Eruvin 28a (כח.) — the Talmud in English

If one ate a potita

a small aquatic creeping creature; although it is not the volume of an olive, it is an intact creature, and one is liable for eating it

he receives four sets of lashes:

two on account of the prohibitions concerning aquatic creeping creatures, and two on account of the prohibitions concerning all creeping creatures.

If one ate a

ant

which is a land creeping creature

he receives five sets of lashes:

three on account of the prohibitions concerning land creeping creatures, and two on account of the prohibitions concerning all creeping creatures.

If one ate a

wasp

which is an airborne creeping creature and also swarms upon the earth [Rashi, Pesaḥim 24b]

he receives six sets of lashes:

one on account of the prohibition concerning airborne creeping creatures, two on account of the prohibitions concerning all creeping creatures, and three on account of the prohibitions concerning land creeping creatures.

And now this is difficult:

And if it is so,

as Abaye maintains, that fish are products of the earth, then if one ate a

potita

he should also receive lashes on account of

“the creeping creature that swarms upon the earth”

a land creeping creature

so it appears from Rashi—and he should receive seven sets of lashes, since three additional sets of lashes should be administered on account of a land creeping creature ?!

Rather, Ravina said: Birds

are what

distinguishes between them,

the two beraitot.

According to the one who says: “fruit from fruit and products of the earth,” these

birds

also

are fruit from fruit and

are products of the earth,

and they may be purchased with ma'aser money.

But

according to the one who says: “offspring of the offspring of the earth,”

birds are not included, because

these birds were created from the marsh

mud containing both water and dry land

and were not created from the earth alone.

And now we explain what the tanna'im of the two beraitot disagree about:

According to the one who includes birds,

what is his reasoning?

And according to the one who excludes birds,

what is his reasoning?

It is established for us that, according to the one who expounds the entire Torah by the principles of generalization and specification:

a. If a “generalization and specification” is written, the generalization includes only what is stated in the specification, precisely as it is.

c. If a “specification and generalization” is written, the generalization adds to the specification, and everything is included within it.

b. And if a “generalization, specification, and generalization” is written, it is as though the two preceding principles—which contradict one another in their legal consequences

—were combined.

Therefore we say: one may derive from the generalization only something similar to the specification.

That is, on the one hand, we broaden the specification, but on the other hand, we limit the generalization.

However, these tanna'im disagree when there is a generalization, specification, and generalization as to which side should be given greater weight: the first generalization and the specification that follows it—meaning that one should primarily apply the principle of “generalization and specification,”

while also taking into account the generalization that follows—or perhaps greater weight should be given to the final generalization, in which case one should primarily apply the principle of “specification and generalization,” while also taking the first generalization into account. And the Gemara explains:

According to the one who includes birds, he holds: The final generalization

the final generalization that follows the specification

alone

is decisive, and one primarily applies the principle of

“specification and generalization.”

And if so,

the generalization adds to the specification, and all matters are included.

And

nevertheless, since a generalization was also written at the beginning,

it was effective

it served a purpose:

the first generalization excludes

only

anything

that

is not similar to it,

in that it differs from the specification

in two respects

out of the three characteristics that define the specification: fruit from fruit, products of the earth, and offspring of the offspring of the earth.

Therefore, only fish are excluded, since they are not products of the earth and are not offspring of the offspring of the earth.

But birds, which resemble the specification in two respects—being fruit from fruit and products of the earth—even though in the third respect, offspring of the offspring of the earth, they do not resemble the specification, are not excluded.

And according to the one who excludes birds, he holds: The first generalization alone

is decisive, and we consider it as

“generalization and specification.”

And

according to this principle,

the generalization includes only what is stated in the specification.

Therefore,

these

items written in the verse

are included.

But

anything else—

even things that resemble the specification—

is not.

And

nevertheless,

the final generalization

also

serves a purpose

to a limited extent,

to include everything similar to it

the specification

in three

respects.

That is, things that are also fruit from fruit, products of the earth, and offspring of the offspring of the earth.

Therefore, birds too are excluded, since they resemble the specification in only two respects; they are not offspring of the offspring of the earth, as they were created from the marsh.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat in the name of Rav: One may establish

an eruv teḥumin

with pefu'in

vegetables that contain salt, according to Rabbenu Ḥananel

and with ḥalgalugot

see Megilla 18a

and with gudgedaniyot

a grass eaten by camels, which people eat only under duress, according to the Maharshal in the name of the Arukh

.

But one may not

establish an eruv

with ḥaziz

and not with kafniyot,

inferior dates that have not fully ripened and are not ordinarily eaten.

And we raise an objection to this:

With gudgedaniyot, may one establish an eruv?!

But wasn’t it taught in a beraita: gudgedaniyot

which diminish the semen, and therefore

men who have many children may eat them,

but

men who have no children may not eat them

?

And if they have hardened

the stalks of the gudgedaniyot have become hard

for seed

after a time, the stalks harden like wood, once the seeds have already grown in them

—even men who have many children may not eat them,

since they are harmful to everyone.

And since they are unfit for eating, is it not evident that one may not establish an eruv with them?!

And we answer:

Interpret it

Rav’s statement must be established in one of three ways:

a.

A

the gudgedaniyot

that have not hardened for seed.

And men who have many children

are the ones with whom one may establish an eruv using them, since they are fit for those men to eat.

b.

And if you wish, say: Actually, it is for men who have no children

and it concerns gudgedaniyot that have not hardened for seed; although they are not fit for these men to eat, since

they are fit for men who have many children.

For

did we not learn

in our Mishna:

one may establish an eruv for a nazirite with wine,

and

for an Israelite with teruma?

Apparently, although it is not fit for this one,

it is fit for that one,

and anyone may establish an eruv with it.

Here

with regard to gudgedaniyot

as well: Although it is not fit for this one,

their eruv is not fit for men who have no children,

it is fit for that one,

for men who have many children; therefore, anyone may establish an eruv with it.

c.

And if you wish, say: When Rav said

that one may establish an eruv with gudgedaniyot:

it was with the handakukei of Media

the gudgedaniyot of Media, which are suitable for everyone.

We raise another difficulty against Rav:

And

why

may one not establish an eruv with ḥaziz?

But Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav himself

that

that

hops

humlin, according to Rashi, which grow among thorns

and ḥaziz: one may establish an eruv with them, and one recites over them: “Who creates the fruit of the earth”?!

And we answer:

This is not difficult.

This

statement, in which Rav said that one may not establish an eruv with ḥaziz,

was before

before

Rav came to Babylonia,

and saw that people there ate ḥaziz.

That

statement, in which Rav said that one may establish an eruv with ḥaziz,

was after

after

Rav came to Babylonia,

and saw that people ate it.

And we ask:

And

why, merely because

Babylonia

the inhabitants of which ate it

is considered the majority of the world,

so that it could draw the rest of the people in the world, who do not eat it, after its practice?!

On the contrary, since their practice is unusual, it is not considered a practice even with regard to them [Ritva, s.v. “Its opinion is nullified”].

But wasn’t it taught in a beraita,

that the opinion of a minority is nullified in relation to that of all people:

For we learned in a beraita:

The broad bean, barley, and fenugreek that one sowed for greens,

meaning that his intention in sowing them was to eat them while they were still greens, while moist—as with ḥaziz—and not to eat their seeds once they ripen and dry [Ritva]

—his opinion is nullified in relation to that of all people,

since people do not eat them as greens, but only their seeds once they ripen and dry.

Therefore:

If he sowed them

he is liable

for tithing, even though he did not sow the broad bean, barley, and fenugreek for the purpose of eating their seeds.

But their greens are exempt,

since they are not eaten, despite his having sown them with the intention of eating them as greens.

The shaḥlayim and the gargir

a type of white mustard—which are customarily eaten both as greens and as seeds—

if one sowed them for greens, both the greens and the seeds are tithed.

And if one sowed them for seed, both the seeds and the greens are tithed,

and Tosafot explained: When one sows them for greens, the greens are primary; and when one sows them for seed, the seeds are primary. See there for two distinctions, and see the explanations of the Maharams and the Rashash.

And since the inhabitants of Babylonia who ate ḥaziz were a minority in the world, their eating it does not make ḥaziz an item of food.

Therefore, we give another answer:

When Rav said

that one may establish an eruv with ḥaziz: