Eruvin 46b — the Talmud in English

Rav Pappa said,

he answers what we raised: Why did Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi need to say, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri,” after he had already said, “The halakha is in accordance with the words of the lenient one in matters of eruv”?

It was necessary,

for if not,

you might have thought: This applies only to courtyard eruvin, that the halakha is in accordance with the words of the lenient one, but with regard to boundary eruvin—

in which Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis disagreed—

say no. Therefore

it was

necessary

for him to say that even with regard to boundary eruvin, the halakha is in accordance with the words of the lenient one.

And we explain it:

And from where do you say that we distinguish between courtyard eruvin and boundary eruvin,

to be more lenient in this one than in that one?

As we learned: Rabbi Yehuda said:

When are these words applicable,

that one does not establish an eruv for a person without his knowledge?

With regard to boundary eruvin,

since he loses through the eruv—for it was placed for him on the eastern side of the city—the two thousand cubits that he had on the western side of the city. And even if he made his mind known that he wanted to have his eruv on the eastern side and to lose two thousand cubits on the western side, even so, one does not establish an eruv for him without his knowledge, since there is some disadvantage there, as he loses two thousand cubits [Tosafot and Ritva].

But with regard to courtyard eruvin,

where he loses nothing through the fact that they established an eruv on his behalf, even though there is some disadvantage there, as they established it with his bread without his knowledge, even so,

they establish an eruv whether with his knowledge or without his knowledge,

and because

one may confer a benefit upon a person in his absence, but one may cause a disadvantage to a person only in his presence. [This was explained on the basis of Tosafot and the Ritva; see what the Gaon Yaakov wondered about their interpretation.]

Behold, we see that even in a place where there is some disadvantage, they are more lenient with courtyard eruvin than with boundary eruvin. And since this is so, one might have said that the same is true: We say that the halakha is in accordance with the words of the lenient one only with regard to courtyard eruvin. He therefore teaches us otherwise.

Rav Ashi said

he answers:

in response:

It was necessary

to say that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, even though he had already informed us that the halakha is in accordance with the words of the lenient one in matters of eruv.

For if not,

you might have thought: This applies only

that we hold in accordance with the lenient one in matters of eruv

with regard to the remnants of an eruv,

where he placed a courtyard eruv in a guarded place for several Shabbatot, and after some time the eruv diminished below the measure of two meals required for a courtyard eruv [as the Gemara will bring shortly, that Rabbi Yosei was lenient in this matter, saying that even if only any amount remained, it is suitable].

But with regard to the beginning of an eruv,

such as the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis,

say no; we do not hold in accordance with the lenient one. He therefore teaches us otherwise. [Rashi.]

See the Torat Chaim, which raised many difficulties against this interpretation, and explained the words of the Gemara differently.

And from where do you say that we distinguish between the remnants of an eruv and the beginning of an eruv?

As we learned: Rabbi Yosei said: When are these words applicable,

that a measure of two meals is required for a courtyard eruv?

At the beginning of an eruv, but with regard to the remnants of an eruv, even

if

nothing remained except

any amount,

and the reason is: Because according to the essential law, the Sages did not require a measure of two meals for courtyard eruvin even at the outset,

and they said that one should establish a courtyard eruv

with two meals

only so as not to cause the teaching of an eruv to be forgotten

of boundaries—which requires two meals—

by children. [This was explained according to Rashi’s interpretation here—not in accordance with his words on page 80—and Tosafot likewise agreed, as the Maharsha explained their words.]

Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Zerika said:

a.

The halakha

everywhere is

in accordance with Rabbi Akiva

specifically

against his colleague

the single individual who disagreed with him; but when his many colleagues disagreed with him, not so.

b.

And

the

halakha

is

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei

even

against his many colleagues who disagreed with him.

c.

And

the

halakha

is

in accordance with Rabbi

specifically against his colleague, and not against his colleagues.

And we explain:

For what halakhic purpose

were these principles stated? That is to say: Is it possible, on the basis of these principles, to issue a practical ruling, “or perhaps they said this merely as an inference, but we do not rely upon it to derive a halakha from the general principle”? [Rashi.]

Rabbi Asi said: It is actual halakha,

and one performs an act on this basis, and they even expound this publicly [Tosafot in the name of Rashi].

And Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said: They incline

the ruling in this direction. That is to say: If one comes before us to ask, we instruct him to act in accordance with their words, but we do not expound this publicly.

And Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Hanina said: They appear

so. Even if one comes before us to ask, we do not instruct him in accordance with these principles; rather, if an act has already been performed in accordance with their words, we do not reverse the act.

In this wording

in which Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Zerika stated these principles of halakha,

said

also

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi;

and just as the amoraim disagreed concerning the words of Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Zerika whether they said “halakha,” or “they incline,” or “they appear,” so too did they disagree concerning the words of Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi, for he too said them in the same wording that they used [so Rashi explained; see Gaon Yaakov, s.v. “in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.”]

But many of the early authorities explained: It was the following statement of Rabbi Yohanan that Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi said in his name, as brought in the Gaon Yaakov there.

Rabbi Yohanan said:

a.

When Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda

disagreed,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

b.

When Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei

disagreed,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

c.

And it is not necessary to say, when Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

disagreed,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

because

now, in the place of Rabbi Yehuda

that is to say, when Rabbi Meir disagreed with him—

there is no standing

for the words of Rabbi Meir; rather, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

in the place of Rabbi Yosei—

where even the words of Rabbi Yehuda have no standing in his place—and is it necessary

to ask

that we say that the words of Rabbi Meir have no standing, but the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei?

Rav Asi said: Since Rabbi Yohanan said: When Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei disagree, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

I too learn

from this

that

when Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon disagree, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

d

Behold,

Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan

another principle:

When Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon

disagreed,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

And since this is so, I shall learn:

Now, in the place of Rabbi Yehuda there is no standing

for the words of Rabbi Shimon; rather, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

in the place of Rabbi Yosei—

where even the words of Rabbi Yehuda have no standing in his place, as Rabbi Yohanan said above—and is it necessary

to ask

that we say that the words of Rabbi Shimon have no standing, but the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei?

They raised a dilemma:

In a case where

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagreed,

what

is the halakha?

And we conclude:

Let it stand!

Rav Mesharsheya said: These principles do not stand,

the principles formulated above, that wherever so-and-so and so-and-so disagree, the halakha is in accordance with so-and-so; rather, every case is judged according to what appears reasonable as the ruling in it.

And we explain:

From where does Rav Mesharsheya derive this?

If you say, from this:

As we learned

in our Mishna concerning three people who acquired the establishment of their residence within four cubits, each adjacent to the other, and the middle one was encompassed between them, part of his cubits being encompassed within those of this one and part of his cubits being encompassed within those of his colleague, for we hold that the Mishna there says: He is permitted with them and they are permitted with him, while the two outer ones are prohibited with one another:

Rabbi Shimon says: To what can this be compared? To three courtyards that are open to one another and are open

each through an additional entrance

to the public domain,

and you learn from here that if

the two outer ones established an eruv

of courtyards

with the middle one,

but the outer ones did not establish an eruv with one another,

it

the middle one

is permitted with them, and they

are permitted with it, while the two outer ones are prohibited with one another,

just as we say with regard to the establishment of residence within four cubits.

And Rav Hama bar Gurya said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon

with regard to the three courtyards, and not in accordance with the Sages who disagreed with him.

And

from here you learn that these principles do not stand: For

who disagreed with him

Rabbi Shimon?

Rabbi Yehuda,

who was the standard disputant of Rabbi Shimon [Rashi, in his first formulation; and see there further]!

And if so, this is difficult:

You said: When Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

so how do we rule here in accordance with Rabbi Shimon?!

Rather, is it not to be inferred from here that they do not stand,

these principles!

This cannot be said:

For

what difficulty

is there from here against these principles, such that we should learn from here that these principles do not stand?

Perhaps wherever it was stated

explicitly,

it was stated, and wherever it was not stated

which ruling to follow,

it was not stated,

and then we rule according to these principles!

Rather,

perhaps we should say that Rav Mesharsheya’s statement that these principles do not stand is

from this:

As we learned

in the following chapter:

a. A city that initially had six hundred thousand people [“a city of the many”]—one may not establish an eruv for the entire city through courtyard eruvin and alleyway partnerships in order to permit carrying throughout it [even if it does not contain a public domain, as its streets are not sixteen cubits wide; the reason for this law will be explained in its place].

b.

A city of an individual

that did not have six hundred thousand people

and became

that is to say, although it became later a city

of the many,

where houses and markets were built there and it now has six hundred thousand people,

one may establish an eruv for all of it

as at the outset [the reason for this law will be explained in its place; provided that there is not there a complete public domain sixteen cubits wide].

c.

A city

that was initially

of the many and became

afterward a city

of an individual,

the Sages said that its law is like that of a city of the many, because they were concerned that perhaps it would again become a city of the many. Therefore:

one may not establish an eruv for all of it unless he makes

a distinguishing sign for it, by leaving over from the city

outside it

outside the area included in the eruv—the number of its dwellings equal to the number of dwellings of the

city

“Hadashah”

in Judea

that is the name of the city,

which has fifty dwellings.

The words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Shimon says: