Chullin 75b (עה:) — the Talmud in English

.

requires

the fetus

slaughter

in order to permit it for consumption, since it is not permitted through the slaughter of its mother, as stated.

Had it been permitted by virtue of her slaughter, because it is considered one of her limbs, it would nevertheless be forbidden here, since its mother is a tereifa.

.

And

And likewise

it is obligated

it

to

to give

the foreleg and

the

the foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw

to the kohen. Since it is slaughtered independently, it is included in what is stated: “And this shall be the due of the kohanim from the people, from those who slaughter the slaughtered animal, whether ox or sheep. And he shall give the kohen the foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw.” One who slaughters such a ben paku'a likewise gives the foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw to the kohen. .

And if it dies,

this fetus is

pure with regard to imparting impurity through carrying,

like an animal carcass, since its mother was slaughtered while it was still inside her. Its mother’s slaughter renders it pure from the impurity of an animal carcass.

Rava said to him:

This halakha that you stated, that a fetus of a tereifa

requires slaughter—which tanna’s opinion does it follow?

Whose view is it? It must be

that of Rabbi Meir,

because Rabbi Meir holds that a nine-month fetus requires slaughter independently. But according to the Rabbis, it requires no slaughter at all, since according to them it is already considered slaughtered.

But the other halakha that you stated,

“And if it dies

—

“it is pure with regard to imparting impurity through carrying”—whose view

does it follow? It must be

that of the Rabbis,

who hold that his mother’s slaughter is effective with regard to it and purifies it from the impurity of an animal carcass.

Thus, your statements contradict one another?!

Rav Ḥisda replied to him:

And

And

according to your reasoning,

according to you, Rava, who insist that the first part of this statement follows Rabbi Meir, while its latter part follows the Rabbis, how will you explain

that which Rabbi Ḥiyya taught

in a manner similar to our statement?

For Rabbi Ḥiyya taught as follows:

One who slaughters a tereifa and finds within it a living nine-month fetus—

it requires slaughter and is obligated in the foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw. And if it dies—

it is pure with regard to imparting impurity through carrying.

And here too one may ask: The ruling that it

requires slaughter—

whose view does it follow?

Certainly, it is

that of Rabbi Meir

.

And

And if the ruling is that

if it dies, it is pure with regard to imparting impurity through carrying,

it certainly is

that of the Rabbis.

And if so, that same apparent contradiction exists in the words of Rabbi Ḥiyya as well!?

Rava resolves the difficulty:

This—

this statement taught by Rabbi Ḥiyya—

is not difficult.

For when

Rabbi Ḥiyya said, “

and if it dies, it is pure with regard to imparting impurity,”

he was speaking when they had already found it dead

[the fetus, at the time its mother was slaughtered]

and not when it died later.

He was not referring to a case in which it died later. Indeed, all of Rabbi Ḥiyya’s statements were in accordance with the view of Rabbi Meir.

And what Rabbi Ḥiyya said, that if it dies it is pure with regard to imparting impurity by virtue of its mother’s slaughter, is not difficult. For Rabbi Meir concedes that although the slaughter of the mother does not permit a living ben paku'a, nevertheless, if it dies, it is rendered permitted through its mother’s slaughter. And when its mother is a tereifa, although her slaughter does not permit it for consumption, nevertheless, it purifies it from the impurity of an animal carcass. Therefore, there is no difficulty from Rabbi Ḥiyya’s statement.

But according to you,

according to you, Rav Ḥisda, there is still

a difficulty.

For your statements concern a living fetus that requires slaughter independently, in accordance with Rabbi Meir, whereas if that same fetus subsequently dies, it is pure by virtue of its mother’s slaughter, in accordance with the view of the Sages. The difficulty remains very strong?!

He said to him,

Rav Ḥisda: Even

according to me there is no difficulty,

because

four slaughtering organs

of slaughter

the Torah rendered valid in it,

the Torah rendered valid in a ben paku'a fetus: two organs [the trachea and esophagus] in its mother, and likewise two organs in the fetus itself. That is, the permission granted to the fetus through its mother’s slaughter does not exclude the possibility of slaughtering the fetus itself when necessary. It merely means that the fetus is permitted through its mother’s slaughter. Indeed, when its mother is a tereifa and her slaughter is ineffective for it, it is possible to slaughter the fetus itself, and it will be permitted through that slaughter.

It follows that Rav Ḥisda’s statements were in accordance with the view of the Sages. Therefore, if the fetus dies later, it is pure by virtue of its mother’s slaughter. And although its mother’s slaughter is effective in purifying it, indicating that the fetus is part of her, it is nevertheless possible, even according to the Sages, to slaughter it independently, as stated, and thereby permit it for consumption.

Therefore, there is no difficulty from Rav Ḥisda’s statement.

When Rabbi Zeira ascended,

when he went up

Rabbi Zeira

from Babylonia to the Land of Israel,

Rav Asi found him,

he found

Rav Asi

Rabbi Zeira,

sitting

and

saying this teaching,

the statement we have learned: that a ben paku'a can be slaughtered even according to the Sages, since the Torah rendered four slaughtering organs valid in it.

