Eruvin 46b (מו:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Pappa said:

He resolves the difficulty that we raised: Why did Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi need to say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, after he had already said that the halakha is in accordance with the more lenient opinion in matters of eruv?

It was necessary

to say so, because otherwise

you might have thought: This applies only to courtyard eruvin, where the halakha is in accordance with the more lenient opinion; but with regard to boundary eruvin—

the matter over which Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis disagreed—

say that it does not.

Therefore, it was

necessary

for him to state that even with regard to boundary eruvin, the halakha is in accordance with the more lenient opinion.

And we explain it:

And from where do you say that we distinguish between courtyard eruvin and boundary eruvin,

to be more lenient in the former than in the latter?

As we learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Yehuda said:

In what context is this statement

that one may not establish an eruv for a person without his knowledge?

With regard to boundary eruvin,

since the eruv causes him a loss: If the eruv was placed for him to the east of the city, he loses the two thousand cubits that he had to the west of the city. And even if he had indicated that he wanted his eruv to be to the east and was willing to forgo the two thousand cubits to the west, nevertheless one may not establish an eruv for him without his knowledge, since there is some disadvantage involved, as he loses two thousand cubits [Tosafot and the Ritva].

But with regard to courtyard eruvin,

where he loses nothing through the eruv established on his behalf—even though there is some disadvantage in that the eruv was made with his bread without his knowledge—nevertheless

one may establish an eruv both with his knowledge and without his knowledge,

because

one may confer a benefit upon a person in his absence, but one may not cause a person a disadvantage except in his presence. [

This has been explained in accordance with Tosafot and the Ritva; see also what the Gaon Yaakov asks concerning their interpretation.]

We see, then, that even where there is some disadvantage, the halakha is more lenient with regard to courtyard eruvin than with regard to boundary eruvin. Consequently, one might have thought that the same applies here: We say that the halakha follows the more lenient opinion only with regard to courtyard eruvin. The statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi teaches us otherwise.

Rav Ashi said

in response:

It was necessary

to state that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, even though he had already taught us that the halakha follows the more lenient opinion in matters of eruv.

Because otherwise,

you might have thought: This applies

when we establish the halakha according to the more lenient opinion

with regard to the remnants of an eruv: One placed a courtyard eruv in a protected location for several Shabbatot, and after some time the eruv diminished below the measure of two meals required for a courtyard eruv [as the Gemara will soon cite, Rabbi Yosei was lenient in this matter, ruling that even if only any amount remained, it is sufficient].

But with regard to the initial establishment of an eruv,

such as the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis,

say that we do not

establish the halakha according to the more lenient opinion. The statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi teaches us otherwise. [Rashi.]

See the Torat Chaim, which raises many difficulties with this interpretation and explains the words of the Gemara differently.

And from where do you say that we distinguish between the remnants of an eruv and the initial establishment of an eruv?

As we learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Yosei said: In what context is this statement

that a measure of two meals is required for a courtyard eruv?

With regard to the initial establishment of an eruv; but with regard to the remnants of an eruv, even if

nothing remained

but any amount,

the reason is that, according to the fundamental law, the Sages did not require a measure of two meals for a courtyard eruv even initially,

and they said that one must establish a courtyard eruv

with two meals

only so that the laws of eruv would not be forgotten,

the boundary eruv—which requires two meals—

by children. [This has been explained in accordance with Rashi’s interpretation here—not in accordance with his words on page 80—and Tosafot likewise agreed, as the Maharsha explained their words.]

Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Zerika said:

Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Zerika said:

a.

The halakha

everywhere is

in accordance with Rabbi Akiva

only

when he is opposed by one colleague

who disagrees with him; but when he is opposed by several colleagues, it is not so.

b.

And

the halakha is

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei

even

when he is opposed by his many colleagues

who disagree with him.

c.

And

the halakha is

in accordance with Rabbi

only

when he is opposed by one colleague

and not when he is opposed by several colleagues.

And we explain:

For what halakhic purpose

were these principles stated? In other words: Is it possible to issue a practical ruling on the basis of these principles, “or perhaps they stated this merely as a matter of reasoning, but we do not rely upon it to derive a halakha from the general principle”? [Rashi.]

Rabbi Asi said: It is an actual halakha,

and one performs an act in accordance with it; moreover, one publicly expounds it in this manner [Tosafot in the name of Rashi].

And Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said: We incline

the ruling in this manner. That is, when someone comes before us to ask, we instruct him to act in accordance with their statements, but we do not publicly expound it in this manner.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina said: It appears

so. Even when someone comes before us to ask, we do not instruct him in accordance with these principles; rather, if an act has already been performed in accordance with their statements, we do not overturn the act.

