Eruvin 27b — the Talmud in English

It was necessary

to state this teaching of Rabbi Yitzḥak—that water and salt mixed together may be purchased with second-tithe money

only when he placed oil into them

, which is a fruit.

He said:

Abaye challenged

him

to Rav Yosef: According to you, who said that the case is when he placed oil into them, this is difficult

and let it emerge for him

that it is possible to purchase it with second-tithe money

because of

the

oil

in it, which is certainly purchased with second-tithe money; and what is Rabbi Yitzḥak teaching us concerning water and salt?!

And we answer

It is necessary—

this teaching of Rabbi Yitzḥak, that it is permitted to purchase with second-tithe money water and salt into which he placed oil—

only when he paid for the water and salt “by inclusion.”

That is to say: He gave a large sum of second-tithe money for the oil, because he purchased water and salt together with it [in which the oil was mixed]. He “included” the payment for the water and salt in the price that he paid, which was high because of the oil. And this is what Rabbi Yitzḥak teaches us: that it is permitted.

And we raise an objection

Is it permitted even by inclusion

to pay for water and salt with second-tithe money?!

And we answer

Yes!

And was it not taught

in a beraita that in such a case—when he purchases by inclusion—it is permitted:

For it was taught

Ben Bag Bag says:

It is written concerning second-tithe money: “And you shall give the money—for whatever your soul desires: for cattle, and for sheep, and for wine, and for strong drink.”

And Scripture specified unnecessary particulars in order to expound from them:

“For cattle”: This teaches that one may purchase cattle on account of its hide.

That is to say: He gives second-tithe money for the meat at a price that is also against the value of the hide. This is despite the fact that the hide is not fit for eating, and only food may be purchased with second-tithe money.

But only the meat itself becomes sanctified with the sanctity of second tithe, whereas the hide goes out to non-sacred status.

“And for sheep”: This teaches that one may purchase sheep on account of its wool,

despite the fact that the wool is not fit for eating. And the innovation derived from “sheep” is that it is permitted to do so even though there are here two things that are unfit: the hide and the wool.

“And for wine”: This teaches that one may purchase wine on account of its jug.

And there is an innovation in the purchase of the jug, which will be explained below.

“And for strong drink”: This teaches that one may purchase tamad

—water that is placed over the grape remnants

after it has fermented,

that it fermented and became like wine, so that there is a taste of wine in the water. And it is permitted to purchase the “taste of wine” together with the water by giving the payment for the water by inclusion [Rashi below].

But before it fermented, it is considered only water [Ritva], and it is forbidden to purchase it then with second-tithe money.

And since the Gemara brought this beraita concerning inclusion, it explains it:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Whoever interprets for me “for cattle”

—who explains to me why “for cattle” is written in this verse

according to Ben Bag Bag—

I will carry his garments after him to the bathhouse

—I will carry his garments after him to the bathhouse! That is to say, I will serve him like a student who serves his teacher.

And the Gemara explains Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement:

What is the reason

for the difficulty specifically in the superfluity of this word?

For

all of them

“for sheep,” “for wine,” and “for strong drink”—

are necessary,

are necessary. Except for “for cattle”—

which is not necessary

to write in order to teach that one may purchase cattle on account of its hide.

And we explain

Why are they necessary,

that is to say: Why were “for sheep,” “for wine,” and “for strong drink” necessary?

For had the Merciful One written

only

“for cattle,” we would have said:

specifically the meat of

cattle is what is sold

, being purchased with second-tithe money

on account of

together with

its hide, because

the hide

itself

of cattle

is

[part of it, as one cannot remove it while the animal is alive].

But sheep on account of its wool, since

wool

is not itself

of sheep

is

[since one can shear it while the animal is alive],

we might say it is not

possible to purchase the wool with second-tithe money on account of the sheep; therefore “for sheep” is written.

And had the Merciful One written “for sheep”

to permit the purchase of sheep

on account of

together with

its wool, we would have said:

specifically wool is permitted

because it is attached to it,

the wool to the sheep.

But wine on account of its jug—

the wine is not attached to the jug—

we might say it is not

permitted to include the jug in the wine. Therefore “for wine” is necessary.

And had the Merciful One written “for wine”

to permit purchasing wine together with its jug,

we would have said: because that is its protection

of the wine [for the jug protects it].

But tamad after it has fermented, which is merely acidity

[which is not actually a fruit but merely water into which “acidity” entered—the sharpness of the grape remnants, as in “his teeth shall be set on edge”],

we might say it is not

permitted to purchase it with second-tithe money; therefore

the Merciful One wrote: “strong drink.”

