Chullin 70a (ע.) — the Talmud in English

And likewise, with regard to Rabba’s ruling that the fetus is sanctified retroactively, it is necessary to state his ruling in both of these cases:

For

if it were stated that

Rabba stated his ruling only

in this case,

with regard to a third that emerged through the side, we would say that only

in this case,

in this matter,

Rabba said his ruling that it is sanctified from that point onward, because if we were to say that it is sanctified retroactively, this would lead to a leniency. For the emergence of that third through the womb nullifies the sanctity of the firstborn from it.

that it becomes sacred from this point onward. This is because if we were to say that it becomes sacred retroactively, this would result in leniency. For the emergence of that third through the womb cancels the sanctity of a firstborn.

But in this case,

in the case of one who sells his fetus to a gentile,

say that

it is possible that

Rabba concedes

to

Rav Huna

who is stringent and says that it is sanctified retroactively and that its sale does not take effect.

For this reason,

it is necessary

to state Rabba’s view that it is sanctified retroactively in both of these cases.

The Gemara raises an objection:

We learned

in our Mishna: An animal

that is expecting its firstborn [

that is giving birth to a firstborn offspring]

whose labor is difficult, one cuts

from the fetus

limb by limb and throws it to the dogs.

This is because the sanctity of the firstborn does not take effect upon the fetus as long as the majority of it has not emerged. Therefore, when it emerges limb by limb and the majority has not emerged, it is not sacred and may be thrown to the dogs. And the Gemara proves:

Is it not

referring also to a case in which he

cuts

the fetus’s limbs one by one

and sets

them aside until the majority emerges, and even in this case our Mishna says that he throws them to the dogs?

It is therefore difficult, for this ruling accords only with the words of Rav Huna, who says that it is sanctified from that point onward. It is understandable why he throws them to the dogs: With the emergence of the first pieces, before they accumulated to constitute a majority, sanctity did not take effect.

And if you say

in accordance with Rav Huna’s opinion that

it is sanctified retroactively, “it must be buried” should have been stated!

For after the majority of its limbs has emerged and they are lying before us, with its majority apparent, it becomes clear retroactively that it was sacred from the beginning of its emergence?!

The Gemara answers:

No.

The Mishna is not speaking of a case in which he cuts the limbs and sets them aside until they accumulate and are recognizable as a majority, for in that case the sanctity of the firstborn takes effect upon them.

Rather,

with what are we dealing here? With a case in which he cuts

limb by limb

and throws

each one away. Therefore, no majority of limbs is present before us at all, and there is nothing upon which the sanctity of the firstborn [which takes effect retroactively] can take effect. But the Gemara argues:

But

according to your words, if he

cuts

the limbs

and sets

them before him,

what

would their status be?

They must be buried!

Since in this manner they accumulate to constitute a majority, and the sanctity of the firstborn takes effect upon them.

The Gemara therefore asks:

Rather than the tanna teaching

until the tanna taught in the

latter clause

of our Mishna:

“When the majority

of the firstborn

has emerged, it must be buried, and its mother is exempt

from

the firstborn status,”

let him make the distinction in this very matter,

the tanna should have distinguished in our Mishna itself and said as follows:

When are these words stated?

Only

when he cuts and throws away limb by limb,

for only then does sanctity not take effect upon it, and therefore he throws it to the dogs.

But

if he

cuts and sets it aside—

it must be buried,

because then it accumulates to constitute a majority and becomes sacred!?

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

this is also what he said,

the tanna in our Mishna:

“When are these words stated? When he cuts and throws away

limb by limb”; only then is it permitted to throw it to the dogs.

But

if he

cuts and sets aside

the pieces before him, then

it becomes as though the majority has emerged

at once,

and it must be buried!

