Chullin 81b — the Talmud in English

Rather, even

if

he slaughtered

first the

olah

and its blood was sprinkled,

and afterward slaughtered

the

non-sacred animal,

also

he is exempt [and it is permitted, and likewise when he slaughtered the non-sacred animal first]. Because

the

first slaughter

of the olah

is not a slaughter fit for eating!

For it does not render the flesh of the olah permitted for eating, since all of it is burned on the altar . And since the slaughter of the first is not fit, the slaughter of the second is not subject to the prohibition of “that one and its offspring”; and all the more so, if the second slaughter was of an olah, he is exempt, because it is not a slaughter for eating .

And Rabbi Yaakov said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

The slaughter of an olah is a slaughter fit [for the prohibition] after the sprinkling of the blood, for it too renders flesh permitted for eating. Because

the altar’s consumption is called eating!

What is the reason?

For the verse says: “And if he shall surely eat of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offering

on the third day, it shall not be accepted.” This verse was stated with regard to pigul: if he slaughtered the offering with the intention of eating it after its permitted time, the offering is pigul. And from the doubling of the expression “he shall surely eat” we expound:

The verse speaks of two acts of eating: one, human eating, and one, the altar’s consumption!

For one who thinks to perform one of these acts of eating outside its time has a pigul thought. Whether the thought was about human eating of the offering, that it should be outside its time, or whether the thought was about the altar’s eating, namely, the burning of the offering, that it should be outside its time—the offering becomes pigul! From here we learn that the altar’s consumption is called eating, and therefore slaughter for the purpose of burning is included in the prohibition of “that one and its offspring” .

Mishna:

One who slaughters

the animal

and it is found

to be

a tereifa.

Or

one who slaughters in the

name of

idolatry, or one who slaughters a red heifer—

a red cow —

or a stoned ox

whose judgment was finalized to be stoned,

or a beheaded heifer

that is destined to be beheaded , all of which are forbidden for eating even after their slaughter; if afterward he slaughtered their offspring—

Rabbi Shimon exempts

because of “that one and its offspring.” Since the first slaughter is a slaughter that is not fit: it does not render the flesh permitted for eating, and it is not called slaughter. The prohibition of “that one and its offspring” applies only to a slaughter that is fit [of both], as it is written: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring on one day.”

And the Sages impose liability!

For in their view even a slaughter that is not fit is called slaughter.

One who slaughters and it becomes an animal carcass in his hand,

because the slaughter was spoiled without the slaughterer’s intention.

And one who strangles,

who kills the animal.

And one who tears out

the signs in the animal’s neck intentionally and kills it, and afterward slaughters its offspring—

he is exempt

because of “that one and its offspring,”

even according to the Rabbis, because there is no slaughter here at all.

Gemara:

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said:

What we learned, that the Sages impose liability for one who slaughters for idolatry because of “that one and its offspring,”

was taught

so

only

in a case

where he slaughtered

the

first for idolatry and

the

second for his table,

to eat it, and not for the sake of idolatry. Since there is no liability for death because of idolatry for the slaughter of the second, it is possible to impose lashes for it because of “that one and its offspring.”

But,

if he slaughtered the

first for his table

and

the

second for idolatry—

he is exempt

from lashes for “that one and its offspring.” The slaughterer incurs liability for death for this slaughter because of idolatry, and it is not possible to impose lashes upon him for it, because

he is subject to the greater penalty: one does not punish for a single transgressive act with two punishments, but punishes him only with the more severe punishment .

Rabbi Yohanan said to him

to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: This

halakha—

even schoolchildren know it!

Rather,

if you wished to teach us a novel point from our Mishna, you should have said this:

There are cases when even

if

he slaughtered the first for his table and the second for idolatry, he is liable

for lashes for the slaughter of the second because of “that one and its offspring” . How so?

For example, where they warned him

during the slaughter of the second

because of

the lashes for

“that one and its offspring,” but they did not warn him because of

the death penalty for

idolatry,

and it is found that he has only one punishment, lashes for “that one and its offspring.”

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Since when they warned him

for death he was

exempt

from lashes, then also

when they did not warn him

for death—

he is likewise exempt

from lashes. For whenever this act contains the possibility that the person would incur the death penalty, he does not receive lashes for that act, even if in practice it contains no death penalty!

And Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish followed

their

respective positions,

for we find that they disagreed in a dispute resembling this one .

For when Rav Dimi came, he said: Unintentional transgressors liable for death,

who unintentionally violated a transgression for which there is a death penalty when done intentionally, or

unintentional transgressors liable for lashes,

who acted unintentionally in a transgression for which there are lashes when done intentionally,

and another matter,

where there was also a monetary obligation to his fellow in the same transgressive act involving death or lashes—for example, he unintentionally ate carcasses and tereifot belonging to another person, in which case he is exempt from lashes, but the amoraim disagreed whether he must pay:

Rabbi Yohanan says: He is liable

for money.

And Reish Lakish says: He is exempt

even from money.

And Rav Dimi explains:

Rabbi Yohanan says he is liable, for they did not warn him

concerning death or lashes, and consequently this act has no punishment other than the monetary payment.

And Reish Lakish says he is exempt, for since when they warned him

he would have been

exempt

from monetary payment,

when they did not warn him, he is likewise exempt

from money.

And it is necessary

for Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish to teach us their dispute in our context, concerning one act that carries liability for death and liability for lashes, even though it is already known that they disagree concerning an act that carries death or lashes together with money.

For if he had taught us

that they disagree

in this

with regard to the liability for death and lashes for slaughtering “that one and its offspring” for idolatry, we might have said that only

in this Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said

that he is exempt from lashes even if they did not warn him concerning death, since in this slaughter there is a possibility of liability for death, and therefore the status of lashes has departed from it, because the two punishments, death and lashes, are of one type—both are upon the person’s body. It is not possible to impose two similar punishments for one act.

But in this,

in a case where he unintentionally performed an act that carries liability for death or lashes and also carries monetary liability,

one might say that he concedes to him,

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish to

Rabbi Yohanan, since the punishments are dissimilar: one is upon the person’s body and the other upon his property. When he acted unintentionally, he should be made liable for money [since in practice he has no death penalty] .

поскольку наказания различны: одно относится к телу человека, а другое — к его имуществу; поэтому при ошибочном действии его следует обязать выплатить деньги [поскольку фактически смертное наказание ему не полагается].

And

on the other hand,

if

it had been

stated

that their dispute was only

in this,

in the law of unintentional transgressors liable for death together with money, we might have said that only

in this Rabbi Yohanan said

that he is liable for money, because death and money are not of one type.

But in this,

in the case discussed in our sugya, where he is unintentional with regard to the death liability and intentional with regard to the lashes,

one might say that Rabbi Yohanan concedes

Rabbi Yohanan

to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, that he is exempt from lashes even if they did not warn him concerning death, since death and lashes are both punishments upon the person’s body. Therefore

that he is exempt from lashes even if he was not warned concerning the death penalty, since death and lashes are both punishments imposed upon the person’s body. Therefore,

it is necessary

to teach that they disagree in both cases .

And the Gemara discusses what we learned in the Mishna, that Rabbi Shimon exempts because of “that one and its offspring” one who slaughters a red heifer:

And

for

the slaughter of a red heifer—

is it a slaughter that is not fit!?

But it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says: A red

heifer

transmits the impurity of food,

for its flesh has the status of food with regard to contracting impurity . For although Rabbi Shimon holds that food forbidden for benefit is not considered food with regard to contracting impurity , nevertheless, with regard to a red heifer he agrees that it is considered food, despite its being forbidden for benefit,

since it had

a time when it was fit!

For there was a certain time when the flesh of the heifer had the status of food.