Eruvin 22b (כב:) — the Talmud in English

If you say that this is because a rocky ascent surrounds it

Tzur = a place-name

on this side,

surrounding Eretz Yisrael on two sides in the shape of the Hebrew letter kaf sofit: a rock, a mountain ledge ten handbreadths high, surrounding it and making it possible to ascend to Eretz Yisrael [that is, on two sides—the northern and eastern sides—Eretz Yisrael is surrounded by mountains that are ten handbreadths high and stand upright, forming an enclosure around it],

and the slope [a descent]

a slope

of Geder [a place-name]

a place-name

on this side the southern side, surrounds it with a descent—a trench ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide—and since it is surrounded by partitions, it is not a public domain.

the southern side, surrounds it—a trench ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide—and since it is surrounded by partitions, it is not a public domain.

It is impossible to say this.

For if so,

Babylonia as well

should not incur liability for carrying there on account of its being a public domain.

For

the Euphrates River

surrounds it

on this side [that is, on two sides, like the final kaf]

that is, on two sides, like the letter khaf

and

the

Tigris River

surrounds it

on this side!

Moreover, according to your argument, one should raise an even stronger objection: the many domains

of the entire world as well—

the

ocean

surrounds them,

and they should not incur liability for carrying in them on account of their being a public domain!

Rather, it is necessarily the case that partitions within which the person standing there does not see himself as enclosed by partitions are not considered partitions. If so, one should likewise incur liability for carrying in the public domains of Eretz Yisrael?! [This is explained according to the Ritva; see Tosafot and Gaon Ya'akov.]

And Abaye added and said:

And Abaye added and said:

Perhaps your intention is not that there is no public domain throughout all of Eretz Yisrael, but rather that it is only regarding the

you do not mean that there is no public domain anywhere in the Land of Israel. Rather, it is only regarding the

ascents and descents [ups and downs] in Eretz Yisrael—which are steep and not convenient for use—that you

[ups and downs] in the Land of Israel—which are upright and not convenient for use—it is that you

said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan that one is not liable for carrying on them in a public domain [the reason will be explained further in the Gemara].

in the name of Rabbi Yohanan that one is not liable for them on account of a public domain [and the reason will be explained further on in the Gemara].

Rav Dimi said

to Abaye:

O skull-owner [one who possesses a skull], that is, an important person,

[master of the skull], that is, an important person,

I saw your head among the pillars [I saw your head among the pillars of the beit-midrash of Rabbi Yohanan]

[I saw your head among the pillars of the study hall of Rabbi Yohanan]

when he said [when]

[when he said]

Rabbi Yohanan stated this teaching!

The early authorities disagreed concerning the interpretation and intent of these words:

Tosafot explained that “your head” refers to Rabba, Abaye’s teacher and superior. Rav Dimi said to him: Since Rabba, who was Abaye’s teacher, was present in the beit-midrash, he is surprised that Abaye did not hear this statement of Rabbi Yohanan from his teacher [as explained by the Maharsha in the name of Rashbam].

The Ritva explained [and wrote that the preceding interpretation was not stated by Rabbi Yehuda, the author of Tosafot]: He said it as a witty remark: Since Abaye had independently arrived at the correct conclusion, Rav Dimi imagined that Abaye had been in Rabbi Yohanan’s beit-midrash when he stated this teaching.

And we find support for this interpretation:

It was also stated: When Ravin came, he said that Rabbi Yohanan said—and some say that Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yohanan said: With regard to the ascents and descents in Eretz Yisrael, one is not liable for carrying on them on account of their being a public domain, because they are not like the encampments of the wilderness,

that is, the Shabbat labors and the prohibition of carrying are derived from the labors of the Tabernacle, which were performed in the wilderness, where Israel encamped according to their standards—and these are not like the encampments of the wilderness.

The early authorities disagreed concerning the interpretation of the matter:

Rashi wrote that the land in the wilderness was level, since the cloud leveled all the ascents and descents for the Children of Israel. Since ascents and descents are not similar to that, one is not liable for carrying on them on account of their being a public domain.

Rachava asked Rabba [Mishkenot Ya'akov]:

[Mishkenot Yaakov]:

A mound

ten handbreadths high or more, whose status is that of an area enclosed by partitions by virtue of the mound’s sides, and the mound had a slope for the public to ascend it, which was extremely steep, until it

rose [accumulated]

[accumulates] to a height of

ten

handbreadths

within four cubits [until the length of the slope reached four cubits, the mound rose to a height of ten handbreadths or more, the measure of steepness for a mound that is not convenient for public passage],

cubits [meaning that when the length of the slope was four cubits, the mound rose to a height of ten handbreadths or more, which is the degree of steepness at which a mound is not convenient for public walking]]

and

nevertheless

the public traverses it,

is it said that the public who traverse the slope come and nullify the partitions at the top of the mound, and

one is liable for carrying on it on account of its being a public domain, since they have nullified the partitions? [This refers to a case in which the top of the mound is sixteen cubits wide, the measure of a public domain, and six hundred thousand people tread there—the Ritva; see Gaon Ya'akov.]

since they have nullified the partitions? [This is speaking of a case in which the top of the mound is sixteen cubits wide, the measure of a public domain, and six hundred thousand pass there—Ritva; see Gaon Yaakov].