Rava raised

a doubt:

Rava

asked whether

the limbs follow the majority, or do the limbs not follow the majority [

the Gemara will explain this doubt below, and which majority is under discussion]? The Gemara considers in what matter this doubt was stated:

What are the circumstances? If you say

that it is referring to

a case in which the majority

of the fetus

emerged through a minority of a limb,

meaning that the limb that completes the majority of the fetus outside emerged only by its minority, while the majority of that limb remains inside,

and this is what is troubling him:

Rava asks whether

this

same

minority on the outside,

which emerged and through whose emergence the majority of the fetus is considered to have emerged,

do we assign

it according to

the majority of

that limb which remains inside,

and therefore

we consider the minority of the limb as though the majority of the limb remained inside, and consequently this fetus did not in fact emerge in its majority [and the sanctity of the firstborn did not take effect upon it; if he wishes, he may cut its body into pieces and throw them to the dogs]?

Or

perhaps this limb, which emerged only by its minority,

do we assign according to the majority

of the

fetus,

and consider it accordingly? Since the majority of the fetus, together with the minority of this limb, is outside, the entire fetus is treated as though its majority emerged outside, and the sanctity of the firstborn takes effect upon it; if he cuts pieces from it, they must be buried and treated as sacred.

This is how the Gemara initially formulated Rava’s doubt as to whether the limbs follow the majority—that is, whether the addition of a minority of a limb is sufficient for the fetus to be considered as having emerged in its majority.

However, the Gemara rejects this interpretation of Rava’s doubt:

It is obvious!

There is no doubt at all.

For certainly

we do not abandon

the

majority of the fetus

that emerged,

and go

according to

the

majority of the

limb

that remains inside, in order to consider the fetus as though it had not emerged at all.

Rather, in such a case, where the majority of the fetus is outside, we certainly consider it as having emerged in its majority, even through the emergence of a minority of a limb, and this fetus is sanctified with the sanctity of the firstborn.

Rather,

Rava’s doubt as to whether the limbs follow the majority is as follows:

For example, half emerged

of the fetus,

through the majority of a limb.

That is, this half that is outside emerged by means of the majority of a limb, while a minority of that limb remains inside.

And this is what is troubling him:

whether

that

same

minority on the inside,

which remained inside the mother,

what is the law as to assigning it

whether it should be attributed

after

the

majority of the limb

that is outside, so that the entire limb is considered to be outside, and it follows that it is treated as though the majority of the fetus were outside and is sanctified with the sanctity of the firstborn.

And this is the doubt raised by Rava: “Do the limbs follow the majority?” That is, do we follow the majority of the limb and therefore consider the majority of the fetus to be outside, or not?

The Gemara proves:

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

“When its majority has emerged, it must be buried.”

The Gemara discusses this:

What

is meant by

“its majority”? If you say

that it refers to a case in which

its majority

of the fetus

literally

emerged at once, it is very difficult to interpret it in this manner—

For

until now, has it not already taught us

that we know the principle

that “the majority is equivalent to the whole”?

And why does the Mishna need to teach us that if the majority of the fetus emerged, it is considered as though all of it emerged?!

Rather, is it not

certainly referring to the case presented here,

for example, when half emerged

of the fetus

through the majority of a limb

that emerged? In this manner, the entire limb is considered to have emerged, and consequently the majority of the fetus is treated as being outside. This is the novelty taught by our Mishna: If its majority emerges in this manner, it is sacred and must be buried.

The Gemara rejects this:

No!

The words of our Mishna should be established in accordance with the first case that we explained in Rava’s doubt.

For example, when its majority emerged

of the fetus

by [

means of]

a minority of a limb.

That is, only because a minority of one of the animal’s limbs emerged did this emergence complete the emergence of the majority of the fetus.

And it teaches us

our Mishna

that we do not abandon

the

majority of the animal’s fetus, and go

and assess the fetus’s emergence

according to

that

limb

that emerged only by its minority; since it is a minority, it is considered as though it had not emerged, and therefore the fetus’s emergence is not considered the emergence of its majority. Rather, certainly the minority of the limb outside helps complete the fetus’s emergence so that its majority has emerged; it is considered a birth, and it is sacred.

Rava raised a question:

If a person inserted his hand into the womb of an animal and

wrapped

the firstborn fetus

in a palm fiber,

and the fetus emerged wrapped in the fiber,

what is the halakha?

