Chullin 86b — the Talmud in English

Add the minority

that do not touch

to the presumption,

because both the presumption and the minority render the dough pure,

and the majority is thereby weakened!

For the majority that “most infants touch” is not powerful enough to render the dough impure.

Thus, Rabbi Meir held: “Add the minority to the presumption.” If so, why did Rabbi Ami have to say that Rabbi Meir’s reason was that most of their actions are defective? We answer: Rabbi Meir’s reason for declaring the dough pure is not that “adding the minority to the presumption” establishes the action as certainly having occurred or not occurred. Rather, Rabbi Meir holds that when there are two opposing sides—on one side a majority, and on the other side a minority together with a presumption—the matter is an evenly balanced uncertainty. Therefore, one must distinguish between uncertainty regarding the dough, which is uncertainty concerning ritual impurity, and uncertainty regarding slaughter, which is uncertainty concerning a prohibition.

If they said that an uncertainty concerning ritual impurity is treated as pure, would they say that an uncertainty concerning a prohibition is treated as permitted!?

That is, the dough must be declared pure because the infant about whom we are uncertain whether he touched the dough is “something that has no awareness with which to be asked,” and they learned from the case of the woman suspected of adultery that whenever the object of the uncertainty has no awareness with which to be asked, its uncertainty is treated as pure. This is not so with the slaughter performed by a deaf-mute, an intellectually disabled person, or a minor. If we were to say that Rabbi Meir holds that most of their actions are proper, then their slaughter would be uncertain as to whether it was valid—even though there is a minority whose actions are not proper, together with the presumption that the slaughter is prohibited because it is invalid. Consequently, with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, it would be prohibited to slaughter after a deaf-mute, an intellectually disabled person, or a minor, because one must be stringent in every uncertainty concerning a prohibition. Since it is demonstrated that Rabbi Meir permits slaughtering after them, Rabbi Ami inferred from this that Rabbi Meir held that most of their actions are defective, and therefore their slaughter is considered certainly invalid.

Rabbi issued a ruling in accordance with Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi issued a ruling

on another occasion

in accordance with the Sages,

in their dispute in our Mishna.

The Gemara discussed this:

Which of them was the later ruling?

Which of the two rulings did Rabbi issue later, thereby retracting his first ruling, so that we should rely on it in practice?

Come and hear a proof: Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba, and Rabbi Zeira were standing in the marketplace of Caesarea, at the entrance to the house of study. Rabbi Ami emerged

from the house of study.

He found

Rabbi Abba and Rabbi Zeira standing at the entrance.

He said to them,

Rabbi Ami said:

Did I not tell you: During the time of study in the house of study, do not stand outside!

I already told you not to stand outside while study is taking place in the house of study,

lest there be someone who needs a teaching,

lest someone come to ask a question in the house of study,

and they become distracted!

It is possible that the Sages in the house of study will not have a clear answer and will be distracted from their study in order to answer his question, whereas if you were there, you could answer him on the basis of the teaching you had received.

Rabbi Zeira entered

the house of study,

but Rabbi Abba did not enter!

The scholars in the house of study

were sitting

and

were raising the question: Which of them

did Rabbi issue

later?

Rabbi Zeira said to them: You did not leave me time to ask the elder.

When I was standing outside with Rabbi Abba, I did not know that you were discussing this question inside. Had I known, I would have asked Rabbi Abba

perhaps he had heard it from his father

—who was Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba—

and his father from Rabbi Yohanan! Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba

—who, as stated, was Rabbi Abba’s father—was regularly present before Rabbi Yohanan, and

every thirty days

he would

review his learning

and repeat what he had learned

before Rabbi Yohanan,

so perhaps he had heard Rabbi Yohanan’s answer to this question.

What was concluded

regarding this question—which ruling did Rabbi issue later?

Come and hear a proof: Rabbi Elazar sent a message to the Diaspora: Rabbi issued a ruling in accordance with Rabbi Meir!

This is apparently difficult:

But

Rabbi

also issued a ruling in accordance with the Sages,

so why did he not inform them of this ruling as well?

Rather, is it not so? Infer from this that the statement

“he issued a ruling in accordance with Rabbi Meir”

was the later ruling!

It is this ruling that one should follow in practice, and therefore he did not inform them of the other ruling.

And we conclude:

Infer from this!

Mishna:

If one slaughtered one hundred wild animals in one place,

he need not perform the covering after each slaughter. Rather,

one covering is sufficient for all of them!

When he finishes slaughtering all the wild animals, he covers all their blood at once.

Similarly, if one slaughtered

one hundred birds in one place—

one covering is sufficient for all of them!

And even if one slaughtered

a wild animal and a bird in one place—

one covering is sufficient for all of them!

Rabbi Yehuda

disagrees with the first Tanna regarding the final case and

says:

If one

slaughtered a wild animal

and a bird in one place, he should not wait until he finishes slaughtering both. Rather,

he should cover

the blood of the wild animal first,

and afterward slaughter the bird

and cover its blood.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: “A wild animal”

as it is written in the Torah in the passage concerning the covering of the blood—

the term includes

“a wild animal”—

whether many or few!

That is, whether one slaughtered many wild animals or only one wild animal.

Similarly,

“a bird,”

as it is written concerning the covering of the blood—

the term includes

“a bird”—

whether many or few!

From here they said: If one slaughtered one hundred wild animals in one place—

one covering is sufficient for all of them!

If one slaughtered

one hundred birds in one place—

one covering is sufficient for all of them!

If one slaughtered

a wild animal and a bird in one place—

one covering is sufficient for all of them!

Rabbi Yehuda says: If one slaughtered a wild animal—

he should cover it

first,

and afterward slaughter the bird. As it is stated: “A wild animal or a bird,”

since the verse separated them with the word “or,” we learn that each one requires its own covering.

They said to him,

the Sages said to Rabbi Yehuda:

But it says: “For the soul of every flesh—its blood is in its soul”!?

And we inquire about this:

What were the Sages answering him?

How could this verse prove whether one covering is sufficient for all of them or whether each one requires a separate covering?

And we explain:

This is what the Sages were saying to him: This word “or”

which is stated between “a wild animal” and “a bird” does not come to teach that each one requires its own covering, as you said. Rather,

it is needed

to divide!

Had the word “or” not been written, I would have said that one is obligated to cover the blood only if he slaughtered both a wild animal and a bird. Therefore, the verse says “a wild animal or a bird,” to teach that even if he slaughtered only one of them, he is obligated to cover its blood. But if he slaughtered both, one covering is sufficient for all of them!

And Rabbi Yehuda

answered the Sages:

The division

between a wild animal and a bird is learned from the verse: “When anyone hunts an animal or a bird ...”

“and pours out

its blood

and covers it with earth.”

It follows!

The word “its blood” is written in the singular, implying that whether it is a wild animal or a bird, each one individually requires covering. It follows that the word “or” stated between “a wild animal” and “a bird” must teach that there is not one covering for all of them; rather, each one requires its own covering.

And the Sages

answered Rabbi Yehuda: The division cannot be learned from the word “its blood.” For

“its blood”

can refer to many bloods!

The word “its blood” can refer to many bloods, as

it is written: “For the soul of every flesh—its blood is in its soul,”

where the Torah uses the expression “its blood” regarding the many bloods of “every flesh.” If so, I could still say that one is obligated to cover the blood only if he slaughtered both a wild animal and a bird. Therefore, the Torah wrote “or” to divide them, teaching that if one slaughtered either of them, it requires covering. But one cannot learn from “or” that if he slaughtered both, each one requires its own covering. Rather, one may say that one covering is sufficient for all of them.

Rabbi Hanina said: Rabbi Yehuda agrees

that although the act of covering the blood comes between slaughtering the wild animal and slaughtering the bird, nevertheless

with regard to the blessing

recited over slaughtering ,

he recites only one blessing!

The blessing he recited at the beginning over slaughtering the wild animal also applies to slaughtering the bird, and he need not recite another blessing for it. This is because the covering between the wild animal and the bird is not considered an interruption.

Ravina said to Rav Aha son of Rava. And some say

he said to him

Rav Aha son of Rava said to Rav Ashi: What is different from

this

which happened with Rav’s students? Rav Bruna and Rav Hananel, Rav’s students, were sitting at a meal. Rav Yevai the Elder came and stood over them

and was serving them during the meal.

They said to him

Rav’s students said to Rav Yevai the Elder:

Give

us a cup of wine

to recite the blessing!

for the cup of blessing of the blessing after the meal. And afterward they reconsidered their decision.

They went back and said to him—

Give

us a cup of wine

to drink,

in order to drink from it!

Rav Yevai the Elder said to them: Thus said Rav: Once one says, “Give [wine] to recite the blessing,”

everyone who says so reveals through his intention that he has finished his meal, and

it is forbidden for him to drink wine

until he first recites a blessing over the wine [“Who creates the fruit of the vine] , for this drinking does not join the first meal! And therefore Ravina wondered: Just as saying “Give [wine] to recite the blessing” is considered an interruption and the completion of the meal,

here too, once he became occupied with the covering

of the wild animal, the covering is considered an interruption and a diversion of attention from the preceding slaughter, and when he subsequently comes to slaughter the bird—

he becomes obligated to recite a blessing

over its slaughtering !?