Chullin 69a (סט.) — the Talmud in English

Ta shma

from what we learned in our Mishna,

this is the general rule:

when a person cuts

something that

is

from the body

of the animal while it is still alive and places it inside it,

it is forbidden

to eat, even after the animal has been slaughtered.

And

something

that is not its body,

but rather a fetus found inside it after it has been slaughtered,

is permitted.

The Gemara analyzes this: The law that one who cuts something from the fetus and places the severed piece inside the animal, and that the piece is permitted to eat, was already taught at the beginning of our Mishna. If so, these words of the Mishna, “

and that is not its body—

is permitted,”

what do they come to include?

What do they come to add?

Is it not to include a case such as this,

namely, that if one cut off most of the limbs of the fetus and a minority of them remained inside, that minority is permitted to eat—and this is the intent of our Mishna when it says: “And that is not its body is permitted”?

But the Gemara rejects this possibility:

No!

Our Mishna comes

to include

the law of a fetus

with closed hooves in the womb of a cow.

That is, the fetus’s hooves were “closed”: They were not split, as are the hooves of kosher animals, but were closed like those of a camel. The Mishna teaches that if it is found whole

in the womb of a cow, it is permitted to eat, even though the shape of its hooves is like that of a camel.

And

this law is stated

according to

the view

of Rabbi Shimon. For although Rabbi Shimon said

that a

closed-hoofed offspring of a cow,

meaning one born from the cow, is

forbidden,

this prohibition applies specifically

where

it has already been born and

emerged into the open air. But

a closed-hoofed fetus found

in its mother’s womb is permitted,

and may be eaten.

If so, perhaps this is what our Mishna intends by saying, “And that is not its body is permitted”: to include even this closed-hoofed fetus found whole in the womb of a cow, which too is permitted to eat.

Summary of the laws of a fetus that extended one of its limbs a. If the fetus extended its foreleg, whether it retracted it or not, the limb itself is forbidden .

b. If it retracted its foreleg before its mother was slaughtered, the place of the cut—that is, the boundary between the part of the limb that emerged outside and the part that remained inside—is permitted. But if it did not retract it before slaughter, the place of the cut is forbidden.

c. The portion of the limb that remained inside, even if it is the minority of the limb, is not forbidden even if it did not retract it and the limb remained outside d. If it extended its foreleg and it was cut off, then extended its hind leg and it was cut off, and so too with the rest of its limbs, until most of its body had emerged, they do not combine to be considered a birth. e. If it extended its foreleg and it was cut off, extended its hind leg and it was cut off, and likewise with the other limbs of its body, until most of it had been completed, it is forbidden.

f. Even if the fetus completed the emergence of most of its limbs, only those that emerged outside are forbidden. But the small portion that remained inside is not forbidden on account of the majority.

Rav Ḥananya asked:

A pregnant sacrificial animal of the offering of peace-offerings that was in the Temple courtyard and stood there at the time of its slaughter, and

the

fetus

extended its foreleg in the courtyard—what is

the status of this emergence of a limb?

Should we say that

since it is

the courtyard partition a

“partition” with regard to sacrificial animals,

since a peace-offering that emerges beyond the courtyard partition and is slaughtered there is forbidden, because the courtyard is the partition and proper place of the sacrificial animal,

it is also

this partition serves as a partition

with regard to this one,

permitting the limb that emerged, so that we do not consider it to have “emerged beyond its partition,” and the limb is permitted through the slaughter of its mother?

Or perhaps

the courtyard partition does not help to permit it, because

with regard to this one,

the limb that emerged,

it is not a partition, for the “fetus’s partition,”

is only

its mother

and the courtyard partition is irrelevant to it?

Abaye said to him: You should also be uncertain

regarding an animal of

lesser sanctity in Jerusalem,

whose partition is the wall of Jerusalem; if it emerged beyond the partition of Jerusalem, it became forbidden.

If so, you should likewise be uncertain about the law of an animal of lesser sanctity whose fetus extended its foreleg within Jerusalem and retracted it, after which the animal was brought into the courtyard and slaughtered, whether, since the limb emerged within the walls of Jerusalem, it should not become forbidden and the foreleg should be permitted through the slaughter of its mother; or perhaps we do not apply the principle of “since” in this case, and the walls of Jerusalem do not permit the limb from the prohibition of “that which emerges.”

Abaye continues and proves:

Why are you not uncertain about this?

