Chullin 70a — the Talmud in English

And likewise, concerning Rabbah’s ruling that retroactively he is consecrated, it is necessary to state his ruling in both of these cases:

For

if it was stated,

if Rabbah had stated his ruling only

in this case,

concerning the third that emerged through the side, we would have said that only

in this case,

in this matter,

Rabbah said

his ruling that from then onward he is consecrated, because if we were to say that he is consecrated retroactively, we would arrive at a leniency. For the emergence of that third through the womb nullifies the firstborn consecration from him.

But in this case,

concerning the ruling of one who sells his fetus to a gentile,

say

perhaps

Rabbah concedes to

Rav Huna

that

they are stringent and say that retroactively he is consecrated, and his sale does not take effect,

because of this

it is necessary

to state Rabbah’s reasoning that from then and retroactively he is consecrated in both of these cases.

The Gemara raises an objection:

We learned

in our Mishna: An animal

that is giving birth to its firstborn

[that is, giving birth to a firstborn offspring]

that is having difficulty giving birth, one cuts

from the fetus

limb by limb and throws it to the dogs.

Since the firstborn consecration does not take effect upon the fetus as long as most of it has not emerged. Therefore, when a limb emerges limb by limb and there has not yet been the emergence of most of it, it is not consecrated and it is permitted to throw it to the dogs. And the Gemara proves:

Is it not

the case also where he

cuts

the limbs of the fetus one by one

and places

them until most of them emerge, and even in this case our Mishna said that he throws them to the dogs?

This is therefore difficult, for this ruling accords only with the words of Rav Huna, that from then onward he is consecrated. And it is understandable why he throws them to the dogs: because with the emergence of the first pieces, before they accumulated to a majority, the consecration did not take effect.

And if you say

in accordance with Rav Huna’s view that

retroactively he is consecrated, “it must be buried” should have been stated!

For after most of its limbs have emerged and they are lying before us, with its majority recognizable, it becomes clear retroactively that from the beginning of its emergence it was consecrated?!

The Gemara answers:

No.

The Mishna is not speaking of a case in which he cuts the limbs and places them until they accumulate and are recognizable as a majority, for then the firstborn consecration takes effect upon them.

Rather,

with what are we dealing here? With one who cuts

limb by limb

and throws

one of them away one by one. Therefore there is no majority of limbs before us at all, and the firstborn consecration [which takes effect retroactively] has nothing upon which to take effect. But the Gemara argues:

But

according to your words, if he

cuts

the limbs

and places

them before him,

what

would their status be?

They must be buried!

Since in this manner they gather to form a majority, and the firstborn consecration takes effect upon them.

If so, the Gemara asks:

Rather than the tannaitic teaching,

before the tannai taught in the

latter part

of our Mishna

“If most of it emerged

of the firstborn,

it must be buried, and its mother is exempted

from

the firstborn status,”

let him distinguish within it,

the tannai should have made this distinction in our Mishna itself, and said as follows:

When are these words applicable?

Only

when he cuts and throws limb by limb,

for only then does consecration not take effect upon it, and therefore he throws it to the dogs.

But

if he

cuts and places —

it must be buried,

since then it accumulates to form a majority, and it is consecrated?!

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

this is also what he said

the tannai in our Mishna:

When are these words applicable? When he cuts and throws

limb by limb, and only then is it permitted to throw it to the dogs.

But

if he

cuts and places

the pieces before him, then

it becomes like one whose majority has emerged

at once,

and it must be buried!

Rava inquired:

He was uncertain

about

whether

with regard to limbs, do we follow the majority, or with regard to limbs do we not follow the majority [and below the Gemara will explain this uncertainty and which majority is under discussion]. And the Gemara discusses in what matter this uncertainty was stated:

the Gemara will explain this doubt below, and which majority is under discussion]? The Gemara considers in what matter this doubt was stated:

What are the circumstances? If you say,

if it is said that this concerns

a case where most of it emerged

of the fetus

in a minority of a limb,

meaning that the limb that completes the majority of the fetus outside emerged only in its minority, whereas the majority of that limb remained inside.

