Chullin 74a (עד.) — the Talmud in English

And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

There is no

prohibition of a limb from a living animal by Torah law with regard to these dangling limbs and flesh,

but only a mitzva of “separation.”

That is, the Sages instructed that one separate from the dangling limb and flesh, whereas the verse, “and flesh torn in the field,” is merely an asmachta. And it is proven that by Torah law the dangling limb does not become a limb from a living animal through slaughter, because slaughter does not cause a detached limb to be considered severed.

He sat,

that is,

Rav Yosef before

Rav Huna,

Rav Huna, and

thus

he sat and said: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: If one eats this

dangling limb,

he receives lashes.

One of the Sages said to him,

one of the scholars:

Do not listen to him,

do not heed this statement that he cites in the name of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav, because

this is what

he

said in the name

of

Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta in the name of Rav:

If one eats this

dangling limb, he

does not receive lashes.

For it is not intrinsically prohibited; there is only a mitzva of separation.

Rav Huna said to him: On which

of Rav’s positions

shall we rely?

On the view that one receives lashes for a dangling limb, or on the view that one does not receive lashes for it?

Rav Yosef turned his face away from him,

turning his face away from him angrily!

And

he said to him

Rav Yosef:

What difficulty is there?!

What contradiction is there between what that scholar cited in the name of Rav—that one does not receive lashes for a dangling limb—and what I cited in the name of Rav—that one does receive lashes? For

when I said

what I said in the name of Rav, it was only

in a case of death.

When the animal containing the dangling limb dies, only then does one receive lashes, because

death

the animal’s

causes a detached limb to be considered severed.

The limb is not impure, and its prohibition is not that of an animal carcass; rather, it has the status of a limb from a living animal. Rav teaches us that one who eats this limb is warned on account of the prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal, and not on account of the prohibition of an animal carcass.

But

when he said

what that scholar said, he was referring to

a case of slaughter.

For

slaughter, as stated,

does not cause a detached limb to be considered severed,

and the limb is pure and permitted by Torah law. The Sages prohibited it only on account of the mitzva of separation. There is no liability to lashes for this.

Rava said: From where

is the source for

this matter that the Sages stated

with regard to this law, that

death causes a detached limb to be considered severed,

and

slaughter does not cause a detached limb to be considered severed?

As it is written

with regard to the impurity of creeping animals (Leviticus 11:31–32): “These are the impure among you, among all the creeping animals. Whoever touches them when they are dead shall be impure until evening.

And everything upon which any of them falls when they are dead shall be impure.

From any wooden vessel, or garment, or hide.”

The word “when they are dead,”

what does it exclude?

If you say

that this word comes

to exclude

that creeping animals do not convey impurity

during their lifetimes,

but only after their death, this law

can be derived from

“everything upon which anything from

their carcass

falls shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:35).

It is derived from there that they convey impurity only after death. Why, then, did the verse repeat the phrase “when they are dead”?

from there that they impart impurity only after death. Why, then, did the verse repeat the words “when they are dead”?

Rather, conclude from here

that the verse “everything upon which they fall when they are dead” is to be understood as teaching that through death, the dangling limb attached to the animal becomes as though it had fallen off before death, and it is therefore a limb from a living animal, because

“death causes a detached limb to be considered severed.”

And

this matter applies only when the animal dies on its own. But

slaughter

the

does not cause a detached limb to be considered severed.

Therefore, a dangling limb of an animal that was slaughtered does not convey impurity.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: But the verse,

“upon which they fall when they are dead,”

is written with regard to creeping animals,

which are not subject to slaughter at all. How, then, can we derive from there the principle that death causes a detached limb to be considered severed with regard to an animal, as well as the principle that slaughter does not cause a detached limb to be considered severed?!

He said to him:

The word “when they are dead” was not stated in order to teach a law concerning the impurity of creeping animals, since we already know that the verse concerning creeping animals refers to after their death, as it was already written above, “their carcass.” Thus, it certainly refers to after death. Why, then, was “when they are dead” stated? The verse could have said, “and when anything falls.”

