Eruvin 71b (עא:) — the Talmud in English

And Rav Yosef said

to explain the rationale of Rabbi Shimon:

The case is actually referring to one alleyway, and according to everyone one utensil is required; and it is referring to a case where they placed the oil and the wine in a single utensil.

And now the words of Rabbi Shimon are properly understood.

However, in any event, according to the Rabbis it is ineffective, since wine and oil are not “connected.”

And

Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis

differ with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis:

As we learned in a Mishna: Oil

of teruma

that floated on top of wine

of teruma,

and a tebul yom [

who renders teruma unfit through contact]

touched the oil—

he rendered only the oil unfit.

And Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says:

Both of them [the wine and the oil]

(are connected) [

are joined]

to one another,

and both became unfit together.

And

the Rabbis

of our Mishna correspond

to the Rabbis

with regard to the halakhot of a tebul yom, who hold that they are not connected; consequently, they are not considered mixed together.

And Rabbi Shimon

of our Mishna corresponds

to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri,

who holds that they are connected, and that the wine and oil are considered mixed together.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Elazar ben Tadai says,

with regard to the law of the Mishna, concerning a homeowner who was a partner with his neighbors:

Both this one and that one must establish an eruv,

and they cannot rely on the partnership.

And we raised an objection to this: Did Rabbi Elazar ben Tadai say that

even if

he was a partner

with this one through wine and

was also a partner

with that one through wine,

they must establish an eruv between them?!

Rabba said:

Where

this

one neighbor

came with his lugino,

with his jug, and poured his wine into the barrel,

and this

second neighbor

came with his lugino,

with his jug,

and poured

his wine into that same barrel—even though they did not do so for the purpose of a shituf of the alleyways—

everyone agrees that it constitutes an eruv.

They disagree in a case where they purchased

the two of them together

a barrel of wine with

money

that they had jointly owned

as partners.

The food contributed for an eruv or a shituf must be contributed by placing food designated for each of the members of the alleyway in one place. Therefore, one may not establish a shituf in an alleyway with money or by purchasing food with jointly owned money, because each partner’s share has not been defined as separate private food.

And this is the matter of their dispute:

Rabbi Elazar ben Tadai holds

that there is no retroactive clarification,

and since they purchased a barrel of wine together, each person’s specific share of the wine was not determined; consequently, each did not contribute his defined share of the partnership.

And the Rabbis hold

that there is retroactive clarification.

It is therefore as though each one contributed his specific share of the wine before they entered into the partnership.

Rav Yosef said:

That which ben Tadai said, “they must establish an eruv,” does not mean that one may not rely on a partnership in place of a shituf of the alleyways.

Rather, this is what he is saying: Although it is a valid shituf of the alleyways, and it is permitted to carry into the alleyway, nevertheless, if they also wish to permit carrying from one courtyard to another through the opening between them, they must also establish an eruv hatzerot.

And Rabbi Elazar ben Tadai and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the principle that one may rely on a shituf in place of

where an

eruv

is required.

As one [

ben Tadai]

holds: One may not rely

on the shituf of the alleyways; rather, the courtyards must be joined by an eruv in order to carry within them and between them, despite the fact that the shituf was effective with regard to the alleyways.

And the other [

the Rabbis]

holds: One may rely

on the shituf, and there is no need to establish an eruv for the courtyards.

Rav Yosef said: From where do I say

that this is the basis of their dispute?

Because Rav stated two halakhot:

a.

As Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir,

who holds that one may not rely on a shituf in place of an eruv, as explained below in the Gemara.

b.

And Rav Bruna said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar ben Tadai!

And what is the reason

that Rav holds in accordance with both of them?

No; it is because they have a single rationale!

The rationale of ben Tadai is that one may not rely on a shituf in place of an eruv!

Abaye said to him: And if they have a single rationale,

then

the two halakhot

that Rav ruled—

why is it necessary

to state both of them?

Let him state only that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, and we would consequently know as well that the halakha is in accordance with ben Tadai!

And we answer:

Rav teaches us this

by not sufficing with stating that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir:

We do not act in accordance with two stringencies

where one tanna adopts a stringent position—in opposition to other tannaim—

with regard to eruvin.

And Rabbi Meir is stringent in two respects:

a. He holds that one may not rely on a shituf made with wine.

b. One may not rely on a shituf even when it was made with bread.

These are two separate stringencies, since below the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir concerning a shituf made with bread, while the Rabbis of our Mishna disagree with him concerning a shituf made with wine.

If so, Rav could not say that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir in order to adopt all of his stringencies.

For this reason, Rav first had to state that the halakha is in accordance with ben Tadai: With wine, one may not rely on a shituf, as this is the case discussed in our Mishna. He then taught us that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir: Even with bread, one may not rely on a shituf.

And we explain:

What is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and what is the opinion of the Rabbis,

that you said they disagree as to whether one may rely on a shituf in place of an eruv when the shituf was made with bread?

As it was taught in a beraita:

An eruv hatzerot is instituted because of dwelling: Through the eruv, by which all the houses in the courtyard contribute food to one place, we regard all the residents of the houses as though they dwell in the place where they contributed the bread; thus there is only one residence in the courtyard, and the entire domain of the courtyard, together with the other houses, becomes designated to this house [Rashi above, 49a].

And therefore:

One establishes an eruv in courtyards with bread,

but not with wine, since a person’s dwelling follows the bread and not the wine.

And if they wished to establish an eruv with wine—

one may not establish the eruv.

But a shituf of the alleyways is not instituted in order to join the houses so that they will constitute one domain; rather, it is instituted to join the courtyards so that they will constitute one domain. And a courtyard is not a dwelling-house, such that one would say that specifically bread is required.

And therefore:

One may establish a shituf in an alleyway

even

with wine.

And if they wished to establish a shituf with bread—

all the more so

they may establish the shituf,

since bread is superior for this purpose!

“One establishes an eruv”

in courtyards, and “one establishes a shituf”

in an alleyway!

That is to say: Although the courtyards have been joined with one another to permit carrying from a house into its courtyard, and although all the courtyards—whose entrances open onto one another—have also been joined with one another to permit carrying from one courtyard to another, one may not rely on the eruv in place of a shituf. Rather, an additional shituf of the alleyways must be made to permit carrying from a house in the courtyard into the alleyway.

Likewise, one may not rely on the shituf in place of an eruv.

And the reason is:

So that the law of eruv will not be forgotten by the children, who might say, “Our fathers did not establish an eruv”; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: Either one establishes an eruv or one establishes a shituf,

and one may rely on an eruv in place of a shituf, and on a shituf in place of an eruv.

They disagree about it—

in explaining the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages—

Rav Rahumi and Rabba bar Yosef [

in the Bach]:

One said:

Where they established an eruv or a shituf

with bread—

everyone agrees that one is sufficient,

as the placement of a single loaf is sufficient, since bread is effective both for an eruv and for a shituf. [

And according to this, since an eruv is always established with bread, there is no one who says, “One may not rely on an eruv in place of a shituf.”]]

They disagree

where they established a shituf in the alleyway

with wine,

which is effective only for a shituf and not for an eruv.

And this is the basis of their dispute: whether, nevertheless, one may rely on the shituf in place of an eruv, saying: Since it is suitable for its purpose, namely, a shituf, we may rely on it for one matter as well.

Or whether we may not rely on it, and they must also establish an eruv.