Eruvin 47a (מז.) — the Talmud in English

It is sufficient that he leave some of it and not combine it with

three courtyards containing two houses.

And Rav Hama bar Gurya said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon!

And from here you may learn that those principles do not hold, for

who disagrees with

Rabbi Shimon?

Rabbi Yehuda! But did you not say

that wherever

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda?!

And necessarily, those principles do not hold.

This too cannot be said, for

what difficulty is there? Perhaps here too, wherever it was explicitly stated

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

it was stated

and this is the halakha even where Rabbi Yehuda is present. However,

where it was not stated, it was not stated,

and we rule according to those principles.

Rather,

you might say that those principles do not hold]

from this:

As we learned:

a. A courtyard into which many houses open: it is prohibited to carry from the house designated to one of the residents of the courtyard into the shared courtyard until all the residents of the courtyard establish an eiruv with one another. And if one of the residents of the courtyard is a gentile, he too prevents them—in certain circumstances—from carrying from their private domain into the shared courtyard, unless he has renounced his rights in the courtyard in their favor.

b. Even

one who leaves his house and goes to observe Shabbat in another city, whether he is a gentile or an Israelite, prevents the residents of the

courtyards

from carrying

from their houses, unless the Israelite established an eiruv with them before he left, and the gentile renounced his rights in their favor.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

Since he is not in the city, he

does not prevent

the residents of the courtyards.

Rabbi Yosei says:

A gentile

who left his house and went to another city

does prevent them,

for he may come in the middle of Shabbat, and one does not mentally abandon his house; therefore, it is considered a dwelling that has an owner.

However, an

Israelite

who went to observe Shabbat in another city

does not prevent them because

he has mentally abandoned his house,

as it is not the way of an Israelite to come

back to his house

on Shabbat.

Therefore, it is considered a dwelling without an owner, which does not prevent them.

Rabbi Shimon says:

Whether he is a gentile or an Israelite, he does not prevent them, and this is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

Moreover,

even if he left his house

on the eve of Shabbat

and went to observe Shabbat at his daughter’s

house, which is

in the same city, he does not prevent

the residents of the courtyard,

for he has already abandoned the thought

of returning on Shabbat. It is therefore considered a dwelling without an owner, and this is unlike Rabbi Yehuda, who says that if he did not leave for another city, he does prevent them.

And Rav Hama bar Gurya said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

And

from here you may learn that those principles do not hold, for

who

is the tanna who

disagrees with him,

Rabbi Shimon?

Rabbi Yehuda; but you said that when Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon

disagree,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda?

Rather, necessarily, those principles do not hold!!

Rashi explained: He could have proved that those general rules do not apply from the fact that we rule in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who says that even when the person is in the same city he does not prevent the residents from carrying, contrary to Rabbi Yosei, who requires him to be outside the city. Rather, the Gemara mentions only one of these possible proofs.

This too cannot be said:

For

what difficulty is there?

Perhaps here too, wherever it was explicitly stated

according to whom the halakha is to be ruled,

it was stated,

and

where it was not stated

according to whom to rule,

it was not stated,

and we rule according to those principles!

Rather,

you might say that those principles do not hold]

from this:

As we learned [in the continuation of the chapter], concerning one who was traveling along the road toward his house and Shabbat became dark upon him. We learned there that if he recognized a tree or a fence between the place where he was standing and his house, he says, “My Shabbat residence is beneath that tree or fence.” If he did not recognize one, he says, “My Shabbat residence is where I am.” This enables him to acquire a Shabbat residence even though he did not deposit bread:

This is [the law mentioned above]

that they said: A poor person

[who has no bread],

establishes his eiruv with his feet

—one who comes along the road and has no bread with him is like a poor person—

[without bread].

However, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed concerning this law:

Rabbi Meir says: We have no case

in which he can establish his eiruv with his feet

other than a poor person,

that is, one who is traveling and has no bread with him. But one who has bread cannot establish an eiruv except with bread.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Both a poor person and a wealthy person

may establish an eiruv even when they have no bread with them, and

the Sages said

that one establishes an eiruv with bread only

in order

to ease the burden on the wealthy person, so that he will not leave

and trouble himself

to establish his eiruv with his feet. [The discussion there explains the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda in greater detail.]

