Chullin 75a (עה.) — the Talmud in English

And Reish Lakish answers: This statement, that he passed through the river, is referring to a case in which the ben pekua emerged

through a dry slaughter.

Through a dry slaughter, in which there was no discharge of blood. Therefore, neither the mother nor the fetus was rendered fit to contract ritual impurity.

And this is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

who was cited above and maintains that slaughter renders an item fit to contract impurity, and not the blood.

And the Gemara asks:

Who is the tanna,

who taught the beraita stating that if

the fetus passed

through the river,

it was rendered fit

to contract impurity, and if it

went to the cemetery—it

became impure,

meaning that the fetus contracted the impurity of food even though it is alive and apparently is not literally “food”?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili!

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili:

A ben pekua, even when alive,

contracts the impurity of food and requires preparation

by a liquid in order to contract impurity. This indicates that the fetus and the mother are two separate bodies, and the fetus is not rendered fit to contract impurity through the blood of its mother’s slaughter.

And the Sages say: It does not contract the impurity of food, because it is alive. And anything that is alive—

does not contract the impurity of food.

Rabbi Yoḥanan thereby teaches that although, according to the Sages in our Mishna, a nine-month-old living fetus is permitted for consumption, nevertheless, according to their view it does not contract the impurity of food; this applies only according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

For the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Yosei here, even if they agree with the Sages in our Mishna that the fetus is permitted for consumption, nevertheless it neither contracts impurity nor renders others impure, because living creatures do not contract impurity while alive.

And

with regard to this matter,

Rabbi Yoḥanan follows

the same approach as

Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his own reasoning

[and below we will explain in what way Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his own reasoning].

For Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Beit Shammai—

stated the same position:

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, this is what we said,

what we have just learned: that a ben pekua contracts the impurity of food.

And

Beit Shammai

stated this in the following Mishna:

As we learned

in tractate Uktzin:

Fish

that were removed from the water,

from when

do they

contract impurity

[the impurity of food, if they came into contact with an impure object], since while they are alive in the water they do not contract impurity?

Beit Shammai

say:

Once they have been caught

from the water, they immediately contract impurity even though they are still alive. Since they do not require slaughter, they are considered dead as soon as they are caught.

And Beit Hillel say: Once they die. Rabbi Akiva says: From the time that they are no longer

the fish

able to live

outside the water.

The Gemara asks:

What is the difference between them,

between the view of Beit Hillel and that of Rabbi Akiva, since, ostensibly, both maintain that the fish are fit to contract impurity from the moment they cease living?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The jumping fish,

the one fluttering between life and death, for example, when the area between its fins is completely dry as a rock, and in such a case it is no longer considered alive,

is the difference between them,

between Beit Hillel and Rabbi Akiva. According to Beit Hillel, it is considered alive, since it has not yet died completely. According to Rabbi Akiva, it is considered dead, because once it has dried out, it will no longer live.

With regard to this matter, the Gemara says that Rabbi Yoḥanan, who maintains that the view of Beit Shammai accords with that of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, follows his own reasoning. As explained above, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili agrees with the Sages in our Mishna. That is, according to him, the reason the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili maintain that a ben pekua does not contract the impurity of food is not that they hold that a nine-month-old ben pekua is forbidden for consumption without slaughter, in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s position in the Mishna. For if that were so, they would not disagree with regard to fish, which are certainly permitted for consumption, and Beit Shammai could likewise have agreed with them in that case. Rather, the reason for the Sages’ position is that living creatures do not contract impurity. Therefore, Beit Shammai cannot agree with them, but must agree with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

Rav Ḥisda inquired:

According to Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that from the moment a fish is on the verge of dying it contracts impurity, is it the case that when

signs of tereifa develop in fish,

such as when their intestines are perforated or one of the other eighteen conditions of tereifa occurs, and they will certainly die,

what is the halakha?

Do they contract impurity from the moment they become tereifa?

This uncertainty,

you must inquire about it

and clarify it

according to the one who says, ‘A tereifa can live,’

that there is no certainty that a tereifa will die,

and

likewise

you must inquire

about this uncertainty

according to the one who says, ‘A tereifa cannot live,’

but certainly dies once it becomes tereifa.

And the Gemara explains the uncertainty: This uncertainty,

you must inquire about it

and clarify it

according to the one who says, ‘A tereifa can live,’

because only

with regard to an animal

can one say that although it has become tereifa, it can continue to live, since

its vitality is greater—

its life force is more substantial, and it can endure for a long time until the defect constituting the tereifa affects it and ends its life. Therefore, with regard to an animal, it is said that a tereifa can live.