Or is one not liable for carrying on it

on account of its being a public domain, because the passage of the public along a route that is not convenient for walking does not nullify the partitions?

And we explain Rachava’s question:

According to the Rabbis,

who say in the Mishna that the passage of the public does not nullify the partitions of the upright posts [since there are four partitions there, as explained above],

you need not ask

concerning a mound [which likewise has four partitions, since every height of ten handbreadths is considered a partition—the Ritva]: The passage of the public does not nullify the mound’s partitions, and one is not liable for carrying on it on account of its being a public domain, by means of a kal va-homer:

Now,

and

just as there

with regard to the upright posts,

where its use is convenient, the Rabbis say: The public does not come and nullify the partition, here

with regard to a mound,

where its use is not convenient, is it not all the more so that the public does not come and nullify the mound’s partitions, and it is not a public domain.

the public does not come and nullify the mound’s partitions, and it is not a public domain.

When you need to ask, it is according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who says in the Mishna with regard to the upright posts that the public comes and nullifies the partitions of the upright posts [since they pass through it from all four directions—according to the Ritva cited above]. In this case, you must ask concerning a mound [where as well they pass through from four directions—the Ritva]:

What is the law?

Can one say:

There

with regard to the upright posts, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the partitions are nullified because

its use is convenient,

the use of the public road; but

here

with regard to a mound,

where its use is not convenient, the public does not come and nullify the partition,

or perhaps there is no difference?

Rabba said

to Rachava:

One is liable for carrying on the mound on account of its being a public domain, since the partitions are nullified.

for the mound on account of a public domain, for the partitions are nullified.

Rachava then asked Rabba:

And even if the mound is so steep that

if the mound is so upright that

one ascends it with a rope—

is one liable?

Rabba said

to Rachava:

Yes, [that is, one is liable for carrying on it on account of its being a public domain].

[that is, they are liable for it on account of a public domain].

Rachava then asked Rabba:

And even if one ascends the mound in the manner in which people ascended

if they ascend upon the mound in the manner in which they would ascend

the ascents of Beit Meron [a place-name], where the ascents were extremely steep and the width of the path was narrow, so that two people could not ascend them simultaneously, but only one after the other?

[a place-name], whose steps were extremely upright and the width of each step was narrow, so that two could not ascend them at once, but only one after the other?

Rabba said

to Rachava:

Yes [that is, one is liable for carrying on it].

[that is, they are liable for it].

See the Iyyunim and the Introduction concerning the law of a mound that rises within four cubits.

He raised an objection to him: A courtyard into which the public enters through this

entrance or breach

which

is on one side,

and exits through this one

on the other side [from all sides of the courtyard—Tosafot], its status is that of a

public domain

for

matters of ritual impurity,

for if a case of uncertain impurity arises there, it is pure, in accordance with the law of uncertain impurity in a public domain, which is pure, since the public passes through it.

And

its status is that of a

private domain

for

the

matter of

Shabbat, since it is enclosed by partitions, and we see that the public does not come and nullify the partitions.

since it is surrounded by partitions, and we see that the passage of the public does not nullify the partitions.

And this beraita—

whose opinion is it?

If you say it is the Rabbis

of the Mishna with regard to the upright posts, this cannot be,

for

now, just as there

with regard to the upright posts,

where its use is convenient, the Rabbis say: The public does not come and nullify the partition, here

with regard to a courtyard

that

has remnants [where the wall does not have a breach extending to its base, and a remnant of the wall that had been there remains below], and therefore

where its use is not convenient, is it not all the more so,

and this is obvious; why was it necessary to teach it?!

Rather, is it not Rabbi Yehuda,

who, although he holds with regard to the upright posts that the public comes and nullifies the partitions, here, with regard to a courtyard where its use is not convenient, holds that the passage of the public does not nullify the partitions. And this is difficult: How did you say that one is liable for carrying on a mound where its use is not convenient, on account of its being a public domain, and that the partitions are nullified?!

And we reject this:

No.

Actually, it is the Rabbis

and the ruling follows their view, that the partitions are not nullified.

And

as for what is difficult for you—that it is obvious—do not find it difficult, for

the public domain with regard to ritual impurity

is what

was what it was necessary for him

to teach, whereas the fact that it is a private domain with regard to Shabbat is obvious!

Come and hear: Alleyways that are open at both ends toward pits, cisterns, and caves are private domains

with regard to

with regard to Shabbat, and public domains with regard to ritual impurity.

And we are perplexed in explaining the beraita: Alleyways that are open at both ends

“to pits”—

which implies that the alleyway is inside the pit—

could it enter your mind

that this is so?!

Rather, this is what it is saying: Alleyways that are open at both ends [crosswise and lengthwise—the Ritva], one side of which is a public domain, while their other side is open

this is what it says: alleys that are open [crosswise and lengthwise—Ritva], which on one side face a public domain, and on their other side are open

“to pits”,

and one who wishes to pass must limit himself to walking along the edge of the pit, or they are open “to cisterns and caves”;

they are private domains

with regard to

with regard to Shabbat, since the public does not come and nullify the alleyway’s partitions,

since the public does not come and nullify the partitions of the lane,

and public domains with regard to ritual impurity,

since the public walks there. We see that the public does not come and nullify partitions where use is not convenient, as here, where, when exiting, they must pass narrowly along the edge of the pit.

And this beraita—

whose opinion is it?

If you say it is the Rabbis,

is it not difficult: It is obvious?! For

now, just as there

with regard to the upright posts,

where its use is convenient, they say,

the Rabbis,

the public does not come and nullify it

with regard to the partitions,

here

in the alleyways open toward pits,

where its use is not convenient, is it not all the more so!

Rather, is it not Rabbi Yehuda,

and because its use is not convenient, Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the partitions are not nullified. And this is difficult: How did Rabba say that one is liable for carrying on a mound on account of its being a public domain?!

And we reject this:

No, it is actually the Rabbis

it is,

and it was necessary for him to teach that it is a public domain with regard to ritual impurity,

but you should not find it difficult by saying that it is obvious.

Come and hear: The paths of Beit Gilgul [a steep and elevated road—which is not convenient for public passage—in Eretz Yisrael]

[a steep and high ascending road, which is not convenient for the walking of many—in the Land of Israel]

and similar paths are private domains

with regard to

with regard to Shabbat,

since the public does not nullify the partitions found there [since it is an ascending road],

and public domains with regard to ritual impurity,

since the public walks there.

And which are the paths of Beit Gilgul that are considered private domains with regard to Shabbat?

that are considered a private domain with regard to Shabbat?

The school of Rabbi Yannai says: Any path on which a slave cannot carry a se'a of wheat

in his hands or on his shoulders,

and

he could

run before a sergeant [police officer].

[a policeman].

And this beraita, which establishes that it is a private domain with regard to Shabbat and that the public does not come and nullify the partitions—

whose opinion is it?

If you say it is the Rabbis,

why was it necessary to state this? It is obvious,

for

now, just as there

with regard to the upright posts,

where its use is convenient, the Rabbis say: The public does not come and nullify its partition; here, where its use is not convenient, is it not all the more so

that they do not nullify the partition!

Rather, is it not Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds with regard to the upright posts that the public comes and nullifies the partitions because its use is convenient, but here, where its use is not convenient, they do not nullify the partitions. And this is difficult for Rabba, who said that although its use is not convenient, the public comes and nullifies the partitions—according to Rabbi Yehuda?!

And we answer:

Rabba said

to Rachava:

The paths of Beit Gilgul,

which are in Eretz Yisrael,

are you speaking of—

as a question?!

In Eretz Yisrael it is obvious that they are private domains and that the public does not nullify the partitions, for

Joshua loved Israel; he arose and established for them

for Israel

roads and highways [a route used by people—Rashi above 7a];

[a way of human passage—Rashi above 7a],

wherever its use is convenient, he designated it for public use.

Wherever its use is not convenient, he designated it for private use,

and if the owners of the fields adjoining a road whose use is not convenient wished to take it for themselves, they had the right to do so. Consequently, it is considered only like an open area, which is a karmelit—the Ritva.

Mishna:

Since the upright posts around wells were permitted only for the water of those ascending for the pilgrimage festivals, the Sages were concerned that perhaps the water would run out after the upright posts had been made, and people would rely on them and carry even without water. Therefore:

Whether it is a pit [water collected from rainwater]

of the public,

or a public well, or a private well, one makes upright posts for them,

since with regard to a well there is no concern that the water will run out, as it is not their way to run out. A public pit is likewise permitted, since if the water in the pit runs out, people will remind one another not to carry.

But for a private pit,

where there is concern that the water will run out, one does not make upright posts for it; rather,

one makes for it

a partition ten handbreadths high

and not upright posts,

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava says: One makes upright posts only for a public well,

since it has two advantages: There is no likelihood that its water will run out, and even if it does run out, the public will remind one another.

And for the others, one makes a belt

an enclosure of ropes with fewer than three handbreadths between them [but according to Rabbi Akiva, ropes are permitted only as a partition consisting of warp and woof—the Ritva]

ten handbreadths high,

as in the case of Hanania at the beginning of our chapter, where one makes “ropes” for a pit [the Ritva].