Eruvin 34b (לד:) — the Talmud in English

For

it is obvious

that even though it is one hundred cubits deep, the pit is entirely governed by the law of a private domain [and nothing is taught by the statement “even one hundred cubits deep”], since

a private domain rises up to the firmament. And just as it rises—

an ordinary

private domain—

above

upward, all the way to the firmament,

so too

the private domain in the pit

descends below

even to a depth of one hundred cubits. And what does our Mishna teach us by this statement?!

Rather, it is speaking of a pit that stands

the pit

in the public domain.

But the difficulty still remains:

that the one who established the eiruv intended

the one who established the eiruv

to establish his Shabbat residence—

where?

If above,

in the public domain,

why

[the wording of the Bach] is it effective?

For

he

[his Shabbat residence] is

in one place

[in the public domain],

while his eiruv is in another place

[in the pit, which is a private domain, as we have said].

And

if

he intended to establish his Shabbat residence

below—

it is obvious

that it is effective, for

“he and his eiruv are in one place”?!

And we explain:

It is necessary

for our Mishna to teach that the eiruv is valid only in a pit

that stands in a karmelit,

such as the fields in a valley,

and he intended to establish his Shabbat residence above

in the karmelit.

And it is the opinion of Rabbi, who says: With regard to anything that is prohibited as a rabbinic shevut—

such as bringing the eiruv from the pit, which is a private domain, into a karmelit—

the Sages did not decree against it during twilight.

And this is the novel point of the Mishna: He is considered to be in one place with his eiruv.

Mishna:

If one placed

his eiruv for Shabbat boundaries

on the top of a reed or on the top of a kondes

when it is

[the reed and the kondes, according to Maimonides and Rashi; according to the Raavad, this refers only to the reed, since the kondes is always detached]

detached and stuck into the ground

[but not rooted, as the Gemara explains]

even if it is one hundred cubits high, this is a valid eiruv,

provided that it is four handbreadths wide at its top.

For we hold in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda [above, on page 33b] that the eiruv must be placed on a surface measuring four handbreadths, Rashi.

Gemara:

Rav Adda bar Mattana raised a contradiction before Rava

from our Mishna, which teaches: When it is

“detached and stuck into the ground,”

his eiruv is a valid eiruv.

Infer from this:

If it is detached and stuck into the ground, yes.

If it is not detached and stuck into the ground—

but rather rooted, so that his eiruv is in a tree—

no,

it is not a valid eiruv.

And the reason is that he would be using the tree if he removed it from there, and therefore it is not a valid eiruv [as stated above, on page 32b].

Whose opinion is

our Mishna?

It must be that

it is the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: With regard to anything that is prohibited as a rabbinic shevut,

such as using a tree,

the Sages decreed against it

even

during twilight,

when the eiruv is acquired.

But now the difficulty arises:

Yet you said,

[above on this page], that the

first clause

of this Mishna—“If one placed it in a pit even one hundred cubits deep, this is a valid eiruv”—is the opinion of

Rabbi,

who holds that the Sages did not decree against a shevut during twilight.

Would we then say:

The first clause is the opinion of Rabbi

and

the latter clause is the opinion of the Rabbis

?!

He said to him,

Rava to Rav Adda bar Mattana:

Rami bar Hama already raised

this contradiction of yours

before Rav Ḥisda.

And Rav Ḥisda answered him,

Rav Ḥisda answered Rami bar Hama: Indeed,

the first clause is the opinion of Rabbi, and the latter clause is the opinion of the Rabbis.

Ravina

gave a different answer and

said: The entire

Mishna

is the opinion of Rabbi.

And the latter clause,

which states that if one placed it on an attached reed his eiruv is not valid, is because it is forbidden to remove the eiruv from the tree

lest he break off a branch.

That is, he would certainly break it off, since the reed is soft, and he would be liable for cutting it.

The use of a tree that the Sages prohibited as a rabbinic decree lest one climb it and detach something was permitted during twilight, since twilight is a period of uncertainty and they did not issue that decree then.

A certain troop

[the king’s army]

came to Nehardea,

and as a result the place became crowded for Rav Naḥman’s students, so they had to leave the city.

Rav Naḥman said to them,

to his students on Friday afternoon:

Go out and make braided mats in the marsh,

[go out to the marsh—to prepare a place there for your sitting on Shabbat—and bind many reeds together, like chairs on which to sit. See the Ritva for the reason they had to make them before Shabbat],

and tomorrow we will go and sit upon them

[and tomorrow, on Shabbat, we will go and sit on them].

Rami bar Hama raised an objection to Rav Naḥman,

who permitted using reeds on Shabbat, from our Mishna, which teaches: When it is

“detached and stuck into the ground.”

And it implies:

If it is detached and stuck into the ground, yes; if it is detached

(and not

[Rashi does not have this version]

stuck into the ground, no.

Since it is forbidden to use them on Shabbat [as we have said].

It is apparent, then, that even reeds are like trees—and not like vegetables—and are included in the Sages’ decree prohibiting the use of a tree?!

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

There,

in our Mishna, which demonstrates that it is forbidden to use reeds, the reference is to

hardened reeds

[reeds that have already hardened], whose law is that of a tree!

But as long as the reeds are soft, they are vegetables, and the Sages did not prohibit using vegetables.

And we explain:

And from where do you say that we distinguish between hardened reeds,

which are trees,

and those that are not hardened,

which are vegetables?

And we explain:

As it was taught

in one beraita:

The kanin, the atadin, and the hagin

[a type of thorn]

are a species of tree, and they are not subject to the prohibition of diverse kinds in a vineyard,

since the prohibition of diverse kinds in a vineyard applies only to grain and vegetables.

And it was taught in another beraita: The reeds, the kidan

[a spice called keda]

and the urbanin are a species of vegetable, and they are subject to the prohibition of diverse kinds in a vineyard!

But

the statements conflict

the reeds with the reeds

with one another,

as in one beraita it says that they are a species of tree, while in another beraita it says that they are a species of vegetable?!

Rather,

it must be that

infer

as we said:

Here,

where they are considered trees,

the reference is to hardened reeds; here,

where they are considered vegetables,

the reference is to those that are not hardened.

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from this!

And since we cited a beraita that teaches that kidan [keda] is a species of vegetable, we ask:

And

why,

is keda a species of vegetable?!

But we learned in a Mishna: One may not graft pegam

[a species of vegetable]

onto white keda

because

it is a vegetable on a tree,

and this is prohibited as diverse kinds of trees.

It is apparent, then, that keda is a species of tree.

Rav Pappa said

in answer:

Ordinary keda is one matter,

and it is a species of vegetable,

whereas white keda is another matter,

and it is a species of tree!

Mishna:

If one placed

his eiruv for Shabbat boundaries

in a tower and the key was lost,

so that he cannot bring his eiruv to the place where he intended to establish his Shabbat residence, which is outside the tower, in a private domain, nevertheless

this is a valid eiruv,

and the Gemara explains the reason.

Rabbi Eliezer says: If he does not know that the key is in its place, it is not a valid eiruv

[and even when it is uncertain to him, it is not a valid eiruv, until he knows that it is in its place. Rabbi Eliezer holds that an eiruv subject to uncertainty is invalid, Ritva. See Rashi carefully in the Gemara, regarding Rabbi Eliezer’s statement in the beraita].

Gemara:

We question the first tanna:

Why

is it a valid eiruv when the key was lost?

He is in one place and his eiruv is in another place

[Although here the case involves two private domains, nevertheless, “since he cannot take it, it is considered like two places,” Rashi]?!

Rav and Shmuel both say: Here we are dealing with a tower made of bricks,

which is easy to dismantle, as the Gemara proceeds to explain: It is speaking of bricks that are not cemented with mortar, so that dismantling them is not prohibited.

And

the fact that we permit him to dismantle them in order to take the eiruv, if he wishes, is because

it is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says:

Even

one may remove

[break through an opening]

from the outset and take it!

As we learned in a Mishna: If a house was filled with produce,

and the house had been

sealed

before the Festival, so that there was no access to the produce inside without dismantling it,

and it collapsed

on the Festival—one may take produce from the place where it collapsed on the Festival, and he need not be concerned about muktze. This anonymous Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon, who does not hold that there is a prohibition of muktze.

But one may not dismantle it from the outset, because that would constitute dismantling a tent.

Rabbi Meir says:

Even

one may dismantle it and take the produce from the outset.

Since the bricks are not cemented with mortar—as the Gemara proceeds to explain—this is not considered dismantling a tent.

The same applies to our Mishna: For this reason the eiruv is valid, since dismantling the tower does not involve the prohibition of dismantling a tent.

And it initially entered our minds that our Mishna was dealing with a tower made of bricks cemented with mortar. Therefore we ask:

But Rav Naḥman bar Adda said in the name of Shmuel:

Rabbi Meir, who permitted dismantling it from the outset, was speaking only of a house built

with bricks in the open

[bricks arranged one on top of another and not cemented with mortar].

If so, in our Mishna he is in one place and his eiruv is in another place, since it is forbidden to dismantle the bricks because they are cemented with mortar?!

And we answer:

Here too,

our Mishna is speaking

of bricks in the open!

But we still ask:

Yet Rabbi Zeira said

regarding the Mishna of the house that collapsed, and according to Rabbi Meir:

Only

on the Festival did they say

that it is permitted to dismantle it from the outset,

but not on Shabbat.

And here too, why is it a valid eiruv on Shabbat?!

And we answer:

Here too,

our Mishna is speaking

of the Festival.

And we question these answers:

If so,

if our Mishna is speaking of the Festival, the following difficulty arises:

This is precisely what it teaches afterward

in the beraita concerning our Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer

[Rashi’s version; see the Gilyon and the Rashash]

says: If in the city—

where the tower is located—

the key was lost,

the key,

his eiruv is a valid eiruv,

and even though he does not know where it is, since once he knows where it is he can bring it to the tower [the Gemara below will explain how he can bring it to its place].

But if in the field,

where there is a public domain [Korban Netanel, letter shin; see there],

the key was lost,

the key,

his eiruv is not a valid eiruv.

For even once he knows where it is, he cannot bring it from the public domain into the private domain, to the place of the tower, in order to open it.

But now the difficulty arises:

And if the Mishna is speaking of the Festival,

and the same applies to the beraita—

what difference is there between a city and a field?

For “even in the field he can bring it, since it is needed for the Festival” [Ritva; see also the lengthy discussion of the Rashash here]?!