And Rav Hiyya bar Ashi would teach it to Hiyya bar Rav in the presence of Rav

—[before Rav]—the Mishna cited above, including Rabbi Yehuda’s statement:

“Both a poor person and a wealthy person,” and Rav said to him

—to Rav Hiyya bar Ashi—

“Conclude with it

also: ‘The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda!’”

And is this not difficult:

Why do I need two statements?!

But did you not say

that wherever

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

so why did Rav need to teach us here that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda? Rather, necessarily, it is because those principles do not hold.

This too cannot be said, for

what difficulty is there? Perhaps

it is specifically

Rav who

does not accept those principles,

and therefore he needed to teach us that here the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda; but everyone else accepts those principles.

Rather,

you might say] that what Rav Mesharshiya said—that those principles do not hold—is

from this:

We find that Rabbi Yohanan himself, who stated these principles, did not accept them [Ritva; and this also appears to be implied by Rashi below], concerning

what we learned:

a. A yevama who is pregnant from her husband and ultimately gives birth to a viable child is, from the time she became pregnant, like the wife of a brother who has children, who is not subject to yibbum. If her husband’s brother had relations with her, he is liable to karet.

b. A pregnant yevama whose fetus was not viable and whom she miscarried is subject to yibbum from the moment her husband died. Nevertheless, if she performed halitza while pregnant, her halitza is not valid [as Rashi cited here; see the Gemara, tractate Yevamot, in that discussion]. Therefore:

The yevama may not perform halitza

[she is prohibited from performing halitza] immediately after her husband’s death, because we are concerned that she may be pregnant with a nonviable fetus and be subject to yibbum; the halitza she performs now does not release her, since the halitza of a pregnant woman is invalid, and she may then marry relying on this halitza [Rashi here and in the discussion in Yevamot; see that discussion] .

what we learned:

a. If a woman whose husband died is pregnant and ultimately gives birth to a viable child, then from the time she became pregnant she is like the wife of a brother who has children, who is not subject to the mitzva of levirate marriage. If her husband’s brother has relations with her, he incurs the punishment of karet.

And she may not perform yibbum

immediately, lest she be pregnant with a viable fetus, in which case he would be having relations with the wife of his brother who has children, for which he is liable to karet, since a pregnant woman is not subject to yibbum.

Rather,

until she has from the day her husband died three months,

since, once her pregnancy has not become recognizable, she is not pregnant, and she may perform halitza or yibbum.

And likewise all the other women

whose husbands died:

They may not marry

immediately, since perhaps she is pregnant. When she gives birth, we will not know whether the child is from the first husband, in which case she gave birth after nine months, or from the second, in which case she gave birth after seven months. We must be concerned that she may give birth to another child from her second husband, who may then marry and die, and the first husband’s brother may perform yibbum with her, although it is uncertain whether the deceased was also his paternal brother, thereby violating the prohibition against the wife of a maternal brother [for the mitzva of yibbum applies only to the wife of a paternal brother].

And

they

may not even become betrothed, by rabbinic decree, lest they marry.

Rather,

until they have three months

that have elapsed since their husbands’ deaths, for once her pregnancy has not become recognizable, there is no longer any concern.

And they are prohibited from marrying during this period:

Whether

they were widowed while still betrothed and were still

virgins; although there is no concern that the child is from the first husband, since she had not had relations with him, the Sages issued a decree due to married women.

And whether

they were widowed after marriage and were

non-virgins.

Whether widows or divorcees.

Whether betrothed or married, [the Gemara in Yevamot explains that this interprets the first clause: “whether virgins”—that is, betrothed women; “whether non-virgins”—that is, married women].

Rabbi Yehuda says:

Women who were married

to the first husband

may become betrothed

to a second husband immediately, since there is no concern that they will give birth from the second husband; and he did not issue a decree concerning betrothal on account of marriage.

For this same reason, women who had only been

betrothed

to the first husband and were widowed

may marry

the second, since she had not had relations with the first husband, and the child will not be a matter of uncertainty.

Except for a betrothed woman in Judea,

who may not become betrothed

because the groom’s heart

the betrothed man’s

is attached to her [he is accustomed to her, knows her, and she is receptive to him], for it was customary there to seclude the groom and bride even before marriage, and we are concerned that he may have relations with her .

to the first husband and were widowed

may marry

Rabbi Yosei says:

Except for a betrothed woman in Judea,

All women

who had been married

may become betrothed,

and all betrothed women may marry, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, since there is no concern; and we do not issue a decree concerning betrothal on account of marriage.

