Eruvin 23a (כג.) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava,

that one constructs pasin only for a public well.

And Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The leniency of the pasei biraot was granted only for a well of spring water.

And it is necessary to state

these two statements:

For had he taught us

only that

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, I would have said

that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava permits the use of pasin for any water

that is public, and even

water

collected

in a cistern.

And that which he teaches

in the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava that one constructs pasin only for a

“public well” -

which implies that it is permitted for a well but not for a cistern—comes only

to exclude the view of Rabbi Akiva

in the Mishna, who holds that a well is permitted even when it is private. That is, I would have said that this is what Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava means: even in the case of a well, which Rabbi Akiva holds is permitted even when it is private, it is permitted only when it is public, as in the case of a cistern, for according to everyone it must be public.

And therefore

he teaches us

the other statement of Rav Yosef in the name of Shmuel—

that the leniency of the pasei biraot was granted only for a well of spring water

alone; but a cistern, even a public one, is likewise not permitted.

And had Rav Yosef taught us

only, in the name of Shmuel, that the leniency of the pasei biraot was granted only for a

well of spring water

alone,

I would have said

that at least in the case of a well,

it makes no difference whether it is public or private

and it is permitted. Therefore

he teaches us: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava.

Mishna:

And Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava further said:

A garden

in which vegetables are grown

and a karpef

a large enclosed area outside the city, used for storing wood—which are not enclosed for residential purposes, one may not carry within them at all.

And when

they are seventy cubits and remnants by seventy cubits and remnants

and no more—which is the area of a square beit se’a

and they are enclosed by a fence ten handbreadths high, one may carry within them, provided

that they were enclosed for residential purposes. It is sufficient

that there be a watchman’s hut

a shelter for guards

or a dwelling

for the owner of the property, even though it is not occupied regularly, but only occasionally—or

that it be adjacent to the city

within two thousand cubits, so that the owner can walk and stroll there.

Since it is close to his home, he intends to use it continually, and it is therefore considered as though it had been enclosed for residential purposes. But if the enclosure was larger than a beit se’a, one may not carry within it even if it was truly enclosed for residential purposes.

Rabbi Yehuda

bar Ilai—adds to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava—and

says: Even if there is not in it

in the garden or karpef any dwelling at all,

but only a cistern

made to collect rainwater and formed by excavation,

a ditch

similar to a cistern, except that it is built above ground, according to Rabbeinu Yehonatan; and the Tiferet Yisrael explains it as resembling a cistern excavated lengthwise,

or a cave

for sheltering beneath it from the sun and taking pleasure in it, according to Rabbeinu Yehonatan,

one may carry within it,

since it appears that it was enclosed for human use.

Rabbi Akiva says:

He disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava on two points.

a.

Even if none of these features is present, one may carry within it, provided that it contains

no more than

seventy cubits and remnants by seventy cubits and remnants,

for he holds in accordance with the tanna at the beginning of this chapter, who says that even an area not enclosed for residential purposes is permitted up to the size of a beit se’a. And the Gemara asks: This is the same tanna as the one in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter, who says: They spoke of a beit se’a only with regard to a garden and a karpef. What, then, is the difference between them?

b. If it was enclosed for residential purposes, it is permitted even when larger than a beit se’a.

Rabbi Eliezer says: If its length

of the garden

is greater than its width by even one cubit

so that it is not square,

one may not carry within it,

even though its total area is not greater than a beit se’a, for the Sages permitted a square area when it was not enclosed for residential purposes.

Rabbi Yosei says: Even if its length is twice its width,

as long as its area is no greater than a beit se’a—which is five thousand cubits—

one may carry within it.

Rabbi Ilai said: I heard from Rabbi Eli

e

the commentators do not explicitly clarify whether the entire enclosed area must be square, regardless of its size, or whether this was stated only with regard to an area of two se’a, because in that case two sides are longer than seventy cubits and remnants. But if the sides are not longer than that, the shape is irrelevant. Rabbi Ilai said: I heard from Rabbi El i

ezer,

to disagree with the statement of the first tanna in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, and with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava and Rabbi Akiva:

One may carry in a garden or karpef that was not enclosed for residential purposes

even if it is

large

like a beit kor,

which contains thirty se’a. But no more than that.

And I likewise heard from him:

a. It is prohibited to carry from one’s house into another person’s courtyard, or into a courtyard belonging to many people, until they all establish an eruv of courtyards.

b. If one of the residents of the courtyard did not join the eruv with the other residents, it is prohibited for all of them to carry from a house into the courtyard, since the courtyard is shared by everyone, including the one who did not join with them, whereas the houses of those who joined the eruv belong only to those who joined it. Therefore, they are prohibited from carrying from their houses into the courtyard.

c. If one of them forgot to join the eruv, he can permit carrying from the houses of the other residents into the courtyard by “relinquishing” his rights in the courtyard to the other residents merely by making a declaration. It then turns out that the houses of the other residents and the courtyard constitute a single domain.

And Rabbi Ilai teaches us:

a. When residents of a courtyard forgot to join the eruv, and one of them relinquished his rights in the courtyard to the other residents, it is not only his rights in the courtyard that are relinquished to the other residents; his rights in his house are also relinquished to them. It follows that all the houses in the courtyard and the courtyard constitute a single domain. Nevertheless:

b.

When residents of a courtyard forgot to join the eruv,

and one of them relinquished his rights—

his house

of the one who forgot

is prohibited for bringing in

from the courtyard

and taking out

to the courtyard

for him

for the one who forgot; for if he takes objects out or brings them in, he thereby reasserts his ownership of his domain.

Therefore, he is prohibited from taking objects out from his own house. However, he may take objects out from their house into the courtyard, since everything constitutes a single domain.

But for them

the other residents of the courtyard

it is permitted

to take objects out even from his house, since the rights in his house too were relinquished to them, just as his rights in the courtyard were, and everything constitutes a single domain.

And

likewise

I heard from him:

One fulfills

the obligation to eat maror

with

the eating of

arkavlin

the name of a bitter vegetable

on Passover!

And

with regard to all three of these traditions,

I went over all the students

of Rabbi Eliezer,

and sought for myself a colleague

who likewise remembered that Rabbi Eliezer had said this,

but I found none!

Rather, they hold:

a. An enclosure not made for residential purposes is not permitted when larger than a beit se’a.

b. One who relinquishes his rights in his courtyard does not relinquish his rights in his house; therefore, even for the other residents it is prohibited to carry from his house into the courtyard.

c. Arkavlin is not a type of maror.

Gemara:

We raise a difficulty concerning the wording of the Mishna: “And Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava further said”:

What did Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava teach

before this Mishna, concerning the law of a garden and a karpef, that would justify saying

that it teaches ‘further’

in addition to that law?

If you say that the reason the Mishna says “further” is not because Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava taught another law concerning a garden and a karpef, but

that the word “further” does not appear because Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava taught another law concerning a garden and an enclosure, but rather

because he taught it

in the preceding Mishna, on folio 22:

one ruling as a stringency

that Rabbi Yehuda is stringent and permits the construction of pasin only for a public well,

and he teaches

in this Mishna another

different

stringent ruling.

Since he is stating two laws as stringencies,

that is why it teaches “further”,

even though they do not concern the same subject?!

This is not so.

For

Rabbi Yehuda

bar Ilai

who taught

in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter

one ruling as a stringency,

saying there: One may enclose with pasin only up to the size of a beit se’a,

and he teaches another

in the preceding Mishna, on folio 23a: “Rabbi Yehuda says: If the public domain passes between them, one moves it to the sides.”

And

nevertheless,

it does not teach

above

“further”

after “Rabbi Yehuda says.”

Evidently, when the subjects are not the same—for the first clause concerns the measurement of the enclosure, while the latter clause concerns the removal of partitions—even though both are stringencies, it does not teach “further.”

What, then, is different here, that it teaches “further”? And we answer: This case is not comparable to that of Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai.

For

there,

with regard to Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai,

the Sages interrupted them—

the two statements of Rabbi Yehuda—

the Sages,

who disagreed with him at the beginning of the chapter, as it teaches there: They said to him, “They spoke of a beit se’a only with regard to a garden and a karpef.” Only after their statement does the subsequent Mishna teach Rabbi Yehuda’s latter statement.

But

here,

with regard to Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava,

the Sages did not interrupt them,

and the latter statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava is taught adjacent to his first statement. Therefore, it teaches “further,” because Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava taught two stringencies.

We raise a difficulty against this answer:

And

when

whenever the Sages interrupt them, it does not teach “further”,

even when both statements concern the same subject?

But

we see this with regard to

Rabbi Eliezer of the tractate Sukkah, whom the Sages interrupted,

between Rabbi Eliezer’s two statements—and as will be explained—

and

nevertheless

it teaches “further.”

For we learned in Sukkah: Rabbi Eliezer says: A person is obligated to eat fourteen meals in the sukka, and the Sages say: There is no fixed limit to this matter. “And Rabbi Eliezer further said: One who did not eat in the sukka on the first night of the Festival should make it up on the final night of the Festival.”

We see, then, that the fact that the Sages interrupted them is not a reason not to say “further.”

If so, it must be that the reason the statement of Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai does not say “further” is that it does not concern the same subject—which is not the case with Rabbi Eliezer, whose two statements concern the same subject, namely, the meal. If so, with regard to Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, whose statements do not concern the same subject, why does it teach “further”?

We reject this: In fact, two stringencies that do not concern the same subject are a reason to write “further.” And in fact, with regard to Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai, the reason it does not teach “further” is that the Sages interrupted them. As for the proof that the Sages’ interruption is not a reason not to say “further,” based on Rabbi Eliezer of Sukkah, this is not difficult, for that case is not comparable to that of Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai:

For

there,

with regard to Rabbi Eliezer of Sukkah,

in his statement

of Rabbi Eliezer, who said that one is obligated to eat fourteen meals in the sukka, the interruption was

in the same subject

by the Sages, who said to him: There is no fixed limit to this matter. The subject nevertheless remains Rabbi Eliezer’s statement, since the Mishna merely records the view of those who disagreed with him, and immediately afterward it teaches “further.”

But

here,

with regard to Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai, the Mishna does not merely record the Sages’ view concerning Rabbi Yehuda’s statement; rather, they added another point, and

they interrupted it with a different matter,

for Rabbi Yehuda said that more than a beit se’a was not permitted with pasei biraot, and the Sages added to their disagreement concerning pasei biraot and said: “They spoke of a beit se’a only with regard to a garden and a karpef.” This addition does not directly concern Rabbi Yehuda’s statement, and any such case is considered an interruption. That is why it does not teach “further.”

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva says: Even if there is not

in it

(one)

any one

of these features, one may carry within it,

provided that it is seventy cubits and remnants by seventy cubits and remnants: