Eruvin 35b (לה:) — the Talmud in English

And we explain: The tanna teaches the case of the food that was burned in order

to demonstrate the force of Rabbi Yosei—

that he deems valid an eruv that was possibly burned, because we establish the matter according to its presumption that it was still intact while it was day.

Had he not also taught the case of the food that was burned—for it no longer exists in the world when the uncertainty arose—we would not have known that in such a case as well we establish the matter according to its presumption.

And therefore

he teaches the case of teruma that became impure: to demonstrate the force of Rabbi Meir—

who is stringent in a case of uncertainty concerning an eruv, even where the item still exists and it would be more appropriate to establish it according to its presumption.

And we raise an objection from the Mishna:

But

is that so?

Does Rabbi Meir hold that an uncertainty is treated stringently,

even though an eruv for the limits is rabbinic?!

And it was taught:

An impure person who descended to immerse

in a mikveh, and was uncertain whether he immersed or did not immerse.

And even

when he knows with certainty that he

immersed

in it, it is possible to find a case of uncertainty concerning the immersion.

For example: After his immersion, he found that the mikveh lacked forty se'a of water, and there is

uncertainty

whether at the time of his immersion he

immersed in a

full mikveh containing

forty se'a

and afterward became deficient, or

whether he did not immerse in forty se'a.

And likewise, there were two mikvaot: one contained forty se'a, and one did not contain forty se'a, and he immersed in one of them,

but he does not know in which one he immersed—

his uncertainty renders him impure.

When is this statement said? When

he became impure with

severe impurity

[impurity by Torah law], and he must purify himself from it through his immersion.

But one who became impure with

minor impurity,

by rabbinic decree,

for example:

One who ate impure foods and drank

[or drank]

impure liquids,

whose impurity is rabbinic, as the Sages decreed [among the eighteen decrees enacted by the Sages and listed in tractate Shabbat 13b] that the body [of a person who eats impure foods or drinks impure liquids] should be disqualified from eating teruma [although by Torah law food or drink does not render a person impure].

And

likewise,

one who comes

[one who enters]

with his head and the majority of his body into drawn water,

as the Sages decreed [as part of the eighteen decrees] that he should be disqualified from eating teruma.

Or three log of drawn water fell upon his head and the majority of his body,

as they likewise decreed that he should be disqualified from eating teruma.

And he descended to immerse

from one of these rabbinic impurities, and

there is uncertainty whether he immersed or did not immerse.

And even if he immersed—

there is uncertainty whether he immersed in forty se'a or did not immerse in forty se'a.

And likewise, there were two mikvaot: one contained forty se'a, and one did not contain forty se'a, and he immersed

from minor impurity

in one of them, but he does not know in which one he immersed.

In all these cases,

his uncertainty renders him pure!

And this unattributed Mishna is Rabbi Meir, for an unattributed Mishna is Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei renders him impure,

because we establish him according to his presumption that he was impure [as will be explained below].

We see, then, that in a case of uncertainty Rabbi Meir rules leniently with regard to a rabbinic prohibition. How is this different from an uncertainty concerning an eruv, which is rabbinic, regarding which Rabbi Meir rules stringently?!

And we explain:

Rabbi Meir holds: The laws of the limits—

are by Torah law!

And an uncertainty concerning a Torah prohibition is treated stringently.

And we raise an objection to this answer:

But

if

Rabbi Meir holds that the laws of the limits are by Torah law?!

But it was taught:

One measures [the Shabbat limit] only with a rope of fifty cubits, neither less nor more. And he should measure [neither he nor his fellow who measures with him] only opposite his heart.

If he was measuring and reached a valley [a depression] or a fence, he “bridges over” the valley [if the valley is not fifty cubits wide from one upper edge to the other, then although traversing its slope entails traveling more than two thousand cubits, he measures only the aerial distance between its edges], and resumes his measurement [from beyond the valley].

If he reached a mountain, he “bridges over” it and resumes his measurement.

If he cannot bridge over it: In this case

[but not in other cases, as stated below; Rashi, 58a]

Rabbi Dostai bar Yannai said: I heard from Rabbi Meir that one may use the method of kiddur in measuring mountains

[he measures with short ropes of four cubits; one person holds the rope opposite his heart, and the second person, who is higher up on the mountain, holds it opposite his feet. The slope is not measured as it is, but along a straight line, thereby gaining half a person’s height, so that one may proceed farther by means of such a measurement].

And now this is difficult:

If it could enter your mind

that it is as you said, that Rabbi Meir holds that

the laws of the limits are by Torah law,

how could Rabbi Meir permit measuring the Shabbat limit by means of kiddur?!

But Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: One may not use kiddur

in measurements:

Not in

measuring the limits of

cities of refuge

[as the area surrounding a city of refuge also provides refuge for one who killed inadvertently].

