Eruvin 46a (מו.) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection to this: If so, that the water is absorbed in the clouds,

all the more so it is newly created matter and is forbidden

according to Rashi’s version, because it is muktze and may not be moved even within its four cubits; then how can the beraita state that it has two thousand cubits in every direction?!

Therefore, we answer the question of why the water did not acquire its place of residence in the clouds in another manner:

Rather, the water in the clouds is constantly moving

since the clouds do not remain in one place but move from place to place; this appears to be the straightforward interpretation. And since they do not remain stationary, they do not acquire a place of residence.

Now that you have arrived at this

conclusion, that something that does not remain stationary does not acquire a place of residence, regarding

the ocean

that is, concerning what we asked above: “Let it acquire a place of residence in the ocean,”

you should likewise have no difficulty:

for

the water in the ocean is also constantly moving

and does not acquire a place of residence there.

And it was taught

likewise, that water that does not remain stationary does not acquire a place of residence:

flowing rivers

whose waters do not remain stationary but continue flowing

and flowing springs

whose waters do not remain stationary do not acquire a place of residence; therefore,

they are like the feet of every person

that is, like the feet of the one who draws the water, according to Tosafot and the Ritva. And even if they have owners, the water drawn from them is not like the feet of its owners, but like the feet of the one who draws it.

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri

that a sleeping person acquires a place of residence. But ownerless objects do not acquire a place of residence, as will be explained shortly.

He said

that is, he asked

Rabbi Zeira asked Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi: Did you hear this explicitly

from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi,

or did you hear it by inference

that you heard another statement from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and inferred from his words that he held in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri?

He said to him

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi said to Rabbi Zeira:

I heard it explicitly.

And we explain Rabbi Zeira’s question as to whether he heard it by inference, meaning that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said something from which it could be learned that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri:

What

is this

inference

that can be drawn from it?

For Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The halakha is in accordance with the more lenient opinion in matters of eruv

in all their aspects, and the laws of boundaries are among the laws of eruvin. Since Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri is lenient concerning a sleeping person, ruling that he acquires a place of residence and that one does not say that he is forbidden to leave his four cubits, the halakha should be in accordance with his opinion.

And we object:

And

since you have said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explicitly stated that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri in this matter, then

why do I need both statements

that he said that the halakha is in accordance with the more lenient opinion in matters of eruv, and he also said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri?

Rabbi Zeira said: Both are necessary

these two statements:

For had he taught us only

that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, I would have said

that the halakha is in accordance with him

both for leniency

that is, in the case of a sleeping person, where his opinion is lenient,

and for stringency

that is, concerning ownerless objects, which according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri acquire a place of residence, and it is forbidden to remove them beyond their boundary. Therefore,

he teaches us

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi:

The halakha is in accordance with the more lenient opinion in matters of eruv

to teach that the halakha is not entirely in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan; only a sleeping person acquires a place of residence even though he lacks awareness, because we say: Since an awake person acquires a place of residence, a sleeping person likewise acquires one. But ownerless objects, which have no awareness at all with which to acquire a place of residence, are not governed by the halakha in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and do not acquire a place of residence. This has been explained according to the wording of Rashi, Tosafot, and the Ritva. See also another interpretation in the Ritva.

And we explain further:

Let him say

only

“The halakha is in accordance with the more lenient opinion in matters of eruv,”

and

“The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri” -

why do I need

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to say it?

It was necessary! It might enter your mind to say: This applies

that the halakha is in accordance with the more lenient opinion in matters of eruv when

an individual is lenient in the presence of an individual

who disagrees with him,

and

the halakha follows the

majority

who are lenient

in the presence of a majority

who disagree with them.

But when an individual

is lenient

in the presence of a majority, say that it does not

apply, and the halakha follows the majority even though they are stringent. Therefore, he teaches us that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri as a leniency, even though the majority disagrees with him.

He said

Rava expressed his astonishment

to Abaye

at these answers:

Since

after all,

eruvin

including the laws of boundaries

are rabbinic

and therefore

what difference is there between an individual in the presence of an individual and an individual in the presence of a majority

? Obviously, in every case the halakha is in accordance with the more lenient opinion. The original question thus returns: Why was it necessary to teach us that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri?

Rav Pappa said to Rava: And

when the laws are

rabbinic, is there no distinction for us between an individual in the presence of an individual and an individual in the presence of a majority?!

But wasn’t it taught:

Rabbi Eliezer

according to the version in the older manuscripts

says:

The Sages decreed that every woman who sees blood renders impure the pure items that she touched during the preceding twenty-four hours, because we say that perhaps the blood was displaced from its place before it emerged, and the walls of the womb held it back. This applies only to a woman who has an established status of seeing blood. But

any woman who has passed through three periods

a period being the usual interval for the onset of menstruation, namely, from thirty days to thirty days, without seeing blood, if she sees blood afterward,

it is sufficient for her to reckon from the time she saw it

to render pure items impure; she does not render pure items impure retroactively for the preceding twenty-four hours.

And it was taught

concerning this:

It once happened that Rabbi acted in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer!

After he remembered

the initial assumption is that he remembered that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,

Rabbi said

Rabbi:

Rabbi Eliezer is worthy of being relied upon in a time of pressing need

when there were years of famine and there would be a loss of pure items.

Let us examine the matter:

What does “after he remembered” mean?

If you say that it means after he remembered

that it had been explicitly stated concerning this dispute

that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer but in accordance with the Rabbis?

That is impossible, for if so,

how could he act in accordance with his opinion in a time of pressing need?

Rather

you are compelled to say that the reason he did not retract, even after remembering, was

that

in truth

no ruling had been stated that the halakha is neither in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer nor in accordance with the Rabbis.

And

after he remembered

what had been said in the beraita, this means that he remembered

that it was not an individual who disagreed with him

that is, with Rabbi Eliezer,

but a majority disagreed with him.

It therefore follows that one must act in accordance with the majority; and since this was the reason, it is fitting that he

said: Rabbi Eliezer is worthy of being relied upon in a time of pressing need.

It is thus compelled that although the entire decree that pure items become impure retroactively for the preceding twenty-four hours is only rabbinic, nevertheless, were it not a time of pressing need, one would have to act in accordance with the majority.

Accordingly, we can properly say: Had Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi not explicitly stated that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, I would have said that since a majority disagrees with him, one should be stringent in accordance with the opinion of the majority.

He said

expressing his astonishment

Rav Mesharsheya

also

to Rava; and some say that it was Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak

who expressed his astonishment

to Rava

because he did not distinguish between an individual in the presence of an individual and an individual in the presence of a majority:

But it was taught:

A report

that a person hears concerning the death of a relative, when it is

recent

as will be explained,

entails observing seven and thirty

that is, the person who heard the report must observe seven days of mourning and thirty days of mourning.

A report

that is distant does not entail observing

mourning

except for one day.

And which is a recent report, and which is a distant report?

If he heard it

within thirty days

of the deceased’s death, this is a

recent

report; but if he heard it

after thirty days

it is a

distant

report.

These are the words of Rabbi Akiva.

And the Sages say: Whether it is a recent report or a distant report, it entails observing seven and thirty

And

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Everywhere

apart from the laws of mourning, according to Tosafot,

where you find an individual who is lenient and a majority who are stringent

even when the matter is only rabbinic,

the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the more numerous stringent authorities, except for this

that is, except for the laws of mourning, according to Tosafot,

for even though Rabbi Akiva

who is a single authority is the one who

is lenient, while the Sages

who are the majority

are stringent,

even so,

the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva

since he is the one who is lenient.

And

we explain the reason: because

he held

Rabbi Yohanan

in accordance with Shmuel, for Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the more lenient opinion in matters of mourning.

We see, then, that

it is specifically with regard to mourning that the Rabbis were lenient

and allowed reliance on the individual who is lenient;

but generally, even with regard to rabbinic matters, there is a distinction between an individual in the presence of an individual and an individual in the presence of a majority

and where the stringent authorities are the majority, one acts in accordance with them.