Chullin 74b (עד:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even if

the fetus that emerged from its slaughtered mother grew, and it is

five years old and plows in the field—

the slaughter of its mother renders it ritually pure,

and it nevertheless retains this permitted status.

And likewise, if

one tore open

the animal without slaughtering it,

and found in it

a fetus

of nine

months while it was

alive,

it

requires slaughter

for itself,

because its mother was not slaughtered.

And if so, there is no basis upon which to permit it.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna the ruling that a fetus found in the womb of its slaughtered mother is permitted even without slaughter, since it is treated as part of its mother.

Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said:

This fetus

was not treated,

no leniency was found concerning its status as a kosher animal,

except with regard to matters of slaughter alone:

only with regard to slaughter is it permitted without slaughter, by virtue of its mother’s slaughter. However, with regard to the other halakhot, it has the status of an ordinary animal.

The Gemara asks:

To exclude what?

That is, with regard to what other matters could one have been lenient in its case, apart from slaughter?

The Gemara explains:

To exclude its fat and its sciatic nerve.

Since it completed its gestation and emerged into the air of the world, its fat and its sciatic nerve are forbidden, as in the case of every animal.

The Gemara asks:

Its fat—whose?

Whose fat is forbidden?

If we say,

if it is stated that

the fat of the fetus

is forbidden, then in this matter

they explicitly disagree,

as they dispute it in the beraita below—

As it is taught:

The prohibition of

the sciatic nerve applies to a fetus,

an unborn animal,

and

also

its fat is forbidden; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The sciatic nerve

does not apply to a fetus, and

also

its fat is permitted.

And Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said: The dispute

between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the fetus and its fat applies only

to a live nine-month-old fetus. And

with regard to this ruling,

Rabbi Meir followed his own reasoning,

as he holds that a fetus that completed nine months of gestation has the status of an animal; therefore, its sciatic nerve and its fat are forbidden.

And Rabbi Yehuda,

who permits the sciatic nerve and the fat, likewise follows

his own reasoning,

which is the position of the Sages in our Mishna: A fetus is not considered an animal in its own right; rather, it is rendered permitted through the slaughter of its mother. The same applies with regard to its sciatic nerve and its fat: They are not forbidden, since the fetus itself is considered one of its mother’s limbs. Therefore, the sciatic nerve and the fat are not treated as the limbs of an independent animal.

And if so, it cannot be said that Rabbi Oshaya excludes the sciatic nerve and the fat, since Rabbi and the Rabbis disagree even in this matter [and Rabbi Yehuda follows the view of the Rabbis], whereas Rabbi Oshaya’s statement was made according to everyone. Once again, we must ask: What is the matter concerning which everyone agrees that the fetus is treated as an animal in every respect?

Rather, the fat attached to the sciatic nerve.

The fat embedded in the sciatic nerve, which everyone agrees is forbidden; with regard to this matter, the fetus has the status of an animal.

But the Gemara rejects this: Even in this matter

they explicitly disagree,

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda [the Rabbis].

As it is taught: The sciatic nerve,

when it is removed from the thigh [in the sciatic nerve of an ordinary animal, and not specifically in that of a fetus],

one searches

for it

everywhere it is,

so that no remnant of it remains,

and cuts

the

fat

attached to it

from its root,

from all its roots embedded and intermingled in the thigh around the place of the nerve;

this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says: One may cut it off

by cutting it

flush with the surface.

He cuts it in a straight line level with the thigh, and only the fat protruding onto the surface must be cut away because of appearances. But the roots of the fat, rooted deep within the flesh of the thigh, are permitted, and one need not search for them.

And if Rabbi Yehuda holds that the fat attached to the sciatic nerve of an ordinary animal is not forbidden, then certainly the same law applies to a fetus. If so, once again we must explain: What is the matter concerning which everyone agrees that the fetus is treated as an ordinary animal?

