Eruvin 26b — the Talmud in English

But

our Mishna—that is, the Mishna under discussion—follows the opinion of

Rabbi Eliezer,

as Rabbi Ilai said: “I heard from Rabbi Eliezer...”

But

the Mishna below follows the opinion of

the Rabbis

.

And Rav Sheshet explains their dispute [the Ritva. The Rif’s version reads: Rav Sheshet said]:

Once you examine the matter carefully

[once you investigate the matter yourself and reach the basis of their reasoning, you must say this—the Ritva]:

According to Rabbi Eliezer: One who renounces his rights to his courtyard also

likewise

renounces them

to his house, even though he did not state this explicitly [the Mishna is dealing with this case—and as we explained in the Mishna—since Rabbi Ilai said: “I sought a colleague but did not find one”; but if he had stated this explicitly, everyone would agree that it is permitted]. Therefore, the other residents may carry from his house into the courtyard, because once he has renounced his rights to them, the entire area is considered one domain [but he himself may not do so, because it appears that he is retracting his renunciation, as we explained in the Mishna].

According to the Rabbis: One who renounces his rights to his courtyard

without stating that he is also renouncing his rights to his house

has not renounced his rights to his house,

and therefore even the other residents may not carry from his private house into the courtyard shared by all of them.

And we challenge Rav Sheshet’s explanation:

It is obvious

that this is the point of their dispute. Why, then, did he need to say: “Once you examine the matter carefully”?

And we answer:

Rava said: Rav Huna bar Ḥinena and I interpreted

Rav Sheshet’s statement as follows:

His words were not necessary

to teach us the point of their dispute, since that is obvious.

Rather,

Rav Sheshet teaches us that one can understand one matter from another: From the fact that we see that according to Rabbi Eliezer “one renounces his rights generously,” and therefore he also renounces his rights to his house, although he did not mention it when making the renunciation, while according to the Rabbis “one renounces his rights begrudgingly,” we understand that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis also disagree in another case concerning this principle. Therefore:

If five people reside in one courtyard,

and four of them joined together in an eruv,

and one of them forgot and did not join the eruv,

then he must renounce his rights to each one of the residents of the courtyard in order to permit carrying in the courtyard. [Otherwise, the courtyard would belong to the person to whom he renounced his rights, and the eruv that the others prepared the previous day would not be effective in joining them to the rights they received on Shabbat, since they did not prepare the eruv with the intention of including this portion].

According to Rabbi Eliezer: When he renounces his rights, he need not renounce them

explicitly

to each and every one,

and even if he renounced his rights only to one of the residents of the courtyard, we say that, presumably, he renounced them with all of them in mind, since he renounces his rights generously.

According to the Rabbis: When he renounces his rights, he must renounce them

explicitly

to each and every one,

but if he renounced his rights only to one person, we say that he renounced them only to the one he mentioned and not to the other residents of the courtyard, and carrying in the courtyard remains prohibited.

With whose opinion does the following beraita agree? “If five people reside in one courtyard, and one of them forgot and did not join the eruv, when he renounces his rights, he need not renounce his rights to each and every one”—with whose opinion? It agrees with Rabbi Eliezer!

Rav Kahana

is the one who

teaches

Rav Sheshet’s statement

in this form,

as we said above: Rav Sheshet spoke only about our Mishna, while Rava and Rav Huna explained that he intended to teach the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis concerning renouncing one’s rights to each individual.

But

Rav Taviumi teaches

the essential statement of Rav Sheshet

as follows: “With whose opinion does the following beraita agree? ‘If five people reside in one courtyard, and one of them forgot and did not join the eruv, when he renounces his rights, he need not renounce his rights to each and every one’—with whose opinion? Rav Huna bar Yehuda said that Rav Sheshet himself said:

:

With whose opinion? With Rabbi Eliezer’s!”

He said to him

[he asked him]:

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: According to Rabbi Eliezer,

what is the law

if he says

and explicitly makes his intention clear when he renounces his rights to his courtyard:

I am not renouncing

my rights to my house?

And

I also have this question:

According to the Rabbis, if he says

and explicitly makes his intention clear:

I am renouncing

my rights to my house as well,

what

is the law? Will his house be permitted to them? He explains his uncertainty: Perhaps

the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is that he holds: One who renounces his rights to his courtyard

presumably also

renounces his rights to his house,

as Rav Sheshet explained above, because he renounces his rights generously.

And

if so,

this

person

has

explicitly

said: I am not renouncing,

and his house remains prohibited to them.

Or perhaps, the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion

is not that he renounces his rights generously, but rather

because people do not usually reside in a house without a courtyard,

and it is not considered a residence!

And

if so,

when he says, “I am not renouncing,” his statement has no force,

and

even though he says, “I reside there,” he has said nothing of consequence.

And according to the Rabbis, if he says, “I am renouncing”,

this is my uncertainty:

What is the reason for the Rabbis’ opinion?

Perhaps we should say that it is

because they hold that one who renounces his rights to his courtyard has not renounced his rights to his house,

as Rav Sheshet explained above, because he renounces his rights begrudgingly.

And

if so, here the situation is different, because

this

person

has said: “I am renouncing.”

Or perhaps the reason for the Rabbis’ opinion is that a person does not completely remove himself from his house and courtyard and become like a guest among them, and

since this is the normal practice of people,

when this person says, “I am renouncing,” his statement has no force,

because his individual opinion is disregarded in light of the practice of everyone else.

Abaye said to

Rav Pappa:

Whether one follows the Rabbis or Rabbi Eliezer, once he has made his intention clear, he has made it clear!

We learned in the Mishna:

“And so I also heard from him”

[from Rabbi Eliezer] that one may fulfill the obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover with arkavlin:

What are arkavlin? Reish Lakish said: They are atzvata

[a thick fiber that grows around a date palm and wraps itself upward around it],

called haruziyata

[many of them joined together like strings of beads], and they have the taste of bitter herbs. The Ritva wrote [above, 26a] that the basis of the dispute over whether one may fulfill the obligation with them is as follows: According to Rabbi Ilai in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, one may fulfill the obligation with them even though they are not a type of seed, since they grow from a tree. But the Rabbis who disagree hold, as we say in Pesaḥim [page 39a], that the bitter herbs must be comparable to matza, which is a type of seed. [See Tosafot and the Keren Orah].

We have completed the chapter “They Make Upright Posts.”

Introduction to the eruv of Shabbat boundaries

A.

The Shabbat boundary -

from the Torah or rabbinic?

The verse, “No man shall go out from his place on the seventh day” [Exodus 16:29], is the source for the prohibition against going outside the boundary on Shabbat.

According to Rabbi Akiva [Shabbat 69a], this verse teaches that, by Torah law, it is forbidden for a person to go outside his “place” on Shabbat, and the intention of the verse is to prohibit going outside the boundary of two thousand cubits around the place of a person’s Shabbat residence at the onset of Shabbat.

Whereas according to the Sages, this verse comes to prohibit the labor of transferring an object from one domain to another on Shabbat, while the prohibition against a person’s going outside the boundary of two thousand cubits is only rabbinic.

However, the early authorities disagreed as to whether the Sages agree with Rabbi Akiva that by Torah law it is forbidden to go outside the boundary of twelve mil, which are three parsaot, corresponding to the size of the Israelite encampment in the wilderness.

B.

The nature of the prohibition -

going out or walking?

Likewise, we find in the words of our early authorities two differing explanations of the nature of the prohibition “to go out from his place” - according to the Ramban,

going out

of the person from the place of his Shabbat residence is the prohibition, similar to the labor of transferring from one domain to another.

And according to the Rambam,

walking

a distance outside the boundary is the prohibition, similar to transferring an object four cubits in the public domain.

C.

How is the place of Shabbat residence established?

Every person and object has a “place of Shabbat residence” at the onset of Shabbat, and around it there is a Shabbat boundary of two thousand cubits in every direction.

This place can be established both by the person’s presence in that place at the time Shabbat begins, and by the person designating that place as “the place of his Shabbat residence,” although he himself is at the time Shabbat begins in another place.

The designation of “the place of Shabbat residence” can, in principle, be made merely by a statement, with the person declaring, “My Shabbat residence is in such-and-such a place,” although he is not present in that place [and indeed this is what one does when there is no other possibility].

However, the Sages instituted that if a person is in a certain place at the time Shabbat begins and wishes to establish another place of Shabbat residence for himself, so that he will be able to walk from it onward two thousand cubits, he should do so by placing an eruv of Shabbat boundaries [of food suitable for two meals] in that place, on the eve of Shabbat, while it is still day.

Establishing the place of Shabbat residence in another place [by his presence in that place when Shabbat begins, or by placing the eruv, or by his statement] enables a person to walk on Shabbat two thousand cubits in every direction from that place which he established for himself as the place of his Shabbat residence, and not from the place where he is present during Shabbat.

The person need not place the eruv himself, but may send it by means of an agent who will place it there.

D.

The definition of the “place of Shabbat residence” changes from place to place:

One who establishes his Shabbat residence in a city has the entire city considered his “place of Shabbat residence,” and around it he has two thousand cubits in every direction.

If he wishes to place an eruv, he may do so outside the city, but not inside the city, because the entire city is his place of Shabbat residence even without the eruv, and it follows that he accomplished nothing by placing the eruv.

And if he places the eruv in another city [adjacent to his city and located within the Shabbat boundary of his city], the entire second city will be considered his place of Shabbat residence, and he will have a Shabbat boundary of two thousand cubits around the second city.

One who establishes his Shabbat residence outside a city, in a house or in any place enclosed for dwelling, has the entire enclosed place considered his place of Shabbat residence, and he has two thousand cubits around that place.

Whereas one who establishes his Shabbat residence in an open place outside a city has four cubits as his place of Shabbat residence, and two thousand cubits around his four cubits.

E.

A fundamental condition for placing the eruv is that “he and his eruv be in one place.”

That is, that it be possible for him at the onset of Shabbat to reach and take his eruv.

F.

In the chapter before us it will be explained:

a. Which food is suitable for placing the eruv, and what its measure is.

b. Where is the place in which it is possible to place the eruv.

c. Who is suitable to be an agent for placing the eruv.

Mishna:

Our Mishna is divided into two matters:

The first, to teach us that salt and water are not considered food where food is required.

And the second, a dispute between tannaim concerning to what extent the eruv is effective when the person placing the eruv is restricted in his eating.

The first matter:

a.

With all

kinds of food

one may make

an eruv of Shabbat boundaries .

And

with all kinds of food

one may participate in

a partnership of alleyways [so that they may carry from the houses in the courtyards into the alleyway shared by all the courtyards].

Except for water and salt,

which are not considered food.

The foundation of the eruv is based on the fact that a person’s intention is that his fixed place and dwelling is the place where his provisions are found. Therefore, food is required, but not water or salt.

b.

And all

kinds of food

may be purchased with second-tithe money

[which he brought up to Jerusalem, and the Torah said: “And you shall bestow the money for whatever your soul desires”],

except for water and salt.

And the Gemara explains the reason.

c.

One who vows

benefit

from food is permitted to have water and salt.

The second part:

One may make

an eruv of Shabbat boundaries

for a nazirite with wine, although he is forbidden to drink it, since it is food for others, the Sages permitted it to him.

even though he is forbidden to drink it, because it is food for other people; therefore, the Sages permitted it for him.

And

for the same reason one may make an eruv

for an Israelite with teruma,

although it is forbidden to him, since it is permitted to priests.

Sumakhos says:

One may make an eruv for an Israelite only

with unconsecrated produce,

and not with teruma [and the Gemara explains that Sumakhos does not disagree concerning wine for a nazirite, since he can seek release from his nazirite vow].

And

one may make an eruv - according to everyone -

for a priest

by placing it

in a beit ha-peras [a field in which a grave was lost, and a field in which a grave was plowed], although it is rabbinically forbidden for a priest to enter there, lest a barley-grain-sized bone be found there that imparts impurity through contact and carrying; and whenever he cannot enter and eat his eruv, it is impossible to say that “his Shabbat residence is in the place of his eruv.” Nevertheless, it is permitted, since he is permitted to enter there by blowing [blowing the earth with his mouth before his feet in order to examine it].

Rabbi Judah says:

One may make an eruv for a priest

even among graves,