Eruvin 47a — the Talmud in English

It is sufficient that he leave some area unjoined and not combine everything:

three courtyards belonging to two houses.

And Rav Hama bar Gurya said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon!

From here you can learn that those general rules do not apply. For

who disagrees with him—

Rabbi Shimon?

Rabbi Yehuda! But you said that

wherever

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda?!

You must therefore conclude that those general rules do not apply.

This too cannot be said. For

what is the difficulty? Perhaps here too, wherever it was explicitly stated

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

it was stated

that this is the halakha even when Rabbi Yehuda disagrees. However,

where it was not stated, it was not stated,

and we rule according to those general rules.

Rather,

you might say that those general rules do not apply]

from this:

As we learned:

a. A courtyard to which many houses open: it is prohibited to carry from a house belonging exclusively to one of the residents of the courtyard into the jointly owned courtyard until all the residents of the courtyard establish an eruv, a joint legal residence, with one another. If one of the residents of the courtyard was a gentile, he too prevents them—in certain circumstances—from carrying from their private domain into the shared courtyard, unless he relinquishes his rights to his portion of the courtyard.

b. Even

one who leaves his house and goes to spend Shabbat in another city, whether he is a gentile or a Jew, prevents the residents of the

of the

courtyards

.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

Since he is not in the city, he

does not prevent

the residents of the courtyards from carrying.

Rabbi Yosei says:

A gentile

who leaves his house and goes to another city

does prevent them,

because he might come during Shabbat, and one does not remove his house from his thoughts. Therefore, it is considered a dwelling that has an owner.

However,

a Jew

who goes to spend Shabbat in another city

does not prevent them, because

he has removed his house from his thoughts,

as it is not the practice of a Jew to return

to his house

on Shabbat.

Therefore, it is considered a dwelling without an owner, which does not prevent the residents from carrying.

Rabbi Shimon says:

Whether a gentile or a Jew, he does not prevent them, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

Moreover,

even if he leaves his house

on the eve of Shabbat

and goes to spend Shabbat with his daughter,

who is

in the same city, he does not prevent

the residents of the courtyard from carrying,

because he has already removed from his mind

the possibility of returning on Shabbat. It is therefore considered a dwelling without an owner, unlike Rabbi Yehuda, who says that if he did not leave for another city, he does prevent them.

And Rav Hama bar Gurya said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

And

from here you can learn that those general rules do not apply, for

which

sage is the

one who disagrees with him,

Rabbi Shimon?

Rabbi Yehuda; but you said that when Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon

disagree,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda?

Rather, you must conclude that those general rules do not apply. !!

This too cannot be said.

For

what is the difficulty?

Perhaps here too, wherever it was stated

explicitly whose view is to be followed,

it was stated,

and

where it was not stated

whose ruling should be followed,

it was not stated,

and we rule according to those general rules!

Rather,

you might say that those general rules do not apply]

from this:

As we learned [in the continuation of the chapter], concerning one who was traveling home and Shabbat became imminent: If he recognized a tree or a fence between the place where he was standing and his home, he says, “My residence is beneath it,” referring to that tree or fence. If he did not recognize one, he says, “My residence is where I am.” This enables him to establish a Shabbat residence even though he did not place bread there:

This is [the law mentioned above]

And this is [the law mentioned above]

[who has no bread],

what they said: A poor person

who has no bread, or one who is traveling and has no bread with him, and is therefore like a poor person,

establishes his residence through his feet [without bread].

However, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed concerning this law:

However, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about this law:

Rabbi Meir says: We have no case

in which one can establish his residence through his feet

except a poor person—

that is, one who is traveling and has no bread with him. But one who has bread can establish his residence only with bread.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Both a poor person and a wealthy person

may establish their residence even without bread, and

the Sages said

that one

establishes residence with bread only

in order

to make it easier for the wealthy person, so that he need not leave

and trouble himself

to establish his residence through his feet.

The discussion there explains the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda in greater detail.]

And Rav Hiyya bar Ashi taught this Mishna to Hiyya bar Rav in Rav’s presence

before Rav], including Rabbi Yehuda’s statement:

“Both a poor person and a wealthy person,” and Rav said to him

Rav Hiyya bar Ashi:

“Conclude with it”

continue and say to him as well]:

“The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda!”

But surely this raises a difficulty:

Why do I need two statements?

Did you not say

that wherever

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda?

Why, then, did Rav need to teach us here that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda? You must conclude that those general rules do not apply.

This too cannot be said, for

what is the difficulty? Perhaps

only

Rav

is the one who

does not accept those general rules,

and therefore he needed to teach us that here the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda; but everyone else accepts those general rules.

Rather,

you might say that what Rav Mesharsheya said—that those general rules do not apply—was learned]

from this:

We find that Rabbi Yohanan himself—who stated these general rules—did not accept them [Ritba; and this also appears to be implied by Rashi below], concerning

what we learned:

a. If a woman whose husband died is pregnant and ultimately gives birth to a viable child, then from the time she became pregnant she is like the wife of a brother who has children, who is not subject to the mitzva of levirate marriage. If her husband’s brother has relations with her, he incurs the punishment of karet.

b. If a woman whose husband died is pregnant but the fetus is not viable and she miscarries it, she becomes subject to levirate marriage from the time her husband dies. Nevertheless, if she performs halitza while pregnant, it is not a valid halitza [as Rashi cited here; see the Gemara, tractate Yevamot, in that discussion]. Therefore:

The woman subject to levirate marriage may not perform halitza

she is forbidden to perform halitza] immediately after her husband’s death, because we are concerned that she may be pregnant with a nonviable fetus and be subject to levirate marriage. The halitza that she performs now would not release her, because halitza performed by a pregnant woman is not valid; yet she might then marry relying on this halitza [Rashi here and in the discussion in Yevamot; see that discussion].

And she may not enter into levirate marriage

immediately, because perhaps she is pregnant with a viable fetus, in which case the brother would be having relations with the wife of a brother who has children, for which he incurs the punishment of karet. A pregnant woman is not subject to levirate marriage.

Rather,

until she has

from the day her husband died

three months,

for once her pregnancy has not become apparent, she is presumed not to be pregnant and may perform halitza or enter into levirate marriage.

And likewise all other women

whose husbands died:

They may not marry

immediately, because perhaps the woman is pregnant. When she gives birth, we will not know whether the child is the first husband’s, born after nine months, or the second husband’s, born after seven months. There is concern that she might give birth to another child from her second husband, who might then marry and die, and the first husband’s brother might enter into levirate marriage with her, even though it is uncertain whether the deceased was his paternal brother as well. He would then violate the prohibition against marrying his maternal brother’s wife, [for the mitzva of levirate marriage applies only to the wife of a paternal brother].

And

also

they may not become betrothed,

as a safeguard lest they marry.

Rather,

until they have three months

that have passed since their husbands’ deaths, for once their pregnancies have not become apparent, there is no longer any concern.

They are forbidden to marry during this period:

Whether

they were widowed while betrothed and were still

virgins,

and although there is no concern that the child is the first husband’s, since she did not have relations with him, the Sages issued a decree as a safeguard for married women;

or

they were widowed after marriage and were

non-virgins.

Whether they are widows or divorcees.

Whether they were betrothed or married,

the Gemara in Yevamot explains that this interprets the first clause: “whether virgins,” meaning betrothed women, and “whether non-virgins,” meaning married women].

Rabbi Yehuda says:

Women married

to the first husband

may become betrothed

to a second husband immediately, since there is no concern that they will give birth from the second husband; and he did not issue a decree concerning betrothal as a safeguard against marriage.

For this same reason, women who were only

betrothed

to the first husband and were widowed

may marry

the second husband, since they did not have relations with the first husband and the child will not be subject to uncertainty.

Except for a betrothed woman in Judea,

who may not become betrothed

because the heart

of her fiancé

is attached to her

he is familiar with her, knows her, and she is willing to him], because in that region it was customary for the bride and groom to be alone together even before marriage, and we are concerned that he might have relations with her.

Rabbi Yosei says:

for her husband.

