Chullin 81a (פא.) — the Talmud in English

According to

the verse

Exact page location

“it transfers it to a positive mitzva”,

and with regard to every negative commandment that is transferred to a positive mitzva, one is not flogged for violating it.

What is the reason? —

Where do we find a positive commandment with regard to an animal lacking the required time?

As the verse says: “From the eighth day onward

it shall be accepted!”

and its meaning is:

from the eighth day

yes,

but

before that

it is still lacking the required time; therefore,

it shall not

be accepted! And

a negative commandment inferred from a positive commandment —

is a positive commandment!

This positive commandment includes all offerings disqualified because they lack the required time, concerning which the Torah warned through a prohibition that they not be accepted before their proper time; and it transferred the prohibition concerning every such offering to the positive commandment of “from the eighth day,” teaching that it is a mitzva to leave them until their proper time and to sacrifice them then.

And we challenge this:

But it is needed

for the verse “from the eighth day”

for the teaching of Rabbi Aptoriki,

and it does not come to teach about a positive commandment.

For Rabbi Aptoriki raised the following contradiction:

he would ask:

It is written: “And it shall be seven days under its mother,”

which implies:

that

after seven days, on

the night

preceding the eighth day, it is

fit

for an offering, since seven days have already elapsed.

And it is written,

on the other hand:

“From the eighth day onward it shall be accepted,”

which implies that only

from the eighth day onward

yes,

but on

the night,

the night ushering in the eighth day,

it shall not

be accepted as an offering!

How

are these two verses to be reconciled?

The night —

for sanctification!

From the night of the eighth day onward, it is already permitted to consecrate the animal as an offering; [before then, it is forbidden to consecrate it because it is forbidden to consecrate disqualified animals as offerings]. Nevertheless, it still cannot be sacrificed.

The day —

for acceptance!

From the eighth day onward, the animal may be sacrificed on the altar as an offering, and it will effect acceptance for the one who brings it.

But since the verse is needed for this exposition, how can we derive from it that every animal lacking the required time is transferred to a positive mitzva?

And we answer:

Another verse is written:

“

“So shall you do with your ox, with your sheep,

it shall be with its mother for seven days; and on the eighth day you shall give it to Me!” And from here we learn that there is a positive commandment concerning an animal lacking the required time.

Rav Hamnuna said: Rabbi Shimon would say: The prohibition against slaughtering “it and its offspring” does not apply to sacrificial animals!

What is the reason?

Since Rabbi Shimon said: An unfit slaughtering is not called slaughtering,

and

the slaughtering of sacrificial animals is likewise an unfit slaughtering,

since it does not permit the meat to be eaten until the blood is sprinkled, it is therefore not included in the prohibition “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring on the same day.”

Rava raised an objection

from a beraita: One who slaughters

it and its offspring,

and the two animals were

sacrificial animals,

and he slaughtered them

outside

—Rabbi Shimon says:

one who slaughters the

second,

although he is not liable to karet for slaughtering outside, since the second offering is not fit to be sacrificed inside at that time because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring,” nevertheless he violates

a prohibition

of slaughtering outside.

For Rabbi Shimon would say: Every

offering

that is fit to come

to the Temple and be sacrificed

at a later time,

but he slaughtered it outside now,

is subject to a prohibition, but not to karet!

Since the time for its sacrifice has not yet arrived. And with regard to anything that is not fit to be sacrificed inside, one is not liable to karet for slaughtering it outside.

And the Sages say: Anything for which there is no karet —

—

is not subject to a prohibition!

And we find this difficult

with regard to what we learned in the beraita: “

Sacrificial animals outside

—Rabbi Shimon says: One who slaughters the

second

violates

a prohibition,

but is not liable to karet.” But

the first

offering that was slaughtered outside

has certainly been killed,

and its slaughtering is not considered “slaughtering,” since it was an unfit slaughtering, as Rabbi Shimon maintains that an unfit slaughtering is not called slaughtering. Consequently, the

second offering

is accepted inside!

It is fit to be sacrificed that day, since it is not subject to the prohibition of “it and its offspring,” given that the slaughtering of the first was not considered “slaughtering.” If so,

he should also be liable to karet

for slaughtering the second, since he slaughtered an offering fit to be sacrificed inside!?

And Rava said—and some say

that this is what

Kadi

[the name of an amora] said:

The beraita is incomplete,

and

this is what it teaches:

If the two animals that were “it and its offspring” were

sacrificial animals

and he slaughtered them

outside,

then:

According to the Sages,

who maintain that an unfit slaughtering is considered slaughtering,

the first incurs karet

for slaughtering outside, and the

second offering is disqualified

because it was slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard. [The same is true of the first, which is also disqualified.]

And

one who slaughters it is

exempt

both from karet and

from the prohibition of slaughtering outside,

since it is not fit to be sacrificed inside that day because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring.”

But

according to Rabbi Shimon,

who maintains that an unfit slaughtering is not called slaughtering,

both incur karet

for slaughtering outside, since even the second is fit to be sacrificed that day, as stated.

