Chullin 74a — the Talmud in English

And Rabba bar bar Hana said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: ![](pamud.bmp "

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There is not in them in these dangling limbs and flesh the prohibition of a limb from a living creature by Torah law,

but only a mitzva of “separation.”

That is to say, the Sages commanded separation from dangling limbs and flesh,

whereas the verse, “and flesh in the field torn” is merely an asmachta. And it is proven that by Torah law the dangling limb does not become a limb from a living creature through slaughter, because slaughter does not cause detachment. He sat,

he sat,

Rav Yosef

before

before

Rav Huna, and

thus

he sat and said: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: If one ate this

dangling limb—

he is flogged.

One of the Sages said to him,

one of the Sages:

Do not listen to him,

do not listen to this matter that he cites in the name of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav, because

thus

so

Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in his name

in the name of

Rav:

If one ate this

dangling limb—

he is not flogged.

For there is no intrinsic prohibition in it, but only a mitzva of separation.

Rav Huna said to him: We, upon whom

upon which of Rav’s views

shall we rely?

Whether upon the view that one is flogged for a dangling limb, or upon the view that one is not flogged for it?

Rav Yosef turned his face away from him,

he turned his face away from him in anger!

And

he said to him

Rav Yosef:

What difficulty is there!?

What contradiction is there between what that Sage cited in the name of Rav—that one is not flogged for a dangling limb—and what I cited in the name of Rav—that one is flogged? For

when I said,

what I said in the name of Rav was only

in the case of death.

When the animal in which there is a dangling limb dies, only then is he flogged, because

death

death

causes detachment.

The limb is not impure, and its prohibition is not according to the law of a carcass, but according to the law of a limb from a living creature. Rav informs us that one who eats from this limb is warned on account of the prohibition of eating a limb from a living creature, and not on account of the prohibition of a carcass.

Whereas

when he said

what that Sage said, it was

in the case of slaughter.

For

slaughter, as stated,

does not cause detachment,

and the limb is pure and permitted by Torah law. The Sages prohibited it only on account of the mitzva of separation. There is no liability for flogging on its account.

Rava said: From where

what is the source of

this matter that the Sages said

for this law that the Sages said, that

death causes detachment,

and

slaughter does not cause detachment?

For it is written

with regard to the impurity of creeping creatures [Leviticus 11:31–32]: “These are the impure among you, among every creeping creature. Whoever touches them in their death shall be impure until evening.

And everything upon which some of them falls in their death shall be impure.

Of every wooden vessel or garment or skin.”

The word “in their death,”

to exclude what?

If you say,

if it is said that this word comes

to exclude

that creeping creatures do not convey impurity

during their lifetimes

but only in their deaths, this law is

derived from “

and everything upon which something from

their carcass

falls shall be impure” [ibid. 11:35].

It emerges

from there that they convey impurity only in their deaths. Why, then, did Scripture repeat and say “in their death”?

Rather, conclude from it

that this is how one must understand the words of Scripture, “everything upon which they fall in their death”: through death, the dangling limb attached to it is made as though it had fallen before the death, and it is a limb from a living creature, because

“death causes detachment.”

And

this matter applies only to the animal’s dying on its own. But

not

the

slaughter causes detachment.

Therefore a dangling limb of an animal that was slaughtered does not convey impurity.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: But this verse,

“they fall upon them in their death,”

is written with regard to creeping creatures,

which have no slaughter at all. How can we learn from there the law that “death causes detachment” with regard to an animal, and likewise the law that slaughter does not cause detachment?!

He said to him:

The word “in their death” was not stated to teach regarding the impurity of creeping creatures, since we already know that the verse speaking of creeping creatures refers to after their death, for above it was already written “in their carcass.” If so, it certainly speaks of after death. Why, then, was “in their death” stated, when it could have said “and when it falls,” and we would learn from it that death causes detachment?

Rather, necessarily,

if it does not concern creeping creatures, since they are not subject to slaughter,

for slaughter does not apply to them,

assign it to the matter of an animal,

learn this word with regard to an animal, that the slaughter of an animal does not cause detachment. Therefore “in their death” was written in the verse, to exclude that slaughter causes no detachment.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But it is still needed,

for we must still learn from the word “in their death,” which was said with regard to creeping creatures, that impurity of a creeping creature takes effect only when the condition of the creeping creature is

like

the time of

death: at the time of its death the creeping creature is moist, and therefore only

At the time of death, the creeping animal is moist; therefore, only creeping animals that are

moist ones convey impurity,

but

dry ones do not convey impurity.

We should learn this from “in their death,” and again this word is not superfluous, so that we could learn from it the law that “slaughter does not cause detachment”?

The Gemara answers:

Two “in their death” are written.

The word “in their death” was stated twice. Therefore, from the verse [ibid. 11:31], “whoever touches them in their death shall be impure,” we learn that specifically moist ones convey impurity; and from the verse [ibid. 11:32], “they fall upon them in their death,” which appears superfluous, we learn the law that death causes detachment and slaughter does not cause detachment.

