Eruvin 35a (לה.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

the text is incomplete in the language of the

beraita, and

this is what it teaches:

in it:

If they placed

for the eruv

in a tower, and locked it before him, and the key was lost, it is a valid eruv, as we explained regarding the Mishna: it concerns a tower made of loose bricks, whose dismantling does not involve a Torah prohibition of demolition.

as we explained the Mishna: this refers to a tower made of loose bricks, whose dismantling does not constitute a Torah prohibition against demolishing.

When does this statement apply? On a Festival. When one establishes an eruv on the eve of the Festival for the Festival, since it is permitted to dismantle the tower on a Festival in order to remove the eruv.

This is when one establishes the joining of boundaries on the eve of the Festival for the Festival, since it is permitted to dismantle the tower on a Festival in order to remove the joining of boundaries.

But on Shabbat—

his eruv is not an eruv, since the Sages did not permit him to dismantle it [Rashi].

Since the Sages did not permit him to dismantle it.

If the key is found,

not near the tower,

whether in a city or in a field,

even so,

his eruv is not an eruv on Shabbat, since he cannot bring it to the place of the eruv. For even if he does not carry it through a public domain, but rather through roofs, courtyards, and enclosed areas, it is nevertheless prohibited, since they belong to several people who did not establish a courtyard eruv among themselves.

on Shabbat. For he cannot bring it to the place of the joining of boundaries. Even if he does not carry it through a public domain, but rather through roofs, courtyards, and enclosed areas, it is nevertheless prohibited, since these places belong to several people who did not establish a joining of courtyards with one another.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

If the key is found

in the city

on Shabbat,

his eruv is

an eruv, since he holds that he can bring it, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

because he holds that he can bring it, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

But

in a field his eruv is not an eruv, since he cannot bring it from a public domain into a private domain.

since he cannot bring it from a public domain into a private domain.

All this applies when the key is found.

And if the key was lost, Rabbi Eliezer also disagrees with the first tanna. The first tanna permitted dismantling the tower on a Festival because he holds in accordance with Rabbi Meir, as we said above. But Rabbi Eliezer disagrees, holding that dismantling it is prohibited, as is evident from the Mishna, where Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the first tanna, who permitted it on a Festival.

For the first anonymous tanna permitted dismantling the tower on a Festival because he held in accordance with Rabbi Meir, as we said above. But Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that dismantling it is prohibited, as is explained in the Mishna, where Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the first anonymous tanna, who permitted it on a Festival.

The Gemara now explains the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer of the beraita, who holds that if the key is found

in the city, his eruv is an eruv,

even on Shabbat:

Because he holds that he can bring it through roofs, courtyards, and enclosed areas, even if they belong to two people who did not establish an eruv between them. Rabbi Eliezer holds

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon [

below, at the beginning of the chapter “All Roofs”],

who says: Roofs, courtyards, and enclosed areas—

are a single domain. [

That is, neither a change in ownership of these places nor a change in their use causes them to become two separate domains, such that carrying from one to the other would be prohibited. Rather, one may carry objects from one place to another. This allowance applies specifically]

to objects that rested

at the onset of Shabbat

within

these domains; such objects may be carried from one courtyard to another and from a courtyard to an enclosed area.

It was not,

however, said that carrying is permitted

with regard to objects that rested inside a house

and were taken out to a courtyard, roof, or enclosed area—even if they were taken out in a permitted manner—for it is prohibited to carry such objects.

Therefore Rabbi Eliezer permits it here as well, since here too the case concerns a key that did not rest in a house [Ritva].

The reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling concerning a found key

in a field,

that

his eruv is not an eruv, is

because he holds

in accordance with the Sages.

Rabba and Rav Yosef both said,

in order to resolve the question raised against the first tanna—who holds that when the key was lost, the eruv is valid—namely, that the person is in one place while his eruv is in another:

Here we are dealing with a tower

large

made of wood,

with a capacity of forty se’a,

and the case is that even though the key was lost, he can dismantle it, since it is not a tent.