And this is what he is uncertain about:

Rava asks whether

this

same

minority that is outside,

which emerged and through whose emergence it is considered that most of the fetus emerged outside,

do we cast it after

the

majority of

that limb which remained inside

and assign it to that,

we consider the minority of the limb, and it is considered as though the majority of the limb remained inside; therefore this fetus indeed did not emerge in its majority [and the firstborn consecration did not take effect upon it, and if he wishes he may cut its body into pieces and throw them to the dogs ].

Or

perhaps this limb that emerged only in its minority

do we cast after the majority

after the majority

of the fetus and assign it to that,

we consider it accordingly. And since the majority of the fetus, together with the minority of this limb, is outside, the entire fetus is judged as one whose majority emerged outside, and the firstborn consecration takes effect upon it; and if he cut pieces from it, they must be buried and treated with consecration.

This is how the Gemara initially stated Rava’s uncertainty, whether with regard to limbs we follow the majority—that is, whether, in order to consider the fetus as one whose majority emerged, the completion by the minority of a limb is effective.

However, the Gemara rejects this explanation of Rava’s uncertainty:

It is obvious!

There is no uncertainty at all.

For it is certainly the case

that we do not abandon

we do not set aside

the majority of the fetus

that emerged,

and we go

and follow

after

the

majority of the limb

that is inside, in order to consider the fetus as though it had not emerged at all.

Rather, in this situation, where the majority of the fetus is outside, we certainly consider it as one whose majority emerged, even through the emergence of the minority of a limb, and this fetus is consecrated with firstborn consecration.

Rather,

Rava’s uncertainty whether with regard to limbs we follow the majority is as follows:

For example, half of it emerged

of the fetus

through the majority of a limb.

That is, this half that is outside emerged through the majority of a limb, whereas a minority of that limb remained inside.

And this is what he is uncertain about:

whether

that

same

minority that is inside,

which remained inside the mother,

what is the law concerning assigning it,

whether it should be attributed

after

the

majority of the limb

outside, and thereby it is considered as though the entire limb were outside, with the result that it is judged as though the majority of the fetus were outside and it is consecrated with firstborn consecration.

And this is Rava’s uncertainty: “Did we follow the majority with regard to limbs?” That is, do we follow the majority of the limb and therefore consider it as though the majority of the fetus were outside, or not?

The Gemara proves:

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

If most of it emerged, it must be buried.

And the Gemara discusses:

What

is

“most of it”? If you say,

if it is said that this concerns a case where

most of it

of the fetus

actually

emerged at once, it is very difficult to explain it this way—

And

until now have we not been taught

the law

that “the majority is like the whole”?

And for what purpose does the Mishna need to teach us that if most of a fetus emerged, it is considered as though all of it emerged?!

Rather, is it not

certainly speaking of the case presented here,

for example, half of it emerged

of the fetus

through the majority of a limb

that emerged, and thereby it is considered as though the entire limb emerged, and through this they judge it as though the majority of the fetus were outside. And this is what our Mishna innovates: if most of it emerged in this manner, it is consecrated—and must be buried.

The Gemara rejects this:

No!

The words of our Mishna should be established in accordance with the first manner that we explained concerning Rava’s uncertainty.

For example, most of it emerged

of the fetus

through

[by means of]

the minority of a limb.

That is, only through the fact that the minority of one of the animal’s limbs emerged outside was this emergence completed to the emergence of the majority of the fetus.

And it teaches us

our Mishna

that we do not abandon

the

majority of the animal’s fetus, and we go

and judge the fetus’s emergence

after

that

limb

that emerged in its minority; and since it is a minority, it is considered as though it did not emerge, and therefore the fetus’s emergence will not be considered the emergence of a majority. Rather, certainly, the minority of the limb outside is effective to complete the fetus’s emergence to its majority, and it is considered a birth, and it is consecrated.

Rava asked:

a person inserted his hand into the womb of the animal, and

wrapped

the firstborn fetus

in a palm fiber, and

the fetus emerged wrapped in the fiber,

what is the law?

