Chullin 85a (פה.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Rather,

the uncertainty concerning the mitzva of sounding the shofar that overrides Yom Tov applies in a case where the listener is

of uncertain sex, either a man or a woman [since a woman is exempt from the mitzva of shofar], and even he is permitted to sound it, even on an unquestionably observed Yom Tov, despite the fact that his obligation in the mitzva is only uncertain.

[who is exempt from the mitzva of shofar]. Even such a person is permitted to sound the shofar, even on a Festival whose status is certainly established, although the mitzva that he is obligated to perform applies to him only because of the uncertainty.

And once it has become clear what the objection raised against Rabbi Yosei from the uncertainty concerning the sounding of the shofar was, one may say that Rabbi Yosei is not concerned by this objection, because

Rabbi Yosei follows his own reasoning—

as he said: An unquestionably identified woman may also sound the shofar!

She is permitted to sound it on Rosh HaShana even though she is certainly exempt from sounding the shofar; all the more so, one whose obligation to sound the shofar is uncertain may sound it, and this is not because an uncertain mitzva overrides Yom Tov. And no proof may be brought from this to the case of covering the blood, since it is prohibited to cover on Yom Tov the blood of an animal that is certainly exempt from covering, such as the blood of a domesticated animal. If so, one may say that likewise, since it is uncertain whether the kוי is obligated in covering, its covering does not override Yom Tov.

As it was taught:

And we find that this was Rabbi Yosei’s view at the beginning of the passage in which the obligation of placing one’s hands on a sacrifice is explained. It states: “Speak to the Children of Israel.” And we derive:

The Children of Israel place their hands

on sacrifices,

but the daughters of Israel do not place their hands!

A woman who brings a sacrifice does not place her hands upon it.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: Women,

although they are exempt from placing their hands, nevertheless

do place their hands—

as a voluntary act!

If they wish to place their hands upon the sacrifice, they have permission to do so; we do not say that since they are exempt, by placing their hands they are performing sacrificial service with consecrated animals. The same applies: According to Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon, women are permitted to sound the shofar, even though sounding the shofar unnecessarily is prohibited on Yom Tov.

Ravina said:

Even

according to what the Rabbis say,

that a woman is prohibited from sounding the shofar on Rosh HaShana,

there is likewise an objection

to the answer given to Rabbi Yosei concerning his kal va-chomer: The sounding of the shofar by a person of uncertain sex, either a man or a woman, proves that it is permitted on Yom Tov; and necessarily, an uncertain mitzva overrides Yom Tov. This proof can be refuted, however:

What is there to say about sounding the shofar,

whose uncertain case overrides Yom Tov?

Its certain case overrides Shabbat in the Temple!

In the Temple, they sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana even when it falls on Shabbat. Therefore, its uncertain case overrides Yom Tov, even outside the Temple.

Can you say the same with regard to covering—

which does not apply at all!

The certain case of covering the blood never overrides Shabbat anywhere. Therefore, one may say that its uncertain case does not override Yom Tov.

We learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the distinguished said in reply: What is there to say about circumcision, which does not apply on the nights of Festivals!

And we wonder: Is it only

on the nights of Festivals that it does not

apply, while

on other nights it does apply!?

But circumcision is not performed on any night.

And we answer:

Rather,

this is what he is saying:

What is there to say about circumcision, which does not apply at night as it does during the day? Can you say the same with regard to covering, which applies at night as it does during the day? Rabbi Abba said: This is one of the matters that Rabbi Hiyya said: I have no answer for them! And Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the distinguished supplied an answer.

Mishna:

1.

One who slaughters

a wild animal or a bird

and it is found to be tereifa 4 .

And one who slaughters for

the sake of

idolatry,

and one who slaughters non-sacred animals inside,

in the Temple courtyard,

or consecrated animals,

the bird sacrifices,

outside

the Temple courtyard.

Or one who slaughters

a wild animal or bird subject to stoning,

for example, one that killed a person or one that copulated with a person, and whose sentence of stoning was finalized, and he slaughtered it before it was stoned.

All of these are prohibited for consumption even after they have been slaughtered.

Rabbi Meir obligates

one to cover their blood,

but the Sages exempt!

This is because it is “slaughter that is not fit,” meaning that it does not render the meat permitted for consumption. Therefore, it is not considered slaughter, and they are exempt from covering the blood.

2.

One who slaughters and it became an animal carcass in his hands,

meaning that the slaughter was invalidated without intent on the slaughterer’s part; or

one who kills an animal by piercing its throat,

meaning that he killed the animal;

or one who tears

the organs of slaughter in the animal’s neck deliberately and kills it,

is exempt from covering,

even according to Rabbi Meir, because there was no slaughter at all.

Gemara:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi saw

that he was arranging the Mishna

according to the words of Rabbi Meir concerning “it and its offspring,”

as in the previous chapter Rabbi Meir and the Sages likewise disagreed in the Mishna concerning the law of slaughter that is not fit, whether it is considered slaughter with regard to the prohibition of “it and its offspring.” Since Rabbi approved Rabbi Meir’s position concerning the law of one who slaughters “it and its offspring,” namely, that he is liable for lashes even when the slaughter is not fit, therefore he

stated it,

the opinion of Rabbi Meir,

in the wording “the Sages,”

as the Mishna there says: “And the Sages obligate,” meaning Rabbi Meir.

And

the words of

Rabbi Shimon,

who disagrees with Rabbi Meir in this matter and maintains that slaughter that is not fit is not considered slaughter, were approved by Rabbi

with regard to covering the blood, where he stated

Rabbi Shimon’s opinion in our Mishna

in the wording “the Sages,”

as our Mishna says: “And the Sages exempt” from covering the blood in the case of slaughter that is not fit [and later it will be explained why Rabbi approved one sage’s words here and the other sage’s words there].

And we inquire:

What is Rabbi Meir’s reason concerning “it and its offspring”?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: He derived

a gzera shava,

“slaughter”—

“slaughter,” “it and its offspring,”

from slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple courtyard,

concerning which consecrated animals are slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard [as the expression “slaughter” appears in both].

Just as there,

in the case of slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple courtyard,

slaughter that is not fit is considered slaughter.

For every slaughter of consecrated animals outside the Temple courtyard is slaughter that is not fit, since the consecrated animals are prohibited for consumption after being slaughtered outside. Nevertheless, their slaughter is considered slaughter, since the Torah made one liable for karet for this slaughter.

So too here,

with regard to “it and its offspring,”

also—

slaughter that is not fit is considered slaughter!

And we inquire:

And Rabbi Shimon,

who said concerning “it and its offspring” that slaughter that is not fit is not considered slaughter,

what is his reason?

And we answer:

Rabbi Mani bar Patis said: He derived

from the verse concerning Joseph, who said to the one appointed over his household to bring his brothers into the house,

“Slaughter an animal and prepare it”

6 . Just as there,

the slaughter was

slaughter that was

that was

fit

for consumption, as it is written: “for the men will eat with me,”

so too here,

with regard to “it and its offspring,” the slaughter referred to there is specifically

slaughter that is fit 7 .

And we inquire:

And Rabbi Meir, too—

should he not derive it from “

slaughter an animal and prepare it”!? And we answer: Rabbi Meir maintains:

One derives “slaughter” from “slaughter,” but one does not derive “slaughter” from “killing” 8 .

We derive “slaughter” from “slaughter,” but we do not derive “slaughter” from “slaughtering” 8 .

And we challenge this:

What practical difference is there?

That is, even if the words are not precisely identical, in any event one should be able to derive a gzera shava, since their meanings are identical!?

For was it not taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael:

In the passage concerning the afflictions of houses, it is written

“And the priest shall return,”

while elsewhere in the same passage it is written

“And the priest shall come,”

and we derive a gzera shava from one to the other, because

“returning” and “coming” are the same!

That is, “returning” and “coming” express one concept, and one may derive one from the other by a gzera shava even though they are two different words. Why, then, did Rabbi Meir not derive “slaughter” from “killing”?

And we explain:

This applies

when they derive a gzera shava even from words that are not entirely similar—

where there is no equivalent that resembles it!

That is, when it is impossible to derive the gzera shava between two words that resemble one another.

But

if

there is one that resembles it—

we derive it from the one that resembles it!

That is, the gzera shava between two genuinely similar words is preferred over a gzera shava between two words that are not entirely similar.

We raise a difficulty:

But Rabbi Shimon, too, should derive

“the one and its offspring”

from the slaughter of animals outside the Temple precincts;

why, then, did he prefer to derive it from “slaughter, slaughtered”?

And we explain: Rabbi Shimon held:

One derives

“the one and its offspring” from “slaughter, slaughtered,” because they are

non-sacred from non-sacred,

as both concern non-sacred animals.

But one does not derive

“the one and its offspring” from the slaughter of animals outside the Temple precincts, because they are

non-sacred from sacred.

For the law of slaughtering animals outside the Temple precincts applies only to sacrificial animals .

And Rabbi Meir,

who derived the law of the one and its offspring from the slaughter of animals outside the Temple precincts, held that this is not considered deriving “non-sacred from sacred,” because

is it truly the case that

the prohibition of

“the one and its

offspring” applies only to non-sacred animals? Surely

it applies to sacred animals as well!

And we conclude:

This is what Rabbi Hiyya meant when he said: Rabbi regarded Rabbi Meir’s opinion concerning the one and its offspring favorably and recited it in the formulation of the Sages,

for since Rabbi Meir’s argument was correct, Rabbi regarded his words favorably and established them in the formulation “the Sages” .

We raise another difficulty:

What is the rationale of Rabbi Meir concerning covering the blood?

And we answer:

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: He derived

a gzera shava of

“pouring”

—

covering the blood

from the slaughter of animals outside the Temple precincts!

[In both cases the expression “pouring” is stated.]

Just as there

in the slaughter of animals outside the Temple precincts

an unfit slaughter is considered slaughter, so too here,

with regard to covering the blood,

an unfit slaughter is considered slaughter!

And Rabbi Shimon,

who said that an unfit slaughter is not considered slaughter with regard to covering the blood, based his view on the fact that with regard to covering the blood,

“which may be eaten” is written,

and its meaning is specifically a slaughter that renders the animal permissible for consumption.

And Rabbi Meir

could say to you:

That

verse, “which may be eaten,”

came to exclude an impure bird

from the obligation of covering,

that is what it came for!

Since it is not fit for consumption at all . But a pure bird, which is fit for consumption, is not excluded by “which may be eaten,” even when the slaughter is unfit.

And Rabbi Shimon

held:

What is the reason

that an impure bird was excluded by “which may be eaten”? It is because

it is not fit for consumption.

If so, the slaughter of a

tereifa

[and likewise every unfit slaughter]

also

should be excluded, since the tereifa

is not fit for consumption!

And we conclude:

This is what Rabbi Hiyya meant when he said: Rabbi regarded Rabbi Shimon’s opinion concerning covering the blood favorably and recited it in the formulation of the Sages,

for Rabbi regarded Rabbi Shimon’s argument favorably because it was correct .