Eruvin 27a (כז.) — the Talmud in English

because he can create a barrier [

between himself and the grave]

and walk and eat,

since he can enter before Shabbat begins into the place where his eruv was placed by means of a chest, box, or cabinet [that is, by means of various types of carts that interpose between him and the impurity of the grave, and a priest is permitted to enter the cemetery inside them], and take the eruv and eat it.

But if he cannot enter there, it may not be permitted—even according to the first tanna, who maintains that if it is suitable for others it is satisfactory, and despite the fact that it is suitable for an Israelite—for when he places it among the graves, it is “he in one place and his eruv in another place.”

But if the person establishing the eruv can take it, but it is not suitable for him to eat [although it is suitable for another person to eat], it is properly considered “he and his eruv in one place.”

Gemara:

Rabbi Yohanan said: One does not learn from general formulations. In every place where we learned the word “all,” the meaning is not that nothing falls outside the general rule. There are “general rules” in which the tanna was not precise in his wording, and some matters do not fall within that rule.

Whenever the Mishna says “a general rule,” it does not mean that there are no exceptions. Sometimes the tanna was not precise in his wording, and certain matters do not belong to that general rule.

V

This is true not only where the tanna excluded nothing from the general rule, but

even where it is stated

“all” and the tanna added

within it

the tanna

“except

for a particular matter,” which would indicate that everything except that particular matter is included in the rule; nevertheless, one does not learn from it.

The Gemara infers from these words of Rabbi Yohanan that they do not refer to our Mishna:

Since he said

that “one does not learn from general formulations,” and added

“even where it is stated ‘except

for something,” it follows that the general formulation to which Rabbi Yohanan referred did not contain the word “except.” Therefore, Rabbi Yohanan added and said, “even where it is stated ‘except.’”

V

From

his words you learn

that it does not refer here

to our Mishna

itself [Rabbi Yohanan said it], for the word “except” is stated in it.

Since this is so, we must clarify:

To what does it refer [what was Rabbi Yohanan referring to]?

And we explain: Rabbi Yohanan

was referring there,

to what we learned:

Every positive mitzva whose performance is time-bound [

where time causes the mitzva to come, such as shofar and sukka]

men are obligated

in them

and women are exempt.

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Mitzvot

whose performance is not time-bound—

both women and men are obligated.

And concerning this we raised the following question:

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How can it be that

it is a general rule,

with no exceptions,

that women are exempt from every positive mitzva whose performance is time-bound?!

After all,

the mitzva of eating

matza

on the first night of Passover, which is obligatory, as it is stated: “In the evening you shall eat matzot,” women are obligated in it, because the mitzva of eating matza was juxtaposed with the prohibition against leaven. This teaches: Anyone included in the prohibition “you shall not eat leaven” is included in the positive commandment “rise and eat matza.”

And likewise the mitzva of

rejoicing

on a Festival, as it is stated: “And you shall rejoice, you and your household,” includes women.

V

And likewise the mitzva of

Hakhel

during the Festival of Sukkot in the year following the Sabbatical year, when the king stands on a platform and reads before Israel the mitzvot of Deuteronomy. And it is stated in that passage [Deuteronomy 31:12]: “Gather together the people, the men and the women and the children.” This shows that women too were obligated.

D

All these

are positive mitzvot whose performance is time-bound, and women are obligated?!

We further raised the following question:

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How can it be that

women are obligated in every positive mitzva whose performance is not time-bound?!

After all,

the mitzva of

Torah study,

from which women are exempt, as it is written: “And you shall teach them to your sons,” and we infer: but not your daughters.

And likewise the mitzva of

procreation,

as it is written: “Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and subdue it.” And we expound: A man, whose way it is to conquer, is obligated in procreation, but not a woman.

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And the mitzva of

redemption of the firstborn,

as it is written: “And every firstborn of your sons you shall redeem.” And we expound: “You shall be redeemed”—anyone who is subject to being redeemed, namely a male, is the one obligated to redeem his son. But a woman is not included in the mitzva of redemption, for it is written, “the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem,” excluding your daughters. Therefore, she is not obligated to redeem her son.

D

All these

are positive mitzvot whose performance is not time-bound,

yet

women are exempt!

Rather,

because of these difficulties,

Rabbi Yohanan said: One does not learn from general formulations [and, as with the formulation “women are exempt from every positive mitzva whose performance is time-bound,” “every” is not to be understood literally],

and when it says that women are exempt from “every” positive mitzva whose performance is caused by a specific time, “every” is not meant literally],

even where [in another general rule]

in another general rule]

it is stated “except”

for a particular matter.

Abaye said, and some say Rabbi Yirmeya: We too have learned

that one does not learn from general formulations, even where it is stated “except”!

For we learned:

They stated another general rule: Every

food or drink [Nidda 32b]

that is carried above a zav [“the upper object of a zav”]

is impure [

as we expound: “And whoever touches everything that shall be beneath him”—the zav—“shall be impure.” This refers to the upper object of a zav].

And every

object

upon which a zav is carried [“the lower object of a zav”]

is pure.

Except for that which is fit for lying and sitting—

that is, which is designated for sitting and lying—which is impure [as it is written: “Every bed upon which the zav lies shall be impure, and every vessel upon which he sits shall be impure”].

This excludes a bowl turned upside down [a bowl used for grain], on which he sat, which does not become impure as the seat of a zav.

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Likewise,

a person

upon whom a zav is carried is impure. For it is written: “And the one who carries ‘them’”—all that is stated concerning the zav [Rashi in his commentary on the Torah]—“shall launder his garments!” This includes one who carries the zav himself.

The Gemara infers that this general rule has exceptions:

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Is there

no more?!

Are there no other things besides lying and sitting that fall outside the general rule, according to which the lower object of a zav is pure?!

But there is

the “riding-object

of a zav,” on which he sits while riding, which is also a lower object of a zav and is impure, in addition to the lying and sitting objects listed in the general rule of the Mishna.

Rather, it is evident that the “general rule” is not literal and has exceptions.

The Gemara rejects Abaye’s proof:

This riding-object—

what are the circumstances?

If the zav sits upon it [

he sits upon it]—

that is sitting,

which is listed in the Mishna; so what difficulty does this pose for him?!

The Gemara answers:

We

mean the following:

There is also

another

pommel of a saddle [

the wooden part beside the saddle, which the rider grasps], which is also impure, even though the zav does not sit upon it.

As it was taught in a beraita: The saddle

on the animal, upon which a zav sat, is

impure

because of the

seat

of a zav.

And the part that is grasped [

that is, the pommel of the saddle] is

impure with the impurity of a riding-object [as it is written: “And every riding-object upon which the zav rides shall be impure]. Yet it was not taught in the Mishna, proving that a general rule has exceptions?!

Rather, conclude from this: One does not learn from general formulations, even where it is stated “except”!

Ravina said, and some say Rav Naḥman: We too have learned

in our Mishna that one does not learn from general formulations, even where “except” is stated.

For we learned:

With all foods one may establish an eruv and participate in a partnership, except for water and salt.

V

How can it be that

there is nothing else

with which one may not establish an eruv or participate in a partnership?!

But there is

also

truffles and mushrooms,

with which one may not establish an eruv even when they are cooked, since a person does not ordinarily rely on them, neither as a meal nor as a relish, but they are consumed only occasionally.

Rather, conclude from this: One does not learn from general formulations, even where it is stated “except.”

We learned in the Mishna:

Everything may be purchased with second-tithe money,

except for water and salt:

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina:

One

of them

teaches

the law of salt and water stated below

with regard to the eruv.

And one

of them

teaches

the law of salt and water stated below

with regard to

second tithe.

And the Gemara explains:

One teaches it with regard to the eruv:

They taught

that one may not establish an eruv with salt and water

only when the water is by itself and the salt is by itself—

one may not establish an eruv

with them when each is separate.

But with water and salt

mixed together, they are considered significant food, for dipping one’s bread in them; therefore

one may establish an eruv

with them.

And one teaches it with regard to second tithe: They taught only when the water is by itself and the salt is by itself,

it

is not that they may be purchased with second-tithe money.

But water and salt

mixed together

may be purchased with second-tithe money.

And we explain:

The one who teaches

this “they taught” that we mentioned

with regard to second tithe, all the more so

does he teach it

with regard to the eruv.

And the one who teaches

this “they taught”

with regard to the eruv,

but

with regard to second tithe, he does not

teach it, and even water and salt mixed together may not be purchased with second-tithe money.

What is the reason?

With regard to second tithe,

a fruit [

an object produced from another object is called a “fruit”]

is required

for second tithe—as will be derived on page 28b—and

these,

water and salt,

are not fruit.

When Rabbi Yitzḥak came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia, he

taught

this “they taught”

with regard to second tithe.

A challenge was raised

to Rabbi Yitzḥak from a beraita:

Rabbi Yehuda ben Gadish testified before Rabbi Eliezer:

The people

of my father’s household would purchase fish sauce [

the fatty substance of fish]

with second-tithe money.

He said to him,

Rabbi Eliezer to Rabbi Yehuda ben Gadish:

Perhaps you did not hear

that fish sauce may be purchased with second-tithe money

except when fish entrails are mixed into it,

but fish sauce by itself may not be purchased with it!

And now we challenge Rabbi Yitzḥak:

Even Rabbi Yehuda ben Gadish did not say

that it is permitted to purchase with second-tithe money something suitable only for dipping food in

except fatty fish sauce,

fatty fish sauce,

which is a fruit [

since fish too are included in the category of “fruit,” as will be stated below].

But water and salt

alone

he did not

say. How, then, could Rabbi Yitzḥak say that water and salt mixed together may be purchased with second-tithe money?!

Said

—he answered—

Rav Yosef: