Chullin 69a — the Talmud in English

ta shma

from what we learned in our Mishna,

this is the rule:

when a person cuts

something that

is

from the body

of the animal while it is still alive and places it inside it,

it is forbidden

for consumption even after its slaughter.

And

something

that is not its body,

but rather a fetus found inside it after it has been slaughtered,

is permitted.

The Gemara analyzes: The law that when one cuts from the fetus and places the piece inside the animal, and the piece is permitted for consumption, we have already learned at the beginning of our Mishna. If so, the words of the Mishna, “and

that is not its body—

permitted,”

what do they come to include?

What do they come to add?

Is it not to include such a case,

this law: that if he cut most of the parts of the fetus, and a minority of them remained inside, this minority is permitted for consumption, and this is the intention of our Mishna when it says, “and that is not its body is permitted”?

But the Gemara rejects this possibility:

No!

Our Mishna comes

to include

the law of a fetus

“with cloven hooves” in the womb of a cow.

That is, the hooves of the fetus were “cloven together”: they were not split as are the hooves of kosher animals, but were closed like those of a camel. And the Mishna teaches that if it is found whole in the womb of a cow, it is permitted for consumption, even though the form of its hooves is like that of a camel.

in the womb of a cow, it is permitted to eat, even though the shape of its hooves is like that of a camel.

And

this law is stated

according to

the view

of Rabbi Shimon. For although Rabbi Shimon said

that a

fetus with closed hooves born to a cow

that is, one born from a cow,

is forbidden, this applies

only

where

it has already been born and

emerged into the outside air. But

a fetus with closed hooves found

in its mother’s womb is permitted,

that is, it is permitted to eat.

If so, it is possible that this is what our Mishna intended by saying, “and that is not its body is permitted”: to include also this one with cloven hooves, found whole in the womb of a cow, which too is permitted for consumption.

Summary of the laws of a fetus that brought out one of its limbs a. If the fetus brought out its hand, whether it brought it back in or did not bring it back in, the limb itself is forbidden . c. The portion of the limb that remains inside, even if it is the minority of the limb, is not forbidden even if he did not bring it back and the limb remained outside. d. If he brought out his hand and brought it back, and afterward brought out his other hand and brought it back, and similarly brought out the rest of the limbs and brought them back, even though most of its body emerged in this manner, they do not combine to be considered a birth. e. If he brought out his hand and they cut it off, brought out his leg and they cut it off, and similarly with the rest of its bodily limbs, until they completed most of it—it is forbidden .

B. If it drew its foreleg back in before its mother was slaughtered, the place of the cut—that is, the boundary between the part of the limb that emerged and the part that remained inside—is permitted. If it did not draw it back in before slaughter, the place of the cut is forbidden.

C. The part of the limb that remained inside, even if it is the minority of the limb, is not forbidden [even if it was not drawn back in and the limb remained outside ]. D. If it brought out one foreleg and drew it back in, then brought out the other foreleg and drew it back in, and likewise repeatedly brought out its other limbs and drew them back in, even though most of its body emerged in this manner, the limbs are not combined to be considered a birth . E. If it brought out its foreleg and it was cut off, then brought out its hind leg and it was cut off, and likewise with the rest of its limbs, until this amounted to most of its body, it is forbidden .

f. Even if the fetus completed bringing out most of its limbs, only those that emerged outside become forbidden. But the small part that remained inside is not forbidden on account of the majority.

Rabbi Hanania asked:

A pregnant sacrificial animal of peace-offerings that was in the Temple courtyard and stood there at the time of its slaughter, and

the

fetus

brought out its hand in the courtyard, what is

the law of this emergence of a limb?

Should we say

since it is

the partition of the Temple courtyard

a “partition” with regard to sacrificial animals,

since when a sacrificial animal of peace-offerings goes outside the partition of the Temple courtyard and is slaughtered there, it is forbidden, because the courtyard is its partition and the place of the sacrificial animal,

it is also

this partition a partition

with regard to this one,

to permit the limb that emerged, so that we do not consider it as having “emerged outside its partition,” and the limb will be permitted through the slaughter of the mother,

or perhaps

the partition of the Temple courtyard does not help to permit it, because

with regard to this one,

the limb that emerged,

it is not a partition, for the “partition of a fetus,”

only the partition of

its mother is

its partition, and the partition of the Temple courtyard is irrelevant to this.

Abaye said to him: You should also be uncertain

for you should also have a doubt concerning an animal of

lesser sanctity in Jerusalem,

whose partition is the wall of Jerusalem, and if it goes outside the partition of Jerusalem, it becomes forbidden.