Rather, necessarily,

if it does not pertain to creeping animals, which are not subject to slaughter,

since slaughter is not applicable to them,

apply it to an animal,

and interpret this word with regard to an animal, whose slaughter does not cause a detached limb to be considered severed. Therefore, the verse states “when they are dead,” to exclude the possibility that slaughter causes a detached limb to be considered severed.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But it is still needed

to derive from the word “when they are dead,” stated with regard to creeping animals, that impurity from a creeping animal takes effect only when the condition of the creeping animal is

like

the time of

death.

At the time of death, a creeping animal is moist; therefore, only

moist creeping animals convey impurity,

whereas

dry ones do not convey impurity.

Let us derive this from “when they are dead,” and thus the word is not superfluous, so that we could derive from it the principle that “slaughter does not cause a detached limb to be considered severed.”

The Gemara answers:

Two instances of “when they are dead” are written.

The phrase “when they are dead” appears twice. Therefore, from the verse “whoever touches them when they are dead shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:31), we derive that only moist ones convey impurity; and from the verse “upon which they fall when they are dead” (11:32), which would otherwise appear superfluous, we derive that death causes a detached limb to be considered severed, whereas slaughter does not cause a detached limb to be considered severed.

We learned in our Mishna that Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree regarding one who slaughtered the mother and afterward cut off the hand that had protruded outside. They disagree as to whether the slaughter purified the protruding limb from the impurity of an animal carcass: According to Rabbi Meir, the slaughter does not purify it, whereas according to the Sages, it does.

And concerning this,

Rav Ḥisda said: The dispute

applies only

to the limb of a live fetus,

which belongs to a species subject to slaughter. That is, since slaughter applies only to a live animal, and this fetus is also alive, the slaughter of the mother is effective in purifying its protruding limb, because slaughter applies to its species.

But with regard to the limb of a dead fetus

that protruded outside,

everyone agrees that slaughter causes a detached limb to be considered severed,

and it remains in its state of impurity as a limb from a living animal; it is considered as though it had been cut off while the fetus was alive, and the slaughter of its mother does not purify it from the impurity of an animal carcass. For slaughter does not apply to its species. Even the Sages agree that the slaughter does not purify it.

And Rabba said: Just as the dispute in this matter,

just as Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree concerning the impurity of the protruding limb of a live fetus, according to the Sages, who hold that it is pure,

so is the dispute in this matter;

with regard even to a dead fetus, the Sages hold that the limb is pure.

We learned in our Mishna:

A live fetus of eight months

that is, a nonviable fetus destined to die and prohibited for consumption as a tereifa—its slaughter does not purify it, since slaughter does not apply to its species.

And concerning the Mishna’s statement that slaughter does not apply to its species, the Gemara asks:

But it was taught

in the Sifra: A fetus

of eight months,

if it is born

alive

and is slaughtered,

proves that even though slaughter applies to its species—

its slaughter does not purify it.

Therefore, a tereifa too, although slaughter applies to its species, will not have its impurity purified by slaughter [these are the words of the Sifra].

It is evident from the words of this beraita that a live eight-month fetus is considered to belong to a species to which slaughter applies. Yet our Mishna states that a live eight-month fetus does not belong to a species to which slaughter applies, since it is of the species of nonviable fetuses, to which slaughter is not applicable?!

Rav Kahana said:

The words of the Sifra, which state that slaughter applies to its species, mean that

slaughter applies to its species by virtue of its mother.

When it is inside its mother’s womb, the mother’s slaughter is effective with regard to it. Therefore, it is considered as belonging to a species to which slaughter applies.

But

whereas

our tanna

disagrees with this reasoning—that permission granted to a fetus through its mother’s slaughter causes the fetus to be considered as belonging to a species to which slaughter applies—and holds that although the fetus is permitted through its mother’s slaughter, nevertheless, since this is not slaughter performed on its own body, this permission does not cause it to be considered as belonging to a species to which slaughter applies. Therefore,

as for the species of its mother, he does not raise the difficulty.

One cannot raise a difficulty against the tanna of our Mishna from the words of the Sifra, which holds that the mother’s slaughter causes the fetus to be considered as belonging to a species to which slaughter applies.

The Gemara asks: Earlier, in the words of the Sifra, the proof from an eight-month fetus to a tereifa was cited: Just as the slaughter of an eight-month fetus does not purify it even though slaughter applies to its species, so too the slaughter of a tereifa should not purify it.

The Gemara considers:

And according to this tanna who raises the difficulty,

this tanna who derives a law concerning a tereifa from an eight-month fetus,

from where does he know that a tereifa, whose slaughter purifies it,

is indeed purified by slaughter? Why not derive the matter from a non-kosher animal, which is prohibited for consumption and whose slaughter does not purify it, and conclude that a tereifa too, which is prohibited for consumption, should not have its impurity purified by slaughter?

The Gemara explains:

He derives it

that a slaughtered tereifa is purified

from Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav.

For Rav Yehuda said that Rav said. And some say

that this matter

was taught in a baraita,

that is, it was stated in a baraita.

The verse states [

Leviticus 11:39]:

“And if an animal dies

that is yours to eat, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until evening.”

The wording “and if an animal dies” indicates that this law does not apply to every animal, but rather

some animals convey impurity

because of death,

and some animals do not convey impurity

because of it.

And which is that?

Which animal does not convey impurity upon its death?

This is a tereifa that was slaughtered.

Its carcass is pure, even though its slaughter was not effective in permitting it for consumption.

Rav Hoshaya raised a question: If he inserted

his

hand into the animal’s womb and slaughtered

inside it

a live fetus of nine months,

and after its slaughter it emerged from its mother’s womb while its mother was still alive,

what

would be the law as to whether it is rendered permitted by this slaughter? The Gemara adds: This uncertainty

must be raised

is one that must be considered

according to the

view of

Rabbi Meir,

who will say below that a live nine-month fetus in its mother’s womb has already completed its development and requires slaughter in its own right,

and

likewise

it must be raised according to the Rabbis,

who maintain that even in this case its mother’s slaughter renders it permitted.

The Gemara explains the uncertainty:

It must be raised according to Rabbi Meir,

because it is possible to say that

Rabbi Meir said only up to this point

that

a ben paku’a requires slaughter; this applies

only where slaughter is effective for it and renders it permitted,

where

that is,

it emerged into the air of the world. But

while it is

in its mother’s womb,

even if it is slaughtered in accordance with the law,

it is not permitted by it;

slaughter does not render it permitted

through slaughter.

Therefore, it is possible to say that according to Rabbi Meir, a nine-month fetus is not rendered permitted through slaughter.

And all the more so according to the Rabbis, who maintain that slaughter cannot apply to it at all, since a fetus can be permitted only through its mother’s slaughter. Even if it emerges alive after its mother’s slaughter, slaughter cannot apply to it, since it is regarded as already slaughtered. According to them, slaughter applies to a fetus only if it emerges from its mother’s womb while she is still alive. Only in that manner is slaughter effective for it.

However, on the other hand,

or perhaps

it is possible that

even according to the Rabbis,

who maintain that its mother’s slaughter renders it permitted, nevertheless they maintain that slaughter is effective even in the stated case. This is because, according to the Rabbis, all

four slaughtering סימנים

of slaughter [the two slaughtering סימנים of its mother and its own two slaughtering סימנים; according to the Sages, both its mother’s סימנים and its own סימנים render it permitted through slaughter]

the Torah rendered effective for it

if these סימנים were slaughtered. Any two סימנים, whether those of its mother or its own, render it permitted. If so, it is possible that even the Sages, who maintain that slaughter does not apply to it except together with its mother’s slaughter, would concede that in this case the slaughter renders it permitted.

Rav Hanania said

([he brings proof toward resolving the Gemara’s uncertainty]:

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

“If a tereifa was born from the womb,

and it never had a time when it was fit, how do we know that slaughter purifies it?” [These are the words of the Mishna].

The wording of the Mishna, “a tereifa was born from the womb,” implies even that it became a tereifa only one moment before it emerged from the womb; this too is included in the definition “it never had a time when it was fit.”

And if it is so,

if it were indeed possible to slaughter a fetus while it was in its mother’s womb, and it would be rendered permitted through this slaughter, then

you can find

a case

where it had a time when it was fit,

because

if he wished,

if he wanted, he could

insert his hand

into its womb

and slaughter

the fetus?!

Since this possibility is not proposed, it follows that the fetus’s being in its mother’s womb does not give it the status of one that had a time when it was fit, and it is proven that slaughter is not effective in this manner!

Rava said to him: Teach

the words of our Mishna as follows: “If a tereifa

was formed from the womb.”

That is, it was already a tereifa from the moment of its formation, and not that it became a tereifa later while still in its mother’s womb.

And you can find it in

an animal that was formed as

an animal with five legs.

An extra leg was formed between its hind legs, and we learned [above, 58a, and Bekhorot 40a–b] that “any excess is regarded as if removed”: Every superfluous limb is regarded as though it is missing from the animal, and it is a tereifa. If so, here is a possibility of an animal that was formed a tereifa from the womb, and this is the case to which our Mishna referred when it said that it never had a time when it was fit.

Accordingly, it is possible that if the fetus became a tereifa between the time of its formation and the time it emerged into the air of the world, this would be included among those that had a time when they were fit, and it would be possible to slaughter it inside its mother’s womb and render it permitted through this slaughter. It follows that our Mishna cannot prove either side of the above uncertainty as to whether it is effective to slaughter a fetus while it is still in its mother’s womb.

Mishna:

The source of the law of a ben paku’a is explained in the Gemara from the verse [Deuteronomy 14:6]: “And every animal that brings up its hoof ... among the animals, that you may eat.” The verse is expounded as follows: “An animal within an animal”—that you may eat it. That is, an animal found inside another animal [a fetus] is permitted for consumption as it is [while still in the womb] [excluding its blood, which is prohibited for consumption, as the Gemara will expound below].

The commentators discussed the nature of the ben paku’a’s permissibility: Did the Torah innovate that through the mother’s slaughter the fetus is also regarded as slaughtered, and this is the reason for its permissibility? Or is it a scriptural decree that although the mother’s slaughter does not take effect upon the fetus, it is nevertheless permitted by the scriptural decree, “Everything within an animal you may eat”? Since it is found inside the animal, it is permitted.

Below, in the note, we will present these alternatives, as well as the practical difference between them.

If one slaughters the animal and finds in it

a

live or dead

eight-month

fetus, or

if the fetus was

a dead nine-month fetus—

he tears it open

the fetus

and removes its blood [which is prohibited for consumption ],

and the fetus is permitted for consumption even without slaughter.

But if he

finds

inside the animal a

live nine-month fetus—

the fetus requires

slaughter,

and

if he slaughtered it and its mother on the same day, he is

liable for “it and its offspring

you shall not slaughter on the same day” [Leviticus 22:28],

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

His reason is that completion of the number of gestational months is what gives it the status of an animal in its own right. It is not included in “Everything within an animal you may eat,” and it requires slaughter in its own right.

And the Sages say: Its mother’s slaughter purifies it

and renders it permitted for consumption and it does not require slaughter in its own right. The Sages maintain that gestational months alone do not make it an animal in its own right; this occurs only together with birth. As long as the fetus has not been born, even if its nine months have been completed, it remains classified as a fetus and is rendered permitted together with its mother’s slaughter.