Chullin 9a (ט.) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this:

If so:

Since the membrane interrupts and prevents the milk from flowing onto the meat beneath it, if so, even when one places the ribs on the meat

from above, as well,

let us say that the meat does not absorb the milk, since

there is a membrane

that separates between them. For there is no milk-fat that does not have a thin membrane both above and below.

And we answer: The upper membrane is flimsy, and

since

the butcher’s

hand

handles it

it crumbles. This is not so with the lower membrane, which is strong and does not crumble.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: A Torah scholar must learn

to train his hand in

three things,

and should not be satisfied with merely being proficient in their laws.

They are:

writing—

that he should know how to sign his name, in case he sits in judgment or serves as a witness—,

slaughter and circumcision.

And Rav Ḥananya bar Shelamya said in the name of Rav:

He must learn

also the knot of tefillin,

which is made in the form of the letter dalet,

the blessing of bridegrooms, and tzitzit.

And the other one—the one who says that one needs to train only in the first three and not in these—holds that

these,

the knot of tefillin, the blessing of bridegrooms, and tzitzit,

are common

and everyone is proficient in them; they do not require instruction, as one will become proficient in them on his own.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Any slaughterer who does not know the laws of slaughter is forbidden to eat from his slaughter.

And these are the laws of slaughter:

Interruption—

If he interrupted the slaughter in the middle and waited for the amount of time required for slaughter, and afterward completed the slaughter, the animal becomes an nevela as a result.

Pressing—

If he severed the head in one motion, without moving the knife back and forth, it is an nevela.

Concealment—

If he concealed [inserted] the knife between the two signs, even if he cut them in accordance with their law, the slaughter is invalid, since the knife was inserted from within and is not visible.

Deviation—

If he slaughters outside the proper place of slaughter, above the upper ring of the windpipe, toward the head, it is an nevela.

And tearing—

If he slaughtered the esophagus but severed the windpipe without slaughtering it, or vice versa, or if he slaughtered one of them and waited until it died, since he did not slaughter the two signs in accordance with their law, it is an nevela.

And we ask:

What does Shmuel teach us

? But

all

these disqualifications

have already been taught

in the following Mishnayot, where it is taught that the animal becomes an nevela because of them. And since he is not proficient in them, it is obvious that it is forbidden to eat from his slaughter.

And we answer:

It is necessary

for Shmuel’s statement only in a case where

he

has already

slaughtered two or three times before us, and slaughtered properly. It might have been said: Since on the other

occasions

he slaughtered properly, this one too,

although we did not see him do it,

he slaughtered properly.

Shmuel therefore teaches us:

Since he has not mastered

the laws of slaughter,

sometimes he interrupts or presses

during the slaughter

without knowing

that the animal thereby becomes an nevela.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The slaughterer,

who slaughters,

must inspect the signs after

the

slaughter,

to see whether most of them were slaughtered properly.

Rav Yosef said: We too have learned this

for we learned as follows in a Mishna below [32a], where it teaches:

Rabbi Shimon says: If he waited the time required for inspection,

this is the measure that disqualifies the slaughter because of interruption.

And Rav Yosef infers:

Is it not

that if he waited during his slaughter for the amount of time

required to inspect the signs

after the slaughter, this is the interruption that invalidates the slaughter? And it is thereby proven that there is a requirement to inspect the signs after they have been slaughtered.

Abaye said to him: No!

There is no proof from here, because

this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

The “inspection” mentioned with regard to interruption is

the time required for the inspection by a scholar

of the knife. Although the slaughterer is proficient in inspecting it, he must show the knife to the scholar of the city. The amount of time that passes until the scholar comes and inspects it is the measure of interruption that invalidates the slaughter. Consequently, nothing can be inferred from this with regard to Shmuel’s statement.

And we challenge this:

If so, you have made your statement dependent on varying measures!

For sometimes the scholar is far from the place of slaughter and sometimes he is near. How, then, did Rabbi Shimon establish the measure of interruption according to an undefined amount of time?

And we answer: Do not say that it means the inspection by a scholar,

but rather the time required for the inspection by a slaughterer who is a scholar.

The slaughterer himself is the scholar of the city. Rabbi Shimon’s intention is to establish the amount of time required to inspect the knife, which is a fixed measure of time.

And the Gemara discusses:

If he did not inspect

the signs after the slaughter,

what

is the ruling? Do we place the animal in a state of prohibition with regard only to eating, because of the uncertainty, or are we also stringent with regard to the ritual impurity of an nevela?

Rabbi Eliezer ben Antigonus said in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Yannai:

Its status is that of a

terefa,

which is

forbidden to eat

alone.

It was taught in a baraita:

It has the status of an

nevela

because of the uncertainty,

and imparts impurity through carrying

like an nevela.

And the Gemara discusses:

With regard to what do they disagree?

In

the

law of Rav Huna, who said: An animal during its lifetime is presumed forbidden

[for during its lifetime it contains the prohibition of a limb from a living animal], and it does not leave its presumptive status of prohibition

until it becomes known to you by what means it was slaughtered.

If uncertainty arises for you regarding its slaughter, whether it was slaughtered properly or not, establish the matter according to the presumptive status of prohibition that it had initially. You cannot remove it from that presumptive status of prohibition until its permissibility becomes known to you. Therefore, we leave this animal with its presumptive status of prohibition until it becomes certain that it was slaughtered properly and left that status.

But when it

was slaughtered

properly,

it has a presumptive status of permissibility,

like the majority of animals that are slaughtered and presumed not to be terefot, and it is permitted

until it becomes known to you

with certainty

by what means it became a terefa.

But we do not prohibit it because of uncertainty regarding whether it is a terefa.

Rabbi Eliezer and the tanna of the baraita disagree regarding the prohibition in which the animal is presumed to have been held during its lifetime.

The master,

the tanna of the baraita,

holds that an

animal

remains in its presumptive status of prohibition,

as we leave it according to its presumption and assume that it was still not slaughtered.

And

since

it has now died

before us, we must say that it is an nevela, like any animal that died without slaughter. Therefore, it also imparts impurity like an nevela.

And the other master,

Rabbi Eliezer,

holds that

an animal

is presumed forbidden

with regard to eating;

we say so.

But

we do not say

that it has a

presumptive status of impurity

as an nevela, since even during its lifetime it did not impart impurity like an nevela.

And we return to explain

the substance

of Rav Huna’s statement:

Rav Huna said: An animal, during its lifetime—

is presumed forbidden until it becomes known to you by what means it was slaughtered. If it was slaughtered—

it is presumed permitted until it becomes known to you by what means it became a terefa.

The Gemara now assumes that what Rav Huna said, “If it was slaughtered, it is presumed permitted,” refers to a case in which it was slaughtered in accordance with its law, and no uncertainty arose regarding the animal’s fitness.

And we challenge this:

Let him say:

Why should Rav Huna not say, “

If it was slaughtered—

it is permitted”?

Why does he need the law of presumptive status? The law of presumptive status applies only where there is an uncertainty before us, when we say, “Leave the matter according to its presumption,” whereas here no uncertainty has arisen. And we answer:

Rav Huna teaches us this:

that

Even though a defect has arisen in it

with regard to terefot, and there is now an uncertainty before us whether it became a terefa before the slaughter and is forbidden, or whether the defect arose in it after the slaughter and it is permitted. Rav Huna teaches that we establish it according to its presumptive status of permissibility, because an ordinary animal is not a terefa, and we assume that the defect occurred in it after the slaughter, so that it is kosher.

And the defect is

for example, the case in which Rabbi Abba asked Rav Huna: A wolf came and took the intestines—what is the ruling?

And the Gemara wonders: “

Took? They are no longer there!”

That is to say, if the wolf took the intestines after the slaughter, and we did not see any defect in them before it took them, what is there to be uncertain about?!

And we explain:

Rather, a wolf came and

a wolf came and

pierced the intestines, and they are before us. “Pierced intestines” is one of the eighteen terefot.

and they are before us. A perforated intestine is one of the eighteen fatal defects.

What is the ruling?

Do we say that the intestines were pierced by the wolf after the slaughter, in which case the animal is kosher, or are we concerned that they were already pierced during its lifetime, in which case it is a terefa?

And we challenge this: If, as you say, the wolf

pierced

the intestines,

we see that it pierced them; what is there to be uncertain about regarding the possibility that they were pierced during the animal’s lifetime?

so why should we suspect that they were pierced during the animal’s lifetime?

Rather, it took them,

the wolf took the intestines, and we did not see the wolf pierce them,

and returned them when they were pierced.

And now we are uncertain:

What is the ruling? Is it

the case that

we are concerned that at the site of a perforation

that had already been present during the animal’s lifetime,

there was a perforation,

where the wolf inserted its teeth, rendering the animal a terefa, so that it is forbidden?

Or are we not

concerned about this, but rather assume that the perforation was caused by the wolf’s teeth, which pierced them after the slaughter, and the animal is permitted?

He said to him,

Rav Huna:

We are not concerned that at the site of a perforation

that had already been present during its lifetime,

the wolf pierced

it. Rather, we establish the animal according to its presumptive status of permissibility and say that the wolf pierced it now. This is the meaning of Rav Huna’s statement: “If it was slaughtered, it is presumed permitted until it becomes known to you by what means it became a terefa.”

Rav Abba raised an objection

to Rav Huna from that which is taught in a baraita:

If one saw a bird pecking at a fig, or a mouse pecking at melons—

one does not attribute the perforation to the bird’s pecking,