Rav Asi said to him:

Rav Asi:

Excellent!

This teaching is correct and fine.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan likewise said,

Excellent!

And the Gemara asks: Does

this imply

from Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that this ruling is correct, that

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish disagrees with him,

in that

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish

disagrees and holds that it is impossible to slaughter the ben paku'a of a tereifa and permit it for consumption?

The Gemara rejects this:

He was merely delaying.

It was the practice of Reish Lakish that whenever Rabbi Yoḥanan would state a teaching with which Reish Lakish did not agree, he would wait an hour or two before disagreeing with Rabbi Yoḥanan, in case Rabbi Yoḥanan would retract it on his own.

since he waited,

And once he had waited,

he remained silent before him

and Reish Lakish did not hasten to disagree with him. During this interval, Rav Asi left and did not hear whether Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish in fact disagreed on this matter.

Some say

that the reason Reish Lakish remained silent on this matter was that

he was drinking,

he was drinking water,

he remained silent before him,

and therefore

he remained silent before him,

he was silent because he was drinking and did not respond to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words. Consequently, Rav Asi left the beit-midrash and did not manage to hear Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even

a five-year-old that plows in the field—its mother’s slaughter purifies it.

The Gemara asks: Rabbi Shimon Shezuri’s statement—

is it not identical to

the statement of

the first tanna?!

That is, the Sages in the Mishna who disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that even the living nine-month fetus is purified by its mother’s slaughter. What does Rabbi Shimon Shezuri add to their statement?

Rav Kahana said:

placed its feet

A fetus that emerged and placed its feet

stood on its hooves

on the ground—this is the difference between them.

This is the distinction between the view of the Sages and that of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri.

For according to the Sages, the fetus is permitted only while it is in its mother’s womb. But if it stands on its feet, it requires slaughter. [This slaughter is rabbinic,

so that people will not confuse it with an ordinary animal that requires slaughter].

By contrast, according to Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, a ben paku'a is exempt from slaughter in every circumstance. As he states in the Mishna: “Even a five-year-old that plows in the field—its mother’s slaughter purifies it.”

Rav Mesharshiya said: According to the one who says

[Ḥananya, below 78b],

we take into consideration the father’s seed,

that the offspring of an animal and a wild creature is identified with its father,

a ben paku'a that mates with a “proper” animal,

an ordinary animal that requires slaughter,

the offspring

born of the two

has no remedy.

For we judge it as though it possesses only one slaughtering organ fit for slaughter. From its father’s side, it is already considered slaughtered, and only from its mother’s side is it fit for slaughter. The Torah permitted an animal for consumption only through the slaughter of two organs! Although, seemingly, if we combine these two organs—the one it receives from its father, which is considered slaughtered, and the one from its mother, which requires slaughter—then when the second organ is slaughtered, both of its organs will be considered slaughtered [both the one from its father, which is considered slaughtered from the time the ben paku'a was born, and this organ, which is slaughtered now], this combination is ineffective. For there was an extremely long interval between the slaughter of the two organs. If we rely on the status of slaughter that exists in the organ it receives from its father, which is considered slaughtered from the time its father impregnated its mother, and combine it with the slaughter performed now, there is no interval greater than this between the slaughter of the two organs!

And according to Rav Mesharshiya, the Torah did not render four organs valid in this fetus, as the amoraim concluded above on the first side of the page. Since the organ corresponding to the father—the ben paku'a—is already considered slaughtered, slaughter is no longer effective for it.

Abaye said: Everyone,

even the first tanna [the Sages in our Mishna], who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and holds that a ben paku'a that has placed its feet and stood on the ground becomes obligated in slaughter because of appearances,

the case of a

agree with regard to the case of a

cloven-hoofless fetus

[whose hooves are solid and whole rather than split like those of other kosher animals], which is

a ben paku'a—

that it is permitted

through its mother’s slaughter.

What is the reason? Anything astonishing

any astonishing and unusual thing, such as this cloven-hoofless fetus born to an animal whose hooves are split,

people take note of and remember,

people pay attention to it and remember how it came to be that it is a ben paku'a. Consequently, it may be permitted even without slaughter, and there is no concern that people might err and come to permit an ordinary animal as well.

Some say: Abaye said, everyone agrees with regard to

Some say: Abaye said, Everyone agrees with regard to a fetus

cloven-hoofless fetus born to a

that is cloven-hoofless, the offspring of a

cloven-hoofless animal,

and this cloven-hoofless animal discussed here is

a ben paku'a,

whose mother’s belly was opened through slaughter, and this fetus was found inside her,

that the fetus is permitted

even without slaughter.

What is the reason? Two astonishing features

two astonishing [unusual] things: this fetus is the offspring of a kosher animal, yet it possesses a sign of impurity; and its mother is likewise cloven-hoofless. Only a combination of two such astonishing features

people take note of and remember,

people remember them.

