Chullin 9a — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if a membrane interrupts and prevents the fat from flowing to the flesh beneath it, then even when one places the flanks upon the flesh

from above, also,

let us say that the flesh did not absorb from the fat, for

there is a membrane

that interrupts between them. For there is no fat that does not have a thin membrane both above and below.

And we answer: The upper membrane is weak, and

since

the butcher's

hand

touches it, it

[crumbles]. This is not so with the lower membrane, which is strong and does not crumble.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: A Torah scholar must learn

to train his hand in

three things,

and he should not be content with being proficient in their laws.

And they are:

writing—

that he know how to sign his name, in case he sits in judgment or gives testimony,

slaughtering and circumcision.

And Rav Hananya bar Shelamya said in the name of Rav:

He must learn

also the knot of tefillin,

which is made like the letter dalet,

and the blessing of bridegrooms, and tzitzit.

And the other one, the one who says that he must learn only the first three and not those others, maintains that

these,

the knot of tefillin, the blessing of bridegrooms, and tzitzit,

are common

and everyone is proficient in them, and they do not require instruction, for he will become proficient in them on his own.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Any butcher who does not know the laws of slaughtering—it is forbidden to eat from his slaughtering.

And these are the laws of slaughtering:

Interruption—

if he interrupted in the middle of the slaughtering and paused for the amount of time sufficient for slaughtering, and afterward completed his slaughtering, the animal becomes an animal carcass through this.

Pressing—

if he severed the head all at once, without moving the knife back and forth, it is an animal carcass.

Concealment—

if he concealed [inserted] the knife between the two signs, even if he cut them in accordance with their law, the slaughtering is invalid, since the knife is inserted from within and is not visible.

Deviation—

if he slaughters outside the place of slaughtering, above the upper ring in the windpipe toward the head, it is an animal carcass.

And uprooting—

if he slaughtered the gullet but severed the windpipe not by slaughtering, or vice versa, or if he slaughtered one of them and waited for it until it died, since he did not slaughter the two signs in accordance with their law, it is an animal carcass.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

What does Shmuel come to teach us

Shmuel? But

all

these invalidations

we have already learned them

in the later Mishnayot, that the animal becomes an animal carcass through them. And since he is not proficient in them, it is obvious that it is forbidden to eat from his slaughtering.

And we answer:

It is necessary

for Shmuel's statement only in a case where

he

had already

slaughtered before us two or three times, and slaughtered properly. You might say: Since on the other

occasions he

slaughtered properly, this one also,

although we did not see him,

slaughtered properly. Shmuel comes to teach us

that

since he has not mastered

the laws of slaughtering,

sometimes he pauses or presses

during the slaughtering

and does not know

that through this the animal becomes an animal carcass.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The butcher,

the one who slaughters,

must examine the signs after

the

slaughtering,

to see whether most of them were slaughtered properly.

Rav Yosef said: We too have learned this,

we learned this in the later Mishna [32a], for it teaches:

Rabbi Shimon says: If he paused for the time required for examination,

this is the amount of time that invalidates through interruption.

And Rav Yosef infers:

Is it not

that if he paused during his slaughtering for a period of time

sufficient for examining the signs

after the slaughtering, this is the interruption that invalidates. And it proves that there is a law of examining the signs after they have been slaughtered.

Abaye said to him: No!

You have no proof from here, for

this is what Rabbi Yohanan said:

The “examination” mentioned with regard to interruption is

the time required for the examination of a scholar

to examine the knife. For although the butcher is proficient in examining it, he must show the knife to the scholar of the city. And the amount of time that elapses until a scholar comes and examines it is the amount of time of interruption that invalidates. Consequently, nothing can be inferred from it regarding Shmuel's statement.

And we raise an objection:

If so, you have made your words dependent on measures!

For sometimes the scholar is far from the place of slaughtering and sometimes he is near. How then did Rabbi Shimon make the measure of interruption dependent on an undefined amount of time?

And we answer: Do not say “the time required for the examination of a scholar,”

but rather, the time required for the examination by a scholar who is a butcher.

For the slaughterer himself is the scholar of the city. And Rabbi Shimon's intention is to a fixed amount of time for examining the knife.

And the Gemara discusses:

If he did not examine

the signs after slaughtering,

what

is the law? Do we place the animal, because of the doubt, in a state of prohibition only with regard to eating, or are we also stringent with it regarding the impurity of an animal carcass because of the doubt?

Rabbi Eliezer ben Antigonos said in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Yanai:

Its status is like that of a

trefa, which

is

forbidden for eating

only.

In a baraita it was taught:

It has the status of an

animal carcass

because of the doubt,

and it imparts impurity through carrying

like an animal carcass.

And the Gemara discusses:

With regard to what do they disagree?

In

the law

of Rav Huna, for Rav Huna said: An animal during its lifetime stands with the presumption of prohibition

[for during its lifetime it contains the prohibition of a limb from a living animal], and it does not leave its presumption of prohibition

until it becomes known to you by what means it was slaughtered.

For if a doubt arose for you concerning its slaughtering, whether it was slaughtered properly or not, establish the matter upon the presumption of prohibition that it had initially, and you cannot remove it from the presumption of prohibition until the permission becomes known to you. Therefore, we place this animal upon its presumption of prohibition until it becomes known with certainty that it was slaughtered properly and left its presumption.

But when it

was slaughtered

properly,

it stands with the presumption of permissibility,

like the majority of slaughtered animals, which stand with the presumption that they are not trefot, and it is permitted,

until it becomes known to you

with certainty

by what means it became a trefa.

But on account of a doubtful trefa we do not prohibit it.

And Rabbi Eliezer and the baraita's tanna disagree: What is the prohibition in which it is presumed to have stood during its lifetime?

The master,

the tanna of the baraita,

maintains:

An animal

stands with the presumption of prohibition,

for we establish it upon its presumption, and attribute that it is still not slaughtered.

And

since

it is now dead

before us, we necessarily say that it is an animal carcass, like every animal that died not through slaughtering, and therefore it also imparts impurity like an animal carcass.

And the master,

Rabbi Eliezer,

maintains:

An animal

has the presumption of prohibition

of eating,

we say.

But

the presumption of impurity

of an animal carcass

we do not say.

For even during its lifetime it did not impart impurity like an animal carcass.

And we return to explain

the body

of Rav Huna's statement:

Rav Huna said: An animal, during its lifetime—

stands with the presumption of prohibition, until it becomes known to you by what means it was slaughtered. If it was slaughtered—

it stands with the presumption of permissibility, until it becomes known to you by what means it became a trefa.

And now the Gemara assumes that what Rav Huna said, “If it was slaughtered—it stands with the presumption of permissibility,” is in a case in which it was slaughtered in accordance with its law, and no doubt concerning the animal's fitness arose for us.

And we raise an objection:

And let him say,

why should Rav Huna not say

“If it was slaughtered—

it is permitted,”

and why does he need the law of presumption? The law of presumption applies only where there is a doubt before us, when we say, “Establish the matter upon its presumption,” whereas here no doubt has arisen! And we answer:

Rav Huna comes to teach us

that

even though a defect arose in it

of trefot, and now there is a doubt before us whether it became a trefa before slaughtering and is forbidden, or whether the defect arose in it after slaughtering and it is permitted. Rav Huna says that we establish it upon the presumption of permissibility, for an ordinary animal is not a trefa, and we attribute that the defect occurred in it after slaughtering, and it is fit.

And the defect is

for example, that which Rabbi Abba asked Rav Huna: A wolf came and took the intestines—what is the law?

And the Gemara is astonished: “

Took?! But they are not here!”

That is, if the wolf took the intestines after slaughtering, and we did not see any defect in them before it took them, what is there to doubt about the matter?!

And we explain:

Rather,

a wolf came and

punctured the intestines,

and they are before us, and “punctured intestines” is one of the eighteen trefot,

what is the law?

Do we say that the intestines were punctured by the wolf after slaughtering, and it is fit, or are we concerned that they were already punctured during its lifetime, and it is a trefa?

And we raise an objection: If it is as you say, that the wolf

punctured

the intestines,

we see that it punctured them,

so what is there to doubt—perhaps they were punctured during its lifetime?

Rather, it took them

the wolf took the intestines, and we did not see that the wolf punctured them,

and returned them while they were punctured.

And now we are uncertain:

what? Who

that is, do we

fear that in the place of a puncture

that had already been in them during its lifetime

there was a puncture,

where the wolf inserted its teeth, and it is a trefa and forbidden?

Or not

do we fear this, but rather attribute that the puncture was caused by the wolf's teeth, which punctured them after slaughtering, and it is permitted?

He said to him,

Rav Huna:

We do not fear that in the place of a puncture

that had already been there during its lifetime

the wolf punctured

the intestines; rather, we establish it upon the presumption of permissibility and say that the wolf punctured them now. And this is what Rav Huna said: “If it was slaughtered, it stands with the presumption of permissibility until it becomes known to you by what means it became a trefa.”

He raised an objection to him

Rav Abba raised an objection to Rav Huna from that which is taught:

He saw a bird pecking at a fig, and a mouse pecking at melons

—we do not attribute the puncture to the bird's pecking,