Why do you not raise this uncertainty concerning it? Because it is clear that

the fetus’s partition is its mother,

and not the walls of Jerusalem. If so,

here too,

the same applies in this uncertainty:

the fetus’s partition is its mother,

and not the courtyard partitions. Therefore, if a fetus of a peace-offering animal extended its foreleg within the courtyard partitions, the foreleg became forbidden, and the courtyard partitions do not help it.

Ilfa asked:

If, in the middle of slaughtering the mother,

the

fetus

extended its foreleg between

the slaughtering of the first

sign

and

the slaughtering of the second

sign [for the slaughter of an animal is performed by cutting both signs, the trachea and the esophagus],

what is the law?

The sides of the uncertainty are:

Is it the case

that

the first sign joins

of the mother

with the second sign,

and the two acts of slaughter together constitute one complete slaughter, in order

to purify it

the fetus’s foreleg that emerged

from

the impurity of an

unslaughtered carcass?

Or

perhaps

not

do these signs join together, and the slaughter is not considered one complete act of slaughter sufficient to purify the foreleg. The slaughter of the first sign, when the foreleg was inside the animal, was also intended to permit the foreleg to be eaten. But the slaughter of the second sign, which took place after the foreleg was outside, cannot permit the foreleg to be eaten; it has only the power to purify the foreleg from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass. Since the two acts of slaughter differ in what they can accomplish with regard to this foreleg—the first slaughter fully permits the foreleg, whereas the second slaughter is effective only to purify it from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass—it must be considered whether they join to constitute a complete act of slaughter that purifies the foreleg from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass, or perhaps this slaughter does not purify it even from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass.

Rava said: It is a kal va-homer! If the first sign

was effective for this fetus

to join

with the second sign

to permit it to be eaten

when it did not extend its foreleg, then

will it not be effective for it

the fetus

to purify it

to purify the limb

from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass?!

Rather, certainly the slaughtering of the first sign, whose power is great enough to permit it completely as food, cannot be diminished to the extent that it would not purify it even from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass!

Rabbi Yirmeya asked:

A fetus that extended its foreleg and the foreleg became forbidden, after which its mother was slaughtered and they removed the fetus from her womb; the fetus grew and mated with an animal, producing offspring—

what is the law with regard to being concerned

to forbid

the

foreleg of

its offspring

as its father’s foreleg is forbidden?

The Gemara discusses this:

What are the circumstances?

Under what circumstances was this offspring born?

If you say

that the case is one

where it went,

where that fetus that emerged from its slaughtered mother went and

mated

with

a fully viable animal

[an ordinary animal that requires slaughter], this uncertainty cannot be raised, because

why specifically this one?

Why is the uncertainty specifically concerning the offspring of the fetus

that has

within it

the prohibition of “that which emerges”?

For

even a “fetus of a slaughtered mother”

[a live fetus that emerged from the womb of its slaughtered mother]

in general,

even if it did not extend its foreleg,

also

the offspring born from it is forbidden.

For Rav Mesharsheya said: According to the one who says [

Ḥananya, below, 78b]

“We are concerned for the father’s seed,”

that the offspring of an animal is “related” to its father [and therefore, when the father is slaughtered, one may not slaughter the offspring on the same day, because of the prohibition “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring on the same day”; we do not say that the prohibition applies only to a mother and her offspring],

when a fetus of a slaughtered mother mates with a fully viable animal,

an ordinary animal that requires slaughter for its flesh to be permitted to eat,

the offspring

born from them

has no remedy!

For from its mother’s side it requires slaughter like any animal, whereas from its father’s side it has no signs suitable for slaughter, since its father is considered already slaughtered.

Therefore, in this case as well, since its signs are considered “half” slaughtered [those on its father’s side are slaughtered, while those on its mother’s side are not], it is consequently forbidden to eat forever.

For this reason, the Gemara’s uncertainty cannot be established as referring to an offspring born from a ben paku'a that mated with an ordinary animal, since in any event the offspring is forbidden to eat. If so, to what case does the Gemara’s uncertainty refer?

It is not necessary

to posit this uncertainty except in a case

where it went

that same ben paku'a [which had extended its foreleg] went and came

and

to an animal that was

a ben paku'a like it

like itself.

And the uncertainty is:

What

shall we say?