Nevertheless, Rabbi Yosei disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda in this matter. According to Rabbi Yehuda, there is no distinction between a widow and a divorcee, and even a widow may become betrothed during her mourning period. Rabbi Yosei holds:

Except for a widow, who is prohibited even from becoming betrothed immediately, until thirty days of her mourning have elapsed, because of the mourning

for her husband.

And we say:

An incident occurred, and

Rabbi Elazar [an emendation of the text]

did not enter the house of study. He found

Rabbi Elazar

Rabbi Asi, who was standing,

and

he said to him

—Rabbi Elazar said to Rabbi Asi—

“What was said

today

in the house of study?”

He said to him: This is what Rabbi Yohanan said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

who holds that we do not issue a decree concerning betrothal on account of marriage .

Rabbi Elazar

And

we also

say [Rashi’s version] in order to raise a difficulty concerning Rabbi Yohanan’s statement [and through the clarification of his words, the proof that those principles do not hold will become clear]:

It is implied from the fact that Rabbi Yohanan ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

by inference that

what we learned in the Mishna cited above [in the statement of the one who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei], anonymously: “And likewise all women may not marry and may not become betrothed,” “whether betrothed or married,” is not an anonymous Mishna, but

an individual

who

disagrees with him,

Rabbi Yosei. For if it were an anonymous Mishna, Rabbi Yohanan himself holds that the halakha follows an anonymous Mishna; how, then, could he rule in accordance with Rabbi Yosei? [Ritva here]. Yet it is stated anonymously, and he should have ruled accordingly?!

And we say concerning this:

No!

Indeed, it is an individual who disagrees with him, for we find that Rabbi Meir disagrees with him and holds that even where there is no concern that she might be pregnant, she is nevertheless prohibited, contrary to Rabbi Yosei. That is, if so, it is a case of “an anonymous ruling followed by a dispute,” and the halakha does not follow the anonymous ruling [Ritva here] .

It is implied from the fact that Rabbi Yohanan ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

And it was taught [that is, “for it was taught as follows”]:

If she had been eager

—accustomed—to leave her husband and

go to her father’s house

in another city to live there, and certainly had not had relations with her husband;

or if she had been angry with her husband

and had not had relations with him;

or if her husband was elderly

and incapable of fathering children;

or if he had been

ill

and unable to have relations; or if she had been ill [and intercourse was difficult for her]; in all these cases she is certainly not pregnant; or if she had been

infertile [due to her natural constitution, having already been married to three men without bearing children and having thereby acquired the status of an infertile woman]; or if she had been

elderly;

or

a minor;

or

an aylonit [one born with this condition and displaying the signs of an aylonit]; all these women are incapable of giving birth;

or if she was incapable of giving birth

because she had drunk a sterilizing potion;

or if her husband had been imprisoned

before his death and therefore had not had relations with her;

or if she miscarried after her husband’s death

a fetus conceived from him.

All these women, although there is no concern that they might be pregnant, nevertheless, if their husbands died or they were divorced,

all must wait three months.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir,

who issues a decree on account of women concerning whom there is uncertainty whether they are pregnant.

Rabbi Yosei permits

these women

to become betrothed and marry immediately,

and he does not issue a decree on account of other women.

This beraita clearly proves that Rabbi Meir issued a decree prohibiting marriage even in the case of women whom we know certainly are not pregnant. He is therefore also the tanna of the Mishna, who issued a decree prohibiting even betrothed women—who are not pregnant—from marrying.

And once we have explained that Rabbi Meir is the one who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei, we prove from Rabbi Yohanan that he himself did not accept those principles:

For if not, this would be difficult:

Why did

Rabbi Yohanan need to rule that in this Mishna the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei?

But did you not say—you, Rabbi Yohanan—

“When Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

disagree anywhere,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei”,

and here it is Rabbi Meir who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei, as we said?!

Rather, necessarily, those principles do not hold, and Rabbi Yohanan never stated them. Those amoraim who stated them in his name were expressing their own opinions [Rashi].

This too cannot be said:

For

what difficulty is there?

Perhaps

he needed to specify the halakha here in order

to exclude the view of Rav Naḥman in the name of Shmuel, who said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir in his decrees.