If so, you should also be uncertain about the law of an animal of lesser sanctity whose fetus brought out its hand within Jerusalem and brought it back, and afterward the animal was brought to the Temple courtyard and slaughtered

And Abaye continues and proves:

For what reason are you not uncertain,

why are you not uncertain about it? Because it is clear that

the partition of a fetus is its mother,

and not the walls of Jerusalem. If so,

here too,

so too is the law in this uncertainty:

the partition of a fetus is its mother,

and not the partitions of the Temple courtyard. Therefore, if the fetus of an animal of peace-offerings brought out its hand within the partitions of the Temple courtyard, the hand becomes forbidden, and the partitions of the Temple courtyard do not help it.

Ilfa asked:

If in the middle of the slaughter of the mother

the

fetus

brought out its hand between

the slaughter of the first

sign

and

the slaughter of the

second

sign

—for the slaughter of an animal is performed by cutting the two signs, the windpipe and the gullet—

what is [the law]?

The two sides of the uncertainty are:

Is,

whether

the first sign joins

of the mother

to the second sign,

and the two slaughterings together constitute one complete slaughtering, in order

to purify it

the hand of the fetus that emerged

from

the impurity of an

unslaughtered carcass.

Or

perhaps

not

these signs do not join, and the slaughtering is not considered one complete slaughtering in order to purify the hand. For the slaughtering of the first sign, when the hand was in the animal’s womb, came also to permit the hand for consumption. Whereas the slaughtering of the second sign, which was performed after the hand was outside, does not have the capacity to permit the hand for consumption; rather, it has only the capacity to purify the hand from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass. And since the two slaughterings differ in their power to act upon this hand—the first slaughtering permits the hand entirely, whereas the second slaughtering helps only to purify it from an unslaughtered carcass—one must determine whether they join to form a complete act of slaughtering to purify the hand from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass, or perhaps even from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass this slaughter does not purify it.

Rava said: A kal va-chomer! If the first sign

of this fetus

joined

to

the second sign to permit it for consumption

when it did not bring out its hand, then

will it not help it

the fetus

to purify it

to purify the limb

from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass?!

Rather, it is certainly not possible that the first cut, whose power is great enough to permit it entirely for eating, should be deficient to the extent that it cannot purify it even from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass.

Rabbi Yirmeya asked:

A fetus brought out its foreleg, and the foreleg became forbidden. Its mother was subsequently slaughtered, and the fetus was removed from her womb. The fetus then grew up, mated with an animal, and produced offspring with it.

What is the law regarding concern

that the foreleg of

the

foreleg of

offspring

of this fetus should be forbidden, just as its father’s foreleg was forbidden?

The Gemara discusses:

What are the circumstances?

In what manner was this offspring born?

If you say,

if the case is one

where it went,

where that fetus that emerged from its slaughtered mother went and mated

with

an

ordinary animal

—an ordinary animal that requires slaughter for its flesh to be permitted for consumption—it is impossible to be uncertain about this, because

why specifically this one?

Why is the uncertainty specifically concerning the offspring of the fetus

that has

in it

the prohibition of “that which emerges”?

But

even an ordinary “fetus that emerged from a slaughtered mother”

a living fetus that emerged from the womb of its slaughtered mother,

of the world,

even though it did not bring out its hand,

also,

the offspring born from it is forbidden.

For Rav Mesharsheya said: According to the one who says

[Hanania, below, 78b]

“we are concerned for the father’s seed,”

that the offspring of an animal is “attributed” to its father—and for this reason, when the father is slaughtered, one may not slaughter the son on the same day, because of “You shall not slaughter it and its young on the same day,” and we do not say that the prohibition applies only to a mother and her son—

a fetus that emerged and mated with an ordinary animal,

an ordinary one, which requires slaughter in order for its flesh to be permitted for consumption,

the offspring

that emerges from them

has no remedy!

For from the side of its mother, it requires slaughter like every animal. But from the side of its father, it has no signs fit for slaughter, since its father is judged as already slaughtered.

Therefore, in this one, since its signs are considered “half”-slaughtered [those on its father’s side are slaughtered, while those on its mother’s side are not slaughtered], therefore it is forever forbidden for eating.

For this reason, the Gemara’s doubt cannot be established with regard to offspring born from a ben pekuah that mated with an ordinary animal, since in every case the offspring is forbidden for eating. If so, with regard to what case did the Gemara raise its doubt?