And had the Merciful One written

only

“for strong drink,” we would have said: What

does

“strong drink”

come to include? Not to include the permission of purchasing by inclusion, but the permission to purchase

a Keilah fig cake

[a fig cake from a place called Keilah], since

it is a fruit.

And it requires inclusion because it is not properly fit for eating, since eating it confuses the mind, and it is not customary to eat it—Ritva; and see Tosafot.

But wine on account of its jug, we might say it is not

; therefore the Merciful One wrote “for wine.”

And had the Merciful One written wine on account of its jug,

we would have said because

that is its protection

of the wine.

But sheep on account of its wool, we might say it is not

; therefore

the Merciful One wrote “sheep,” even on account of its wool.

But this is difficult:

“For cattle,”

to include cattle on account of its hide—

why do I need it?

For it can be derived from the other particulars?!

And if you would say

perhaps you will answer that

if the Merciful One had not written “for cattle,” we would have said

that

“sheep”

would not include the inclusion of wool, since it is not itself part of sheep; and I would say that “sheep” means only

on account of

together with

its hide, yes,

it is permitted to include it, but

on account of its wool, no.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote “for cattle,”

in order

to bring in

the inclusion of

its hide.

And consequently

“sheep” became superfluous in order to bring in its wool.

This cannot be said!

For

even if the Merciful One had not written “cattle”

as well,

we would not have said: Sheep on account of its hide, yes; on account of its wool, no.

For if so, let the Merciful One write “cattle”—

for nothing can be included from it except hide—and let Him not write “sheep.” And it would emerge

automatically

[even though “cattle” had not been written]

that “sheep” became superfluous

to teach about its wool!

And since the Merciful One wrote “sheep,”

which necessarily comes to teach

that even on account of its wool,

then it is again difficult:

“For cattle,”

which the Merciful One wrote—

why do I need it?!

Is it not a kal va-chomer:

Now, if sheep on account of its wool is sold,

purchased with second-tithe money, even though it is not itself part of it,

cattle on account of its hide,

which is itself part of it—

is it necessary?!

And the Gemara concludes explaining Rabbi Yoḥanan’s question:

This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan was saying: “Whoever interprets for me

what explains the need for writing

‘for cattle,’ according to Ben Bag Bag—

I will carry his garments

after him

to the bathhouse!”

And now the Gemara returns to explain the beraita above, in which Rabbi Yehuda ben Gadish and Rabbi Eliezer disagreed whether fish brine may be purchased with second-tithe money. But both of them maintain that fish themselves may be purchased with second-tithe money.

And we explain

With regard to what do Rabbi Yehuda ben

Gadish and Rabbi Eliezer,

who maintain that fish may be purchased with second-tithe money,

and these tannaim below,

who maintain that fish may not be purchased with second-tithe money, disagree?

Rabbi Yehuda ben Gadish and Rabbi Eliezer expound

throughout the Torah [Rav Ḥisda] by the interpretive method of

multiplications and limitations.

And

if

these tannaim expound

throughout the Torah by the interpretive method of

generalizations and particulars.

Rashi explains the distinction between the forms of exposition in tractate Shevuot, page 4b:

One who expounds multiplications and limitations maintains:

When a generalization is written in the Torah, followed by a particular, and followed by a generalization, we treat the generalization as a multiplication and the particular as a limitation.

The limitation that follows the first multiplication does not explain the multiplication, but limits it somewhat. It comes to say: the first multiplication did not multiply everything, but only this and what is similar to it.

And without the latter multiplication, it would have been understood that only this and what is similar to it are included.

Therefore, when another multiplication comes afterward, it comes to multiply even something unlike the limitation.

And therefore Scripture multiplied everything, and the limitation limited only one thing, the thing that is most appropriate to exclude.

One who expounds generalizations and particulars maintains:

If the second generalization had not been written, but only the first generalization and the particular, one might say: the generalization contains only exactly what is in the particular [and not what resembles it].

And when the second generalization was written, in order to add, it is sufficient for you to add only something resembling the particular.

And this is what we say: A generalization, a particular, and a generalization—you derive [from the generalization] only something resembling the particular.

That is to say: Indeed, you derive an addition to the particular by means of the final generalization, but you derive as an addition to it only something resembling it.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Gadish and Rabbi Eliezer expound

what is written:

“And you shall give the money for whatever your soul desires,” by which every thing is included in this verse.

And afterward it is written: “For cattle, and for sheep, and for wine, and for strong drink,” which implies these and not others.

And afterward it is written: “And for whatever your soul asks of you,” in which everything is included—

by

multiplications and limitations.

And this is how they expound:

“And you shall give the money for whatever your soul desires”—

it multiplied

the verse to include every thing.

