Chullin 69b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara answers: in order to permit the fetus inside it, an additional condition is necessary.

I require

that this fetus have

hooves

[for this is the meaning of the verse: “And every animal that parts the hoof, and is cloven-footed, and brings up the cud among the animals, that you may eat”].

And there is none.

A likeness of a dove has no hooves, and therefore it is forbidden, despite having been found inside the animal.

And the Gemara asks:

But

if so,

from now on

a

cloven-hoofed

[whose hooves are closed, like those of a camel] found

in the womb of a cow—should it be forbidden,

it should be forbidden, since it does not have hooves like those of a cow; yet we learned above [68b] that a fetus whose hooves are closed and which is found in the womb of a cow is permitted?!

And the Gemara answers:

This is the teaching of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, like

the students of

Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai,

who expounded as follows:

It is stated in the aforementioned verse: “That parts the

hoof

and is cloven-footed, with two hooves, etc.,

among the animals,

that

you may eat.”

We have here “hoof” and “hooves,” and the meaning is that when one of them, even a single hoof, is found in an animal, you may eat it.

And this is a “cloven-hoofed” one: its hoof is not split as it is in a cow [whose hoof is split and appears as two], but its hoof is one. And it is explicit in the verse that through this hoof it is permitted.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Actually, as you said at first,

that the principal teaching that a fetus is permitted through the slaughter of its mother is from the verse, “An animal within an animal you may eat.”

And what is difficult for you,

and what is difficult for you from what we learned,

one may not effect substitution

with fetuses—yet with regard to substitution too it is stated “animal”; why is a fetus not considered an animal with regard to the law of substitution, as it is here?

The answer is: indeed, a fetus is treated as an animal, and it is possible to learn from this that one may effect substitution with fetuses. And what we learned, that one may not effect substitution with fetuses—

whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi Shimon’s, who compares animal tithe to substitution

with regard to animals [on the basis of the verse that will be brought below], concerning several laws.

And as we learned in tractate Temura [10a]:

Rabbi Shimon said: Animal tithe was included within all the sacrificial offerings. And why was it singled out from the general category, so that Scripture specifically stated the law of substitution with regard to it, as it is said [Leviticus 27:32–33]: “And every tithe of cattle and flock, etc., and if he shall indeed substitute it, then both it and its substitute shall be holy”? In order to compare other offerings to it, and to teach from it the law of substitution with regard to all offerings similar to animal tithe:

Just as tithe is an offering of an individual, and substitution applies to it, so too the entire law of substitution applies only to an offering of an individual, and not to an offering of partners or of the community.

And likewise: just as tithe is sanctified for the altar [an offering brought upon the altar], and substitution applies to it, so too the entire law of substitution applies only to offerings sanctified for the altar, and not to property sanctified for Temple maintenance [which is used for the other needs of the Temple, and not specifically for the needs of the altar].

And according to Rabbi Shimon, we also have reason to say:

Just as tithe does not apply to limbs and fetuses

independently, but only to a whole animal, as it is written [in the aforementioned verse], “that which passes under the staff,” and only a whole animal passes under the staff,

so too substitution does not apply to limbs and fetuses,

but only to a whole animal.

And therefore we do not include a fetus with regard to substitution, even though “an animal within an animal” is stated concerning it. But with regard to permission to eat, we include it from “an animal within an animal,” to permit it through the slaughter of its mother.

And the Gemara explains:

And from where do you say this,

from where do we say that indeed the statement of the Mishna in Temura, “one may not effect substitution with limbs or fetuses, etc.,” is according to Rabbi Shimon?

For we learned

[Temura 10a] at the end of that same Mishna, in which the law that one may not effect substitution with limbs and fetuses is stated, the opinion of Rabbi Yosei is brought, who holds that substitution takes effect upon limbs:

Rabbi Yosei said:

Even though you hold that one may not effect substitution of fetuses with limbs,

but with consecrated animals

you certainly agree that

one who says, “The leg of this one is an olah offering”—

the sanctity spreads through the entire animal, and

all of it is an olah offering.

If so,

even when he says, “The leg of

this

animal

shall be a substitute

for this one,”

the substitution should take effect, and

all of it should be a substitute in its place!

And the Gemara proves that Rabbi Shimon is the one who holds that one may not effect substitution:

For

to whom is he replying,

who is the tanna to whom Rabbi Yosei says, “But with consecrated animals, one who says, ‘The leg of this animal is an olah offering’ [the sanctity spreads through the entire animal], and all of it is an olah offering”?