It is necessary,

this doubt was necessary only for the case

that he went,

that same ben pekuah [which had extended its foreleg] went and came

and

upon] an animal that was

a ben pekuah like him,

like him.

And the doubt is:

What?

Should we say,

an organ produces an organ,

and every organ in the offspring is like the “offspring” of the corresponding organ in its father,

and

if so,

cut it,

we cut from the fetus the “extended” organ that comes from its father,

and it is permitted,

and the rest of the offspring is thereby permitted [for the organ born from the forbidden organ has been cut off and is no longer present].

Or perhaps,

perhaps one should not say that every organ in the offspring is born through the force of the corresponding organ in its father, but rather,

its seed is mixed.

All the organs of the offspring are mixed and blended through the force of all the organs of the father’s body, and therefore everything is forbidden.

He returned,

Rav Yirmeya returned and

said: It is obvious

that an organ does not produce an organ; rather, certainly the matter is

that its seed is mixed.

And the proof of this is:

if so,

that an organ produces an organ,

a blind person would give birth to a blind person, and an amputee would give birth to an amputee!

Rather,

since a blind person does not give birth to a blind person, and an amputee does not give birth to an amputee,

it is obvious that its seed is mixed,

and all the organs of the body are considered offspring of all the organs of the father’s body.

And

this is what we are asking,

these are the sides of the doubt concerning offspring born from a ben pekuah that had extended one of its organs:

On the one hand, every

animal in general,

the mother,

does it

not come through the force of all the organs of its body, including

milk and blood,

and does it come into the air of the world,

and it is permitted?

Nevertheless, the Torah permitted the offspring of an ordinary animal, even though it was born from the forbidden milk and blood of its mother?! And it is proven that even when some of the mother’s organs are forbidden, this does not impair the offspring’s fitness.

And if so,

here too,

also here,

it is no different.

And the “extended” organ in the father’s body does not forbid the offspring.

Or perhaps,

perhaps when the Torah permitted offspring born from an animal, it permitted only an animal in which there are these two prohibitions, milk and blood, and only with

two prohibitions

two prohibitions

do we say

that the offspring is permitted. But

three,

three prohibitions [milk, blood, and an additional extended organ],

we do not say

that the Torah permitted the offspring of such an animal.

And the Gemara discusses:

And according to whom,

according to whose view is this doubt?

If

it is

according

to the opinion of

Rabbi Meir,

there is no doubt about it, because according to him there indeed

is the prohibition of milk and blood

in this fetus [as will be explained below, that the tannaim disagree concerning this law]. But

the prohibition

of the organ that

extended, does not exist,

it does not apply to it. For Rabbi Meir holds that a nine-month fetus found alive in its mother’s womb also requires independent slaughtering and is not permitted through her slaughtering. And this offspring, whose father and mother are benei pekuah, requires slaughtering, and it will permit it.

And if so, it is certainly permitted, since it contains only two prohibitions and not three.

And

if according

to the opinion of

Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that a fetus is permitted through the slaughtering of its mother, indeed

the prohibition of the extended organ exists,

it exists in this offspring from the side of its father and mother; however,

the prohibition of milk does not exist,

it does not exist in this offspring according to Rabbi Yehuda.

For we learned: The prohibition of

the

sinew of the thigh applies to a fetus

in its mother’s womb,

and its milk is forbidden, the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no

prohibition of the sinew

applies to a fetus, and

even

its milk is permitted!

And if so, both according to Rabbi Meir and according to Rabbi Yehuda, it does not contain three prohibitions. According to Rabbi Meir, it contains only the prohibition of milk and blood; and according to Rabbi Yehuda, it contains only the prohibition of the “extended organ” and blood.

Rather,

certainly,

we do not say anything that comes through the force of.

That is, we did not raise a doubt at all about whether an organ that comes “through the force of” a prohibition—since it was born and formed through the force of a forbidden organ—would itself be forbidden.

For the matter is obvious

that it is permitted,

that it is permitted.

And this is what we are asking.

This is what we doubted:

What is it,

is it permitted

to drink his milk?

And the sides of the doubt are:

For every

ordinary milk,

ordinary milk that issues from a fit animal,

is it not considered like an organ torn from a living creature,

since it was milked from the animal while it was still alive,

and

even so

it is permitted,

the milk is permitted.

And if so,

this

milk issuing from an animal one of whose organs is “extended,” and that organ has been forbidden with the prohibition of “an organ torn from a living creature,”

is likewise no different.

Its milk too should be permitted, since the prohibition of “an organ torn from a living creature” does not apply to milk.