“For cattle, and for sheep, and for wine, and for strong drink”—

the verse limited

one thing.

“And for whatever your soul asks of you”—

it again multiplied

everything.

And since

it multiplied

the verse

and limited, and

then

multiplied again—

it multiplied everything!

But the limitation was effective to limit one thing.

And we explain

What did it multiply,

what did Scripture multiply?

It

multiplied

every matter.

And what did it limit?

According to Rabbi Eliezer, it limited

the verse

fish brine

[in which fish innards are not mixed].

According to Rabbi Yehuda ben Gadish—

who maintains that even brine may be purchased with second-tithe money—

it limited

the verse

water and salt.

But fish were included through the multiplication, which multiplied everything.

And

if

these tannaim—

of the two beraitot brought immediately below—

expound

these verses by

generalizations and particulars.

For it was taught:

It is stated in the Torah how the money of second tithe is to be spent in Jerusalem:

“And you shall give the money for whatever your soul desires”—

a generalization.

“For cattle, and for sheep, and for wine, and for strong drink”—

a particular.

“And for whatever your soul asks of you”—

it again becomes a generalization.

A generalization, a particular, and a generalization—

you do not derive

[by learning from the generalization]

except something resembling the particular

[and not every thing; and not like the one who expounds by multiplications and limitations, to include everything except one thing]:

Just as the particular is explicitly

something that is:

a.

A fruit

[everything produced from another thing is called “fruit”], which is produced

from a fruit,

for the calf is born from its mother, and its mother too is considered a “fruit.” And likewise grapes are produced from the grape remnants that were sown in the ground, which too are fruit.

b.

And products of the ground

they are—that is to say, they are nourished and grow from the ground.

So too everything

that is

a fruit from a fruit, and products of the ground,

may be purchased with second-tithe money.

Fish are excluded, for they are nourished from the water and not from the ground, and therefore they may not be purchased with second-tithe money.

And another beraita was taught,

to expound the generalization, particular, and generalization in this verse in another manner:

Just as the particular—

cattle, sheep, wine, and strong drink—

is explicitly

something that is

a progeny

born from

progenies

that were created in the act of Creation from

the earth,

so too every progeny

of

the progenies of the earth,

which were created in the act of Creation from the earth, may be purchased with second-tithe money.

Fish are excluded, for they were created from the water and not from the earth, and therefore they may not be purchased with second-tithe money.

And this means that the tannaim of these two beraitot are the tannaim who disagree and maintain that fish may not be purchased with second-tithe money.

And the Gemara explains

What is the difference between them,

what is the practical legal difference between the two tannaim of the two beraitot?

Abaye said

[he came to disagree with what the Gemara said above, that according to both tannaim fish were excluded]:

Fish—

is the difference between them.

According to the one who says

that we require

a fruit from a fruit and products of the ground,

fish too are included in this category, to be purchased with second-tithe money.

For Abaye holds:

these fish—

are products of the ground.

For they too are nourished from the ground.

But

according to the one who says

that we require

a progeny of the progenies of the earth,

fish were excluded by this particular, since

the fish—

were created from the water

[they were created from the water and not from the earth].

And we raise an objection to this:

And did Abaye say

that

fish—

are products of the ground?!

But Abaye said:

It is written concerning

the water-creeping creature:

a. “And whatever has no fins and scales, in the seas and in the streams, among every water-creeping creature and among every living creature that is in the water, they are an abomination to you. And they shall be an abomination to you; from their flesh you shall not eat” [Leviticus 11:10–11].

Thus there is one prohibition concerning the water-creeping creature.

b. “And whatever has no fins and scales you shall not eat” [Deuteronomy 14:10].

Thus there is a second prohibition concerning the water-creeping creature.

And it is written concerning

the land-creeping creature:

a. “Everything that walks on its belly and everything that walks on four, up to every one that has many feet, among every creeping creature that swarms upon the earth, you shall not eat them, for they are an abomination” [Leviticus 11:42].

Thus there is one prohibition concerning the land-creeping creature.

b. “And every creeping creature that swarms upon the earth is an abomination; it shall not be eaten” [Leviticus 11:41].

Thus there is a second prohibition concerning the land-creeping creature.

c. “And you shall not defile your souls with every creeping creature that moves upon the earth” [Leviticus 11:44].

Thus there is a third prohibition concerning the land-creeping creature.

And it is written concerning

the winged creeping creature

:

“Every winged creeping creature is impure for you; they shall not be eaten” [Deuteronomy 14:19].

And it is written concerning

all creeping creatures,

two additional prohibitions: “You shall not make your souls abominable with every creeping creature that swarms, and you shall not defile yourselves through them” [Leviticus 11:43].

And therefore: