Eruvin 34a (לד.) — the Talmud in English

And one could raise a difficulty: According to Rabbi Yirmeya, who holds that we say “since,”

why

is it necessary at all to carry the eruv to the place where one establishes his Shabbat residence

Let us say: Since, if he wishes,

the one arranging the eruv can

carry it

to bring the eruv to the place where he wishes to establish his Shabbat residence,

he can

do so;

he can bring it

there. If so, by virtue of the principle of “since,” let it be said:

even though he did not bring it

to the place of his eruv residence,

it is considered as though he brought it there

and it is properly the case that he and his eruv are in one place.

This is analogous to what Rabbi Yirmeya said concerning the basket: Since he can tilt it, even if he did not tilt it, it is considered as though he tilted it, and by virtue of the principle of “since,” he is considered to be in one place with his eruv. The same applies to one who can bring his eruv to the place of his Shabbat residence: It is sufficient that he can do so for him to be considered in one place with his eruv; he need not actually carry the eruv to the place where he establishes his residence.

Rabbi Zeira

answered:

He said:

The reason that the Sages required everyone arranging an eruv to carry the eruv to the place of his Shabbat residence is

a decree, due to a Festival that occurs immediately after Shabbat.

For if his eruv is not located at the place of his residence on the eve of the Festival, it is impossible to invoke the principle of “since,” because, since it is Shabbat, he cannot bring it, and there is no basis for the principle of “since.” [The following passage is explained in accordance with Rashi’s second interpretation.]

He raised an objection

to Rabbi Yirmeya, who said, “since”:

One who

intended to establish his residence in the public domain, and placed his eruv

outside his four cubits—which every person placing an eruv has, as stated by Rava above, on page 32b—

on a wall.

If he placed it

below ten handbreadths, his eruv is valid.

For he can bring it to the place of his residence by carrying it in stages of less than four cubits. Although this is prohibited by rabbinic decree, since it is merely a rabbinic prohibition, they did not impose the decree at twilight, in accordance with Rabbi’s opinion.

But if he placed it on the wall

above ten handbreadths,

which makes it a private domain,

his eruv is invalid,

for he cannot take it from the private domain and bring it into the public domain.

But if he

intended to establish his residence at the top of a dovecote or at the top of a tower

—a large chest—and placed his eruv on the wall adjacent to the tower or dovecote, the law is the opposite:

If he placed it

above ten handbreadths,

his eruv is valid.

This is because the tower and the dovecote are also private domains.

And if he placed it on the wall

below ten handbreadths—

that is, he placed it above the ninth handbreadth, where the public carry objects, making it a public domain, as stated above on page 33a—

his eruv

is not valid,

because he cannot bring the eruv from the public domain into the private domain.

And it was initially assumed that this referred to a tower that could be tilted. Therefore, we raise a difficulty against Rabbi Yirmeya:

Why

is his eruv not valid when he placed the eruv above the ninth handbreadth?

But

here too,

here

let us say: Since he can tilt it

toward the tower

and bring it within ten

handbreadths, the tower would then have the status of a karmelit, since it would be within ten handbreadths and have a width of four handbreadths.

For if he tilts the tower into the height below ten handbreadths and brings his eruv to it, he has brought it from the public domain—at the ninth handbreadth—to the tower, which is now a karmelit. This involves only a rabbinic prohibition, which is not prohibited at twilight, in accordance with Rabbi; and he can eat the eruv at the place of his residence, in the tower.

If so, the difficulty arises: According to Rabbi Yirmeya, his eruv should be valid by virtue of “since he can tilt it”!

Rabbi Yirmeya

answered:

Here we are dealing with a tower fastened with nails—

one fixed with nails to the wall—

we are dealing with a case in which he cannot tilt it.

Rava

gave a different answer and

said: Even if you say that it is a tower that is not fastened with nails.

And here we are dealing with a long tower

much longer than four cubits—Rashi—

we are dealing with such a case.

For

if he brings it slightly,

if he tilts it to the side and brings even a small part of it below ten handbreadths, then, because of the tower’s length,

its end emerges—

the head of the tower protrudes—

beyond four cubits

from the place of his eruv.

That is, the distance from the place of the eruv on the wall to the head of the tower, which is the place of his residence, would be more than four cubits. If he wishes to bring his eruv from its place on the wall to the head of the tower, he would be carrying an object four cubits in the public domain, and he is not permitted to bring it there.

Therefore, it is not a valid eruv.

We nevertheless continue to challenge Rabbi Yirmeya, who holds the principle of “since”—in accordance with Tosafot’s understanding in the passage beginning “if”:

What are the circumstances

of the statement that when one intended to establish his residence in a tower and placed the eruv on the wall at the ninth handbreadth, the eruv is invalid, since he cannot bring it from the wall—which is a public domain—to the top of the tower?

If there is

in the tower

a window—

an opening—

and a cord—

a rope—extends from the window of the tower, and the eruv is tied to the rope, while the rope is held by the person arranging the eruv, who is in the tower at twilight and establishes his residence there,

then, even though the eruv is in the public domain,

let him bring it

since the person arranging the eruv can bring it to his place of residence at the top of the tower

through the window and by means of the cord.

That is, by means of the cord, through the window.

Since the eruv is bound to his hand, he can bring it to himself even though he is in the private domain and the eruv is in the public domain. This does not involve a Torah prohibition of carrying but only a rabbinic prohibition, as we learned below, on page 96b; and they did not impose it at twilight. Therefore, let his eruv be valid?!

And we explain: Here we are dealing with a case

where he does not have a window or a cord.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he placed it in a pit, even one one hundred cubits deep,

his eruv is valid.

And we explain:

This pit—

where does it stand—

where is it located?

If you say that it stands in the private domain,

and he intended to establish his residence there, then he is [his place of residence] in the private domain, and his eruv—which is in a pit that is ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide—is also in the private domain. What, then, does this teach us that it is effective?!