Eruvin 62b (סב:) — the Talmud in English

The Master said: The courtyard of a gentile is like an animal pen:

and if there is one Jew there, he prohibits.

We question that which was stated in the beraita: According to Rabbi Meir, if there is one Jew there, he prohibits; the Jew prohibits the gentile’s house. This implies that the gentile does not prohibit the Jew [as we explained above]:

But did we not learn

in the Mishna:

One who resides with a gentile in a courtyard—

this

gentile

prohibits him? [The reason is that although, according to the basic law, the residence of a gentile is not considered a residence and he does not prohibit, nevertheless, due to the decree lest one learn from his actions, the Sages deemed the residence of a gentile to be a residence.] If so, the gentile should also prohibit the Jew?!

The reason is that although, according to the basic law, a gentile’s residence is not considered a residence and he does not prohibit carrying, nevertheless, because of a rabbinic decree lest one learn from his ways, the Sages made a gentile’s residence considered a residence. If so, the gentile should also prohibit the Jew from carrying!

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This

statement in the Mishna, that the gentile prohibits, is referring to a case

where he is present

in his house on this Shabbat.

But

this

statement in the beraita, that the gentile does not prohibit the Jew, is referring to a case

where he is absent

from his house, as the Gemara now explains.

And we explain it:

And what does

Rabbi Meir hold?

If he holds: A residence without its owners

who are present in their home on Shabbat

is considered a residence—

even

a residence belonging to a

gentile

without its owners

should also prohibit.

For once the Sages deemed the residence of a gentile to be a residence because of the decree, even without its owners it should likewise be so!

And if he holds: A residence without its owners is not considered a residence,

and this is the reason that when the gentile is absent from his home he does not prohibit—

even

a residence belonging to a

Jew

who resides with another Jew

should likewise not prohibit

when the Jew is absent from his home?!

Yet the beraita implies that if the Jew’s partner in the courtyard had been another Jew, he would have prohibited even when he was absent.

And we explain that there is indeed a basis for distinguishing between an absent Jew and an absent gentile:

Rabbi Meir always holds

that

a residence without its owners is not considered a residence,

and even a Jew, according to the basic law, should not have to prohibit.

However, regarding a

Jew,

he is nevertheless prohibited, because when

he is present

in his home, according to the basic law he

prohibits [since his residence is considered a residence].

since his residence is a residence.

When he is absent, the Sages issued a decree concerning him,

as a decree on account of his being present in his home.

But

a gentile, who

even

when he is present

in his home does not prohibit according to the basic law [since the residence of a gentile is not considered a residence]; rather, the Sages deemed it a residence because of the

decree lest one learn from his actions.

In this case, the Sages left the matter according to the basic law, and said:

When he is present—

since generally it is a residence—even the residence of a gentile is considered a residence because of the decree. Therefore, he

prohibits, and this is the case of the Mishna.

carrying; and this is the case in the Mishna.

But

when he is absent

from his home, since generally it is not considered a residence, and it is only because of the decree [as though he were present], here, in the case of a gentile—whose entire prohibition and residence are the result of a decree [lest one learn from him]—the Sages did not issue the decree, and he

does not prohibit.

And that which is stated in the beraita, that it is prohibited to carry from the gentile’s house into the courtyard even when he is absent, is because when we say that a residence without its owners is not considered a residence, that applies specifically with regard to the fact that, according to the basic law, such a residence does not prohibit the other members of the courtyard from carrying from their homes into the courtyard.

But to carry from such a residence into the jointly used courtyard is prohibited according to the basic law, and the principle that “a residence without its owners is not considered a residence” is of no avail in this regard!

Consequently, it is prohibited even from the residence of a gentile, because the Sages deemed it a residence on account of the decree.

We question that which we said: A gentile who is absent from his home does not prohibit another Jew who is his partner in the courtyard:

What do you mean: When he is absent, he does not prohibit?

But did we not learn: One who leaves his home and goes to spend Shabbat in another city, whether he is a gentile or a Jew, prohibits!

And we answer:

There,

where it teaches that the gentile prohibits, it is referring to a case

where the gentile will come

the gentile

that very day, meaning that the gentile went to a nearby place and will return that same day. For we issue a decree: If you permit carrying into the courtyard before the gentile returns, they will also carry after he returns and will not take notice.

But the beraita is referring to a case in which he went to a distant place and will certainly not return on Shabbat.

But the beraita is referring to a case in which he went to a distant place, and certainly will not return on Shabbat.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov,

who holds that the residence of a gentile is not considered a residence that can prohibit, unless there are two Jews besides him in the courtyard.

And this is an unequivocal halakha, and it is taught publicly.

And Rav Huna said: The practice is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

That is, it is not taught publicly, but one who comes to ask is instructed in accordance with his view.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: The people have adopted the practice in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

That is: one does not instruct people in this manner, but one who is lenient in accordance with his view is not prevented from doing so.

He said,

Abaye raised

a question to Rav Yosef: Since

we have established that

the Mishna of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov

[the halakhot that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov taught in the Mishna] is

few

[that is, they are few],

and clear

[and the halakha follows him in all matters taught in the Mishna],

and

in this very matter of our Mishna,

Rav Yehuda said

explicitly

in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov,

which implies that the matter is obvious!

If so,

what is the ruling

for a student

to instruct

one who asks according to the view of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, even

in the presence

of

his teacher?

For although in general it is presumptuous to issue a ruling in the presence of one’s teacher, nevertheless, in such a simple matter, which does not depend on reasoning, perhaps it is not presumptuous, and a student is permitted to issue a ruling in his teacher’s presence.

He said to him,

Rav Yosef to Abaye:

Even

the law concerning

an egg in kutah [a fully formed egg found in the hen’s intestines [Tosafot], to eat it with milk], which is an obvious matter and does not involve the prohibition of “meat and milk,”

—a fully formed egg found in a hen’s intestines [Tosafot] and eaten with milk—which is an obvious matter and does not involve the prohibition of “meat and milk”—

I asked

[I asked]

Rav Hisda—

whether it was permitted—

throughout the lifetime of Rav Huna,

Rav Hisda’s teacher,

and he did not instruct me

until Rav Huna died.

All the more so, it is prohibited to issue a ruling concerning the halakha being in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

Rabbi Yaakov bar Abba

raised

a question to Abaye: For example,

the laws written in the

Scroll of Fasts [which days it is prohibited to fast; in their time these were the only laws that had been written, while the Mishnayot and the Gemara had not yet been written, and therefore it was called a “scroll”],

—which days it is prohibited to fast on. In their time, these were the only written laws, since the Mishnayot and the Gemara had not yet been written, and therefore it was called a “scroll”—

which is written and lying before one,

what is the ruling for instructing in the place of one’s teacher, since it is a matter that does not depend on reasoning?

since this is a matter that does not depend on analysis?

Abaye said to him: This is what Rav Yosef said: Even concerning an egg in kutah, I asked Rav Hisda throughout the lifetime of Rav Huna, and he did not instruct me.

It follows that even with regard to a simple matter that does not depend on reasoning, it is also prohibited to issue a ruling in the presence of one’s teacher.

Rav Hisda instructed

in Babylonia

in

a place called

Kafrei, during the lifetime of Rav Huna,

his teacher, since it was not Rav Huna’s location, as Rav Huna was in Pumbedita in Babylonia.