Eruvin 36a (לו.) — the Talmud in English

There we followed the presumption, because

there

there are

two presumptions favoring leniency:

the first is the presumption that the deceased was alive, and the second is the presumption that the person who touched him had not become impure.

But

here—

for this reason we do not follow the presumption when there are two witnesses—because there is

only one presumption favoring leniency,

namely, the initial presumption that when he placed it there, it was pure. [Rashi]

And now we return to the Mishna concerning one who was impure and descended to immerse, and to the statement of Rabbi Yosei, who said there that he is impure even with regard to a minor impurity of rabbinic origin. And we wondered:

Rabbi Yosei’s statement is difficult—

concerning one who was impure and descended to immerse, where he is stringent even in a matter of rabbinic origin—

in light of Rabbi Yosei

of our Mishna, who is lenient with regard to an uncertain eruv.

Since he is stringent even in a matter of rabbinic origin, even if you say that Rabbi Yosei holds that the laws of teḥumin are rabbinic and that this is why he is lenient with regard to an uncertain eruv, the difficulty still remains: What is different about the case of one who was impure and descended to immerse, where he is stringent even in a matter of rabbinic origin? [Rashi]

Rabbi Huna bar Ḥinnana said

in response:

The matter of impurity is different,

as one must be stringent with regard to uncertainty about immersion even in the case of impurity of rabbinic origin,

since it has a basis in Torah law.

That is to say: Since one must be stringent with regard to impurity of Torah origin, in order that people not come to treat uncertainty about immersion from impurity of Torah origin lightly, the Sages were stringent even with regard to uncertainty about immersion from impurity of rabbinic origin. This is not the case with an eruv.

And we answer:

Rabbi Yosei holds that the laws of teḥumin are rabbinic.

Here, it is not relevant to decree that people should not come to treat the other labors of Shabbat, which are of Torah origin, lightly, since the labors are not comparable to teḥumin. [Rashi]

Alternatively,

you can answer the difficulty we raised from Rabbi Yosei against Rabbi Yosei in a manner different from that of Rabbi Huna bar Ḥinnana.

Rather, in truth, the reason Rabbi Yosei is stringent with regard to minor impurity of rabbinic origin applies equally to other matters of rabbinic origin.

And regarding the difficulty we raised from this matter of impurity against our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosei is lenient—although even if you say that he is lenient because the laws of teḥumin are rabbinic, the question remains: What is different from the case where he is stringent with regard to impurity of rabbinic origin?—there is no difficulty:

The former

case, where Rabbi Yosei is stringent in a matter of rabbinic origin,

is his own

opinion,

whereas

the latter

case, where Rabbi Yosei is lenient here with regard to an uncertain eruv because the laws of teḥumin are rabbinic,

is that of his teacher

Rabbi Yosei’s teacher, who holds that one is lenient in all matters of rabbinic origin; and the same applies to impurity. [

The Gemara’s earlier question—“Shabbat too is of Torah origin”—and its answer—“The laws of teḥumin are rabbinic”—remain valid according to this “alternatively” answer as well. This “alternatively” answer serves only to reject the position of Rabbi Huna bar Ḥinnana.]

This is also precise,

as we answered, that the ruling in our Mishna is that of Rabbi Yosei’s teacher, for

it teaches

in our Mishna:

“Rabbi Yosei said: Abtolmos testified in the name of five elders that an uncertain eruv is valid.”

This proves that Rabbi Yosei stated this in the name of his teacher.

And we conclude:

Infer from this!

Rava said

in answer to the difficulty from Rabbi Yosei against Rabbi Yosei:

There—

with regard to uncertainty about tevel—

this is the reason

why Rabbi Yosei is stringent even with regard to minor impurity of rabbinic origin: We say,

“Establish the impure person according to his presumption, and say that he did not immerse.”

And we challenge this:

On the contrary, establish the mikveh according to its presumption, and say that it did not lack

water at the time of the immersion?!

And we answer: In what circumstance are we dealing?

With a mikveh that had not been measured

at the outset and therefore had never stood with a presumption of fitness. [Rashi; see what the Ritva wrote.]

But in our Mishna, where, on the one hand, there is a presumption favoring stringency, namely, to establish him according to the presumption of the boundary of his home that he possessed before he established the eruv, and to say that he did not establish an eruv; while, on the other hand, there is a presumption favoring leniency, namely, to say, “Establish the teruma according to its presumption,” and that he did establish an eruv—we follow the lenient position, since the matter is rabbinic. [Rashi]

It was taught in a beraita: How did Rabbi Yosei say that an uncertain eruv is valid?

If he established an eruv with teruma, and it is uncertain whether it became impure while it was still day or whether it became impure after nightfall,

since it can be established according to its presumption that it had been pure.

And likewise,

if he established an eruv

with produce, and it is uncertain whether it was tithed while it was still day or whether it was tithed after nightfall.

This is “an uncertain eruv

that is

valid,” [

as the matter will be explained below.]

But if he established an eruv with teruma, and it is uncertain whether it was pure or impure,

“the uncertainty arose before it was placed there, and it never possessed a presumption that it was fit to serve as an eruv.” [Rashi]

And likewise,

if he established an eruv

with produce, and it is uncertain whether it was tithed or whether it was not tithed.

This is not “an uncertain eruv

that is

valid.”

And we explain the first clause of the beraita—where the uncertainty did not arise with regard to the produce before it was placed there: In any event, why is the eruv valid? On the contrary, we should be stringent for the same reason that we are lenient with regard to teruma whose becoming impure is uncertain.

What is different about teruma, with regard to which one says: “Establish the teruma according to its presumption, and say that it is pure”,

and therefore it constitutes an eruv?