But with regard to fish, whose vitality is not great,

and they die immediately once the tereifa develops in them,

we do not

say of them that “a tereifa can live.” Therefore, they contract impurity from the moment the condition of tereifa develops in them.

Or perhaps, even according to the one who says that a tereifa cannot live,

this uncertainty should still be raised, because

this statement applies only to an animal, since its species is subject to slaughter;

therefore, it has the law of tereifot that disqualify an animal from slaughter, and for that reason we say of it, “A tereifa cannot live”: since it is unfit for slaughter, it is considered dead.

But with regard to fish, since their species is not subject to slaughter, no!

For fish are eaten without slaughter; consequently, becoming tereifa has no significance with regard to permitting them for consumption. They are not considered dead as a result, and therefore they do not contract impurity on account of their tereifa status.

And we conclude:

Teyku!

The Gemara now cites a dispute concerning the status of the fat of a stillborn animal: does the prohibition against forbidden fat apply to it?

An animal that

gave birth to

a stillborn offspring

—a nefel.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Its fat

the fat of the stillborn offspring

is like the fat of an animal,

and one who eats it is liable to receive karet.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Its fat

the fat of the stillborn offspring

is like the fat of a wild animal,

which is permitted for consumption, because the prohibition against the fat of an animal does not apply to a nefel; it is subject only to the prohibition against eating an animal carcass.

And the Gemara explains their positions:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Its fat is like the fat of an animal,

because in his view

the air—

the very fact that it emerges and is born into the air of the world [since it “falls” from the womb]—

causes

it to be considered an animal with regard to all its laws. Once it is born as an animal, the law governing its fat is therefore the same as that governing the fat of an animal, which is forbidden for consumption.

Whereas

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Its fat is like the fat of a wild animal,

because in his view

the completed months are what cause the status to take effect.

That is, in order to be considered an animal with regard to all the laws of an animal, two things are required:

a. That the count of its months be completed and it thereby emerge from the category of a stillborn offspring; b. that it emerge into the air of the world.

This nefel, although it emerged into the air of the world, nevertheless did not complete its months and is not considered an “animal” with regard to all its laws.

There are those who say:

This is another formulation of the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish:

Whenever its months have not been completed,

according to everyone,

it is nothing,

and its fat is permitted for consumption.

They disagree only where one extended his hand into the animal’s womb and tore

from within it

the fat of

a

nine-month

live fetus

and ate it.

Rabbi Yohanan said: Its fat

—the fat of this fetus—

is like the fat of an animal,

because

the months are the determining factor.

The months of gestation that have been completed are what cause it to be considered an animal.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Its fat

—the fat of this fetus—

is like the fat of a wild animal,

because in his view two factors are required for it to be considered an animal:

the months and the air,

these two are

the determining factors

that cause it to be considered an animal. As long as its formation does not include both of these factors, its fat is not considered animal fat. However, if one slaughtered the mother of this fetus, according to Rabbi Yehuda the fat is permitted by virtue of “all that is in the animal you may eat.”

He raised an objection

Rabbi Yohanan

to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish

from what we learned in the Sifra: With regard to the offering of a shelamim offering, it is stated: “And he shall present from the slaughter of the shelamim offering a fire-offering to the Lord: the fat that covers the innards, and all the fat that is on the innards” [Leviticus 3:3].

This verse is understood as excluding the requirement to offer anything other than the fat that covers the innards, and not the fat of the shilil, the fetus in the womb of the shelamim animal.

One might exclude from this verse the warning and punishment for eating the fat of a fetus, while the one offering the sacrifice would nevertheless still be obligated to offer this fat together with the fat of the sacrifice.

Therefore, the verse says with regard to an asham offering: “The fat and the two kidneys,” which are offered upon the altar.

These words are superfluous, since this matter can be derived by a kal va-chomer from a shelamim offering, in which the fat and the kidneys are offered. For with regard to a shelamim offering, from not all of its species is the tail offered—for shelamim offerings may come from cattle and goats, which do not have an alya—yet the fat and the two kidneys are nevertheless offered from them. An asham offering, from every species from which it may come, has the alya offered—for it comes only from sheep—then all the more so the fat and the two kidneys should be offered from it!

If so, why is “the fat and the two kidneys” stated with regard to an asham offering? It is to tell you:

Just as the fat and the two kidneys stated in

the

asham offering are excluded

from the category of what is offered

from a fetus,

so that the fat and kidneys of the fetus within it are not offered—for an asham offering does not come from females, and therefore a fetus cannot be present in an asham offering—

so too every

sacrifice that comes from females,

is excluded from

the category of what is offered, the fat of the

fetus

within it.