The question is whether, since the fiber interrupted and separated between the fetus and its mother’s womb, it was not sanctified with the sanctity of a firstborn, since the sanctity of the firstborn depends upon its being in, and emerging from, the womb, as it is stated: “that which opens the womb.” And therefore this is a separation. Or perhaps this is not considered a separation? And likewise, if he wrapped it

in his garment

while it was still in its mother’s womb,

what is the law?

And likewise, if he wrapped it

in its placenta, what is the law?

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning this last uncertainty: But wrapping it

in its placenta

of the fetus,

is its ordinary manner!

This is the usual way of all fetuses, that they are wrapped in their placentas in their mothers’ wombs?!

The Gemara explains:

Rather,

the uncertainty is if he wrapped it

in another placenta

of another fetus,

what is the law?

And likewise, if the woman delivering the fetus

wrapped it and held it

in her hands, in order to deliver its mother,

and removed it

while it was wrapped in her hands,

what is the law?

Is it that since it is the way of a woman to deliver her animal in this manner, this is not considered a separation, or perhaps even in this manner the matter is considered a separation? And the Gemara discusses all of Rava’s uncertainties:

What are the circumstances?

In what manner was Rava uncertain?

If,

if the uncertainty is in a case such as

that it emerged,

that the fetus emerged

through its head [

through its head], and only afterward a person wrapped it, then he already

caused her to open,

the womb of its mother had already been opened by the emergence of the head, which is significant as birth, and it is a firstborn even though the rest of its body emerged while separated?

Rather,

certainly the uncertainty is in a case such as

that it emerged,

that the fetus emerged

through its legs,

its legs, while the head still remained inside. In this manner it is still not considered born, and the uncertainty is whether the wrapping of the rest of its body and its head nullifies from it the status of “that which opens the womb,” or not. And Rava continues to be uncertain:

A weasel swallowed

the firstborn fetus;

a weasel

that was with it in its mother’s womb, and it emerged from there

and removed it

with it.

What is the law?

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning this uncertainty:

But if the weasel

removed it

with it from the womb of its mother,

it has already taken it out,

for it already brought it outside, and this uncertainty is nothing other than the case in which we were already uncertain above, where a woman wrapped it in her hands and removed it. And here too, the matter under discussion is that it emerged while wrapped inside the weasel. Why then does Rava return and become uncertain concerning that same matter?

Rather,

the Gemara explains: The uncertainty is in a case where

it swallowed it,

the weasel,

and removed it

the weasel removed it outside its mother the animal while it was inside its entrails, and the weasel returned again into its mother while the fetus was within it,

and brought it in

thus, the fetus

, and vomited it up

inside the animal, and from there it was born

and emerged on its own; what is the law?

Is the final emergence considered birth, and is it sanctified, or perhaps, since it was once already outside, while it was in the weasel’s entrails, this second emergence is not considered birth?

And likewise, if he

attached

joined

two wombs

of two animals to one another,

and

the firstborn fetus

emerged from this one,

from its mother’s womb,

and entered that one,

into the womb of the second animal, and from there emerged into the air of the world, and after some time the second animal gave birth to its first offspring—

what is the law?

Is that fetus, which emerged from its mother’s womb and entered it, and emerged from it, thereby exempting it from firstborn status, so that the offspring she gave birth to afterward is not a firstborn, or not?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Is it only a fetus

of its own,

specifically a fetus that was formed and conceived in this animal, that

exempts

it from firstborn status, but a fetus

not of its own,

that was not conceived within it, but was formed in another animal and only entered it while whole and then emerged from it again,

does not exempt,

and therefore the offspring that will be born afterward will be “that which opens the womb,” and will be sanctified as a firstborn,

or perhaps,

perhaps even a fetus

not of its own,

that was not formed within it, but only entered there afterward,

also

it too

exempts

its womb when it emerges from it, and it is no longer “one that has not yet borne”?

And the conclusion of all these uncertainties is—

teyku!