One limb produces one limb,

and every limb in the offspring is like a “child” of the corresponding limb in its father,

and

if so,

cut it,

cut from the fetus the limb that “emerged” from its father,

and it is permitted,

and the rest of the offspring thereby becomes permitted [since the limb born from the forbidden limb has been cut off and is no longer present].

Or perhaps

perhaps one should not say that every limb in the offspring is born through the power of the corresponding limb in its father, but rather

its seed is intermingled.

All the limbs of the offspring are intermingled and blended through the power of all the limbs of the father’s body, and therefore everything is forbidden.

Rav

Yirmeya returned and

said: It is obvious

that one limb does not produce one limb; rather, it is certainly the case that

its seed is intermingled.

And the proof is:

If so,

that one limb produces one limb,

a blind person would beget a blind person, and an amputee would beget an amputee!

Rather,

since a blind person does not beget a blind person, and an amputee does not beget an amputee,

it is obvious that its seed is intermingled,

and all the limbs of the body are considered to have been born from all the limbs of the father’s body.

And

this is what we are asking:

these are the sides of the uncertainty concerning offspring born from a ben paku'a that extended one of its limbs:

On the one hand, every

ordinary animal,

the mother,

does it not come

through the power of all the limbs of the body other than the mother’s womb, including

milk and blood,

when it comes into the world,

and it is permitted.

Nevertheless, the Torah permitted the offspring of an ordinary animal, even though it was born from its mother’s forbidden milk and blood?! This proves that even when some of the mother’s limbs are forbidden, this does not impair the fitness of the offspring.

And if so,

here too

even here,

it is no different.

The limb that “emerged” from the father’s body does not render the offspring forbidden.

Or perhaps,

perhaps when the Torah permitted offspring born from an animal, it permitted only an animal containing these two prohibitions, milk and blood, and only with

two prohibitions

two prohibitions

do we say

that the offspring is permitted. But

three

three prohibitions [milk, blood, and the additional emerged limb],

we do not say

that the Torah permitted the offspring of such an animal.

The Gemara discusses this:

And according to whom

is this uncertainty?

If

it is

according

to the view of

Rabbi Meir,

there is no uncertainty, because according to him there is indeed

a prohibition of milk and blood

in this fetus [as will be explained below, where the tannaitic authorities are shown to disagree concerning this law]. But

the prohibition

of the

emerged limb does not apply,

to it. For Rabbi Meir maintains that a nine-month fetus found alive in its mother’s womb also requires its own slaughter and is not permitted through her slaughter. And this fetus, whose father and mother are both benei paku'a, requires slaughter, and that slaughter will permit it.

If so, it is certainly permitted, since it contains only two prohibitions, not three.

And

if according

to the view of

Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that a fetus is permitted through the slaughter of its mother, then indeed

there is a prohibition of an emerged limb

in this offspring, because of both its father and its mother. However,

there is no prohibition of milk

in this offspring according to Rabbi Yehuda.

As we learned: The prohibition of

the

sciatic nerve applies to a fetus

[a fetus in its mother’s womb],

and its milk is forbidden; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no

prohibition of the sciatic nerve that

applies to a fetus, and

even

its milk is permitted!

If so, according to both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, it does not contain three prohibitions. According to Rabbi Meir, it contains only the prohibitions of milk and blood, while according to Rabbi Yehuda, it contains only the prohibition of the “emerged limb” and blood.

Rather,

certainly,

we do not say anything derives its prohibition merely through its source.

That is, we did not raise any uncertainty at all as to whether a limb that comes “through the power of” a prohibition—because it was born and formed through the power of a forbidden limb—should itself be forbidden.

For it is obvious

that it is permitted,

that it is permitted.

And this is what we are asking.

This is our uncertainty:

What is the law:

is it permitted

to drink its milk?

The sides of the uncertainty are:

After all, every

ordinary milk,

ordinary milk that emerges from a kosher animal,

is not considered like a limb severed from a living animal,

since it was milked from the animal while it was still alive,

and

even so

it is permitted,

the milk is permitted.

If so,

this

milk emerging from an animal one of whose limbs is an “emerged limb,” and that limb is forbidden by the prohibition of “a limb from a living animal,”

is likewise no different.

Its milk too should be permitted, since the prohibition of “a limb from a living animal” does not apply to milk.