Ze’iri said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri,

for even a fetus that had set its feet on the ground is permitted through the slaughter of its mother and does not require slaughter of its own.

And similarly, Rabbi Shimon Shezuri would permit the offspring

of a ben peku’a—

and

also the

offspring of its offspring, until the end of all generations—

and all of them are permitted even without slaughter.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It,

the ben peku’a,

is permitted, but its offspring is forbidden!

Ada bar Ḥavvo had

a ben peku’a upon which a wolf

—a wolf—

fell,

and it consequently had the status of a tereifa, like an animal injured by a predator.

It came before

—he came before—

Rav Ashi, who said to him:

Rav Ashi said to him,

“Go,”

go,

“slaughter it,”

and slaughter it, in accordance with the opinion of the Sages who hold that once it has set its feet on the ground, it must be slaughtered.

He said to him:

Ada bar Ḥavvo,

“But did Ze’iri not say that Rabbi Ḥanina said—

‘The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri’?”

And as he cites him as saying:

“And similarly, Rabbi Shimon Shezuri would permit its offspring and the offspring of its offspring—

‘until the end of all generations!’”

“And even Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say

that it is permitted until the end of all generations,

but

only

with regard to its offspring. But he,

the ben peku’a itself,

did not tell him

that it requires slaughter at all, even if it had set its feet and stood on the ground?!

He said to him:

Rav Ashi:

Rabbi Yoḥanan

himself holds that the halakha is in accordance with the Sages. Since it has set its feet on the ground, it is required by rabbinic law to be slaughtered.

And with regard to what Rabbi Yoḥanan said here, that it itself is permitted but not its offspring, it can be resolved that Rabbi Yoḥanan said these words

only according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri.

He indeed holds that the halakha is in accordance with the Sages, and if it has set its feet on the ground, it requires slaughter.

Ada bar Ḥavvo raised an objection to him:

“But did Rabin bar Ḥanina not say that Ulla said that Rabbi Ḥanina said—

‘The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri! Moreover, wherever Rabbi Shimon Shezuri taught a ruling in our Mishna—

‘the halakha is in accordance with him’?!”

And how can it be said that Rabbi Yoḥanan rules in accordance with the Sages and not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri?

He said to him:

Rav Ashi:

“I,

for my part,

hold as follows:

I am of the opinion that the following is the case:

“As Rabbi Yonatan said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri with regard to a ‘dangerously ill person’ and with regard to the tithe-offering of demai.”

[The Gemara will explain below what these laws are.] But with regard to other matters, it is not necessarily the case that the halakha is in accordance with him.

And the Gemara explains:

What is meant by “dangerously ill”?

What is it?

As we learned in a Mishna: Initially,

at first,

they would say

that

one who is led

to execution

in chains and says, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,” these people

who hear him

shall write

a bill of divorce

and give it

to his wife. Although he instructed them only to write it and did not appoint them as agents to deliver it, we assess his intent as having been to appoint them as agents for delivery as well. The reason he did not state this explicitly is that he was distraught over his life, as he was being led to execution.

They later

a second time

said

that

even one who sets sail,

one who is leaving for the sea,

or

likewise

one who sets out with a caravan,

who says, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,” they do so and give it to her. These people too are preoccupied, and because of their preoccupation they did not instruct them concerning delivery.

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even

a sick person who is

dangerously ill

and instructed them to write the bill of divorce— they act in accordance with his words and give it to her.

This is what was cited above in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri with regard to a “dangerously ill person.”

The Gemara continues and explains:

What is meant by “the tithe-offering of demai”?

What is it?

As we learned in a Mishna: The tithe-offering of demai,

that is, produce from which the tithe-offering was separated while it was still demai [produce purchased from an am ha-aretz suspected of failing to separate tithes, and it is therefore uncertain whether it has been tithed or not]—

if it happened

that it returned

to the place of

its origin,

and became mixed with the untithed produce that had already emerged from the status of demai, then we have before us a mixture of non-sacred produce and the tithe-offering [and a tithe-offering is not nullified by an ordinary majority, but only by a majority containing one hundred times its volume. Here, there is no majority of one hundred against the offering, and it is therefore not nullified. Consequently, it would be a great loss to prohibit the entire mixture because of this tithe-offering that became mixed into it].

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says:

The law of this mixture is that

even on a weekday [

and not only on Shabbat, when one might be lenient out of honor for Shabbat and rely on the am ha-aretz if he says that he indeed tithed this produce ]

one asks

the am ha-aretz about this produce received from him, whether he tithed it, and if he tells him that he tithed it, one relies upon him,

and eats it,

this mixture,

on his word.

This is because it is a significant loss. These fruits have no other remedy, since separating tithes from them a second time would not help: The concern applies to each and every fruit, that perhaps it is from the original tithe-offering. Since there is no remedy for the produce, it is permitted both on Shabbat and on a weekday on the basis of the question asked of the am ha-aretz!