If you say

that Rabbi Yosei said this

to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda,

and they are the tannaim who hold that “one may not effect substitution of limbs with fetuses,” this is impossible. For

do they hold,

do they really hold

this opinion,

that when one consecrates the leg of an animal as an olah, the sanctity spreads through all of it!?

But it was taught,

we learned in a beraita:

One might

say that the law is that

one who says, “

Let

the leg of

this animal

be an olah offering,” should all of it be an olah offering?!

The verse states: “Everything that one gives of it to the Lord—

shall be holy.”

The verse teaches that if a person consecrates only one limb of an animal, “

of it,”

[such as a leg], only that limb which he consecrated shall be

holy, and not all of it

shall be

holy.

One might

say that the law is that

that animal shall go out

from the status of

ordinary

property by redeeming the leg that he consecrated?

The verse states: “It shall be

holy,”

it shall remain as it is,

that the leg shall remain in the sanctity of an offering which the consecrator applied to it.

How is this so?

What shall be done with the sanctity of the leg, for if the animal itself is not brought as an olah, it is impossible to offer its leg by itself?!

The animal shall be sold

by the person who consecrated its leg to another person

for the needs of olah offerings,

so that the purchaser, who buys it for the purpose of his vow or voluntary offering, will consecrate all of it as an olah and offer it.

And its money,

the money for the animal that the purchaser paid the seller, is

ordinary,

for it was not entirely holy, but only its leg,

except for the money of

that

limb in it,

which he consecrated,

the words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: From where is it derived with regard to one who says, “The leg of this one

shall be

an olah offering,”

that

all of it shall be an olah offering? The verse states: “It shall be

holy,” and from the word “shall be” they learn

to include all of it,

that all of it is holy, because the sanctity spread through the entire animal, and it is offered.

After the Gemara brings the words of the beraita, the Gemara returns to clarify who is the tanna who holds that one may not effect substitution of limbs with fetuses.

And the Gemara discusses:

To whom,

to whom did Rabbi Yosei reply in this way and prove that one may effect substitution of limbs with fetuses, from the fact that when one says, “The leg of this animal is an olah offering,” the law is that all of it is an olah offering?

If

he replied in this way

to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda,

do

they hold

do they hold

this opinion, that when one says, “The leg of this one is an olah offering,” the sanctity spreads through the entire animal? Yet we learned here that even in this they disagree and hold that the sanctity of that limb shall remain as it is. Therefore, it is impossible to prove from their view that, according to them, one may effect substitution of fetuses with limbs.

that when one says, “The leg of this animal is an elevation-offering,” the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal? Yet we learned here that they disagree even in this matter and maintain that the sanctity of that limb shall remain as it is. Therefore, it is impossible to prove from their position that one may substitute fetuses for limbs.

If so, the tanna who holds that one may effect substitution of fetuses with limbs is not Rabbi Meir or Rabbi Yehuda.

Rather, is it not

necessarily

to Rabbi Shimon

that Rabbi Yosei replied his words, since he agrees with Rabbi Yosei that when one consecrates the leg of an animal, the sanctity spreads through all of it, and Rabbi Yosei proves to him that according to his view one should say this even with regard to substitution, so that when one effects substitution of one limb, the substitution spreads through the entire animal.

And accordingly, the words of Rav Shimi bar Ashi above are resolved, for with regard to the law that we do not include fetuses from “an animal within an animal,” so that the fetus should be treated as the animal itself even with regard to substitution, Rabbi Shimon follows his own position, that he compares substitution to animal tithe.

And the Gemara rejects:

No.

There is no necessity to say that Rabbi Yosei stated his words to Rabbi Shimon. Rather, it is possible that the first tanna, who holds that one may not effect substitution with limbs and fetuses, is Rabbi Meir or Rabbi Yehuda.

And if so, Rabbi Yosei’s proof from one who consecrates the leg of an olah, that the sanctity spreads through all of it and all of it becomes an olah offering, and therefore the law should be the same with substitution, is not a proof according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. For they disagree even concerning the law of one who consecrates a limb of an olah.

If so, to whom were Rabbi Yosei’s words stated?

The Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yosei stated the reason of his own position.

His words were stated according to his own view. And he holds that since when one consecrates the leg of an animal it becomes entirely an olah, the same law applies when one effects substitution of an animal limb: it becomes entirely a substitute.

Mishna:

An animal

that is destined to give birth to its firstborn,

which is about to give birth to a firstborn,

having difficulty giving birth—

one may cut

it,

limb by limb,

from the limbs that emerge outside,

and throw them to the dogs.

Since most of the firstborn has not yet emerged, the sanctity of the firstborn has not taken effect upon it.

However, if

most of it emerged

at once, and then they cut it,

it must be buried.

Since most of it emerged, this emergence is considered a birth, and the sanctity of the firstborn has already taken effect upon it; therefore, it may not be thrown to the dogs.

And

in both of these cases, whether the fetus emerged with its limbs cut apart, or whether most of it emerged,

the mother is released

from

the firstborn status.

And the offspring that comes after it is no longer a firstborn, since it is not the one that opens the womb.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It was stated: One-third came out

of the firstborn fetus from the womb of its mother,

and sold it

its owner

to a gentile [

since the sanctity of the firstborn had not yet taken effect in it, for the majority of it had not yet come out],

and

after the sale

another third came back and came out,

and it was found that two-thirds, which are the majority of the fetus, were already outside and it was considered born. If so, what is its law?

Rav Huna said:

This firstborn

is sacred

and it is given to a kohen, and it is offered on the altar according to the law of a firstborn.

Rabba said: It is not sacred,

but it is non-sacred.

And the Gemara explains their reasoning:

Rav Huna said

the fetus

is sacred; he holds that

although the sanctity of the firstborn is dependent upon birth and the emergence of the majority of it, once the majority of it has already emerged and it is considered as born,

retroactively

it

is sacred.

And

if so, here, when he sold it to a gentile after one-third had emerged,

since

immediately afterward

the majority emerged for him,

came out

the majority,

the majority of the firstborn, and it was considered born,

the matter is revealed,

the matter becomes revealed

retroactively, that originally it was,

that from the beginning, even before the majority of it came out,

sacred

it was,

and what he sold

what he sold to the gentile

he sold nothing,

for the firstborn is not his, since it is sacred, and it must be given to a kohen.

Rabba said: It is not sacred; he holds, from this point forward

it

is sacred.

For the sanctity took effect only from the moment that the majority of it came out and it was considered born. If so, what

he sold,

that third which he sold to a gentile before the majority of the firstborn came out,

he properly sold,

the sale is valid, for at the time of the sale the sanctity had not yet taken effect, and it was in the domain of its owner.

And they followed their reasoning,

they follow in this dispute according to their opinions and approaches, for they had already disputed this reasoning concerning another matter:

For it was stated: One-third came out

of the fetus

through the side [

for example, by means of surgery through the side of the animal with a knife, or by means of cutting with a substance], and afterward the womb of the animal was opened,

and

the remaining

two-thirds

of the fetus

through

the

womb

came out, as in an ordinary birth.

Rav Huna said: It is not sacred

this fetus, and

Rabba said: It is sacred.

The Gemara explains their dispute:

Rav Huna said,

this fetus

is not sacred,

because

Rav Huna

follows

his reasoning, for he said, that a firstborn fetus emerging from the womb of its mother

a firstborn fetus that emerges from its mother’s womb

retroactively

it

is sacred. And

therefore,

the first majority [

the first majority of the fetus that emerges, on account of which the status of born takes effect upon the fetus]

is not in the womb,

it did not emerge from the womb, for the first third of the fetus came out through the side, and because of this it is not considered a “first issue of the womb.”

Rabba said

the fetus

is sacred

even though the first third came out through the side, because

Rabba

follows

his reasoning, for he said, from this point forward

it

is sacred.

And the majority,

the majority of the fetus,

through the womb came out

it came out [for after that third which came out through the side, another two-thirds came out through the womb]. Therefore, it does not matter that the first third came out first through the side, since at the time its sanctity took effect, which is from this point forward, the majority had already come out through the womb.

However, if so, it is necessary to understand why Rabba and Rav Huna needed to state their approaches both concerning the sale of one-third of the fetus to a gentile and concerning one-third emerging through the womb?

The Gemara explains:

And it is necessary,

it is necessary to state their approaches in both of these matters.

For if he had informed us

Rav Huna of his view only

in this,

concerning one who sells a firstborn to a gentile after one-third has emerged, we would say that only

in this did Rav Huna say that it is sacred retroactively, already from the time of its emergence from the womb,

that it becomes sacred retroactively, from the moment it emerged from the womb,

because

if we say that “it is sacred from this point forward,” this matter will lead him

to

treating it

leniently,

so that it will be exempt from the firstborn status.

But in that,

in the case before us, where one-third of the fetus emerged through the womb,

that

if we say concerning it that it is sacred from this point forward, this will be

stringent,

so that it will be obligated in the firstborn status,

say,

it is possible to say that

he concedes to him

Rav Huna

to Rabba

that it is indeed sacred from this point forward, and not retroactively.

And for this reason Rav Huna’s ruling was stated in both of these matters.