Rather,

certainly,

if it was stated,

if Rabbi Oshaya intended this in his statement,

this is what was stated,

this is what he intended. And this is his statement:

Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said: The Rabbis did not treat it

as permitted without slaughter

except with regard to matters of eating,

and the eating of its flesh, its fat, and its sciatic nerve was permitted.

And this dispensation comes

to exclude

the prohibition against a person

bestializing it, and

against

plowing with it

by yoking this ben pekua together with an ox and a donkey, in violation of the prohibition against mixed species. With regard to these prohibitions, everyone agrees that the fetus has the status of an animal in every respect. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: According to the one who permits

the eating of

its

fat,

the fetus,

he permits

also

the eating of

its

blood.

According to the one who forbids

the eating of its fat,

he forbids

also

the eating of

its

blood.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even according to the one who permits its fat, he forbids its blood.

He raised an objection to him,

Rabbi Yoḥanan

raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish

from what we learned in our Mishna:

One tears it open,

the fetus,

and removes its blood.

This statement of the Mishna concerns an eight-month-old fetus, whether alive or dead, with regard to which everyone agrees that its fat is permitted [their dispute concerns only the fat of a nine-month-old fetus]. It is therefore evident from our Mishna that even those who hold that the fetus’s fat is permitted nevertheless hold that its blood is forbidden, contrary to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish.

Rabbi Zeira said:

What Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said—that one who permits the fetus’s fat permits its blood—does not mean that he permits the blood for eating ab initio. Rather,

to say that

one who eats the blood of one whose fat is permitted

is not liable to receive karet.

This is unlike Rabbi Yoḥanan’s view. It follows that their dispute concerns only whether eating the blood of the fetus entails liability to receive karet, or whether it entails merely the prohibition against eating blood.

And the Gemara asks:

For whom was this stated?

For whose view were the words of Reish Lakish stated, that one who permits the forbidden fat permits the blood as well?

If this statement was said

in

the view of

Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, who are apparently the ones who permit eating the forbidden fat, it would be very difficult to say that Rabbi Yehuda holds that one who eats the blood of this fetus is exempt from karet, since even if we say that the reference is not specifically to the blood of the soul [that is, the first blood that spurts and flows immediately upon slaughter, which is certainly forbidden],

it

would nevertheless not be

the blood of the fetus

anything other than extract blood, the blood that drains from the animal’s body after the blood that spurts and flows, and emerges slowly, which is also forbidden.

As it was taught in a beraita: Extract blood

is

subject to a prohibition

punishable by lashes. This is because five prohibitions were stated concerning it,

but it is not subject to the punishment of karet, because with regard to blood for which one is liable to karet, it is stated [Leviticus 17:10–11]: “I will set My face against the soul who eats the blood, and I will cut it off from among its people. For the soul of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to atone.” The blood sprinkled upon the altar for atonement is only the blood of the soul. Therefore, the punishment of karet applies only to eating the blood of the soul.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

One is liable for it

to receive karet!

It is explicit that Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable to karet for eating any blood. Therefore, it is not possible to say that Rabbi Yehuda is the tanna who holds that where the forbidden fat is permitted, one is not liable to karet for the blood either. If so, who is the tanna who holds this?

Rav Yosef, son of Rav Sala Ḥasida, explained

and established the matter

before Rav Pappa

that the reason Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable even for eating extract blood is that

Rabbi Yehuda accepts

the exposition of

“blood” and “every blood.”

That is, the verse prohibiting the eating of blood states [Leviticus 7:27]: “You shall not eat any blood, in any of your settlements, whether of bird or of animal.”

It would have sufficed to write only, “You shall not eat blood.” Why, then, did the verse state, “any blood,” which is an expression of inclusion? Rabbi Yehuda therefore learns that it comes to include and teach:

Wherever one is liable

that is, wherever one is liable to karet

for

the blood of the soul,

one is liable

also

for

the

extract blood. [This is because “any blood” was juxtaposed with the blood of the soul mentioned in the verse, indicating that their laws are identical.]

But wherever one is not liable

to karet

for

the

blood of the soul,

for

example, in the case of a fetus, which does not contain the blood of the soul, since it is deemed slaughtered by virtue of its mother’s slaughter and is not considered to possess a “soul,”

one is not liable for

the

extract blood.

Now the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish—that one who permits the fetus’s forbidden fat permits its blood as well [meaning that there is no liability to karet]—are properly reconciled, and the tanna is Rabbi Yehuda. Although Rabbi Yehuda holds that one is liable to karet for extract blood, nevertheless, in the case of a fetus, where there is no liability to karet for the “blood of the soul,” since it does not possess a soul, there is likewise no liability to karet for its blood, which is extract blood.

They raised a dilemma: What is the law

as to whether it is possible

to redeem

a firstborn donkey

with

a lamb that is

a ben pekua

[a fetus removed from its slaughtered mother, meaning that its abdomen was opened], which has completed nine months of gestation?

The Gemara explains:

According to Rabbi Meir, you need not raise the dilemma

as there is no doubt in the matter.

Since he said

that Rabbi Meir holds that a nine-month fetus

requires slaughter, and this lamb is a nine-month fetus,

it follows that it

is a full-fledged lamb.

It may certainly be used for redemption.

The dilemma is raised for you

in the view of

the Rabbis, who say

that a nine-month fetus does not require slaughter for itself; rather,

its mother’s slaughter purifies it

and permits it to be eaten.

What is the law?

The two sides of the dilemma are as follows:

Since the Rabbis say

that

its mother’s slaughter purifies it,

and it is considered slaughtered and does not require slaughter for itself, its flesh

is like meat in a basket,

like slaughtered meat placed in a basket.

It

is therefore impossible to redeem with it.

Or perhaps, since it runs along, and runs to and fro,

running and going and coming—

we call it a “lamb,”

and one may redeem with it as with any lamb.

Mar Zutra said: One may not redeem

with a ben pekua lamb.

And Rav Ashi said: One may redeem

with it.

Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: What is your reasoning?

What is your basis for saying that one may not redeem with a nine-month fetal lamb? Your reasoning is that

you derive

this matter by a gezeira shava,

“lamb”—

“lamb” from the verses concerning the Paschal offering.

And in the case of the Paschal offering, a ben pekua fetus is unfit.

And if so, this too should be derived from there:

If so, just as there

with regard to the Paschal offering, the offering must be

a lamb,

a male,

unblemished, and in its first year, so too here,

with regard to redeeming a firstborn donkey, it must be

a male, unblemished, and in its first year?

Mar Zutra replied: It is stated [Exodus 13:13], “And every firstborn donkey

you shall redeem with a lamb.” And it is also stated [Exodus 34:20], “And the firstborn donkey

you shall redeem with a lamb.” Through the repetition of this matter,

the verse included

every lamb, even one that is not a year-old male and unblemished.

Still, this is difficult:

If we expound

“

you shall redeem, you shall redeem”

to include, meaning that it comes to include all these cases, then it should include

even every kind of thing as well,

and even a ben pekua that could be used to redeem a firstborn donkey?

The answer is: If we expound and include every lamb, even a ben pekua,

if so, what purpose does the exposition we derived from the scriptural decree

“lamb—

lamb”

from the Paschal offering serve you?

What benefit does it provide you?

What is it needed for?

Rather, it comes to teach you that a ben pekua may not be used for redemption. We therefore learn that the repetition “you shall redeem, you shall redeem” includes every kind of lamb, even one that is not a male, unblemished, and in its first year, whereas “lamb—lamb” limits this only to one that was born, excluding a ben pekua.

from the Paschal offering

provide you?

What would be its purpose?

Rather, it comes to teach you that a fetus found inside a slaughtered animal is not fit to be used for redemption. We therefore learn that the repetition “you shall redeem, you shall redeem” includes every type of lamb, including one that is not a male, unblemished, and one year old, whereas “lamb—lamb” limits this only to one that was born and excludes a fetus found inside a slaughtered animal.

They raised a dilemma:

If a slaughtered animal became impure with food impurity while a nine-month fetus was inside it before it was removed,

what is the law as to counting a first and a second degree of impurity in its case?

Do we consider the fetus an independent body, and since the mother is a first-degree source of impurity [because the mother herself came into contact with the source of impurity, such as an olive-bulk of an unslaughtered carcass, and is therefore a first degree of impurity and imparts food impurity], and the fetus inside her became impure through contact with its mother, do we consequently count it as “second-degree impurity”?

Or perhaps the fetus is considered part of the mother’s body, and therefore the fetus too is a first degree of impurity, since it is part of the mother and is judged like her?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

The fetus is an independent body, and

one counts a first and a second degree of impurity in its case.

That is, only its mother is a first degree of impurity, whereas the fetus is a second degree of impurity.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: One does not count a first and a second degree of impurity in its case,

because

the fetus is made

the fetus in its mother’s womb

like a nut rattling in its shell.

The nut and the shell that envelops and protects it are one, and the impurity of the nut and the shell is a single impurity. So too with a mother and her fetus: since the fetus is inside her, it is like a part of her and becomes impure with her impurity.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan

from what we learned in the Mishna above [73a]: If one slaughtered the mother and then cut off [the protruding limb of the fetus],

the flesh

[of the fetus] is impure

with the impurity of contact with an unslaughtered carcass, according to Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say:

It does not have the impurity of contact with an unslaughtered carcass; rather, its status is that of

contact with a slaughtered tereifa,

which imparts impurity only to consecrated items.

The impurity mentioned here [both with regard to the animal and with regard to the fetus inside it] is food impurity.

Food impurity applies only if the food has been “rendered fit” to receive impurity by coming into contact with one of the seven liquids, and blood is one of the seven liquids.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raises a difficulty:

Granted, according to me, when I say

that I [Reish Lakish] hold that the mother and the fetus

are one body, this is why it was rendered fit

the fetus was rendered fit to receive impurity

by the blood of its mother,

by the blood of its mother’s slaughter that washed over it. Since the fetus is included in its mother, it was rendered fit to receive impurity through the mother’s preparation.

But according to you,

according to your view, Rabbi Yoḥanan, that the fetus is considered an independent body and is not rendered fit through its mother’s preparation,

by what was it rendered fit,

by what was the fetus rendered fit to receive food impurity, by virtue of which it became impure through contact with the protruding limb?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The fetus was not rendered fit to receive impurity by being washed with liquids; rather, it was rendered fit

through slaughter,

through the act of slaughter itself.

And

our Mishna is

in accordance with

the opinion of

Rabbi Shimon,

who said [above, 33a] that slaughter is what renders an item fit to receive impurity, and not the blood of slaughter. That is, since the animal becomes permitted through slaughter, it is likewise rendered fit through it to receive impurity. And since the fetus is deemed slaughtered by virtue of its mother’s slaughter, it was rendered fit to receive impurity through her slaughter.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish

from what we learned: A nine-month ben pekua fetus that was found alive in the womb of its mother after she was slaughtered, and that grew and

crossed a river,

being washed by its waters,

was rendered fit

to receive impurity.

It went

afterward

to the cemetery—

it contracted impurity

the impurity of food from the impurity of the cemetery.

And from here Rabbi Yohanan raises an objection:

Granted, according to my view, which is that

I hold that the fetus and its mother

are two bodies,

they are two different bodies,

that is why it became susceptible, yes,

only if it was first rendered susceptible to impurity by the river water did it contract impurity from the impurity of the cemetery.

But if

it was not rendered susceptible

by the river water, it

does not

contract impurity.

But according to you,

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish,

who say

you hold that the mother and the fetus

are one body, then,

it had already

been rendered susceptible,

the fetus had been rendered susceptible to impurity

by its mother's blood,

by means of its mother's blood, which emerged during slaughter and washed over the slaughterhouse. Through this, the fetus too was rendered susceptible to impurity, since it is considered one body with its mother. If so, this susceptibility is sufficient for it; why is the river water needed?