The first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer of the Mishna disagree over this matter:

One—

One master [

the first tanna]

holds that despite its size, it is

and not a tent,

a utensil

and not a tent, and

there is no construction of utensils and no demolition of utensils.

And the other master [

Rabbi Eliezer]

holds that since it is large and can contain forty se’a [Ritva],

And it is on the disagreement between these tannaim

it is a tent,

and demolition applies to it.

And they disagree in the dispute between these tannaim,

as they disagree concerning the following:

For we learned: A zav, who renders utensils impure through his movement,

they are impure

struck

with his fist [while wearing a sleeve, and did not touch it]

on top of a chest, box, or tower [

which are large utensils capable of containing forty se’a, Ritva]; they are

impure

through his movement.

Rabbi Nehemiah and Rabbi Shimon declare them pure.

Is it not that they disagree over this:

One master [

the first tanna]

holds that even though it can contain forty se’a,

a tent applies to them,

it is a utensil,

and it becomes impure through the movement of the zav.

And the other master [

Rabbi Nehemiah and Rabbi Shimon]

holds that since they can contain forty se’a, they lose the status of utensils, and the law of

by a person with a flux,

a tent applies to them,

so they cannot contract ritual impurity.

Abaye said

concerning this:

Can you really understand it this way—that they disagree, with regard to the striking of a zav, whether a large utensil is considered a tent or is not considered a tent?!

We see that even a tent can become impure if it is moved. Therefore, it cannot be said that the one who declares a large vessel pure from the movement of a person with a flux does so because he considers it a tent.

But it was taught: If it was

teaches

a tent, and it was moved

by the zav, it is

impure!

If it was

a utensil but was not moved

by the zav because of its weight, it is

pure!

We see, then, that even a tent can contract impurity if it is moved. Therefore it cannot be said that the one who declares a large utensil pure from the movement of a zav does so because he considers it a tent.

And

furthermore,

it teaches in the latter clause [

in the Tosefta, concerning the dispute over a zav who struck a chest, box, or tower]:

And if they were

capable of being

moved,

the chest, box, and tower are

impure!

This is the principle:

If it was moved through his force,

of the zav—“that he actually moved the utensil or the tent, causing it to be displaced somewhat from its place”—it is

impure.

If it was moved

through trembling—“that he struck the ground with his feet, and as a result of the ground shaking the utensil moved, even though it was displaced from the ground”—it is

meaning that the person with a flux moved it by exerting his force on something else,

pure,

since this is force secondary to his force.

We see, then, that according to everyone even large utensils become impure through the movement of a zav. Necessarily, the reason that the one who declares them fit does not do so because they are unfit to contract impurity, on account of their being a tent rather than a utensil, but for another reason.

Rather, Abaye said

to explain their dispute:

Everyone

holds that

movement in which the object is displaced

And the other—Rabbi Nehemiah and Rabbi Shimon—

through his force,

the direct force of the zav, is

impure.

But movement in which the object is displaced

through trembling,

because the zav moved it by applying his force to another object, is

pure.

Here we are dealing with trembling,

in which the zav caused the utensils to tremble

through his force

directly,

and the case is that he struck them directly. However, he did not displace them from their places or move them through his action; he merely caused them to tremble where they stood.

and we are dealing with one tied by a rope—the tower’s lock is tied with a rope.

They disagree over this:

One master—

the first tanna—

holds that

trembling

is considered movement.

And the other master—

Rabbi Nehemiah and Rabbi Shimon—

holds that

trembling

is not considered movement.

Now that Abaye has rejected the notion that these tannaim disagree concerning whether large utensils are tents or utensils when a zav strikes them, it is no longer reasonable to say that the tannaim of our Mishna disagree over this. Rather, we maintain that according to everyone large utensils are tents.

Therefore we ask:

And our Mishna,

our Mishna,

what can we establish it as referring to? Since a large tower is a tent and demolition applies to it, why is the eruv valid when the key was lost?!

only

And we explain:

Abaye and Rava both said:

Here the case concerns

the lock

of the tower,

and the case is one in which it is tied with a rope [

the lock of the tower is tied with a rope].

