Eruvin 62a (סב.) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

Abaye bar Avin and Rav Ḥinnana bar Avin were sitting, and Abaye was sitting with them.

And they were sitting and saying,

wondering about the explanation of our Mishna:

Granted, Rabbi Meir [that is, the first tanna],

who says that a gentile and a Samaritan forbid even one Israelite, his reasoning is understandable.

Because

he holds

that Rabbi Meir maintains that

a gentile's residence

is considered a residence.

Therefore, the matter is considered as though he possesses a domain in the courtyard.

It follows that when an Israelite carries an object from his house, which is designated for him alone, into the courtyard shared by his residence and the residence of the gentile, it is like carrying from one domain into another.

And

therefore

it makes no difference whether

there was, together with the gentile,

one

Israelite in the courtyard,

and it makes no difference whether

there were

two

Israelites in the courtyard: it is forbidden to carry there until they rent his domain from the gentile.

But Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov,

who says that a gentile forbids only two Israelites who live with him in a single courtyard—

what does he hold?

If he holds

that

a gentile's residence is considered a residence,

then

even

if only

one

Israelite lives with him,

he too should be forbidden.

And if

he holds that a gentile's residence

is not considered a residence,

even

if

two

Israelites live with him,

they too should not be forbidden!

Abaye said to them: And

does

Rabbi Meir hold

that

a gentile's residence is considered a residence?!

But it was taught in a beraita: A gentile's courtyard

is like an animal pen.

And if one Israelite is there, he forbids others; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

The beraita will be explained later on this page.

It is proven from that beraita that a gentile's residence is not considered a residence. If so, why does Rabbi Meir here prohibit carrying until one rents from him?!

Rather,

this is the basis of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov:

Everyone agrees

that

a gentile's residence is not considered a residence,

and according to the fundamental law the gentile does not forbid at all; this is the beraita below [as will be explained there].

Nevertheless, because of a decree, the Sages made a gentile's residence equivalent to a residence [Rashi below]. And they decreed that one may neither establish an eruv with him nor have him relinquish his domain; one may only rent it from him.

This was done so that it would be burdensome and costly for the Israelite, who would have to rent from him every Shabbat, and would move his residence from there, rather than learn from the gentile's ways while living with him in one courtyard.

And here,

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov disagree

about

this

decree

that

perhaps he will learn from his ways.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov,

who says that the gentile forbids only when there are two Israelites in the courtyard,

holds: Since a gentile is suspected of bloodshed,

only

two

Israelites

are accustomed to dwell

with a gentile, since when they are two they are not afraid of him. Therefore, the Sages decreed in their case that they must rent the domain, so that they would leave and would not learn from his ways.

But

one

Israelite who lives with a gentile,

it is uncommon

for him to live with a gentile, since he is afraid that the gentile will shed his blood—

the Sages did not decree in his case,

even if he happened to live with him.

This is because we maintain that the Sages did not decree with regard to a matter that is uncommon. And since, according to the fundamental law, the gentile's residence is not a residence, he does not forbid.

But Rabbi Meir holds: At times it happens that one Israelite lives

with a gentile.

And it is considered a common matter; therefore, they decreed that even one Israelite who lives with a gentile must rent from him.

And

because of this decree that perhaps he will learn from his ways,

the Sages said: An eruv is ineffective in the presence of a gentile

even though his residence is not considered a residence,

and relinquishment of domain

by the gentile [Geon Yaakov 63b, in his second explanation]

is ineffective in the presence of a gentile—

until he rents

the gentile's domain to the Israelite. This is so that, because it will be difficult for the Israelite to rent every Shabbat, he will leave there.

And we explain:

And

this matter, that

a gentile does not rent out,

that he does not rent out [that is, even if he rents it out, he retracts each time, and one must rent from him anew every Shabbat—Rosh according to Rashi's approach]—

what is the reason

that he acts in this way?

If you say, because he holds

the gentile:

Perhaps

the Israelite will come

to take possession of his domain

that he possesses in the courtyard or alleyway.

Then

this works well according to the one who says that a substantial rental [as the Gemara proceeds to explain]

is required

from the gentile, for it is understandable that the gentile would fear that the Israelite might take possession of his domain.

