Chullin 80b — the Talmud in English

And if the Mishna holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, this is difficult:

since we have heard Rabbi Shimon say: an unfit slaughter

to permit the meat for eating

is not called slaughter,

and one is not liable for such slaughter on account of “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring on one day.” If so, then

the first,

the first animal, which is an offering slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard,

he killed it!

For this slaughter has no status of “slaughter”; rather, it is as though the animal had been killed, since it is an unfit slaughter, because once it was slaughtered outside it is forbidden for eating. [And nevertheless one is liable to karet for this slaughter, for this is the decree of the verse, that with regard to liability for offerings slaughtered outside, it has the status of slaughter.] And since the slaughter of the first is not slaughter, then the

second offering—

is accepted inside!

For the second animal is fit to be offered upon the altar, and it does not have the disqualification of “lacking its time,” since there is no prohibition of “it and its offspring” upon it. And if so,

he should also be liable to karet

for slaughtering the second outside, an offering that is fit to be offered inside!? Rather, it is proven that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, and therefore there is a prohibition of “it and its offspring” upon the second, and one is exempt for it from karet for offerings [slaughtered] outside.

We also learned in our Mishna that if the two animals were non-sacred and he slaughtered them

inside

the Temple courtyard—

both are disqualified, and the second receives forty lashes

because he transgressed the prohibition of “it and its offspring.”

And this law too proves that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon. For

since we have heard Rabbi Shimon say: an unfit slaughter is not called slaughter,

and if so,

the first,

the first animal [and the same applies to the second],

he killed it!

For non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard are forbidden for benefit, and it is not a fit slaughter. And if so, why

does the second slaughterer receive forty lashes?

But neither of the two slaughters was fit to permit [the meat], and there is no prohibition of “it and its offspring” in them?

We also learned in our Mishna that if the two animals were

offerings

and he slaughtered them

inside,

then

the first is fit and exempt, and the second receives forty lashes

because of “it and its offspring,”

and is disqualified

the second offering, because it is “lacking its time,” as it is not fit on that day for offering because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring.”

And this law too proves that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, for

since we have heard Rabbi Shimon say that an unfit slaughter is not called slaughter,

then every slaughter of offerings is also an unfit slaughter

it is!

For the slaughter alone still does not permit the meat for eating,

for as long as he has not cast the blood

of the offering upon the altar,

the meat is not permitted

for eating. And if so—

why does the second receive forty lashes?

But according to Rabbi Shimon there is no prohibition at all of “it and its offspring” with offerings, since the slaughter of offerings is an unfit slaughter?

And

it is further difficult: why is the offering

disqualified

For the very slaughter of the first is not fit, and depends upon the casting of the blood; how, then, can it cause the second to be subject to the prohibition of “it and its offspring”?

Rather, infer from it,

that our Mishna

is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon

!

And we discuss it:

It is obvious that this is so,

that our Mishna does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Shimon; and what is the novelty in Rabbi Oshaya’s statement?

And we explain:

the slaughter of offerings was necessary for him

to inform us that it is an unfit slaughter.

For

it might enter your mind to say that the slaughter of offerings is a fit slaughter, for if he tore

the offering and did not slaughter it, then

the

meat

is not permitted

for eating,

but

specifically

when he slaughtered, the

meat

is permitted,

so it emerges that the slaughter too causes the meat to be permitted,

and it is a fit slaughter; it teaches us

that it is an unfit slaughter, since through the slaughter alone the meat is still not permitted for eating.

And the Gemara asks why, when one slaughters the second [animal] among offerings inside, the second slaughterer receives forty lashes only because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring”:

and let him also receive lashes

the second slaughterer

because of the prohibition of

slaughtering an offering that is

lacking its time,

whose time to be offered has not yet arrived!? For this offering too has not yet reached its time, since it is forbidden to slaughter it today because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring”? And from where is it established that there is a prohibition concerning the slaughter of an offering that is lacking its time?

As it was taught: From where [do we know] concerning all the disqualified animals

for offering

that are among cattle and sheep, that he

transgresses through offering them

the

prohibition of

“It will not be accepted”? Scripture says

“And an ox or a sheep that has a limb extended or contracted

—you may make it a freewill offering, but for a vow it will not be accepted”! And from the superfluity of “an ox and a sheep” [for it could have written “extended or contracted, etc.”], we expound:

It taught concerning

all

the disqualified animals that

are

among cattle and sheep that there is

the prohibition of

“It will not be accepted”! And “lacking its time” too is disqualified for offering, and it contains the prohibition of “It will not be accepted.”

An offering whose time has not yet arrived is also disqualified for offering, and it is subject to the prohibition of “It will not be accepted.”

And we answer:

when he counts

the tannay in our Mishna counts specifically

the prohibitions of “it and its offspring,”

but

foreign prohibitions,

the other prohibitions besides “it and its offspring,”

he does not count.

But in truth, he also receives lashes because of the prohibition of offering one that is lacking its time.

And we object:

and

does the tannay

not

count other prohibitions?

But

the prohibition of

offerings [slaughtered] outside is a foreign prohibition, and he does count it

in our Mishna.

For it teaches: “Offerings [slaughtered] outside—

the first is liable to karet, and both receive forty lashes”! Granted

that the one who slaughters

the second

receives lashes

because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring,” but why does the first receive lashes,

for he did not transgress “it and its offspring”? Rather, what

prohibition

does he receive lashes for?

Because of the prohibition of offerings slaughtered outside.

And it is proven that the tannay counts other prohibitions as well, besides “it and its offspring.” And if so, the question returns: why did he not also count the prohibition of “lacking its time”?

And we answer:

wherever there is no prohibition of “it and its offspring,”

such as in the case of the first, who slaughtered offerings outside, where there is no prohibition of “it and its offspring,”

he counts

the tannay

foreign prohibitions

of offerings slaughtered outside.

And wherever there is a prohibition of “it and its offspring,”

such as the second, who slaughtered offerings inside,

he does not count foreign prohibitions,

and therefore he did not count the prohibition of “lacking its time.”

Rabbi Zeira said:

There is no difficulty as to why the tannay did not count the prohibition of “lacking its time.” For

leave aside

the prohibition of

“lacking its time,”

for one does not receive lashes for it,