Eruvin 36b — the Talmud in English

If it enters your mind that “the beginning of the day acquires the eruv,”

then, since at the beginning of the day it is already no longer untithed produce,

if he said

“Let my eruv be established with this,”

why did he say nothing?!

And necessarily, the tanna of this Mishna holds that “the end of the day acquires the eruv,” and it is still untithed produce at that time.

Rav Pappa said

and rejected it:

Even if you say that “the beginning of the day acquires the eruv,”

it is likewise not effective, for

we require a meal that is fit “while it is still day,” and there is none,

since while it is still day on the eve of Shabbat it is untithed produce.

Mishna:

A person may make a condition concerning his eruv,

that is: A person may, if he wishes, place two eruvin, one at the end of two thousand cubits to the east of his home, and one at the end of two thousand cubits to the west of his home, and make a condition

and say:

If there come

tomorrow

gentiles from the east

and I will need to flee from them toward the west, my

eruv

on the west shall acquire for me during twilight, to flee

westward

of the city.

And if they come

from the west,

my

eruv

shall acquire for me, to flee

eastward.

And

if they come

from both sides [

from here and from there—

the reading in the Mishnayot]—

I shall go to whichever place I wish.

That is: The eruv shall acquire for me during twilight in such a manner that I shall go to whichever side I wish to travel toward.

And if

they do not come, neither from here nor from there, I am like the inhabitants of my city!

The reason for the entire Mishna is that we say, “There is retroactive designation,” so that it is possible to perform an act whose effect takes effect now, while the clarification of that effect will be tomorrow; that is, tomorrow it will become clear which eruv acquired [the right] for him now, during twilight.

And likewise, he may make a condition concerning his eruv and make it dependent upon the arrival of a Sage, because he wishes to go outside the Shabbat limit to study Torah from his mouth, and now he does not know where he will arrive, while tomorrow he will learn it through people who will come from there to here [by means of a Shabbat-limit eruv that they will place], and he says:

If there comes

tomorrow

a Sage from the east—

my eruv is to the east.

And if he comes

from the west—

my eruv is to the west.

If he comes,

if two Sages come, one

to here and

one

to here—

I shall go to whichever place I wish.

If they do not come

neither to here nor to here—

I am like the inhabitants of my city!

Rabbi Yehuda says: If

two came, one from here and one from there, and

one of them was his teacher,

then even though he said, “I shall go to whichever place I wish,” we do not say that he may go to whichever place he wishes to travel, because “we know about him that at the time of acquiring the eruv, his intention was to acquire for himself that eruv which was on his teacher’s side; however, he himself did not know from which of the sides [his teacher] would come, and now that he knows, let him go there” [the wording of Rashi].

But the first tanna holds that even if one of them was his teacher, he may go to whichever one he wishes.

And if both of them were his teachers—

even if one of them was his primary teacher [Tosafot]—

he may go to whichever place he wishes.

Gemara:

When Rabbi Isaac came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia, he brought a beraita in his hand in which

it taught

the entire Mishna

in the opposite manner [

which contains all the cases of the Mishna—in reverse]:

At the beginning, concerning one who places his eruv because of the gentiles, it is taught: He makes a condition concerning his eruv that he should be able to go toward the side from which the gentiles are coming.

And at the end, concerning one who places his eruv because of a Sage, it is taught: He makes a condition that he should be able to go toward the side opposite the direction from which the Sage comes, so that if he comes from the east, his eruv will be to the west.

And we wonder:

The gentiles

of the Mishna

are difficult in light of the gentiles

of the beraita, and

the Sage

of the Mishna

is difficult in light of the Sage

of the beraita?!

And we answer:

The gentiles in relation to the gentiles are not difficult!

This

—the case of the Mishna, in which he is fleeing from the gentiles—

is referring to tax collectors [

tax farmers], from whom he is fleeing.

This

—the case of the beraita, in which he goes out to meet them—

is referring to the leaders of the city [

the heads of the city], to whom he must go to appease them, or to cry out against them. [And Tosafot explained below, on page 82a, that it is a matter of mitzva [for one establishes an eruv only for a matter of mitzva], since he goes for the needs of the inhabitants of his city and attends to public affairs.]