All women

who were married

may become betrothed,

and all betrothed women may marry, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, since there is no concern; and we do not issue a decree concerning betrothal as a safeguard against marriage.

Nevertheless, Rabbi Yosei disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda in this matter. According to Rabbi Yehuda, there is no distinction between a widow and a divorcee, and even a widow may become betrothed during her mourning period. Rabbi Yosei, however, holds:

Except for a widow,

who is forbidden even to become betrothed immediately, until thirty days of mourning for her husband have passed,

because of mourning

for her husband.

And we say:

There was an incident, and

Rabbi Elazar

according to the textual tradition of the Talmud]

did not enter the house of study; he encountered

Rabbi Elazar

who was standing

he was standing],

and he said to him—

Rabbi Elazar said to Rabbi Asi:

What are they saying

today

in the house of study?

He said to him: This is what Rabbi Yohanan said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

that we do not issue a decree concerning betrothal as a safeguard against marriage.

And

further

we say

Rashi’s version], raising a difficulty concerning Rabbi Yohanan’s statement [and through explaining his statement, the proof that those general rules do not apply will become clear]:

It is implied from the fact that Rabbi Yohanan ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

by inference

that the anonymous ruling in the Mishna above [in the statement of the one who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei], which says, “Likewise, all women may neither marry nor become betrothed,” and “whether betrothed or married,” is not an anonymous Mishna representing an accepted ruling. Rather,

it is the view of an individual,

who

disagrees with him,

Rabbi Yosei. For if it were an anonymous Mishna, Rabbi Yohanan himself holds that “the halakha follows an anonymous Mishna”; how, then, could he rule in accordance with Rabbi Yosei? [Ritba here].

[However, Rashi in Yevamot implies that the Gemara means that only one sage, and not many, disagreed with Rabbi Yosei. For if many disagreed with him, Rabbi Yohanan should have ruled in accordance with the majority.]

But the ruling is stated anonymously, and he should have ruled accordingly?!

And we say in response:

No!

Indeed, it is the view of an individual who disagrees with him, as we find that Rabbi Meir disagrees with him and holds that even in a case where there is no concern that she might be pregnant, she is nevertheless forbidden, contrary to Rabbi Yosei. That is, the Mishna would then be an “anonymous ruling followed by a dispute,” and the halakha does not follow the anonymous ruling. [Ritba here].

And it was taught in a beraita

that is, “for it was taught as follows]:

If she was accustomed

regularly] to leave her husband and

go to her father’s house

in another city to live there, and certainly did not have relations with her husband;

or if she was angry with her husband

and did not have relations with him;

or if her husband was elderly

and incapable of fathering children;

or

if he was

ill

and incapable of having relations;

or if she was ill

and intercourse was difficult for her]; in all these cases she is certainly not pregnant. Or if she was

infertile

by nature, having already been married to three men without bearing children and thus established as infertile]; or if she was

elderly; or

to become betrothed and marry immediately,

a minor; or

This beraita clearly proves that Rabbi Meir issued a decree prohibiting marriage even in the case of women whom we know certainly are not pregnant. He is therefore also the tanna of the Mishna, who issued a decree prohibiting even betrothed women—who are not pregnant—from marrying.

an aylonit

a woman born without the capacity to bear children and who has the signs of an aylonit]; all these women are incapable of giving birth. Or

if she is incapable of bearing children

because she drank a potion;

or if her husband had been imprisoned

before he died and therefore did not have relations with her; or

if she miscarried after her husband’s death

a fetus that she had conceived from him.

All these women, although there is no concern that they are pregnant, nevertheless, if their husbands died or divorced them,

all of them must wait three months.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir,

who issues a decree as a safeguard for women whose status is uncertain because perhaps they are pregnant.

Rabbi Yosei permits

these women

to become betrothed and marry immediately,

and he does not issue a decree concerning them as a safeguard for other women.

It is therefore proven from this beraita that Rabbi Meir issued a decree forbidding marriage even in the case of women whom we know certainly are not pregnant. He is likewise the anonymous sage of this Mishna, who issued a decree forbidding even betrothed women—who are not pregnant—from marrying.