The question is whether, since the fiber intervened and separated between the fetus and its mother’s womb, it did not acquire the sanctity of a firstborn, since the sanctity of the firstborn depends upon its being in and emerging from the womb, as it is stated: “that which opens the womb.” Thus, the fiber constitutes an interposition. Or perhaps this is not considered an interposition? And likewise, if he wrapped it

in his garment

while it was still in its mother’s womb,

what is the halakha?

And likewise, if he wrapped it

in its placenta, what is the halakha?

The Gemara wonders about this last uncertainty: But wrapping it

in its placenta

of the fetus

is its normal manner!

It is the general way of fetuses to be wrapped in their placentas in their mothers’ wombs!?

The Gemara explains:

Rather,

the uncertainty is if he wrapped it

in another placenta

belonging to another fetus,

what is the halakha?

And likewise, if the woman delivering the fetus

wrapped it and held it

in her hands in order to deliver its mother,

and extracted it

while it was wrapped in her hands.

What is the halakha?

Is it that, since it is normal for a woman to deliver her animal in this manner, this is not considered an interposition, or perhaps even in this manner it is considered an interposition? The Gemara considers all of Rava’s uncertainties:

What are the circumstances?

In what manner did Rava raise his uncertainty?

If

the uncertainty is in a case where

it emerged,

the fetus having emerged

headfirst [

that is, through its head], and only afterward a person wrapped it, then he had already

caused her to be one whose womb had been opened,

as its mother’s womb was already opened by the emergence of the head, which is significant as a birth; and it is a firstborn even though the rest of its body emerged with an interposition?

Rather,

certainly the uncertainty is in a case where

it emerged,

the fetus having emerged

feetfirst, its legs emerging while its head remained inside. In this manner it is not yet considered born, and the uncertainty is whether the wrapping of the rest of its body and its head negates its status as “that which opens the womb” or not.

Rava continued to raise another uncertainty:

A weasel swallowed

the firstborn fetus,

which

had been with it in its mother’s womb, and it emerged from there

and extracted it

with it.

What is the halakha?

The Gemara wonders about this uncertainty:

But if

it extracted it,

the weasel having brought it with it out of its mother’s womb,

it has already brought it out;

it has already brought it outside, and this uncertainty is nothing other than the case that we already considered above, in which a woman wrapped it in her hands and extracted it. Here too, the issue is that it emerged while wrapped within the weasel. Why, then, does Rava raise the same uncertainty again?

Rather,

the Gemara explains, the uncertainty concerns a case in which

it swallowed it,

the weasel

and extracted it,

the weasel having brought it outside its mother, the animal, while it was inside the weasel, and the weasel then returned inside its mother while the fetus was within it,

and brought it in

in this manner,

, and regurgitated it

inside the animal, and from there it was born

and emerged on its own—what is the halakha?

Is the final emergence considered a birth, so that it is sanctified, or perhaps, since it had already once been outside, while it was inside the weasel, this second emergence is not considered a birth?

And likewise, if he

attached

that is, joined

two wombs

of two animals to one another,

and

the firstborn fetus

emerged from this one,

from its mother’s womb,

and entered that one,

the womb of the second animal, and from there emerged into the open air; and after some time the second animal gave birth to its first offspring—

what is the halakha?

Did that fetus, which emerged from its mother’s womb, entered the other womb, and emerged from it, thereby exempt that womb from firstborn status, so that the offspring she gave birth to afterward is not a firstborn, or not?

The sides of the uncertainty are:

Is it only a fetus

of hers,

specifically, a fetus conceived and gestated in this animal, that

exempts

her from firstborn status, whereas a fetus

not of hers,

which was not conceived within her, but was formed in another animal and merely entered her whole and then emerged from her again,

does not exempt,

and therefore the offspring born afterward will be “that which opens the womb” and will be sanctified as a firstborn,

or perhaps,

perhaps even a fetus

not of hers,

which was not formed within her but merely entered there afterward,

also

even it

exempts

her womb when it emerges from her, so that she is no longer a “first-time bearer”?

The conclusion of all these uncertainties is—

the matter remains unresolved!

Rav Aha raised a question: If the walls

that is, became enlarged

of the vaginal canal

opened before the firstborn emerged, and the fetus emerged through the cavity of the widened opening without touching the walls of the vaginal canal at all,

what is the halakha?

