Chullin 69b (סט:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara answers: To permit the fetus inside it, an additional condition is necessary.

I require

that this fetus have

hooves [

as this is the meaning of the verse: “And every animal that has a split hoof, and its hoof is completely cloven, and brings up its cud among the animals, that you may eat.”].

But there are none.

A figure resembling a dove does not have hooves, and therefore it is forbidden, despite having been found inside the animal.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But

if so,

from now on,

a

cloven-hoofed fetus [

whose hooves are fused together like a camel’s] found

in the womb of a cow should be forbidden,

since it should be forbidden because it does not have hooves like those of a cow; yet we learned above [68b] that a fetus whose hooves are fused together and which is found in the womb of a cow is permitted?!

The Gemara answers:

This is the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, like

the students of

Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai,

who interpreted the verse as follows:

It is stated in the aforementioned verse: “That has a

hoof

and is completely cloven, with two hooves, etc.,

among the animals,

that

you may eat.”

We thus have “hoof” and “hooves,” and the meaning is that when one of them is found—even a single hoof—in an animal, you may eat it.

And this is the case of the cloven-hoofed fetus: Its hoof is not split as it is in a cow [whose hoof is split and appears as two], but its hoof is a single one. The verse explicitly indicates that by virtue of this hoof it is permitted.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Actually, it is as you initially said,

that the fundamental source for permitting a fetus through the slaughter of its mother is the verse, “An animal within an animal you may eat.”

And what is difficult for you,

namely, what troubles you from what we learned,

one may not effect substitution

with fetuses—for the word “animal” is also stated with regard to substitution; why, then, is a fetus not considered an animal with regard to the law of substitution as it is here?

The answer is: Indeed, a fetus is considered an animal, and it would be possible to infer from this that substitution may be effected with fetuses. But the teaching that one may not effect substitution with fetuses—

whose view is it? It is Rabbi Shimon’s, who likens animal tithe to substitution

with regard to several laws.

And as we learned in tractate Temura [10a]:

Rabbi Shimon said: Animal tithe was included within the category of all consecrated offerings. Why, then, was it singled out from the general category, in that the Torah specified the law of substitution specifically with regard to it, as it is stated [Leviticus 27:32–33]: “And every tithe of cattle and flock, etc., and if he shall indeed substitute it, then both it and its substitute shall be sacred”? In order to compare other offerings to it and derive from it the law of substitution with regard to all offerings resembling animal tithe:

Just as animal tithe is an offering of an individual, and substitution applies to it, so too the law of substitution applies only to an offering of an individual, and not to an offering of partners or of the public.

Likewise, just as animal tithe is kodshei mizbe’aḥ [an offering brought upon the altar], and substitution applies to it, so too the law of substitution applies only to kodshei mizbe’aḥ and not to kodshei bedek ha-bayit [offerings used for the other needs of the Temple, and not specifically for the needs of the altar].

And according to Rabbi Shimon, we can also say:

Just as animal tithe does not apply to limbs or fetuses

independently, but only to an entire animal, as it is written [in the aforementioned verse], “that passes under the rod”—and only an entire animal passes under the rod—

so too, substitution does not apply to limbs or fetuses,

but only to an entire animal.

Therefore, the fetus is not included with regard to substitution, despite the phrase “an animal within an animal.” However, with regard to permission to eat, the fetus is included by the phrase “an animal within an animal,” permitting it through the slaughter of its mother.

The Gemara explains:

And from where do you say this,

that the statement in the Mishna in Temura, “one may not effect substitution with limbs or fetuses, etc.,” is according to Rabbi Shimon?

As we learned [

Temura 10a] at the end of that same Mishna, in which the law that one may not effect substitution with limbs or fetuses is stated, the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that substitution takes effect upon limbs, is cited:

Rabbi Yosei said:

Although you maintain that one may not effect substitution with fetuses for limbs,

but with consecrated animals

you certainly concede that

one who says, “The leg of this animal is an olah offering,”

the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal, and

the entire animal is an olah offering.

If so,

even when he says, “The leg of

this

animal

shall be a substitute

for this one,”

the substitution should take effect, and

the entire animal should be a substitute for it!

The Gemara proves that it is Rabbi Shimon who holds that one may not effect substitution:

For

to whom is he responding,

namely, who is the tanna to whom Rabbi Yosei says: “But with consecrated animals, one who says, ‘The leg of this animal is an olah offering,’ [the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal,] and the entire animal is an olah offering”?