The Sage in relation to the Sage is not difficult: This

—the Sage whom the one making the eruv mentions in his words in the Mishna—

is one who presents chapters [

expounds publicly], whom he wishes to hear.

And

this

—the Sage whom the one making the eruv mentions in his words in the beraita—

is one who teaches Shema [

teaches children to pray]. Two come: one is a Torah scholar who expounds publicly, and the other teaches children to pray. And he wishes to go to hear the Torah scholar who expounds publicly; therefore, he states his words in the negative manner, that he does not wish to go toward the one who teaches [children] to pray, but toward the one who expounds publicly.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: If one of them was his teacher,

he goes to his teacher; and if both of them were his teachers, he may go to whichever place he wishes:

And we explain:

And the Rabbis,

who disagree—what do they hold?

Sometimes he prefers the

Sage who is

his colleague more than his teacher [

whether because human nature is drawn to new faces, or because he is embarrassed before his teacher to ask, while he is not embarrassed before his colleague, Meiri], and it is properly possible to say “retroactive designation,” for we say that yesterday, at the time of acquiring the eruv, his intention was for his colleague and not for his teacher, since we now see that he wishes to go to his colleague and not to his teacher.

Rav said

concerning the end of Rabbi Yehuda’s words, where both of them were his teachers:

The Mishna is not [authoritative],

for it says, according to Rabbi Yehuda, that he may go to whichever place he wishes, and his eruv took effect at the onset of Shabbat according to what he will choose tomorrow on Shabbat!

And the proof that it is not [authoritative] is:

from

a beraita

that

was taught by

Ayo [

a Sage]!

For Ayo taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: A person may not make a condition concerning two things at once,

saying: If he comes to both sides, I shall go to whichever place I wish, for there is no retroactive designation.

Rather, only concerning one, when he does not know where he will come, may he make a condition [Rashi].

Therefore, he makes a condition

only: If

a Sage comes to the east, his eruv is to the east; and if a Sage comes to the west, his eruv is to the west.

And we wonder:

But if he comes to both sides—

not?!

What is different about [his coming] to both sides, that it is not

effective, because

there is no retroactive designation, “for when it is clarified tomorrow, we say: Perhaps yesterday, when he acquired the eruv, his intention was not for this [Sage], but for the other one” [Rashi]? If so, also when he makes a condition concerning one, not knowing where he will come, that his eruv should be

If so, even when he makes a condition regarding one Sage, not knowing from which direction he will come, namely, that his eruv shall be

to the east

if he comes from there tomorrow,

and

his eruv should be to the

west

if he comes from there tomorrow,

there is likewise no retroactive designation, “for when he said ‘to the east’ or ‘to the west,’ his intention was likewise that it should take effect for one of them, and tomorrow it would become clear from which direction the Sage would come, while we must judge it as though it had become clear today, and the eruv took effect during twilight” [Ritva].

Rabbi Yoḥanan said

and answered

this:

Rabbi Yoḥanan:

In the beraita taught by Ayo, it is not speaking of a case in which, during twilight, it was uncertain from where the Sage would come. Rather, it is speaking of a case in which

the Sage had already come, “to that side, and the matter itself was clear at the time of acquiring the eruv, and the eruv immediately took effect for that side with certainty; it was only that this person did not know, and in any case such as this one cannot say [that there is] retroactive designation, and his coming tomorrow is merely the revelation of a fact” [Ritva].

And now we return to what Rav said, that our Mishna is not [authoritative], for it teaches according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there is retroactive designation, on the basis of Ayo’s beraita in the name of Rabbi Yehuda.

And we wonder:

On the contrary,

let us say that

it is not [authoritative]

the beraita

that

was taught by

Ayo, on the basis of

the

Mishna?!

And we answer: It is not conceivable to reject the beraita,

for we have heard Rabbi Yehuda

elsewhere

hold that there is no retroactive designation,

as Ayo taught in his name.

For

thus

we learned [

it was taught]:

One who purchases

a barrel of

wine [

containing one hundred log],

from among the Cutheans [

before they decreed concerning their wine, Rashi], and ordinary Cutheans do not separate teruma and tithe, and he has no vessels into which to separate teruma and tithe;