Rav Aha asked: The walls

expanded

of the womb

before the firstborn emerged, and the fetus emerged within the hollow of the widened opening without touching at all the walls of the passageway of the womb,

what is the law?

The question is whether

air,

the hollow and interior of the

womb,

is what

sanctifies

and brings about the sanctity of the firstborn,

and there is,

for the fetus emerged and passed through the hollow of the passageway of the womb, and it is sanctified,

or perhaps,

it is not only the hollow of the womb that sanctifies it, but

the womb’s contact sanctifies it.

And since the walls of the womb expanded at the time of the emergence,

and there is no,

there was no contact between the fetus and the walls of the womb, and it is not sanctified?

Mar bar Rav Ashi asked:

If, before the animal gave birth,

the walls of the womb were uprooted

from their place and fell, and if so, when it emerged its emergence was not through the passageway of the womb,

what is the law?

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is there really an uncertainty concerning whether, if

they were uprooted,

the walls of the womb, the fetus is sanctified? But

they are not there—

the walls of the womb do not exist; because of what would it be sanctified? For there is neither contact with the womb here nor the hollow of the womb?!

Rather,

the uncertainty is in a case where

they were uprooted,

the walls of the womb,

and they were hung on its neck,

on the neck of the fetus, and they still cover and surround it even though they were uprooted,

what is the law?

Is it only when the walls of the womb are

in their place,

that is, when the womb is healthy and whole and stands in its place, only then do they

sanctify

the fetus with the sanctity of a firstborn; but if they were uprooted and are hanging and suspended

not in their place,

then

they do not sanctify,

or perhaps,

even when they are

not in their place, they also sanctify?

And likewise,

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira:

If

they were scraped away,

a portion was removed from the thickness of

the walls of the womb

from the inside, and they became extremely thin,

what is the law?

Is a fetus that emerged from walls such as these sanctified with the sanctity of a firstborn or not?

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

You have touched upon a question concerning which we were already uncertain,

you have become uncertain concerning a matter similar to what we were already uncertain about.

For Rabbi Zeira asked, and some say,

there are those who say that concerning this uncertainty

Rabbi Zeira asked Rabbi Asi:

If a small part of the walls of the passageway of the womb was breached, but still

“the standing exceeds the breached,”

that is, most of the walls of the passageway remained standing in their place, and only a minority was breached and is absent,

and the fetus emerged

the fetus

through

the place that was

breached.

Apparently, it emerged from a place that is not the passageway of the womb, and the uncertainty is whether we regard the breached minority according to the law of the majority, and it is considered to have emerged from the womb, or not.

And likewise one must be uncertain if the walls of the womb were breached to the extent that

the breached exceeds the standing, and it emerged

the fetus

through

the wall of the passageway of the womb that was

standing—what is the law?

Is it that since most of the walls of the womb are breached, this is judged as though the walls of the womb do not exist at all, and it is not sanctified? Or perhaps, since there is still a standing minority, and the fetus emerged through it, the matter is considered as though there is a womb there, and the fetus is sanctified.

And this uncertainty is similar to the uncertainty that Rabbi Yirmeya was uncertain concerning the walls of the womb being scraped away.

That is, in both of them the walls of the womb were diminished [whether they were diminished in their thickness, or whether they were breached], and the question is whether the emergence of the fetus through what remains is considered emergence from the womb, and it is sanctified, or not.

And the Gemara rejects this and distinguishes between these two uncertainties:

Up to this point, he was not uncertain,

Rabbi Zeira was uncertain only concerning

the breached exceeding the standing. For

although most of it is breached, nevertheless

there is,

there still is a minority of the walls of the womb that still

stands in existence

in its form, and the status of a womb applies to it. Therefore, it is possible to say that the fetus’s emergence from that “standing” part is birth from the womb, and it sanctifies it.

But,

where

they were scraped away,

the walls of the womb were diminished in their thickness,

he had no uncertainty.

According to Rabbi Zeira, there is no uncertainty at all in this matter: Since the entire area of the womb was diminished and reduced in its thickness, such a womb is not fit at all to sanctify the fetus with the sanctity of a firstborn.