We learned in our Mishna that Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagreed when one slaughtered the mother and afterward cut the hand that had protruded outside. They disagreed whether the slaughter purified the protruding limb from the impurity of a carcass: according to Rabbi Meir, slaughter does not purify it, while according to the Sages, it purifies it.

And concerning this,

Rav Hisda said: The disagreement

is only

with regard to the limb of a live fetus,

which has slaughter within its species. That is to say, since slaughter applies only to a living animal, and this fetus too is alive, the slaughter of the mother is effective with regard to it to purify the protruding limb, because slaughter applies within its species.

But with regard to the limb of a dead fetus

that protruded outside, the words of

everyone are: “slaughter causes detachment,”

and it remains in its impurity as a limb from a living creature, and we consider it as though it had been cut while alive; the slaughter of its mother is not effective to purify it from the impurity of a carcass, since slaughter does not apply within its species. And even the Sages agree that slaughter does not purify it.

And Rabba said: Just as the disagreement regarding this,

just as Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagreed regarding the impurity of the protruding limb of a live fetus, according to the Sages it being pure,

so is the disagreement regarding this,

also with regard to a dead fetus, the Sages hold that the limb is pure.

We learned in our Mishna:

A live eight-month fetus

that is, one that is a nonviable fetus and destined to die, and is forbidden for eating as a tereifa—its slaughter does not purify it, since slaughter does not apply within its species.

And regarding these words of the Mishna, that slaughter does not apply within its species, the Gemara raises a difficulty:

But it was taught

we learned in the Torat Kohanim: A fetus

of eight months,

if it was born

alive,

and was slaughtered,

proves that although slaughter applies within its species—

its slaughter does not purify it.

Therefore, a tereifa also, although slaughter applies within its species, its slaughter should not purify it [these are the words of the Torat Kohanim].

It is proven from these words of the beraita that a live eight-month fetus is considered one within whose species slaughter applies. Whereas in our Mishna it is stated that slaughter does not apply within the species of a live eight-month fetus, since it belongs to the species of nonviable fetuses, to which slaughter does not apply?!

Rav Kahana said:

The words of the Torat Kohanim that slaughter applies within its species mean that

slaughter applies within its species together with its mother.

When it is in its mother’s womb, the slaughter of the mother is effective with regard to it. For this reason it is considered one within whose species slaughter applies.

And

whereas

our tanna,

disagrees with this reasoning, that the permission of a fetus together with the slaughter of its mother renders the fetus like one within whose species slaughter applies. He holds that although the fetus is permitted through the slaughter of its mother, nevertheless, since this is not slaughter performed in its own body, this permission does not render it like one within whose species slaughter applies. For this reason,

from its mother’s species, he did not raise a difficulty.

It is not possible to raise a difficulty against the tanna in our Mishna from the words of the Torat Kohanim, which holds that the slaughter of the mother renders the fetus like one within whose species slaughter applies.

The Gemara asks: Above, in the words of the Torat Kohanim, the proof from an eight-month fetus to a tereifa was brought: just as in the case of an eight-month fetus slaughter does not purify it even though slaughter applies within its species, so too a tereifa should not be purified by slaughter.

The Gemara discusses:

And according to this tanna who raises the difficulty,

this tanna who raises a difficulty from an eight-month fetus to a tereifa,

from where does he know that a tereifa whose slaughter purifies it is purified by slaughter

that indeed slaughter purifies it? Why should he not prove from an impure animal, which is forbidden for eating and whose slaughter does not purify it, and if so, a tereifa, which is forbidden for eating, should likewise not be purified by its slaughter?

The Gemara explains:

He derives it

this purification of a slaughtered tereifa he learns

from Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav.

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav. And some say

that this matter

was taught in a baraita,

we learned it in a beraita.

The verse says

[Leviticus 11:39]

“And when there dies from the animal

that is yours for eating, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until evening.”

The wording “and when there dies from the animal” means that this law does not apply to every animal, but

some of an animal conveys impurity

on account of death,

and some of an animal does not convey impurity

on account of it.

And which is this?

What is the animal that does not convey impurity through its death?—

This is a tereifa that one slaughtered.

Its carcass is pure, although its slaughter was not effective to permit it for eating.

Rav Hoshaya raised a question: He extended

his

hand into the innards of an animal and slaughtered

within it

a living nine-month-old fetus,

and after its slaughter it emerged from its mother’s womb, while its mother was still alive,

what

is the law as to whether it is permitted through this slaughter? The Gemara adds: This uncertainty

you should raise

as a question

according to the

opinion of

Rabbi Meir,

who says below that a living nine-month-old fetus in its mother’s womb has already completed its development and requires slaughter for itself,

and

likewise

you should raise it according to the Rabbis,

who maintain that even in such a case its mother’s slaughter permits it.

And the Gemara explains the uncertainty:

You should raise it according to Rabbi Meir,

for it is possible to say that

Rabbi Meir said only this far

that

a ben paku'a requires slaughter; this applies

only where slaughter is effective for it and permits it,

where

when

it has emerged into the air of the world. But

while it is

in its mother’s womb,

even if it was slaughtered properly,

it is not permitted by it,

it is not permitted by

slaughter.

Therefore, it is possible to say that according to Rabbi Meir a nine-month-old fetus is not permitted by slaughter.

And all the more so according to the Rabbis, who maintain that slaughter cannot apply to it at all, since the fetus has no permission except through the slaughter of its mother; and even if it emerges alive after its mother’s slaughter, slaughter cannot apply to it, since it is considered as slaughtered. According to them, slaughter applies to the offspring only if it emerges from its mother’s womb while she is still alive. Only in this manner is slaughter effective for it.

However, on the other hand,

or perhaps

it is possible that

even according to the Rabbis

who maintain that its mother’s slaughter permits it, nevertheless they maintain that even in the stated case this slaughter is effective. For according to the Rabbis, all

four slaughtering signs

of slaughter [the two slaughtering signs of its mother and the two slaughtering signs of the fetus itself; for according to the Sages, both its mother’s signs and its own signs permit it through slaughter]

the Torah made valid for it

if these signs were slaughtered. And every two signs, whether its mother’s or its own, permit it. And if so, it is possible that even according to the Sages, who maintain that it has slaughter only together with its mother’s slaughter, they will concede that in this case the slaughter permits it.

Rav Hananya said [

he brings proof for resolving the Gemara’s uncertainty]:

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

“If a tereifa was born from the womb,”

which had no time when it was fit, from where do we know that slaughter purifies it? [These are the words of the Mishna.]

And the words of the Mishna, “a tereifa was born from the womb,” mean even that it became a tereifa only one moment before it emerged from the womb, and this too is included in the definition “which had no time when it was fit.”

And if it is so,

if it were indeed possible to slaughter a fetus while it was in its mother’s womb, and it would be permitted through this slaughter, then

you find it

in this manner

that it had a time when it was fit,

because

if he wished,

if he had wanted, he would

insert his hand,

insert his hand into its innards

and slaughter it

the fetus?!

And since this possibility is not proposed, it follows that the fetus’s being in its mother’s womb does not cause it to be considered as one that had a time when it was fit, and it is proven that there is no slaughter in such a case!

Rava said to him: Teach

the words of our Mishna as follows: “If a tereifa

was formed from the womb.”

That is, from the time of its formation it was already a tereifa, and not that it became a tereifa afterward while it was in its mother’s womb.

And you find it in

an animal that was formed as

one possessing five legs.

An extra leg was formed between its hind legs, and we learned [above, 58, and Bekhorot 40a–b] that “anything extra,” meaning every surplus limb, “is considered as though removed”; it is regarded as though it were lacking in the animal, and it is a tereifa. If so, before us is a possibility of an animal formed as a tereifa from the womb, and in such a case our Mishna spoke, that it never had a time when it was fit.

Accordingly, it is possible that if the fetus became a tereifa between the time of its formation and the time it emerged into the air of the world, this is included among those that had a time when they were fit, and it is possible to slaughter it in its mother’s womb and it will be permitted through this slaughter. It follows that no proof can be brought from our Mishna for either side of the above uncertainty, whether it is effective to slaughter a fetus while it is in its mother’s womb.

Mishna:

The source of the law of a ben paku'a is explained in the Gemara from the verse [Deuteronomy 14:6], “And every animal that parts the hoof … among the animals, that you may eat.” And they expound: “an animal within an animal”—that you may eat it. That is, an animal found inside an animal [a fetus] is permitted for eating as it is [while excluding its blood, which is prohibited for eating, as the Gemara expounds below].

Regarding the nature of the permission of a ben paku'a, the commentators discussed: Did the Torah innovate that through the slaughter of the mother the fetus too is considered slaughtered, and this is the reason for its permission? Or perhaps it is a scriptural decree that although the mother’s slaughter does not take effect upon the fetus, it is permitted by the scriptural decree “everything within an animal you may eat.” And since it is found inside the animal, it is permitted.

Below, in the note, we shall bring these positions, as well as the practical difference between them.

One who slaughters the animal and finds in it

a fetus

eight

months old, whether it is

alive or dead, or

the fetus was

nine months old and dead—

he tears it open

the fetus

and removes its blood [

which is prohibited for eating ], and the fetus is permitted for eating ] even without slaughter.

But if he

finds

within the animal a fetus

nine months old and alive—

the fetus requires

slaughter,

and

if he slaughtered it and its mother on the same day, he is

liable for “it and its offspring

you shall not slaughter on the same day” [Leviticus 22:28],

the words of Rabbi Meir.

His reason is that the completion of the number of the months of gestation is what gives it the designation of an “animal” in its own right, and it is not included in “everything within an animal you may eat”; it requires slaughter for itself.

And the Sages say: Its mother’s slaughter purifies it

permits it for eating and it does not require slaughter for itself. For the Sages maintain that the months of gestation alone do not make it an animal in its own right, except together with birth. And as long as the fetus has not been born, even though its nine months have been completed, it remains in the category of a “fetus” and is permitted together with its mother’s slaughter.