Eruvin 23a — the Talmud in English

Gemara: The Gemara is the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna.

Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava:

that one may construct corner-post enclosures only around a public well.

And Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The corner-post enclosures around wells were permitted only for a well of flowing water.

And it is necessary to state

these two teachings.

For if we were taught

only that

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, I would say

that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava permits using corner-post enclosures for any water source

belonging to the public, even

water

collected

in a pit.

And this is what he teaches

in the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, that one may construct corner-post enclosures only around

“a public well”— -

which implies that a well is permitted, but a pit is not—is only

to exclude the view of Rabbi Akiva

in the Mishna, who holds that a well is permitted even when it belongs to an individual. That is, I might have said that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava means as follows: Even with regard to a well, which Rabbi Akiva holds is permitted even when it belongs to an individual, it is permitted only when it belongs to the public; whereas with regard to a pit, everyone agrees that it must belong to the public.

And therefore

it teaches us

the other statement of Rav Yosef in the name of Shmuel:

the corner-post enclosures around wells were permitted only for a well of flowing water

alone; but a pit is not permitted, even when it belongs to the public.

And if Rav Yosef in the name of Shmuel had taught us

only that corner-post enclosures were permitted only for

a well of flowing water

alone,

I would say

that at least with regard to a well,

it makes no difference whether it belongs to the public or to an individual

and it is permitted. Therefore

it teaches us: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava.

Mishna:

And Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava further said:

A garden

in which vegetables are grown

and an enclosure

a large enclosed area outside the city, used for storing wood, which are not enclosed for residential purposes: one may not carry within them at all.

And when they are

seventy cubits and remnants by seventy cubits and remnants

and no more, which is the area of “two se’a” when square,

and are enclosed by a fence ten handbreadths high, one may carry within them, provided

that they were enclosed for residential purposes. It is sufficient

that there be a watch hut

a shelter for guards

or a dwelling

for the owner of the property, even if he does not live there regularly but only from time to time

or that it be near the city

within two thousand cubits, so that the owner can walk there and spend time there.

Since it is close to his home, he intends to use it regularly, and it is therefore considered as though it had been enclosed for residential purposes. But if the enclosed area was larger than an area of two se’a, one may not carry within it even if it was actually enclosed for residential purposes.

This has been explained according to Rashi’s approach, but most of the early authorities disagreed with him; see their statements. Rabbi Yehuda

son of Rabbi Ilai—who adds to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava—

says: Even if there is not

any dwelling at all in the garden or enclosure, but only

a pit

made to collect rainwater and formed by digging,

or a cistern

similar to a pit, but built above ground, according to Rabbi Yehonatan; and according to Tiferet Yisrael, something like a pit dug lengthwise,

or a cave

used to shelter beneath it from the sun and relax there

one may carry within it,

because this shows that it was enclosed for human use.

Rabbi Akiva says:

He disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava in two matters.

a.

Even if none of these features is present, one may carry within it, provided that it has

no more than

seventy cubits and remnants by seventy cubits and remnants,

for he holds like the anonymous tanna at the beginning of this chapter, that even an area not enclosed for residential purposes is permitted up to an area of two se’a. And the Gemara asks: This is the same tanna as the one in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter, who says: They stated the measure of two se’a only with regard to a garden and an enclosure. What, then, is the difference between them?

b. If the area was enclosed for residential purposes, it is permitted even if it is larger than two se’a.

Rabbi Eliezer says: If its length

of the garden

is greater than its width by even one cubit

so that it is not square,

one may not carry within it,

even though its total area is not greater than two se’a, because the Sages permitted an area that is square when it was not enclosed for residential purposes.

Rabbi Yosei says: Even if its length is twice its width,

as long as its area is not greater than two se’a, which is five thousand cubits,

one may carry within it.

Rabbi Ilai said: I heard from Rabbi El

i

ezer,

to disagree with the statement of the first tanna in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, and with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava and Rabbi Akiva:

One may carry in a garden or enclosure that was not enclosed for residential purposes

even if it is

as large as

a kor,

which contains thirty se’a, but not more.

And I also heard the following from him:

a. It is prohibited to carry from one’s house into another person’s courtyard, or into a courtyard belonging to several people, until they all establish a courtyard eruv.

b. If one of the residents of the courtyard did not join the eruv with the other residents, all of them are prohibited from carrying from a house into the courtyard, since the courtyard is jointly owned by all of them, including the one who did not join them. The houses of those who joined the eruv, however, belong only to those who joined it; therefore they are prohibited from carrying from their houses into the courtyard.

c. If one of them forgot to join the eruv, he can permit carrying from the houses of the other residents into the courtyard by “renouncing” his rights in the courtyard to the other residents through a verbal declaration. The houses of the other residents and the courtyard are then considered a single domain.

And Rabbi Ilai teaches us:

a. If one of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join the eruv and renounced his rights in the courtyard to the other residents, not only are his rights in the courtyard transferred to the other residents, but his rights in his house are also transferred to them. Consequently, all the houses in the courtyard and the courtyard itself are one domain. Nevertheless:

b.

If one of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join the eruv

and renounced his rights,

his house

of the one who forgot

is prohibited for bringing in

from the courtyard

and taking out

to the courtyard

for him

for the one who forgot, because if he takes objects out or brings them in, he thereby reasserts his ownership of his domain.

Therefore, he is prohibited from taking objects out of his own house. But he may take objects from their houses into the courtyard, since everything is one domain.

But for them

for the other residents of the courtyard

it is permitted

to take objects even from his house, since the rights in his house were also transferred to them, just as his rights in the courtyard were, and everything is one domain.

And

likewise

I heard the following from him:

One fulfills

the obligation to eat bitter herbs

with

the eating of

arkavlin

the name of a bitter herb

on Passover!

And

with regard to all three of these teachings,

I went over all of the students

of Rabbi Eliezer,

and searched for a colleague

who also remembered that Rabbi Eliezer had said this,

but I did not find one!

Rather, they hold as follows:

a. An area that was not enclosed for residential purposes is not permitted if it is larger than two se’a.

b. One who renounces his rights in a courtyard does not renounce his rights in his house; therefore, even the other residents are prohibited from taking objects from his house into the courtyard.

c. Arkavlin is not a species of bitter herb.

Gemara:

We raise a question about the wording of the Mishna: “And Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava further said”:

What did Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava teach

before this Mishna, concerning the law of a garden and an enclosure, that would justify saying

“and further said”

to add this law to the previous one?

If you say

that the word “further” does not appear because Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava taught another law concerning a garden and an enclosure, but rather

because he taught

in the earlier Mishna, on page 22,

one stringency

that Rabbi Yehuda is stringent and permits corner-post enclosures only around a public well,

and he teaches

in this Mishna

another

stringency,

and since he states two stringent laws,

that is why it says “and further,”

even though they do not concern the same subject?

That is not so.

For

Rabbi Yehuda

son of Rabbi Ilai

taught

in the Mishna at the beginning of this chapter

one stringency,

where he says there that one may enclose an area with corner-posts only up to two se’a.

And he teaches another

in the earlier Mishna, on page 23a: “Rabbi Yehuda says: If a public domain passed between them, one must move it to the sides.”

And

in any event,

it does not say

above

“and further”

Rabbi Yehuda said.

It follows that when the subjects are different—because the first statement concerns the measure of the enclosed area, while the latter concerns the removal of partitions—even though both are stringencies, the word “further” is not used.

Why, then, is “and further” used here? We answer: The case of Rabbi Yehuda son of Rabbi Ilai is not comparable.

For

there,

with regard to Rabbi Yehuda son of Rabbi Ilai,

the Sages interrupted

the two statements of Rabbi Yehuda

the Rabbis

who disagreed with him at the beginning of the chapter, as it is taught there: They said to him, “They stated the measure of two se’a only with regard to a garden and an enclosure.” Only after their statement did the Mishna teach Rabbi Yehuda’s later statement.

But

here,

with regard to Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava,

the Rabbis did not interrupt

and the Mishna taught Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava’s later statement immediately after his first statement. Therefore it says “and further,” because Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava taught two stringent laws.

We question this answer:

And

if

whenever the Rabbis interrupt, the word “and further” is not used,

even when both statements concern the same subject?

But

we see this with regard to

Rabbi Eliezer concerning a sukka, where the Rabbis interrupted

between Rabbi Eliezer’s two statements, as will be explained,

and

nevertheless

the word “and further” is used.

For it is taught in tractate Sukka: Rabbi Eliezer says: A person is obligated to eat fourteen meals in the sukka. And the Rabbis say: There is no fixed limit to this matter. “And further,” Rabbi Eliezer said: One who did not eat in the sukka on the first night of the Festival should make it up on the final night of the Festival.

We see that the fact that the Rabbis interrupted is not a reason to refrain from saying “and further.”

If so, it necessarily follows that the reason “and further” is not stated in the teaching of Rabbi Yehuda son of Rabbi Ilai is that the statements do not concern the same subject; whereas Rabbi Eliezer’s two statements concern the same subject, namely, the meal. If so, with regard to Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, whose statements do not concern the same subject, why does the Mishna say “and further”?

We reject this: In fact, two stringent laws that do not concern the same subject are a reason to write “and further.” And in the case of Rabbi Yehuda son of Rabbi Ilai, the reason “and further” is not stated is indeed that the Rabbis interrupted his statements. As for the proof from Rabbi Eliezer concerning a sukka that the Rabbis’ interruption is not a reason to refrain from saying “and further,” that is not difficult, because Rabbi Yehuda son of Rabbi Ilai’s case is not comparable:

For

there,

with regard to Rabbi Eliezer concerning a sukka,

within the statement

of Rabbi Eliezer, who said that one is obligated to eat fourteen meals in the sukka, and within that same subject

they interrupted

the Rabbis, saying to him: There is no fixed limit to this matter. The subject nevertheless remains Rabbi Eliezer’s teaching, since the Mishna merely records the view of those who disagreed with him, and immediately afterward says “and further.”

But

here,

with regard to Rabbi Yehuda son of Rabbi Ilai, the Mishna did not merely record the Rabbis’ view concerning Rabbi Yehuda’s statement. Rather, they added another point, and

they interrupted with a different matter,

for Rabbi Yehuda said that an area larger than two se’a was not permitted with corner-post enclosures around wells, while the Rabbis added, in the context of their dispute concerning such enclosures: “They stated the measure of two se’a only with regard to a garden and an enclosure.” This addition is not truly part of Rabbi Yehuda’s statement, and in any such case it is considered an interruption. That is why the Mishna does not say “and further.”

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva says: Even if there is not

anything

(one)

of all these features,

one may carry within it, provided that it has seventy cubits and remnants by seventy cubits and remnants.

provided that it is seventy cubits and remnants by seventy cubits and remnants: