

for him and for them,

since they established an eruv, and the houses together with the courtyard are all one domain.

And if

the other members of the courtyard gave

him

their

domain

in the courtyard—

then

he is permitted

to take objects from his house into the courtyard, since it is one domain, once they have given him their domain.

But they are prohibited

from taking objects out, both from their house into the courtyard, since these are two domains, and from the house of the one who forgot into the courtyard, even though it is one domain. The Gemara explains the reason.

If

the ones who forgot were

two,

and the other members of the courtyard gave both of them their domain in the courtyard,

the two who forgot prohibit

one another

from

taking objects into the courtyard.

Because the courtyard belongs to both of them, while the houses are each assigned to their respective owners; and one may not take an object from a domain assigned exclusively to him into a domain belonging to him and to his fellow.

And the Mishna repeats and clarifies:

one may give a domain

and thereby permit the other members of the courtyard,

and

if they wish, one

may take

a domain and thereby permit himself.

But

two may give their domain

to others and thereby permit the other members of the courtyard,

but may not take a domain.

For the taking of a domain from the other members of the courtyard is not effective for two people so as to permit them. [

The Gemara explains what this repetition comes to teach.]

b.

From when,

that is, when is the time at which

the members of the courtyard give a domain

?

Beit Shammai say: During the day,

but not on Shabbat.

And Beit Hillel say: [

even – Rav Ovadya of Bartenura ]

after nightfall. [

As the Gemara explains their dispute at the end, before the following Mishna.]

c.

One who gave up his domain, and

afterward

took out

from his house into the domain that he had renounced,

whether

he took it out

unwittingly

or

whether intentionally, he again

again

prohibits

the members of the courtyard, since he has again taken possession of his domain and retracted his renunciation. [

Earlier, in the Gemara on 68b, the amoraim disagreed about this: whether, even in the case of an unwitting act, the reason is that he again took possession of his domain, or whether the reason is that they decreed an unwitting act because of an intentional one ],

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If

intentionally

he took it out, he

prohibits,

for he retracted his renunciation. But

if he acted unwittingly, he does not prohibit!

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If the members of a courtyard forgot to establish an eruv, and one of them forgot, his house is prohibited for bringing in and taking out, for him and for them, while theirs is permitted for him and for them:

And we infer:

It is his house that is prohibited

for the other members of the courtyard to take objects from it into the courtyard.

But his courtyard is permitted!

That is, taking objects from the houses of the other members of the courtyard into the courtyard [which had been] his is permitted for them, as the Mishna teaches: “Their house is permitted for him and for them.”

What are the circumstances?

If he renounced

his entire domain that he has here, he also renounced his house’s domain to them. If so,

why is his house prohibited

for them to take objects from it into the courtyard? And

if he did not renounce

anything at all,

his courtyard

—taking objects into it from their houses—

why is it permitted?

After all, it too belongs to him, whereas their houses are assigned exclusively to them, so this would be taking an object from one domain into another domain?!

And we explain:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he renounced

and mentioned in his renunciation only

the domain of his courtyard, but did not renounce

explicitly also

the domain of his house.

And the Rabbis hold

of the Mishna:

One who renounces the domain of his courtyard—

has not renounced the domain of his house!

That is, it does not become renounced automatically, because this would be a house without a courtyard [according to the Ritva above, 26b].

And the reason is

that a person resides in a house

also

without a courtyard!

That is, a house is still considered a residence even if it has no use of the courtyard; therefore, taking objects out of it is prohibited.

And this disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer—above, 26b—who holds that one who renounces the domain of his courtyard has also renounced the domain of his house.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And theirs is permitted for him and for them”:

And we raised the question:

What is the reason

that it is permitted even for him to take objects from their houses into the courtyard? Why do we not say that he is thereby reasserting possession of the domain he renounced, just as the Mishna says that if he takes objects from his house, it is as though he reasserts possession of his domain?

And we answer: Because

he is considered a guest with regard to them!

Since he does not take objects from his own house, but only from theirs, this is not like reasserting possession of his domain; rather, he is like the other guests of the members of the courtyard who take objects from their house into the courtyard.

We learned in the Mishna:

“They gave him their domain; he is permitted and they are prohibited.”

And we question what we learned, that they are prohibited from taking objects even from his house into the courtyard.

But it is one domain?!

And if the reason is that by taking objects into the domain that they renounced, they have again taken possession of their domain,

let them be considered with regard to him

as though they are, with regard to him,

like

they were

guests

of his, lodging in his house and taking objects from his house into the courtyard. Just as, if he renounced his domain, he is permitted to take objects from their houses into the courtyard as though he were their guest?!

And we answer: There is a distinction between one who renounced his domain to five people, who are many, and many who renounced their domains to one person.

For

one person with regard to five is considered a guest.

But

five with regard to one are not considered guests.

And if they use the courtyard, then even though they do not take objects from their own house, but only from his house, this is considered “taking back the domain,” and the renunciation is nullified.

The Gemara now assumes that what we learned in the Mishna, “They gave him their domain,” refers to the first clause: after he renounced his domain to them, they in turn gave him their domain.

And we raise the question:

Conclude from it

that they

may renounce

to this person

and then renounce again

to that person.

But this would contradict Shmuel, who said above, on 68b, that one may not renounce a domain and then renounce it again—Ritva?!

And we reject this: Nothing can be inferred from the Mishna.

Rather,

this is what it says: They gave

him

their

domain

from the outset,

and he did not renounce his domain to them—

he is permitted and they are prohibited.

We learned in the Mishna:

If

the ones who forgot were

two

and renounced their domain to them, they

prohibit one another:

And we question:

Obviously,

for this situation is no better now than if these two alone had initially been present, in which case they would prohibit one another?!

And we answer:

It is necessary

only in a case where

one of them subsequently [

of the ones who forgot ], after the other members of the courtyard renounced their domain to them,

renounced to his fellow,

both his own domain and his share in the domain that the other members of the courtyard had renounced to them.

Lest you say

that now

it should be permitted,

and his fellow should be permitted to take objects from his house into the courtyard, since the courtyard is now assigned exclusively to him,

it comes to teach us

that it is prohibited!

The reason is that a domain that originally belonged to him he can renounce to his fellow. But a domain that was renounced to him by the other members of the courtyard, and which he did not acquire, he cannot renounce to his fellow.

And the reason for this is:

since

initially,

at the time when he renounced

the domain of the other members of the courtyard to him,

he did not have

he who is now renouncing his domain to his fellow

permission—

permission to carry

in this courtyard.

For at that time they still prohibited one another; thus, the renunciation of the members of the courtyard to them did not then benefit them.

Therefore,

he cannot [

Rashash ] renounce it again to his fellow, since he did not acquire the domain of the others when they renounced their domain to both of them.

We learned in the Mishna:

One gives a domain

and takes a domain:

And we question:

Why do I need this as well?

If

it comes to teach us that one

gives

a domain—

we already learned

this in the first clause of the Mishna: “Their house is permitted for him and for them”!

And it necessarily follows that the reason for the permission is that he renounced his domain to them, as we said.

And

if

it comes to teach us that one

takes

a domain—

we already learned

this explicitly in the Mishna: “They gave him their domain”!

And we answer:

The final clause was necessary: Two give a domain,

as this was not taught in the first clause of the Mishna.

And we question this:

This too is obvious,

that they give a domain to one individual [or to several who established an eruv, since they are considered like one individual ]?!