That is: Although wherever Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, this applies when they disagree concerning a halakha. But with regard to Rabbi Meir’s decrees, the halakha follows him. Since here too it is Rabbi Meir’s decree, we should, on the contrary, rule in accordance with Rabbi Meir. Therefore, Rabbi Yohanan teaches us that nevertheless, with regard to this decree, the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir but in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

Rather,

you might say that what we say—that those principles do not hold—is

from this: For

Rabbi Yohanan himself said concerning

what was taught:

a. The Sages prohibited conducting business with a gentile on his festival day [his holiday, and even during the three days preceding his festival], lest he go and give thanks to idolatry on his festival day.

b. But

Israelites may go

to

the fair of gentiles

—a marketplace established for the festival day of idolaters—

and purchase animals, male and female slaves, from them,

because they bring them into sanctity; and likewise

houses, fields, and vineyards,

because this diminishes the gentiles’ assets, or alternatively, because of settling the Land of Israel [Rashi; the Ritva explained that the reason for all these permissions is that these are things a person needs for the use of his household and can obtain only at the fair, so they are considered matters involving financial loss, concerning which no decree was issued. He says that this is also evident from tractate Moed Katan; see Rashi there, on page 11].

c.

And he writes

documents [Rashi in Avoda Zara; this suggests that it is not a continuation of the first clause and refers to all documents],

and brings

them

before their courts,

and has their judges sign them, even though this accords them honor and there is concern that they may go to idolatry and thank it for this honor,

because it is like rescuing property from their hands. By bringing the document before their courts, he will have witnesses and assistance, and the gentile will be unable to contest the sale [Rashi in Avoda Zara; from Rashi in Moed Katan it appears that the primary novelty is that it is permitted to do this even on their festival day, despite the concern that on that day they may go and give thanks to idolatry. Rashi explains there that it is permitted because he can find them now, whereas on another day he may not].

d.

If he was a koen—who is prohibited from leaving for outside the Land of Israel [because the Sages decreed impurity upon the lands of the nations]—even so, they permitted it and said:

He may become impure outside the Land of Israel

in order

to litigate and contest with them,

because it is like rescuing property from their hands [Shulchan Arukh].

And just as he may become impure outside the Land of Israel, so

they permitted it and said:

He may become impure in a cemetery

in order to litigate with them.

And we raise a difficulty in explaining the beraita:

A cemetery—is it conceivable

that the Sages would permit this?

But

that is Torah-based impurity?!

before their courts, and has their judges sign them, even though this is an honor for them and there is concern that they might go to idolatry and thank it for this honor,

before their courts, and has their judges sign them, even though this is an honor for them and there is concern that they might go to idolatry and thank it for this honor,

because this is like rescuing property from their hands.

By bringing the document before their courts, he will have witnesses and assistance, and the gentile will not be able to challenge the sale [Rashi in Avoda Zara; and from Rashi in Moed Katan it appears that the main novelty is that this is permitted even on their festival day, although on that day there is concern that they might go and thank idolatry. Rashi explains there that it is permitted because he can find them now, whereas he will not find them on another day].

d.

If he was a kohen—

who is forbidden to leave for outside the Land of Israel [because the Sages decreed that the lands of the nations convey ritual impurity]—nevertheless, they permitted it and said:

He becomes ritually impure outside the Land of Israel

in order

to litigate and contest the matter with them, because this is like rescuing property from their hands [Shulhan Arukh].

to litigate and contest the matter with them, because this is like rescuing property from their hands [Shulhan Arukh].

And just as he becomes ritually impure outside the Land of Israel, so

they permitted it and said:

He becomes ritually impure in a cemetery

in order to litigate with them.

And we raise a difficulty in explaining the beraita:

A cemetery—is that conceivable?

Would the Sages permit this? After all,

that impurity is of Torah origin?!

Rather

the statement that we said, “the cemetery,” refers to

a beit hapras,

which is a field that was plowed over a grave, so that it is only a prohibition

by rabbinic decree,

as they were concerned that the bones might have become scattered, and a kohen who enters there might move a bone and become impure; but here they permitted a kohen to enter there in order to rescue them from their hands.

And he may also become impure

outside Eretz Yisrael and in a beit hapras in order

to marry a woman and study Torah.

Rabbi Judah said: When

is it permitted for him to become impure in order to study Torah?

When he does not find

someone from whom

to study

without becoming impure;

but if he finds

someone from whom

to study, he should not become impure.

Rabbi Yose says: Even when he finds

someone

from whom to study, he should also become impure

and go study from the teacher whom he desires,