B. If he first slaughtered

one outside, and

afterward slaughtered

one inside,

then:

According to the Sages, the first incurs karet

for slaughtering outside, and the

second offering is disqualified

because it lacks the required time, since it is not fit to be sacrificed that day because of “it and its offspring.”

And

one who slaughters it is

exempt

from karet, since he slaughtered it inside [although he is liable to lashes for the prohibition of “it and its offspring”; however, the beraita is discussing only liability for slaughtering outside]. But

according to Rabbi Shimon,

the

second offering is fit.

It is not disqualified because of “it and its offspring,” since the slaughtering of the first was an unfit slaughtering.

C. If he first slaughtered

one inside and

afterward slaughtered

one outside,

then:

According to the Sages,

the

first is fit, and

one who slaughters it is

exempt,

since it was done properly. And the

second offering is disqualified,

since it was slaughtered outside [and it is also lacking the required time because of “it and its offspring”]. One who slaughters it is

exempt

from both the prohibition and karet for slaughtering outside, since it is not fit to be sacrificed inside because of “it and its offspring.”

But

according to Rabbi Shimon,

one who slaughters the

second

violates

a prohibition

concerning slaughtering outside, but is not liable to karet, since the offering is not fit to be sacrificed that day because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring.” The slaughtering of the first took place inside and was a fit slaughtering, thereby prohibiting the second under “it and its offspring”; nevertheless, he violates a prohibition because it will be fit to be sacrificed at a later time.

Rava concludes his challenge to Rav Hamnuna: We learned that when one slaughters one inside and one outside, according to Rabbi Shimon the second is subject only to a prohibition

! And if it enters your mind

that according to Rabbi Shimon

there is no

prohibition of

“it and its offspring” applicable to sacrificial animals

because the slaughtering is considered unfit, then

the second, why

did Rabbi Shimon say that he violates

a prohibition and nothing more!?

For

karet as well

he should have been

liable

for slaughtering outside, since the second offering is fit to be sacrificed inside that day, as it is not subject to the prohibition of “it and its offspring”?

Rather, Rava said: This is what Rav Hamnuna meant:

Although the prohibition of “it and its offspring” applies to sacrificial animals, nevertheless

lashes for “it and its offspring” do not apply to sacrificial animals!

What is the reason?

Because although the slaughtering of sacrificial animals is considered a fit slaughtering [since it too renders the meat permitted for consumption together with the subsequent sprinkling of the blood], nevertheless,

since as long as the blood has not been sprinkled

from the offering on the altar,

the meat is not permitted

for consumption, the status of the slaughtering remains suspended. If the blood is ultimately sprinkled, it will become clear retroactively that the slaughtering was fit; and if not, it will become clear that the slaughtering was unfit, since it did not permit the meat. Therefore, one is not flogged for “it and its offspring” in the case of sacrificial animals, because

at the time he slaughters, it is a warning of uncertain liability!

At the time of slaughtering the second, when he is warned not to violate the prohibition of “it and its offspring,” it is not yet certain that this act entails a prohibition, since perhaps the blood will ultimately not be sprinkled and the slaughtering will be unfit, in which case there is no prohibition of “it and its offspring.”

And a warning of uncertain liability

is not considered a warning!

Only in the case where he slaughtered “one inside and one outside” did Rabbi Shimon say that the second is not subject to karet. Since, after the first was slaughtered and its blood sprinkled,

it had already become clear that its slaughtering was fit, and consequently the second offering is subject to the prohibition of “it and its offspring” and is not fit to be sacrificed that day. Therefore, he is not liable to karet for slaughtering it outside.

And Rava follows his own line of reasoning,

as we find in another ruling that he maintains that the warning concerning slaughtering “it and its offspring” in the case of sacrificial animals is considered a warning of uncertain liability.

For Rava said:

An animal

that is non-sacred, with its offspring

being an offering of

peace-offerings,

if he

slaughtered

the

non-sacred

animal first

and afterward slaughtered

the

peace-offering

on the same day, he is

exempt

from lashes for “it and its offspring” [according to Rabbi Shimon], because the warning was a warning of uncertain liability. At the time of slaughtering the peace-offering [when he violates the prohibition of “it and its offspring”], it is not yet certain that such slaughtering is indeed fit and prohibited, since perhaps the blood will not be sprinkled.

But if he slaughtered the

peace-offering

and sprinkled its blood,

and afterward

slaughtered the

non-sacred animal — he is

liable

to lashes, because in this case there is a definite warning. At the time of slaughtering the non-sacred animal, the blood of the peace-offering had already been sprinkled, establishing that its slaughtering was fit, and the subsequent slaughtering of the non-sacred animal was certainly prohibited.

And Rava said: It is non-sacred, with its offspring

being an offering of

an olah

—it is not necessary

that if he

slaughtered

the

non-sacred animal and afterward slaughtered

the

olah, he is exempt,

as will be explained below,