Chullin 75b — the Talmud in English

A.

Requires

the fetus

slaughter

in order to permit it for eating, because through the slaughter of its mother it is not permitted, as stated.

But if it had been permitted on account of her slaughter, because it is considered like one of her limbs, here it would have been forbidden, because its mother is a tereifa.

B.

And

likewise

he is obligated

himself

in

giving

the foreleg and

the

cheeks and the maw

to a kohen. Since he himself is slaughtered, he is included in what is stated [Deuteronomy 18:3]: “And this shall be the due of the kohanim from the people, from those who slaughter the slaughtered animal, whether ox or sheep. And he shall give the kohen the foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw.” And one who slaughters such a ben pekua also gives the kohen the foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw. C.

And if it dies

this fetus, it is

pure from conveying impurity through carrying

like an animal carcass, since its mother was slaughtered while it was still within her. And the slaughter of its mother is effective for it, to purify it from the impurity of an animal carcass.

Rava said to him:

This halakha that you said, that the fetus of a tereifa

requires slaughter—according to whom

is it? According to whose view is it? Necessarily it is

according to Rabbi Meir

, for Rabbi Meir holds that a nine-month fetus requires slaughter for itself. But according to the Rabbis, there is no slaughter in its case at all, for according to them it is considered slaughtered and standing.

But the other halakha that you said,

“And if it dies

—

—pure from conveying impurity through carrying,” according to whom

is it? According to whose view is it? Necessarily it is

according to the Rabbis,

who hold that the slaughter of its mother operates upon it and purifies it from the impurity of an animal carcass.

And it follows that your statements contradict one another?!

Rav Hisda answered him:

And

if

according to your reasoning,

according to your words, Rava, that you compel the beginning of this statement to be according to Rabbi Meir and its end to be according to the Rabbis, how will you explain

that which Rabbi Hiyya taught

like our words?

For Rabbi Hiyya taught as follows:

“One who slaughters a tereifa and finds within it a living nine-month fetus

—requires slaughter, and is obligated in the foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw. And if it dies

—pure from conveying impurity through carrying.”

And here too it can be challenged: The law that it

requires slaughter

—

according to whom is it?

Certainly according to Rabbi Meir

it is.

And

if the law is that

if it dies, it is pure from conveying impurity through carrying,

then certainly it is

according to the Rabbis

. If so, that apparent contradiction also exists in the words of Rabbi Hiyya!?

Rava resolves it:

This

, this statement that Rabbi Hiyya taught,

is not difficult.

For what

Rabbi Hiyya

said, “And if it dies, it is pure from conveying impurity,”

he said it if they had already found it dead

[the fetus, at the time its mother was slaughtered]

he said.

And not in a case where it died afterward. Indeed, all of Rabbi Hiyya’s words were stated according to the view of Rabbi Meir.

And what Rabbi Hiyya said, that if it dies it is pure through the slaughter of its mother, is not difficult. Since Rabbi Meir concedes that although, while a ben pekua is alive, the slaughter of its mother does not permit it, nevertheless, if it is dead, it is permitted through the slaughter of its mother. And when its mother is a tereifa, although it does not permit it for eating, nevertheless it purifies it from the impurity of an animal carcass. Therefore, there is no difficulty from the words of Rabbi Hiyya.

But according to you,

according to your words, Rav Hisda, it is still

difficult.

For your words were stated regarding a living fetus that requires slaughter for itself and according to Rabbi Meir, whereas if that same fetus itself dies afterward, it is pure through the slaughter of its mother according to the view of the Sages. And it is still very difficult?!

He said to him

Rav Hisda: Even

according to me also it is not difficult,

because

four signs

of slaughter

the Merciful One rendered valid in it,

the Torah rendered valid in a ben pekua fetus. Two signs [the windpipe and the gullet] in its mother, and likewise two signs in the fetus itself. That is to say, the permission of a fetus through the slaughter of its mother does not come to deny the possibility that there be slaughter in the fetus itself when necessary. Rather, there is permission for the fetus through the slaughter of its mother. Indeed, when its mother is a tereifa and her slaughter is not effective for it, there is a possibility of slaughtering the fetus itself, and it will be permitted through this slaughter.

It follows that Rav Hisda’s words were stated according to the view of the Sages. And for this reason the fetus is pure through the slaughter of its mother if it dies afterward. Indeed, although the slaughter of its mother is effective for its purification—a matter that teaches that the fetus is part of her—there is still a possibility, even according to the Sages, of slaughtering it by itself, as stated, and permitting it for eating.

And for this reason there is no difficulty with the words of Rav Hisda.

When he went up,

when

Rabbi Zeira

went up from Babylonia to the Land of Israel,

he found

he found

Rav Asi

Rabbi Zeira,

sitting

and

saying this teaching to him,

this statement that we learned, that there is slaughter for a ben pekua even according to the Sages, since the Torah rendered four signs of slaughter valid in it.