The question is whether

air,

the cavity and interior of the

womb, is what

is what

sanctifies

the fetus and confers upon it the sanctity of a firstborn;

and there is

the fact that the fetus emerged and passed through the cavity of the vaginal canal, and is therefore sanctified,

or perhaps,

it is not the cavity of the womb alone that sanctifies it, but

the womb’s contact sanctifies it.

Since the walls of the womb widened at the time of the emergence

and there is no such contact,

there was no contact between the fetus and the walls of the womb, and it is not sanctified?

Mar bar Rav Ashi raised a question:

If, before the animal gave birth,

the walls of the vaginal canal were displaced

from their place and fell, so that when the fetus emerged, it did not emerge through the vaginal canal,

what is the halakha?

The Gemara wonders: Is there really an uncertainty as to whether, if

they were displaced,

the walls of the vaginal canal, the fetus is sanctified? But

they are not present:

the walls of the vaginal canal are gone, and by virtue of what would it be sanctified? There is neither contact with the womb here nor the cavity of the womb?!

Rather,

the uncertainty concerns a case in which

they were displaced,

the walls of the vaginal canal,

and were hung around its neck,

around the neck of the fetus, and they still covered and surrounded it even though they had been displaced,

what is the halakha?

Is it only when the walls of the womb are

in their place,

that is, when the womb is healthy and intact and stands in its proper place, that they

sanctify

the fetus with the sanctity of a firstborn, whereas if they have been displaced and are hanging there,

not in their place,

then they

do not sanctify,

or perhaps,

even when they are

not in their place, they also sanctify?

And likewise,

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a question before Rabbi Zeira:

If

they were shaved down,

some of the thickness of

the walls of the vaginal canal

from the inside was removed, and they became extremely thin,

what is the halakha?

Is a fetus that emerged through such walls sanctified with the sanctity of a firstborn or not?

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

You have touched upon a question that was raised for us,

you have raised an uncertainty similar to one that we already considered.

For Rabbi Zeira raised a question—and some say,

some say that this uncertainty

Rabbi Zeira raised before Rabbi Asi:

If the walls of the vaginal canal were breached slightly, but still

“the standing area is greater than the breached area,”

that is, most of the walls of the vaginal canal remained standing in their place, and only a minority was breached and is absent,

and

the fetus

emerged through

the

breached area.

Apparently, it emerged from a place that is not the vaginal canal, and the uncertainty is whether the minority that was breached is treated like the majority, so that it is considered to have emerged from the womb, or not.

And likewise, one must raise an uncertainty concerning a case in which the walls of the vaginal canal were breached to the extent that

the breached area was greater than the standing area, and the fetus emerged

through

the

standing wall of the vaginal canal—

what is the halakha?

Is it that, since most of the walls of the vaginal canal are breached, this is treated as though the walls of the vaginal canal do not exist at all, and the fetus is not sanctified? Or perhaps, since a minority of the standing wall still exists, and the fetus emerged through it, this is considered as though there is a womb there, and the fetus is sanctified?

This uncertainty is similar to the uncertainty raised by Rabbi Yirmeya concerning the walls of the vaginal canal that were shaved down.

That is, in both cases the walls of the vaginal canal have been diminished [whether their thickness was reduced or they were breached], and the question is whether the fetus’s emergence through what remains is considered an emergence from the womb, so that it is sanctified, or not.

The Gemara rejects this and distinguishes between these two uncertainties:

Up to this point, he did not raise the question,

Rabbi Zeira raised an uncertainty only concerning

the breached area being greater than the standing area. For

although most of it is breached, nevertheless

there is,

there still remains a minority of the walls of the womb that

stands intact

in its form and retains the status of a womb. Therefore, it is possible to say that the fetus’s emergence from that “standing” portion is a birth from the womb and sanctifies it.

But

where

they were shaved down,

the walls of the womb having been reduced in thickness,

he did not raise the question.

According to Rabbi Zeira, there is no uncertainty at all in this matter: Since the entire surface of the womb has been diminished and reduced in thickness, such a womb is not fit to sanctify the fetus with the sanctity of a firstborn.