The produce too,

for this very reason, should we not say the opposite, that it does not constitute an eruv:

Establish the tevel according to its presumption,

that it was not tithed,

and say: It was not tithed,

the produce?!

And we explain:

Do not say

that it is dealing with

a case where it is uncertain whether it was tithed while it was still day or whether it was tithed after nightfall.

Rather, say

that it is dealing with ordinary produce into which teruma became mixed, and

it is uncertain whether it became mixed in while it was still day or whether it became mixed in after nightfall.

Therefore, if the uncertainty did not arise before it was placed there, we establish it according to the presumption that the eruv was fit, and it is valid.

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak asked Rav Huna: If two loaves were before him

of teruma,

one

impure

and forbidden for everyone to eat,

and one pure.

And he said: “Establish an eruv for me with the pure one, wherever it may be!”

That is to say: The pure loaf is the one that establishes his residence for him, although it is not known which loaf it is—

what is the ruling?

And we explain the question:

Does the question apply to Rabbi Meir and does it apply to Rabbi Yosei?

Does it apply to Rabbi Meir,

who holds in our Mishna that in a case where it is uncertain whether the item became impure, one must be stringent?

Rabbi Meir stated his ruling there only

that we are stringent because of the uncertainty, due to the fact

that there is no certainly pure loaf; but

here, there is a pure loaf

that is fit for an eruv. We simply do not know which one it is, and it makes no difference to us which one it is.

Or perhaps, even according to Rabbi Yosei,

who validates an uncertain eruv in our Mishna,

he stated this only there, because if it were the case that it was pure,

then he would know it

where it was and which one was his meal, and the uncertainty concerning impurity would not disqualify it, since we say: Establish it according to its presumption. [The wording of Rashi]

But here, he does not know it,

which one is his meal.

He said to him,

Rav Huna to Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak:

Whether according to Rabbi Yosei or according to Rabbi Meir,

it is not an eruv. This is because

we require a meal that is fit from while it is still day, and there is none.

The following discussion is explained in accordance with the innovations of Rabbi Ḥayyim Halevi in the laws of eruvin, and similarly in the Ḥazon Ish, Eruvin, section 112, subsection 8. Rashi’s words throughout this discussion require study.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman:

The time at which the eruv takes effect is twilight, during which the day ends and the following day begins, although we do not know when this occurs. Once the following day has in fact begun, the eruv takes effect, Tosafot according to Rava.

One who says about a loaf on the eve of Shabbat:

“This loaf is ordinary today and sacred tomorrow” [

that is, this loaf will remain ordinary today and will become sacred tomorrow], and it turns out that on the eve of Shabbat it is fit for an eruv, while at the beginning of Shabbat it is not fit for an eruv.

And he said

to his agents:

“Establish an eruv for me with this,”

for Shabbat—

what is the ruling

that his eruv should be valid?

He said to him: His eruv is valid!

He then asked him: This one who says, “This loaf is

sacred today and ordinary tomorrow”—

so that it will be redeemed tomorrow with money that I have in my house—

and says: “Establish an eruv for me with this; what is the ruling?”

He said to him: His eruv is not valid!

Rava was astonished at Rav Naḥman:

What is different?!

The explanation of the matter is as follows: Since Rav Naḥman said in the first question that although at the time the eruv takes effect—that is, at the beginning of the following day—it is sacred and not fit for an eruv, nevertheless his eruv is valid, it necessarily follows that he holds that since the true beginning of the day is unknown to us, and at that time we are uncertain whether the following day has not yet begun, the consecration does not take effect during the time of uncertainty, even if in fact the following day has already arrived.

This is because the person consecrating the loaf did not intend to consecrate it during a time that is uncertain. Thus, with regard to the eruv, the following day has arrived, whereas with regard to the consecration, it is as though the following day has not arrived.

And since this is so, even if he said, “Today is sacred and tomorrow is ordinary,” we should say that he intended to leave it sacred only when it is certainly “today”; but when it is uncertain whether it is the following day, he intended that the redemption should already certainly take effect [for he does not want to leave the matter uncertain, Ḥazon Ish]. If so, the eruv should properly take effect at the beginning of Shabbat?!

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

“When you can eat a kor of salt over this,”

[

once you measure out a kor of salt for me as payment for the answer], then I will answer you!

This is your answer: When he said,

“Today is ordinary and tomorrow

sacred,” holiness does not descend upon it because of the uncertainty

that is, he did not intend to bring the holiness into effect during a time that is uncertain to us, and therefore the eruv takes effect.

But when he said:

“Today is sacred and tomorrow is ordinary,”

we assess his intention in the opposite manner, that

because of the uncertainty, its sanctity does not depart from it

that is, he intended to remove the sanctity only when it is certainly the following day. [So explained the Ḥazon Ish there; see further there.]

We learned there: The jugs

[

pitchers] that are

tebul yom

[

that were immersed to purify them but whose sunsets had not yet arrived, so that they were not yet completely pure],

which he filled

from the barrel of tevel for the tithe,

[

from which the tithe of the tithe had not been removed],

and said: “That which is in the jug shall be the tithe of the tithe when it grows dark,”

and he did so so that the teruma would not become impure, since a tebul yom disqualifies teruma [but does not disqualify tevel, even when teruma is mixed into it, Rashi]. Since the designation of teruma did not take effect upon it until it grew dark,

his statement is effective

and the teruma was not disqualified.

And if he said: “Establish an eruv for me with this,” he has said nothing,

since he would be establishing an eruv with tevel, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

Rava said: This teaches

[

from this Mishna one can learn] that

“the end of the day

of the eve of Shabbat