But according to the one who says that an insubstantial rental is required—

what is there to say?!

As it was stated:

Rav Ḥisda said:

The Israelite must rent

a substantial rental.

And Rav Sheshet said:

It is sufficient for him to rent from the gentile

an insubstantial rental.

And the Gemara explains:

What is an insubstantial rental,

and

what is a substantial rental?

If you say

that the rental

is substantial

when it involves

a

payment of

a peruta,

because the rental was acquired according to its law, through a monetary payment of at least one peruta, whereas a rental

is insubstantial

when it involves

a

payment of

less than the value of a peruta,

for such a payment is not effective to acquire an actual place through rental.

This cannot be said.

For

is there anyone who says that

a rental

from a gentile for less than the value of a peruta is not

acquired?!

But Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Rabbi Yaakov bar Giyori sent in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Know that one rents from a gentile

his domain in order to permit carrying in the courtyard [Rambam]

even for less than the value of a peruta.

And

furthermore,

in addition,

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: A descendant of Noah is executed for

robbery that he committed against a gentile [Ritva], even

for less than the value of a peruta,

since a gentile does not waive less than the value of a peruta, it is considered robbery for them even when it is less than the value of a peruta, and he is executed for it, as is the law of a descendant of Noah who transgressed one of the seven Noahide mitzvot [for robbery is one of the seven mitzvot].

And it cannot be restored,

that is, even if he returns it, he is not acquitted. For only with regard to an Israelite is it written, “And he shall restore the stolen item that he stole,” but not with regard to a gentile.

And since this is so, the same applies here: for them, even less than the value of a peruta is considered significant for renting from them.

And now it cannot be explained that they disagree over whether a peruta is required, for how could Rav Ḥisda hold that a rental must be for a peruta?!

Rather, a rental

is substantial

when he makes an agreement with the gentile that he may fill the courtyard

with benches

with moharaki

and

thrones

.

Whereas a rental

is insubstantial

when it is

without

[that is, he has no permission to fill it]

benches and thrones.

And now we return to the question concerning the statement that the gentile does not wish to rent because he fears that they will take possession of his domain:

This works well according to the one who says that a substantial rental is required,

for he indeed has reason to fear.

But according to the one who says that an insubstantial rental is required—

what is there to say?

What does the gentile have to fear, when he did not grant him permission to interfere with his use of the courtyard?!

And we answer:

Even so, the gentile is afraid

that the Israelite who rents from him intends

to

perform

sorcery,

since he does not understand why he is renting from him,

and

therefore he

does not rent out

to him.

The essential statement: A gentile's courtyard is like an animal pen.

That is: A courtyard in which several gentiles live in houses, with no Israelite living in this courtyard—although if the courtyard belonged to Israelites, it would be forbidden for anyone to carry from a house designated for one Israelite into the courtyard shared by all of them—because of the gentiles,

it is permitted to bring in and take out from the courtyard to the houses, and from the houses to the courtyard.

The reason is that the gentiles' domains are not divided so as to be considered the separate domain of each individual, since a gentile's residence is not considered a residence, but is like an animal pen.

Therefore, when an Israelite comes to carry from a gentile's house into the courtyard, it is not considered carrying from a domain designated for that gentile into a domain belonging to all of them.

And if there is there—

in this courtyard, in addition to the gentiles—

one Israelite, he forbids

everyone from carrying from the gentiles' houses into the courtyard.

Because it is like his courtyard [a Tosefta not mentioned in the Gemara, which Rashi cites]

belonging exclusively to the Israelite: since the gentile's residence is not considered a residence, it is as though he has no domain in the courtyard. It follows that one who carries from a gentile's house into the Israelite's courtyard is carrying from one domain into another, which is forbidden.

Specifically, an Israelite forbids carrying from a gentile's house. But a gentile does not forbid carrying from the Israelite's house into the courtyard, even though it is shared by both of them [and below the Gemara challenges this: Why does he not forbid?].

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: He never forbids until there are two Israelites who forbid one another.

These are the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov; how he disagrees with Rabbi Meir will be explained later in the Gemara.