And a knife is required in order to cut it,

and cutting the rope involves only a rabbinic prohibition, since it appears like demolishing a tent; and they did not enact this prohibition during twilight [Rashi]. [See the illustration on the following page]

The tannaim of the Mishna disagree concerning carrying a knife in order to cut the rope:

The first tanna holds in accordance with Rabbi Yose, who says: All utensils,

even utensils whose designated use is for a prohibited activity,

may be moved on Shabbat

for the sake of a permitted purpose.

Except for a saw

a saw

that is large, and a plowshare,

which are muktzeh “because of financial loss.” According to him, it is permitted to move the knife in order to cut the rope.

And

if

Rabbi Eliezer held in accordance with Rabbi Nehemiah, who says: Even a cloak, even a large spoon [

a large spoon]

may not be moved

on Shabbat, even for a permitted purpose,

but

only

for the purpose of their designated use,

their particular use.

A knife is not designated for cutting rope. Therefore it may be moved only for its designated use, namely cutting food, and it is prohibited to move it in order to cut ropes; consequently, the eruv is not valid.

Mishna:

The reason is as follows:

A. The person establishing a teḥum eruv must stand at twilight within the eruv’s domain, which acquires his place of residence.

For if the distance between his eruv and the place where he is standing exceeds the Shabbat limit [according to the laws governing measurement of the limit from his eruv to his feet], this is not an eruv.

The reason is that this was the Sages’ enactment: the person establishing the eruv must stand within the domain that acquires him. It is not because, at the time the eruv acquires his place of residence, he is unable to reach his eruv [because he is standing outside the limit and is prohibited from leaving his place].

B. Moreover, even if he intended to spend Shabbat in one place and placed his bread in another place [which he may do if he can bring his eruv to his place of residence], his feet must also be within the “domain of his bread.”

That is, he must stand within the domain that the bread would establish for him, had he intended to acquire residence where the bread was placed. This is so even though he is now not acquiring residence at the place of the bread, but at another place; he is merely effecting the acquisition of residence by placing the bread at the other location.

Although his place of residence is acquired at another location, and he is standing within the domain of that place of residence, this is not sufficient. For the Sages’ enactment included the requirement that he also stand within the “domain of his bread,” in addition to standing within the “domain of his feet.”

Therefore, if a person established his place of residence at a particular location but placed the eruv bread elsewhere, and

the eruv rolled—which had been lying within the “domain of his feet”

—to

outside the “domain

of his feet,”

it follows that although the feet of the person establishing the eruv still stand within the domain of his eruv and place of residence, they now stand outside the “domain of his bread.”

Or

a mound fell upon it,

upon the eruv, and

a wall

fell over it in a manner such that removing the mound involves a Torah prohibition, as the Gemara explains.

Or

it

burned

the eruv.

Or the Israelite placed [the meaning according to Rashi]

teruma

that was permitted to priests—which is fit for an eruv even for an Israelite—and it

became impure

and was thereby forbidden even to priests.

In all these cases, the law of the eruv is as follows:

If

before nightfall

one of these events occurred,

it is not an eruv!

The reason is as follows:

In the case where it rolled beyond the limit, it is because it is not located within the “domain of his bread.”

In the other cases, it is because anything that he cannot take and eat at twilight, which is the time when the eruv acquires his residence, is not an eruv.

And if

after nightfall

one of these events occurred,

it is an eruv,

since “he had already acquired his eruv at twilight; and once Shabbat has been permitted, it remains permitted!” [Rashi]

And if it is

uncertain

when one of these events occurred:

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda say: Since it is uncertain whether he acquired residence at the place where he placed his eruv, to the east, or whether it is not an eruv and he acquired residence at his home, to the west, he has only the two thousand cubits between his city and his eruv.

That is, he may walk only within that area, based on the principle of “whichever way you look at it”: whether he acquired residence at his home or at the place where he placed his eruv, these two thousand cubits are included within his limit.

But he may not enter the two thousand cubits east of his eruv, lest he acquired residence at his home. Likewise, he may not enter the two thousand cubits west of his home, lest he acquired residence at the place where he placed his eruv!

And

this

is similar to someone who is both

Therefore we say:

a donkey-driver

and

a camel-driver.

For one who leads a donkey walks behind his donkey, whereas one who leads a camel walks before his camel; one pulls him in front, and the other pulls him from behind.

Here too, his home pulls him toward his home, causing him to lose the two thousand cubits beyond his eruv. His eruv, however, pulls him toward it, causing him to lose the two thousand cubits beyond his home.

Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon say: An uncertain eruv is

valid!

Its law is that of one who acquired residence at the place where he placed his eruv [Rabbi Akiva Eiger, in his fourth discussion].

Rabbi Yose said: Avtolmos [

the name of a sage]

testified in the name of five elders concerning an uncertain eruv, that it is valid [

the reason will be explained in the Gemara].

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

If it rolled beyond the limit,

it is not an eruv if this occurred before nightfall.

Rava said: They taught this only when it rolled

the eruv

beyond four cubits

from the end of the “domain of his feet.” For now his feet also stand outside the “domain of his bread.”

But

if the eruv rolled beyond the domain of his feet but was still

within four cubits

of the domain of his feet, the eruv acquired his residence, and it is not considered to be outside the “domain of his bread.”

For

one who places his eruv

has four cubits

around it, and only beyond them does he begin counting the two thousand cubits of his limit!

Since this is so, even if he were acquiring residence at the place of his bread, his domain would extend as far as his feet, since the distance between them is no more than the four cubits of the eruv together with the two thousand cubits of the domain. Therefore, it is a valid eruv. [ See the illustration on the following page]

We learned in the Mishna:

If a mound fell upon it, etc.,

it is not an eruv:

It might have entered your mind

that the case is

one in which, if he wished, he could take it,

the eruv, without violating a Torah prohibition involving labor; rather, it is not an eruv because if he wished to take it, he would have to move the stones, which is prohibited because the stones are muktzeh and may not be moved by rabbinic decree.

Therefore we say:

Shall we say that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi?

For if it is in accordance with Rabbi, he said: Anything that is prohibited on account of shevut—

the Sages did not enact its prohibition during twilight.

He could properly take it at twilight, which is the time when the eruv acquires his residence.

And we reject this:

You may even say that

that

it is in accordance with Rabbi that our Mishna is stated—

our Mishna is taught—

it is necessary.

For what are we dealing with here?

A hoe and a pickaxe are required,

a mattock and a pickaxe, in order to clear it, because the mound was large [Rabbenu Yehonatan]. “And this constitutes a Torah labor: in a house, because of building, and in a field, because of plowing. And although he does not intend for this [for building or plowing, which he performs incidentally while clearing the mound], it is a case of an inevitable consequence” [Ritva].

And we explain:

And they are necessary:

These two cases—the loaf rolled beyond the techum and a mound that fell upon it.

For had it taught only the case of a loaf rolled beyond the techum,

I would have said: Only in such a case is it not an eruv,

because it is not with him [

which means that his bread is not with the one establishing the eruv], since the place of the eruv is outside the techum of the bread; for this reason it is not an eruv.

But in the case of a mound that fell upon it, since it is with him,

as it is not located outside the techum of his bread at the time the eruv takes effect,

I would say that it should be an eruv.

Therefore, the tanna teaches us that even when a mound fell upon it, it is not effective.

And had it taught only the case of a mound that fell upon it,

alone,

I would have said:

Only in such a case is it ineffective,

because it is covered [

because the eruv is covered], and it will not become exposed on its own.

But in the case of a loaf that was rolled, since

there are times when the wind comes and brings it back [

there are times when the wind brings it back into the techum],

I would say that it should be an eruv;

therefore

it is necessary

to state these two cases in the Mishna.

We learned in the Mishna:

Or it was burned; teruma, and it became impure, etc.:

And we explain:

Why do I need the tanna to teach the case of the eruv being burned,

when it is obvious that it is not an eruv?!