And

not in

measuring the city nearest the corpse, in order to obligate it to bring

a decapitated heifer.

Because

these measurements

are

measurements

required by the Torah!

It necessarily follows that the fact that Rabbi Meir permitted measuring the Shabbat limit by means of kiddur is because the laws of the limits are rabbinic. We see, then, that Rabbi Meir holds that the laws of the limits are rabbinic?!

And we explain: In fact, it is as we answered, that Rabbi Meir rules stringently in a case of uncertainty concerning an eruv because the laws of the limits are by Torah law. And it is not difficult that from the fact that we see that Rabbi Meir says that one may use kiddur in measuring mountains, it would appear that the laws of the limits are rabbinic.

For

indeed,

our Mishna was stated by Rabbi Meir in the name of

himself,

as this was his own view, and not in the name of his teacher. For Rabbi Meir indeed held that the laws of the limits are by Torah law.

But

the statement of Rabbi Meir, “I heard that one may use kiddur in measuring mountains,” he stated in the name of

his teacher,

for his teacher held that the laws of the limits are rabbinic.

This is also precise,

from the fact that

it teaches

in the Mishna, with regard to using kiddur in measuring mountains:

“In this case Rabbi Dostai bar Yannai said in the name of Rabbi Meir: ‘I heard that one may use kiddur in measuring mountains.’”

Since he said, “I heard,” it can properly be explained that he heard it from his teacher, but he himself did not hold this view [Rashi].

And we conclude: Indeed,

conclude from it!

And now we raise a further difficulty, even according to what we have resolved: Rabbi Meir holds that the laws of the limits are by Torah law, and that is why he rules stringently in our Mishna in a case of uncertainty concerning an eruv.

For here we see that Rabbi Meir rules stringently in a case of uncertainty even where there is an original presumption that should lead to leniency. In the case of teruma that became impure, there is an original presumption that should lead to leniency, since when it was placed there it was pure [Rashi]. If so:

And juxtapose

the uncertainty concerning a

matter of Torah law

where there is a presumption favoring leniency, in which Rabbi Meir disregarded the presumption and ruled stringently,

with

an uncertainty concerning a

matter of Torah law

in which we see that Rabbi Meir follows the presumption and rules leniently.

For it was taught: One who

: One who

touched

a person

on one night, and does not know whether he was alive or dead,

at the time he touched him, and does not know whether he rendered him impure.

And the next morning he arose early and found him dead,

Rabbi Meir declares him pure, “for he established him according to his presumption, and yesterday he was alive” [Rashi].

And the Sages render him impure,

because they hold

that

every

uncertainty concerning

impurities—

its status is

as it was when found.

We see, then, that in a case of uncertainty concerning a matter of Torah law where there is a presumption favoring leniency, Rabbi Meir follows the presumption.

If so, here too, in the Mishna, why is the eruv not valid if it was teruma and it is uncertain whether it became impure during twilight? Why do we not establish it according to its presumption of purity?!

Rabbi Yirmeya

said: Our Mishna—

which states that Rabbi Meir disqualifies an eruv made of teruma that became impure—does not deal with an uncertainty concerning impurity, but with certain impurity—

when a creeping creature was upon it throughout the entire twilight, “from beginning to end, so that it certainly became impure while it was still day, since the beginning of twilight is the eve of Shabbat.”

And we raise an objection to Rabbi Yirmeya’s answer:

If so—

if the case concerns certain impurity that occurred while it was still day— \-

this is difficult: Is it possible that

in this case Rabbi Yosei would say, “An uncertain eruv”

is valid?!

But when it became impure while it was still day, it is stated explicitly in the Mishna that even according to Rabbi Yosei it is not an eruv.

And we explain:

Rabba and Rav Yosef both said,

in order to explain Rabbi Yirmeya’s statement [Tosafot and Ritva]:

Here,

in our Mishna,

we are dealing with two sets of witnesses who contradict one another.

For

one

set of witnesses

says: It became impure while it was still day.

And

one

set

of witnesses

says: It became impure after nightfall

Now it will not be difficult for you why, in the case of one who touched a person on one night, Rabbi Meir follows the presumption, whereas here, in the case of the eruv, he does not follow the presumption: “Since there is a set of witnesses that removes it from its presumption, in a case of uncertainty concerning a matter of Torah law we do not follow the presumption.” [Rashi]

Rava said:

We are indeed dealing in the Mishna with two sets of witnesses, as Rabba and Rav Yosef said, and that is why we do not follow the presumption.

Rather, do not say that in the case of one who touched a person on one night as well, if two sets of witnesses who contradicted one another had come, we would not have followed the presumption.

That is not so.