Rav Asi said to him:

“Well done!”

Excellent!

This teaching is correct and fine.

And Rabbi Yohanan likewise said,

Excellent!

And the Gemara discusses: Is it to be inferred

from this

that Rabbi Yohanan said concerning this law that it is correct, that

he disagrees with him

and

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish

disagrees with this, and he holds that it is impossible to slaughter and permit a ben pekua of a tereifa for eating?

And the Gemara rejects this:

He had been delaying for him.

It was the practice of Resh Lakish that when Rabbi Yohanan would state a teaching with which Resh Lakish did not agree, he would wait an hour or two before disagreeing with Rabbi Yohanan, lest he retract it on his own.

And

since he delayed,

he kept silent to him

and Resh Lakish did not hurry to disagree with him. During this delay Rav Asi left, and he did not manage to hear whether Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish in fact disagreed in this matter or not.

And some say

that some say that the reason Resh Lakish kept silent in this matter was because

he was drinking

water,

and

therefore

he kept silent to him,

he was silent because of his drinking and he did not answer Rabbi Yohanan’s words. And because of this Rav Asi left the beit-midrash and did not manage to hear Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish.

We learned in our Mishna:

“Rabbi Shimon Shezori says: Even

a five-year-old that plows in the field, the slaughter of its mother purifies it.”

The Gemara asks: Surely the words of Rabbi Shimon Shezori

are

the words of

the first tanna!?

That is, the Sages in the Mishna who disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that even a living nine-month fetus is purified by the slaughter of its mother. And what does Rabbi Shimon Shezori add to their words?

Rav Kahana said: A fetus that emerged and

placed its feet

placed its feet

stood on its hooves

on the ground—there is the difference between them.

This is the distinction between the method of the Sages and that of Rabbi Shimon Shezori.

For according to the Sages, the fetus has permission only while it is in the womb of its mother. But if it stood on its feet, it requires slaughter. [And this slaughter is rabbinic,

so that people will not come to exchange it with an ordinary animal that is obligated in slaughter ].

But according to Rabbi Shimon Shezori, in every situation a ben pekua is exempt from slaughter. And so are his words in the Mishna: “Even a five-year-old that plows in the field, the slaughter of its mother purifies it.”

Rav Mesharshiya said: According to the one who says

[Hanania, below 78b],

we are concerned for the father’s seed,

that the offspring of an animal and a wild creature is related to its father,

a ben pekua that mates with an ordinary animal,

an ordinary animal that is obligated in slaughter,

the offspring

born from the two of them

has no remedy.

For we judge it as though it has only one sign fit for slaughter. For from its father’s side it is considered slaughtered, and only from its mother’s side is it fit for slaughter. And the Torah permitted an animal for eating only through the slaughter of two signs! And although apparently, if we combine these two signs—the sign that comes to it from its father, which is judged as slaughtered, and the sign from its mother, which is obligated in slaughter—then when he slaughters the second sign, its two signs are found to be slaughtered [both the sign from its father, which is judged slaughtered from the moment the ben pekua was born, and this sign that is now slaughtered], this combination is not effective. For there was a very long delay between the slaughter of the two signs. For if we rely on the effect of slaughter that exists in the sign that comes to it from its father, which is considered slaughtered from the time of its father’s conception, and combine this with the slaughter now, there is no delay greater than this in the interval between the slaughter of the two signs!

And according to Rav Mesharshiya, the Torah did not render four signs valid in this fetus, as the conclusion of the amoraim above on page 74a. And since the father’s sign of the ben pekua is already judged as slaughtered, slaughter is no longer effective in it.

Abaye said: Everyone,

even the first tanna [the Sages in our Mishna] who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon Shezori and holds that a ben pekua that placed its feet and stood on the ground becomes obligated in slaughter because of appearance to the eye,

agrees in

the case of a fetus

with cloven hooves

[whose hooves are closed and whole and are not split like those of other pure animals], that it is

a ben pekua—

which is permitted

through the slaughter of its mother.

What is the reason? Every strange matter

, every strange and rare thing, such as this fetus with closed hooves that was formed by an animal whose hooves are split,

people remember it well

, people pay attention to it and remember how it was formed that it is a ben pekua, and consequently it is possible to permit it even without slaughter, and there is no concern that they might err and come to permit even an ordinary animal.

Some say: Abaye said, everyone agrees regarding

a fetus

with closed hooves, the offspring of

an animal

with closed hooves,

and this closed-hoofed creature discussed here is

a ben pekua,

whose mother was opened through slaughter, and this fetus was found within her,

so that it is permitted

the fetus even without slaughter.

What is the reason? Two strange matters,

two astonishing [rare] things: this fetus is a pure fetus, yet in any event it has a sign of impurity; and likewise its mother, who is also closed-hoofed. Only a combination of two such strange matters

people remember well

—people remember them.

Ze'iri said that Rabbi Hanina said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri,

for even a fetus that stood upon the ground is permitted through the slaughter of its mother and does not require slaughter for itself.

And so Rabbi Shimon Shezuri would permit his offspring

of a ben ha-pekua,

and

likewise his

offspring's offspring, until the end of all generations,

and all of them are permitted even without slaughter.

Rabbi Yohanan said: It

the ben ha-pekua

is permitted, but its offspring is forbidden!

Ada bar Havah had a

ben ha-pekua upon which a bear fell,

a wolf,

upon it,

and its status is that of a tereifa, like the status of an animal mauled by a predatory animal.

He came before

before

Rav Ashi, who said to him,

Rav Ashi,

go

you

slaughter it

and slaughter it! And this is in accordance with the view of the Sages who maintain that once it has placed its feet and stood upon the ground, it must be slaughtered.

He said to him,

Ada bar Havah,

“But Ze'iri said that Rabbi Hanina said —

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri.”

And as he brings in his name,

“And so Rabbi Shimon Shezuri would permit his offspring and his offspring's offspring —

until the end of all generations!”

“And even Rabbi Yohanan did not say

to permit it until the end of all generations,

but

only with

his offspring. But he,

the ben ha-pekua itself,

did not say to him

that it requires slaughter at all, even if it placed its feet and stood upon the ground?!

He said to him,

Rav Ashi:

Rabbi Yohanan

himself maintains that the halakha is in accordance with the Sages. And once it has placed its feet upon the ground, it is obligated in slaughter by rabbinic law.

And as for what Rabbi Yohanan said here, that it itself is permitted but not its offspring, it can be reconciled by saying that Rabbi Yohanan said these words only

in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri.

But he indeed maintains that the halakha is in accordance with the Sages, and if it has placed its feet upon the ground, it is obligated in slaughter.

Ada bar Havah challenged him:

“But Rabin bar Hanina said that Ulla said that Rabbi Hanina said —

‘The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri! And furthermore, wherever Rabbi Shimon Shezuri taught [a ruling] in our Mishna —

the halakha is in accordance with him!’

And how is it possible to say that Rabbi Yohanan rules in accordance with the Sages and not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri?

He said to him,

Rav Ashi:

“I,

for my part,

maintain as follows,

I hold the following position:

For Rabbi Yonatan said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in the case of a “dangerously ill person” and in the case of “the tithe-offering of demai,”

[below the Gemara will explain what these laws are], but with regard to other matters, it is not established that the halakha is in accordance with him.

And the Gemara explains:

“Dangerously ill person”

what is it? —

As we learned: At first

in the beginning

they would say

that

one who goes out

to be executed

in fetters, and says, ‘Write a bill of divorce for my wife,’ these

who hear him

shall write

a bill of divorce

and give it

to his wife. And although he commanded only concerning the writing and did not appoint them agents for the giving, we assess his intention as having intended also to appoint them agents for the giving. And the reason he did not say this explicitly was that he was distraught over his life, since he was going out to be executed.

They returned

a second time

to say

that

even one who sets sail,

one who goes out to sea,

and

likewise

one who goes out with a caravan,

who says, ‘Write a bill of divorce for my wife,’ they do so and give it to her. For these, too, are preoccupied, and because of their preoccupation they did not command concerning the giving.

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even

the

dangerously ill

person who commanded concerning the writing, they do as he said and give it to her.

This is what was brought above in the name of Rabbi Yonatan, that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in the case of a “dangerously ill person.”

The Gemara continues and explains:

“The tithe-offering of demai,”

what is it?

As we learned: The tithe-offering of demai

that is, one tithed it from demai [produce purchased from an ignoramus suspected concerning tithes, and it is uncertain whether it was tithed or not],

if it happened

that it returned

the tithe-offering

to its place,

and it became mixed with the tithed produce that had already emerged from the status of demai, and if so, before us is a mixture of non-sacred produce with a tithe-offering [and a tithe-offering is not nullified by an ordinary majority, but only by a majority containing one hundred times as much as it. Here, however, there is no majority of one hundred against the offering, and the offering is not nullified in it. Therefore, it is a great loss to forbid the entire mixture because of this offering that became mixed into it].

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says:

The status of this mixture is that

even on a weekday

[and not only on Shabbat, when one may be lenient on account of the honor of Shabbat and rely on an ignoramus if he says that he indeed tithed this produce ]

one asks

the ignoramus about this produce that was received from him, whether he tithed it, and if he says to him that he tithed it, he relies upon him,

and eats it,

this mixture

on his word.

Because it is a great loss. For this produce has no other remedy, since it will not help if he tithes it a second time, as the concern applies to each and every fruit, lest it be from the previous tithe-offering. And since the produce has no remedy, it is permitted both on Shabbat and on a weekday on the basis of the question asked of the ignoramus!