After this beraita from the Sifra was taught, Rabbi Yohanan challenges the position of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish:

Granted, according to me,

according to my view, that one is liable to karet for the fat of a nine-month fetus in its mother’s womb, since the status of an animal applies to it and its fat is forbidden like animal fat,

this is why it was necessary

for this reason it was necessary

for the verse to exclude it,

to exclude it from being offered and to teach that its fat is not offered even though it is fully animal fat.

But according to you,

according to your view, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, that you maintain that one is not liable for the fat of a nine-month fetus that has not yet emerged from its mother’s womb, since in your view the fetus must complete nine months and also emerge into the air of the world, and otherwise it is not called an animal and one is not liable for its fat as for animal fat,

why was it necessary

why do we need these verses to teach that the fat of a fetus is not offered? After all, according to you, since it is not included in the category of animal fat, it is obvious that it is not offered?!

He said to him,

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: Indeed,

the reason for my position

the reason for my statement that the fat of a fetus is not included in the category of animal fat

also

is

from here.

It is derived from the exposition of these verses, which indicates that the fat of a fetus is not considered animal fat. Indeed, this is the source of my statement.

And there are those who say:

Some transmit the discussion in the opposite manner, with Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish challenging Rabbi Yohanan as follows:

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yohanan:

We learned in the Sifra—the beraita cited above, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s proof is from the continuation of the words of the Sifra cited above:

Just as the fat and the two kidneys stated

with regard to being offered

in

an

asham offering are excluded from

being offered—the fat and kidneys of a

fetus

within it—

so

in

every

offering of the fat and kidneys of sacrifices,

is excluded from

being offered the fat and kidneys of a

fetus.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish now challenges Rabbi Yohanan:

Granted, according to me,

according to my view, that the fat of a fetus found in its mother’s womb is not considered animal fat,

for this reason the Merciful One excluded it.

For this reason the Torah excludes their being offered from the category of offering the fat of sacrifices.

But according to you,

according to your view, Rabbi Yohanan, that the fat of a fetus whose nine months have been completed is animal fat,

should it be offered!?

It should be offered, since it is no different from other animal fat?!

He said to him: It is analogous to an animal that lacks time.

That is, it is like a young animal that was born and emerged into the air of the world. Although it is certainly a fully formed animal, nevertheless the Torah disqualified it from being offered during all of its first seven days. It is called meḥusar zeman, “lacking time,” because it lacks the period of one week required for it to become fit for offering; only after it is eight days old is it fit to be offered.

If so, an unborn fetus should at the very least have the same status as a young animal that was born but has not yet completed its required seven-day period: it is not fit to be offered.

Rabbi Ami said: One who slaughters a tereifa and finds within it

a

live nine-month fetus

has the following law:

According to

Rabbi Meir,

who forbids

a ben pekua [a nine-month fetus] of a kosher animal, as he maintains that it is permitted only through its own slaughter, since it is no longer considered part of its mother, when this fetus is found within a tereifa,

it permits

the fetus through its own slaughter. It is not treated as part of its tereifa mother.

But

according to

Rabbi Yehuda,

who permits

a nine-month fetus through the slaughter of its mother, he

forbids

a nine-month fetus of a tereifa. Since the permission of a ben pekua found in the womb of a kosher animal is based on its being considered part of its mother’s body, when its mother is a tereifa, it is considered part of her and has no permission to be eaten through slaughter. Nor does it have its own slaughter, since it is a ben pekua, and its identifying signs are treated as already slaughtered, so slaughter does not benefit them.

Rava said: According to the one who permits

a live nine-month fetus of a kosher animal, he maintains that

also

here, in the case of a tereifa, the nine-month fetus is

permitted,

because

“the Merciful One rendered four identifying signs fit in it” [

the Torah rendered them fit in it].

That is, the law that a fetus is permitted through its mother’s slaughter does not preclude the possibility of slaughtering the fetus itself when this is necessary. Rather, the Torah permitted it through the slaughter of its mother. But when its mother’s slaughter does not contribute to permitting it for consumption because she is a tereifa, it may be slaughtered independently, because it has four slaughtering signs, as stated: the two signs of its mother—namely, the windpipe and the esophagus—through which it could be permitted by her slaughter, and its own two signs, through whose slaughter it is permitted when it cannot be permitted through its mother’s signs. Here, in the case of a ben pekua of a tereifa, since its mother’s slaughter does not permit it, it is slaughtered through its own signs.

Rav Ḥisda said: One who slaughters a tereifa and finds within it a live nine-month fetus—