Or perhaps, there,

ordinary milk, the Torah permitted it for consumption despite its being considered a limb from a living animal, because

there is a remedy for its prohibition,

there is a remedy for the prohibition of the limb from a living animal of its mother

through slaughter,

and only where the source of the prohibition has a remedy that permits it through slaughter did the Torah also permit the milk before the mother herself was slaughtered.

However,

here,

in the case of this fetus,

there is no remedy for its prohibition through slaughter.

There is no way to remedy its prohibition through slaughter, since it is like an already slaughtered animal, and since there is no remedy for permitting it itself, perhaps the Torah did not permit its milk.

The matter remains teiku!

We learned in our Mishna:

One cuts from a fetus

that is in its mother’s womb, and it is permitted to eat.

The Gemara discusses this:

From where do we know

this permission?

As it is written

[Deuteronomy 14:6]:

“And every animal with a split hoof

and a completely split pair of hooves, that brings up its cud among animals, you may eat.”

The verse initially says “animal,” and then repeats the word “animal” at the end of the verse, in the phrase “among animals.” Therefore, the “animal” stated at the beginning of the verse is juxtaposed with the “animal” stated at the end, and we expound: “

Animal—

among animals” [

that is, an animal found inside another animal],

to include the offspring,

so that even what is cut from it is permitted, just like the animal within which it was found.

But the Gemara raises a difficulty: We find a similar verse concerning an animal designated as a substitute for a consecrated offering, as it is stated [Leviticus 27:9–10]: “And if it is an animal from which one brings an offering to the Lord, whatever he gives of it to the Lord shall be sacred. He shall not exchange it, nor substitute another for it, a good animal for a bad one or a bad one for a good one. And if he shall indeed substitute animal for animal, then both it and its substitute shall be sacred.”

If so,

from now on,

since a fetus is called “animal” in the language of the Torah,

they should substitute for it

if one brings an unconsecrated animal alongside a pregnant animal consecrated with the sanctity of an offering and declares that the unconsecrated animal shall be the substitute for the fetus found in the consecrated animal, the substitution should take effect, and the unconsecrated animal should become consecrated with the sanctity of a substitute offering.

Why, then,

why

do we learn: One may not substitute

[that is, if one performed the substitution, the sanctity of the substitute does not take effect ]

limbs for fetuses,

if one declares a particular limb of an unconsecrated animal to be the substitute for a fetus of a consecrated animal, the substitution does not take effect.

And

so

not

does the sanctity of substitution take effect when one substitutes

fetuses

of unconsecrated animals

for limbs

of consecrated animals,

nor

may one substitute

limbs and fetuses

of unconsecrated animals

for

consecrated

whole animals.

And

so

not

may one substitute unconsecrated

whole

animals

for them,

for limbs and fetuses of consecrated offerings.

This proves that a fetus is not called an “animal” for every purpose. For if it were, the sanctity of substitution would take effect upon an unconsecrated animal for which one substituted the fetus of a consecrated animal?!

The Gemara answers [and at this stage assumes] that this is indeed not derived from “animal among animals”; in truth, not everything found inside an animal is called an “animal.”

Rather,

the derivation permitting a piece of the fetus in its mother’s womb is from here:

The verse says

in that passage:

“And every” animal—

to include

the extra wording “every”

the offspring

within it. Indeed, the fetus does not have the status of an “animal.”

But the Gemara raises a difficulty:

If so,

if indeed everything within the animal is included as fit, then

even if one cuts from the spleen or from the kidneys as well

it should be fit.

If so

and why

did we learn

in our Mishna:

One who cuts from the fetus in its womb is permitted to eat it.

But one who cuts

from the spleen or the kidneys

of the animal itself,

it is forbidden

the severed substance

for consumption.

The Gemara explains:

The verse states, “

And every animal—in an animal,

it

you shall eat”; and the meaning is that permission to eat what is inside it applies only when it is possible to eat the animal when it is

whole and not deficient.

But if one cuts from the spleen or the kidneys, it turns out that when one wishes to eat them, the animal is deficient. And for this reason they are forbidden.

It follows that the permission to eat anything found inside the animal applies to everything within it, except for something whose removal leaves the animal deficient.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But if that is so, one who slaughters the animal and finds in it

inside it

a figure of a dove should be permitted.

This figure of a dove should be permitted, since it was found inside the animal.

If so,

and why

did Rabbi Yohanan say, “One who slaughters the animal and finds in it a figure of a dove is forbidden for consumption”?!