Once we have established that Rabbi Meir is the one who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei, we prove from Rabbi Yohanan that he himself did not accept those general rules:

For otherwise there would be a difficulty:

Why did

Rabbi Yohanan need to rule that in this Mishna the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei?

Did you not say—

you, Rabbi Yohanan—

that when Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

disagree anywhere,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei?

Here, Rabbi Meir is the one who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei, as we have said?!

Rather, you must conclude that those general rules do not apply, and Rabbi Yohanan never stated them. Those amoraim who attributed them to him were stating their own views. [Rashi]

This too cannot be said.

For

what is the difficulty?

Perhaps

he needed to specify the ruling here in order

to exclude the view of Rav Naḥman in the name of Shmuel, who said: The halakha follows Rabbi Meir in his decrees.

That is: Although wherever Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, this applies when they disagree about a law. But with regard to Rabbi Meir’s decrees, the halakha follows him. Since here too it is Rabbi Meir’s decree, we should actually rule in accordance with Rabbi Meir. Therefore, Rabbi Yohanan teaches us that even in this decree the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir, but in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

Rather,

you might say that what we say—that those general rules do not apply—is

from this: for

Rabbi Yohanan himself said concerning that which was

taught:

a. The Sages prohibited conducting business with a gentile on his festival day [his holiday, and even during the three days preceding his holiday], lest he go and give thanks to idolatry on his festival day.

b. But

Jews may go

to

the fair of gentiles

a market established for the festival day of idolaters]

and purchase animals, male and female slaves, from them, because they bring them into sanctity; and likewise

they permitted it and said:

houses, fields, and vineyards, because this reduces the property of the gentiles, or alternatively because it promotes the settlement of the Land of Israel [Rashi; and the Ritba explained that all these activities are permitted because these things are needed for one’s household use and are available only at the fair, making them a matter involving irreversible loss, for which the Sages did not issue a decree. This is likewise evident from tractate Moed Katan; see Rashi there, page 11].

in order to litigate with them.

c.

And he writes

documents [Rashi in Avoda Zara; this implies that it is not a continuation of the first clause and that the reference is to all documents],

and brings

them

before their courts, and has their judges sign them, even though this is an honor for them and there is concern that they might go to idolatry and thank it for this honor,

неужели ты думаешь, что речь идёт о кладбище, так что мудрецы разрешили бы это? Ведь

because this is like rescuing property from their hands.

By bringing the document before their courts, he will have witnesses and assistance, and the gentile will not be able to challenge the sale [Rashi in Avoda Zara; and from Rashi in Moed Katan it appears that the main novelty is that this is permitted even on their festival day, although on that day there is concern that they might go and thank idolatry. Rashi explains there that it is permitted because he can find them now, whereas he will not find them on another day].

d.

If he was a kohen—

who is forbidden to leave for outside the Land of Israel [because the Sages decreed that the lands of the nations convey ritual impurity]—nevertheless, they permitted it and said:

He becomes ritually impure outside the Land of Israel

in order

to litigate and contest the matter with them, because this is like rescuing property from their hands [Shulhan Arukh].

And just as he becomes ritually impure outside the Land of Israel, so

they permitted it and said:

He becomes ritually impure in a cemetery

in order to litigate with them.

And we raise a difficulty in explaining the beraita:

A cemetery—is that conceivable?

Would the Sages permit this? After all,

that impurity is of Torah origin?!

Rather

the fact that we say “cemetery” is

a beit ha-peras,

which is a field in which a grave was plowed, so that it is only a

rabbinic

prohibition, because they were concerned lest the bones have become scattered and a priest who enters there shift the bone and become impure; and here they permitted a priest to enter there in order to rescue [it] from their hands.

And he also becomes impure

outside the Land of Israel and in a beit ha-peras in order

to marry a woman and to learn Torah.

Rabbi Judah said: When is it permitted

for him to become impure in order to learn Torah,

when he does not find

someone from whom

to learn

without becoming impure;

but when he finds

someone from whom

to learn, he should not become impure.

Rabbi Yose says: Even when he finds

someone from whom

to learn, he should also become impure

and go to learn from the teacher whom he desires,