If you say

that Rabbi Yosei said this

to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda,

the tannaim who hold that “one may not effect substitution of limbs for fetuses,” this cannot be so. For

do they hold

that

this view,

that when one consecrates the leg of an animal as an olah, the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal?

But it was taught

in a beraita:

One might have thought

that the law is that

one who says, “

Let the

leg of

this animal

be an olah offering, the entire animal should be an olah offering?!

The verse states: “Whatever he gives of it to the Lord—

shall be sacred.”

The verse teaches that if a person consecrates only one limb of an animal, “

of it,” [

such as its leg], only that limb which he consecrated shall be

sacred, and not the entire animal

shall be

sacred.

One might have thought

that the law is that

the animal shall leave

for

non-sacred status

by redeeming the leg that he consecrated?

The verse states: “It shall be

sacred,”

it shall remain as it is,

meaning that the leg shall remain with the sanctity of an offering that the consecrator imposed upon it.

How, then?

What is to be done with the sanctity of the leg, given that if the animal itself is not brought as an olah, it is impossible to offer its leg by itself?!

The animal shall be sold

by the person who consecrated its leg to another person

for the purposes of olah offerings,

so that the purchaser, who buys it for the purpose of his vow or voluntary offering, will consecrate the entire animal as an olah and offer it.

And its proceeds,

the money that the purchaser paid the seller for the animal, are

non-sacred,

since the entire animal was not sacred, but only its leg,

except for the proceeds of

that

limb of it,

which he consecrated,

the words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: From where is it derived, concerning one who says, “The leg of this

shall be

an olah offering,”

that

the entire animal shall be an olah offering? The verse states: “It shall be

sacred,” and from the word “it shall be” we derive

to include the entire animal,

that the entire animal is sacred, because the sanctity has spread throughout the entire animal, and it is offered.

After the Gemara cites the words of the beraita, it returns to clarify who is the tanna who holds that one may not effect substitution of limbs for fetuses.

The Gemara asks:

To whom,

did Rabbi Yosei respond in this manner and prove that one may effect substitution of limbs for fetuses, from the fact that when one says, “The leg of this animal is an olah offering,” the law is that the entire animal is an olah offering?

If

he responded in this manner

to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda,

do

they hold

that

this view,

that when one says, “The leg of this one is an olah offering,” the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal? But we learned here that they disagree even in this case and hold that the sanctity of that limb shall remain as it is. Therefore, it is impossible to prove from their view that one may effect substitution of fetuses for limbs.

If so, the tanna who holds that one may effect substitution of fetuses for limbs is not Rabbi Meir or Rabbi Yehuda.

Rather, is it not

necessarily

to Rabbi Shimon

that Rabbi Yosei stated his words, since he agrees with Rabbi Yosei that when one consecrates the leg of an animal, the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal? Rabbi Yosei therefore proves to him that according to his view, the same should be said with regard to substitution: When one substitutes a single limb, the substitution should spread throughout the entire animal.

Accordingly, the words of Rav Shimi bar Ashi above are resolved, for with regard to the law that a fetus is not included by “an animal within an animal” to be considered an animal itself even with regard to substitution, Rabbi Shimon follows his own method, likening substitution to animal tithe.

The Gemara rejects this:

No.

There is no necessity to say that Rabbi Yosei stated his words to Rabbi Shimon. Rather, it is possible that the first tanna, who holds that one may not effect substitution with limbs or fetuses, is Rabbi Meir or Rabbi Yehuda.

If so, Rabbi Yosei’s proof from one who consecrates the leg of an olah, so that the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal and the entire animal becomes an olah, and therefore the same law should apply to substitution, is no proof according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. For they disagree even with regard to the law of one who consecrates a limb of an olah.

If so, to whom were Rabbi Yosei’s words addressed?

The Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yosei stated his own reasoning.

His words were stated according to his own view. He maintains that since when one consecrates the leg of an animal the entire animal becomes an olah, so too, when one substitutes a limb of an animal, the entire animal becomes a substitute.

Mishna:

An animal

that is carrying its firstborn,

which is about to give birth to a firstborn,

that is having difficulty giving birth—

One may cut

the fetus,

limb by limb,

from the limbs that emerge outside,

and throw them to the dogs.

Since the majority of the firstborn has not yet emerged, the sanctity of a firstborn has not taken effect upon it.

However, if

the majority emerged

of the fetus at once, and they then cut it,

it must be buried.

Since the majority emerged, this emergence is considered a birth, and the sanctity of a firstborn has already taken effect upon it; therefore, it may not be thrown to the dogs.

And

in both of these cases—whether the fetus emerged with its limbs cut apart, or whether the majority of it emerged—

the mother is released

from

the firstborn status.

The offspring born after it is no longer a firstborn, since it is not the first issue to open the womb.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It was stated: One-third emerged

of the firstborn fetus from its mother’s womb,

and its owners sold it

to

a gentile [since the sanctity of the firstborn had not yet taken effect, as most of it had not emerged],

And

and

after the sale

another one-third emerged,

so that it was found that two-thirds, which constitute most of the fetus, were already outside and it was considered born. If so, what is its status?

Rav Huna said:

This firstborn

is sacred,

and it is given to a priest, and it is offered on the altar as required for a firstborn.

Rabba said: It is not sacred,

but is non-sacred.

The Gemara explains their reasoning:

Rav Huna said that

the fetus

is sacred, for he holds that

although the sanctity of a firstborn depends on birth and the emergence of most of it, once most of it has emerged and it is considered born,

retroactively

it

is sacred.

And

if so, here, when he sold it to a gentile after one-third had emerged,

since

immediately afterward

most of it emerged,

it emerged

—the majority,

most of the firstborn, and it was considered born,

the matter is revealed,

it becomes apparent

retroactively, that from the outset it was,

from the beginning, even before most of it emerged,

sacred

it was,

and what he sold,

what he sold to the gentile,

he sold nothing,

since the firstborn is not his, as it is sacred and must be given to a priest.

Rabba said: It is not sacred, for he holds that from this point forward

it

is sacred.

The sanctity takes effect only from the moment that most of it emerged and it was considered born. If so,

what he sold,

that one-third which he sold to the gentile before most of the firstborn emerged,

he sold validly,

the sale is effective, since at the time of the sale the sanctity had not yet taken effect, and it was in the possession of its owner.

And they follow their principles,

they proceed in this dispute according to their respective views and methods, as they had already disagreed concerning this reasoning in another matter:

For it was stated: One-third emerged

of the fetus

through the side [for example, by means of surgery on the animal’s side with a knife, or by cutting it using a drug], and afterward the animal’s womb was opened,

for example, by means of surgery through the side of the animal with a knife, or by means of cutting with a substance], and afterward the womb of the animal was opened,

and

the remaining

two-thirds

of the fetus

through

the

womb,

as in a normal birth.

Rav Huna said: This fetus is not sacred,

and

Rabba said: It is sacred.

The Gemara explains their dispute:

Rav Huna said,

this fetus

is not sacred,

because

Rav Huna

follows

his own reasoning, as he said that

a firstborn fetus emerging from its mother’s womb

retroactively

is

sacred. And

therefore,

the first majority [

the first majority of the fetus to emerge, by virtue of which the status of being born takes effect upon the fetus]

is not in the womb;

it did not emerge from the womb, since the first third of the fetus emerged through the side. For this reason, it is not considered a “first issue of the womb.”

Rabba said,

the fetus

is sacred

despite the fact that the first third emerged through the side, because

Rabba

follows

his own reasoning, as he said: From this point forward

it

is sacred.

And the majority,

the majority of the fetus,

emerged through the womb;

it emerged [since after the third that emerged through the side, another two-thirds emerged through the womb]. Therefore, it is irrelevant that the first third initially emerged through the side, since at the time its sanctity took effect, namely, from this point forward, most of it had already emerged through the womb.

However, if so, it is necessary to understand why Rabba and Rav Huna needed to state their views both regarding the sale of one-third of the fetus to a gentile and regarding the emergence of one-third through the womb?

The Gemara explains:

And it is necessary,

it is necessary to state their views in both of these matters.

For had it been taught

that Rav Huna stated his view only

in this case,

concerning one who sold a firstborn to a gentile after one-third had emerged, we would have said that only

in this case did Rav Huna say that it is sacred retroactively, from the time it emerged from the womb,

that it becomes sacred retroactively, from the moment it emerged from the womb,

because

if we were to say that it is sacred from this point forward, this would lead

to

treating it with

leniency,

so that it would be exempt from the law of the firstborn.

But in this other case,

the case before us, in which one-third of the fetus emerged through the womb,

if

we were to say that it is sacred from this point forward, this would be

a stringency,

so that it would be liable under the law of the firstborn.

We might say that

it could be said that

Rav Huna concedes

that

to Rabba

that it is indeed sacred from this point forward, and not retroactively.

For this reason, Rav Huna’s ruling was taught with regard to both of these matters.