In this wording

in which Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Zerika stated these principles of halakha,

also said

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi

it.

And just as the amoraim disagreed concerning the statement of Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Zerika—whether they said “the halakha,” “we incline,” or “it appears”—so too did they disagree concerning the statement of Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi, who also stated it in the same wording that they used [so Rashi explained; see the Gaon Yaakov, s.v. “in accordance with Rabbi Yosei”]. [

But many of the Rishonim explained that it is the statement of Rabbi Yohanan below that Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi stated in his name, as cited in the Gaon Yaakov there.]

Rabbi Yohanan said:

a.

When Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda

disagree,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

b.

When Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei

disagree,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

c.

And it is unnecessary to say that when Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

disagree,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

because

now, in the case of Rabbi Yehuda [that is, when Rabbi Meir disagrees with him],

there is no place

for the words of Rabbi Meir, but the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda;

in the case of Rabbi Yosei—

where even the words of Rabbi Yehuda have no place—and

need

we say that there is no place for the words of Rabbi Meir, but the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei?

Rav Asi said: Since Rabbi Yohanan said that when Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei disagree, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

I too derive

from this

that

when Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon disagree, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

d

For

Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said

another principle:

When Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon

disagree,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

And consequently, I will derive:

Now, in the case of Rabbi Yehuda, there is no place

for the words of Rabbi Shimon, but the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda;

in the case of Rabbi Yosei—

where even the words of Rabbi Yehuda have no place, as Rabbi Yohanan said above—

need

we say that there is no place for the words of Rabbi Shimon, but the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei?

They raised a dilemma:

When

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree, what

is the halakha?

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Rav Mesharsheya said: These principles are not valid

—the principles stated above, that wherever so-and-so and so-and-so disagree, the halakha is in accordance with so-and-so. Rather, each case must be judged according to what appears to be the appropriate ruling in that case.

And we explain:

From where does Rav Mesharsheya derive this?

If you say it is from this:

As we learned

in our Mishna, concerning three people who acquired their residence for a four-cubit area, one beside the other, with the middle person’s area overlapping those of the two others—part of his cubits overlapping one person’s area and part overlapping his colleague’s area—the halakha stated there in the Mishna is that he is permitted with them and they are permitted with him, while the two outer ones are prohibited to one another:

Rabbi Shimon says: To what can this be compared? To three courtyards that open into one another and open

each through an additional entrance

onto the public domain.

And you can learn from here that if

the two outer courtyards established eruvin

courtyard eruvin

with the middle courtyard

but the outer courtyards did not establish an eruv with one another,

it [

the middle courtyard]

is permitted with them and they

are permitted with it, while the two outer courtyards are prohibited to one another,

just as we say with regard to residence for a four-cubit area.

And Rav Hama bar Gurya said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon

with regard to the three courtyards, and not in accordance with the Sages who disagreed with him.

And

from here you can derive that these principles are not valid: For

who disagrees with him—

with Rabbi Shimon?

Rabbi Yehuda,

who was Rabbi Shimon’s standard disputant [Rashi, in his first formulation; see there as well]!

If so, this is difficult:

You said that when Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

so how can we rule here in accordance with Rabbi Shimon?!

Rather, can one not conclude from this that they are not valid,

these principles?

This cannot be said:

For

what difficulty

is there here against these principles, such that we should conclude from here that these principles are not valid?

Perhaps, where an explicit ruling was stated,

it was stated explicitly,

and where no ruling was stated

as to whom to follow,

no ruling was stated;

and in that case we rule according to these principles!

Rather, [

perhaps we should say that Rav Mesharsheya’s statement that these principles are not valid is derived

from this:

As we learned [

in the following chapter]:

a. A city that initially had six hundred thousand people [“a city of the public”] may not have its entire area joined through courtyard eruvin and alleyway partnerships so as to permit carrying throughout the entire city [even if it does not contain a public domain, meaning that its streets are not sixteen cubits wide; the reason for this law will be explained in its place].

b.

A city belonging to an individual

that did not have six hundred thousand people,

and became [

that is, even though it became] in time a city

belonging to the public,

where houses and markets were built and it now has six hundred thousand people,

may have its entire area joined

as it was initially [the reason for this law will be explained in its place, provided that it does not contain a full-fledged public domain sixteen cubits wide].

c.

A city

that was initially

a city belonging to the public and became

subsequently a city

belonging to an individual,

the Sages said that its status is that of a city belonging to the public, because they were concerned that it might again become a city belonging to the public. Therefore,

its entire area may not be joined unless one makes

a distinguishing sign for it, by leaving outside

it [

outside the joined area] a number of residents equal to the number of residents of the

city

“Hadasha”

in Judea [

that is the name of the city],

which has fifty dwellings.

These are the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Shimon says: