Chullin 80b (פ:) — the Talmud in English

And if the Mishna follows the opinion of Rabi Shimon, this is difficult:

Granted, we have heard Rabi Shimon say: an invalid slaughter

that does not permit the meat to be eaten

is not considered slaughter,

and one is not liable for such slaughter on account of the prohibition: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring on the same day.” If so, then

the first,

the first animal, which is an offering slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard,

he merely killed it!

For this slaughter is not considered “slaughter”; rather, it is as though the animal had been killed, since it is an invalid slaughter, as it was slaughtered outside and is forbidden to be eaten. [Nevertheless, one is liable to receive karet for this slaughter, as this is the decree of the verse, that with regard to liability for slaughtering offerings outside the Temple courtyard, it is considered slaughter.] And since the slaughter of the first animal is not considered slaughter, the

second offering

is accepted inside!

For the second animal is fit to be offered on the altar, and it is not disqualified as one whose time has not yet arrived, since the prohibition of “it and its offspring” does not apply to it. And if so,

he should also be liable to karet

for slaughtering the second animal outside the Temple courtyard, an offering that is fit to be offered inside!? Rather, it is proven that our Mishna does not follow Rabi Shimon. Therefore, the prohibition of “it and its offspring” applies to the second animal, and he is exempt from karet for slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple courtyard.

We also learned in our Mishna that if the two animals were non-sacred and one slaughtered them

inside

the Temple courtyard,

both are disqualified, and the second person receives forty lashes

because he violated the prohibition of “it and its offspring.”

This law too proves that our Mishna does not follow Rabi Shimon. For

granted, we have heard Rabi Shimon say: an invalid slaughter is not considered slaughter,

and if so,

the first

animal [and the same applies to the second],

he merely killed it!

For non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard are forbidden to benefit from, and this is not a valid slaughter. If so, why

does the second person receive forty lashes?

After all, neither slaughter was fit to permit the animal to be eaten, and therefore the prohibition of “it and its offspring” should not apply to them.

We also learned in our Mishna that if the two animals were

consecrated animals

and one slaughtered them

inside,

then

the first is fit and there is no liability, while the second person receives forty lashes

because of “it and its offspring,”

and it is disqualified

the second offering, because it is one whose time has not yet arrived and is not fit to be offered that day due to the prohibition of “it and its offspring.”

This law too proves that our Mishna does not follow Rabi Shimon, because

granted, we have heard Rabi Shimon say that an invalid slaughter is not considered slaughter,

and if so, every slaughter of consecrated animals is also an invalid slaughter

indeed!

For slaughter alone still does not permit the meat to be eaten,

for as long as the blood has not been sprinkled

of the offering on the altar,

the meat is not permitted

to be eaten. And if so,

why does the second person receive forty lashes?

According to Rabi Shimon, the prohibition of “it and its offspring” does not apply at all to consecrated animals, since the slaughter of consecrated animals is an invalid slaughter.

And

there is also a difficulty: why is the offering

disqualified

? After all, the slaughter of the first animal itself is not valid, but depends on the sprinkling of the blood; how, then, can it cause the second animal to be subject to the prohibition of “it and its offspring”?

Rather, conclude from this

that our Mishna

is not in accordance with Rabi Shimon

!

And we raised a difficulty:

It is obvious that this is so,

that our Mishna does not follow Rabi Shimon. What novelty is there in Rabi Oshaya’s statement?

And we explain:

The case of the slaughter of consecrated animals was necessary for him

to teach us that it is an invalid slaughter.

For

it might enter your mind to say that the slaughter of consecrated animals is a valid slaughter, since if one strangled

the offering rather than slaughtering it,

the

meat

is not permitted

to be eaten,

whereas

specifically

when he slaughtered it, the

meat

is permitted,

so it follows that slaughter too causes the meat to become permitted,

and it is a valid slaughter; this teaches us

that it is an invalid slaughter, since through slaughter alone the meat is still not permitted to be eaten.

The Gemara discusses why, when one slaughters the second consecrated animal inside the Temple courtyard, the second person receives forty lashes only for violating the prohibition of “it and its offspring”:

And let him also receive lashes

the second person

for violating the prohibition of

slaughtering an offering that is

one whose time has not yet arrived,

whose time to be offered has not yet come!? For this offering too has not yet reached the time when it may be offered, since it is forbidden to slaughter it that day because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring”! And from where do we know that there is a prohibition against slaughtering an offering whose time has not yet arrived?

As it is taught in a beraita: From where do we know that all the disqualified animals

for offering

that are in an ox and a sheep, that

one violates a prohibition by offering them

of the

prohibition

“It shall not be accepted”? The verse states

“And an ox or a sheep that has a limb extended or contracted,

you may make it a freewill offering, but for a vow it shall not be accepted.” And from the superfluous wording “an ox or a sheep” [as it could have written “one with a limb extended or contracted, etc.”], we derive:

It teaches regarding

all

the disqualified animals that

are found

in an ox and a sheep that there is

a prohibition

of “It shall not be accepted”! And “one whose time has not yet arrived” is also disqualified for offering, and it is subject to the prohibition of “It shall not be accepted.”

An offering whose time has not yet arrived is also disqualified for offering, and it is subject to the prohibition of “It will not be accepted.”

And we answer:

When he counts

the tanna of our Mishna counts specifically

the prohibitions of “it and its offspring,”

but

foreign prohibitions,

other prohibitions besides “it and its offspring,”

he does not count.

In truth, however, he also receives lashes for the prohibition against offering an animal whose time has not yet arrived.

And we challenge this:

And

does the tanna

not

count other prohibitions?

But

the prohibition of

slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple courtyard is a foreign prohibition, and he does count it

in our Mishna.

For it teaches: “Consecrated animals outside the Temple courtyard

the first person is liable to receive karet, and both receive forty lashes”! Granted,

the one who slaughters the

second

receives lashes

for violating the prohibition of “it and its offspring,” but why does the first person receive lashes

? After all, he did not violate “it and its offspring.” Rather, what

prohibition

does he violate for which he receives lashes?

He receives lashes for violating the prohibition against slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple courtyard.

This proves that the tanna counts other prohibitions as well, besides “it and its offspring.” If so, the difficulty returns: why did he not also count the prohibition of “one whose time has not yet arrived”?

And we answer:

Whenever there is no prohibition of “it and its offspring,”

such as in the case of the first person who slaughtered consecrated animals outside the Temple courtyard, where the prohibition of “it and its offspring” does not apply,

he counts

the tanna

foreign prohibitions

of slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple courtyard.

But whenever there is a prohibition of “it and its offspring,”

such as in the case of the second person who slaughtered consecrated animals inside the Temple courtyard,

he does not count foreign prohibitions,

and therefore he did not count the prohibition of “one whose time has not yet arrived.”

Rabi Zeira said:

There is no need to raise the difficulty of why the tanna did not count the prohibition of “one whose time has not yet arrived.”

Set aside

the prohibition of

“one whose time has not yet arrived,”

for one does not receive lashes for it,