Chullin 81a — the Talmud in English

According to

the verse

—

it detached it to a positive commandment

, and every negative commandment that is detached to a positive commandment does not incur lashes.

What is the reason? —

Where do we find a positive commandment concerning “one lacking the required time”?

For the verse says, “From the eighth day onward

it shall be accepted,”

and its meaning is:

from the eighth day

yes,

but

from the beginning

— since, until then, it is still lacking the required time — therefore

it shall not

be accepted! And

a negative commandment derived from the general implication of a positive commandment

is a positive commandment!

And this positive commandment includes all those disqualified because they lack the required time, concerning which the Torah warned through the negative commandment that they should not be accepted before their time, and detached the negative commandment of all those lacking the required time to the positive commandment of “from the eighth day,” to say that it is a mitzva to leave them until after their time and to offer them at the proper time.

And we challenge this:

but it is needed

for the verse “From the eighth day”

for the teaching of Rabbi Aptoriki

, and it does not come to teach about a positive commandment?

For Rabbi Aptoriki posed the following contradiction,

he would ask:

it is written, “And it shall be seven days under its mother,”

and this implies

that

after seven days, on the

night

before the eighth day, it is

fit

for an offering, since seven days have already passed.

And it is written,

on the other hand,

“From the eighth day onward it shall be accepted,”

and this implies that only

from the eighth day onward

yes,

but on the

night,

the night leading into the eighth day,

it shall not

be accepted as an offering!

How

are these two verses to be reconciled?

Night

for consecration!

From the night of the eighth day onward, it is already permitted to consecrate the animal as an offering, [and before then it is forbidden to consecrate it because there is a prohibition against consecrating disqualified animals as offerings], but it is still impossible to offer it.

Day

for acceptance!

From the eighth day onward, it is possible to offer the animal on the altar as an offering, and it will effect acceptance for the one who brings it.

And since the verse is needed for this exposition, how shall we learn from it to detach every case of lacking the required time to a positive commandment?

And we answer:

another verse is written

“

So shall you do for your ox, for your sheep,

it shall be with its mother for seven days—and on the eighth day you shall give it to Me”! And from here we learn of a positive commandment concerning one lacking the required time.

Rav Hamnuna said: Rabbi Shimon was saying: The prohibition of slaughtering “it and its offspring” does not apply to sacrificial animals!

What is the reason?

Since Rabbi Shimon said: An unfit slaughtering is not called slaughtering,

and

the slaughtering of sacrificial animals is also an unfit slaughtering

since it does not permit the meat to be eaten until the blood is sprinkled, and therefore it is not included in the prohibition of “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring on one day.”

Rava raised an objection

from a beraita: One who slaughters

it and its offspring,

and the two animals were

sacrificial animals,

and he slaughtered them

outside

Rabbi Shimon says:

one who slaughters the

second,

even though he is not liable to excision for slaughtering outside, since the second offering is not fit to be offered inside at that time because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring,” nevertheless he transgresses

a negative commandment

concerning slaughtering outside.

For Rabbi Shimon would say: Every

offering

fit to come

to the Temple and be offered

afterward,

and he slaughtered it outside now,

is subject to a negative commandment, but there is no excision!

Since its time to be offered has not yet arrived. And for anything that is not fit to be offered inside, one is not liable to excision if he slaughtered it outside.

And the Sages say: Anything for which there is no excision

—

there is no negative commandment!

And it is difficult for us

concerning what we learned in the beraita: “

Sacrificial animals outside

— Rabbi Shimon says: one who slaughters the

second

transgresses

a negative commandment,”

but he is not liable to excision. Yet

the first

offering that was slaughtered outside

was indeed killed,

and its slaughter does not bear the status of “slaughtering,” since it is an unfit slaughtering, as it was slaughtered outside, and Rabbi Shimon holds that an unfit slaughtering is not called slaughtering. It follows that the

second offering

is accepted inside!

For it is fit to be offered today, since there is no prohibition of “it and its offspring,” as the first slaughtering did not have the status of “slaughtering.” If so,

he should also be liable to excision

when slaughtering the second, since he slaughtered outside an offering fit to be offered inside!?

And Rava said—and some say

that this is what

Kadi

[the name of an amora] said:

the beraita is incomplete,

and

this is what it teaches: A. If the two animals that are “it and its offspring” were

A. If the two animals, “it and its offspring,” were

sacrificial animals

and he slaughtered them

outside,

then:

According to the Rabbis,

who hold that an unfit slaughtering is called slaughtering,

the first is liable to excision

for slaughtering outside, and the

second offering is disqualified

because it was slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard. [The same applies to the first, which is disqualified].

And

one who slaughters it is

exempt

both from excision and

from the negative commandment of slaughtering outside,

since it is not fit to be offered inside today because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring.”

But

according to Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that an unfit slaughtering is not called slaughtering,

both are liable to excision

for slaughtering outside, since even the second is fit to be offered today, as stated.

B. And if he first slaughtered

one outside, and

afterward slaughtered

one inside,

then —

According to the Rabbis, the first is liable to excision

for slaughtering outside, and the

second offering is disqualified

because of “lacking the required time,” since it is not fit to be offered today because of “it and its offspring.”

And

one who slaughters it is

exempt

from excision, since he slaughtered it inside [but he is liable to lashes because of the negative commandment of “it and its offspring”; however, the beraita is dealing only with liability for slaughtering outside]. But

according to Rabbi Shimon, the

offering

is valid.

It does not have the disqualification of “it and its offspring,” because the first slaughtering was an unfit slaughtering.

C. And if he first slaughtered

one inside and

afterward slaughtered

one outside,

then —

According to the Rabbis,

the

first is valid, and

one who slaughters it is

exempt,

since it was done properly. And the

second offering is disqualified,

since it was slaughtered outside [and it too is “lacking the required time” because of “it and its offspring”]. And one who slaughters it is

exempt

from the negative commandment and excision for slaughtering outside, since it is not fit to be offered inside because of “it and its offspring.”

But

according to Rabbi Shimon,

one who slaughters the

second

transgresses

a negative commandment

concerning slaughtering outside. But he is not liable to excision, since the offering is not fit to be offered today because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring.” For the first slaughtering was inside, and it was a fit slaughtering that prohibits the second through “it and its offspring.” Nevertheless, he transgresses a negative commandment, since it is fit to be offered afterward.

And Rava concludes his objection to Rav Hamnuna: We have learned that when one slaughters one inside and one outside, according to Rabbi Shimon the second transgresses only a negative commandment

! And if it should enter your mind

that according to Rabbi Shimon

no

prohibition of

“it and its offspring” applies to sacrificial animals,

because it is considered an unfit slaughtering, then

the second, why

did Rabbi Shimon say that he transgresses

a negative commandment, and no more!?

Surely

excision also

he should have

been liable

for slaughtering outside, since the second offering is fit to be offered inside today, as it has no prohibition of “it and its offspring”?

Rather, Rava said: This is what Rav Hamnuna meant: Even though the prohibition of “it and its offspring” applies to sacrificial animals, nevertheless

Although the prohibition “it and its offspring” does apply to consecrated animals, nevertheless,

lashes for “it and its offspring” do not apply to sacrificial animals!

What is the reason?

Because although the slaughtering of sacrificial animals is considered a fit slaughtering [since it also causes the meat to become permitted for eating together with the subsequent sprinkling of the blood], nevertheless,

since, as long as the blood has not been sprinkled

from the offering upon the altar,

the meat is not permitted

for eating, it follows that the slaughtering remains pending. For if the blood is ultimately sprinkled, it will become clear retroactively that the slaughtering was fit; and if not, it will become clear that the slaughtering was not fit, since it did not permit the meat. Therefore, one does not receive lashes for “it and its offspring” in the case of sacrificial animals, because

at the time when he slaughters, it is a doubtful warning!

For at the time of slaughtering the second, when he is warned not to transgress the prohibition of “it and its offspring,” it is still uncertain that this act indeed involves a prohibition, since perhaps the blood will ultimately not be sprinkled and it will be an unfit slaughtering, which does not involve the prohibition of “it and its offspring.”

And a doubtful warning

—

is not called a warning! It was only in the case where he slaughtered “one inside and one outside” that Rabbi Shimon said that the second is not liable to excision. For after the first was slaughtered and its blood was sprinkled, it had already become clear that its slaughtering was fit, and consequently the second offering involves the prohibition of “it and its offspring” and is not fit to be offered today. Therefore, he is not liable for it to excision for slaughtering outside.

it had already become clear that its slaughtering was fit, and consequently the second offering is subject to the prohibition of “it and its offspring” and is not fit to be sacrificed that day. Therefore, he is not liable to karet for slaughtering it outside.

And Rava’s position follows his own reasoning,

for we find in another law that he holds that the warning concerning slaughtering “it and its offspring” in the case of sacrificial animals is considered a doubtful warning.

For Rava said:

An animal

that is non-sacred and whose offspring

is an offering

of peace-offerings,

if he

slaughtered

the

non-sacred

one first

and afterward slaughtered

the

peace-offering,

on the same day, he is

exempt

from lashes for “it and its offspring” [according to Rabbi Shimon], because his warning was a doubtful warning. For at the time of slaughtering the peace-offering [when he transgresses the prohibition of “it and its offspring”], it is still uncertain that such a slaughtering is indeed fit and prohibited, since perhaps the blood will not be sprinkled.

But if he slaughtered the

peace-offering

and sprinkled its blood,

and afterward

slaughtered the

non-sacred animal — he is

liable

to lashes, because in this case there is a definite warning. For at the time of slaughtering the non-sacred animal, the blood of the peace-offering had already been sprinkled, and it had become clear that its slaughtering was fit, while the subsequent slaughtering of the non-sacred animal was certainly prohibited.

And Rava said: It is non-sacred and its offspring

is an offering

of a burnt-offering —

it is not necessary

that if he

slaughtered

the

non-sacred animal and afterward slaughtered

the

burnt-offering, he is exempt

as follows,