Or perhaps, there,

ordinary milk—the Torah permitted it for eating even though it is an organ torn from a living creature, since

it has a remedy for its prohibition,

there is a remedy for the prohibition of the organ torn from a living creature of its mother,

through slaughtering,

and only where the source of the prohibition has a remedy by which it can be permitted through slaughtering did the Torah also permit the milk before the slaughtering of the mother.

However,

here,

here, with regard to this fetus,

it has no remedy for its prohibition through slaughtering.

There is no remedy for its prohibition through slaughtering, since it is like one already slaughtered, and since it itself has no remedy by which it can be permitted, perhaps the Torah did not permit its milk.

It is unresolved!

We learned in our Mishna:

He cuts from a fetus

that is in its womb, and it is permitted for eating.

And the Gemara discusses:

From where do we know

this permission?

For it is written

[Deuteronomy 14:6]:

“And every animal that has a split hoof

and that cleaves the cleft of its two hooves, that brings up its cud among the animals, you may eat.”

The verse initially said “animal,” and the verse returned and said “among the animals” again, at the end of the verse. Therefore, one should juxtapose the “animal” stated at the beginning of the verse with the “among the animals” stated at the end of the verse, and expound:

“Animal—

among the animals”

[that is, an animal found inside another animal],

to include the offspring,

so that even what is cut from it is permitted, according to the law of the animal in which it is found.

But the Gemara objects: We find a similar verse concerning an offering of substitution, as it is stated [Leviticus 27:9–10]: “And if it is an animal from which they bring an offering to the Lord, everything that he gives of it to the Lord shall be holy. He shall not exchange it, nor substitute a good one for a bad one or a bad one for a good one. And if he does substitute an animal for an animal, then both it and its substitute shall be holy.”

And if so,

from now on,

since a fetus is called “animal” in the language of the Torah,

they shall substitute with it,

if one brings an unconsecrated animal to a pregnant animal consecrated with the sanctity of an offering, and says that the unconsecrated animal shall be the substitute for the fetus found in the consecrated animal, the substitution should take effect, and the unconsecrated animal should become consecrated with the sanctity of a substitute offering.

Why then

and why

do we learn: “One may not substitute”

[that is, if he substituted, the sanctity of the substitute did not take effect ]

neither organs for fetuses,

if he said concerning a particular organ of an unconsecrated animal that it would be the substitute for a fetus of a consecrated animal, the substitution did not take effect.

And

so

not

does the sanctity of substitution take effect when one substitutes

fetuses

of unconsecrated animals

for organs

of a consecrated animal,

nor

may one substitute

organs and fetuses

of unconsecrated animals

for

consecrated animals

that are whole.

And

so

not

may one substitute animals

that are whole

unconsecrated animals

with them,

with organs and fetuses of an offering.

And it is proven that a fetus is not called “animal” for every matter. For if so, the sanctity of substitution would take effect upon an unconsecrated animal with which one substituted a fetus of a consecrated animal?!

And the Gemara answers [and assumes at this stage] that this is indeed not learned from “animal among the animals,” and in truth not everything found inside an animal is called “animal.”

Rather,

the exposition permitting a piece from the fetus in its womb is from here:

The verse says

in that verse:

“And every” animal—

to include

from the superfluous wording “every”

the fetus

inside it. Indeed, the fetus does not have the status of an “animal.”

But the Gemara objects:

If so,

if indeed everything inside the animal was included as fit, then

even if he cuts from the spleen and from the kidneys, also

it should be fit.

Why then,

and why

did we learn

in our Mishna:

“One who cuts from the fetus that is in its womb—the cut-off part is permitted for eating.”

But one who cuts

from the spleen or from the kidneys

of the animal itself,

it is forbidden

to eat

the cut-off thing.

The Gemara explains:

The verse says, “

And every animal—in an animal,

it

you shall eat,” and the intention is that the permission to eat what is inside it applies only when it is possible to eat it when it is

whole and not lacking.

But if he cuts from the spleen and the kidneys, it turns out that at the time when he wishes to eat them, it is lacking. And for this reason they are forbidden.

It follows that the permission to eat applies to every thing found inside the animal, except for a thing through whose removal from there the animal is found to be lacking.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But if that is so, one who slaughters the animal and finds in it

inside it

the form of a dove—it should be permitted.

This form of a dove should be permitted, for it was found inside the animal.

Why then,

and why

did Rabbi Yohanan say: “One who slaughters the animal and finds in it the form of a dove—it is forbidden for eating”?!