Chullin 68b — the Talmud in English

The flesh

of the animal and the fetus inside are impure through

contact with an animal carcass.

For both the animal and the fetus came into contact, after slaughter, with the hand, whose status is that of a carcass. For the slaughter did not permit it. And it is like any animal that died without slaughter,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say:

the contact of the animal’s flesh with the hand is like

contact

with

a slaughtered tereifa,

which, by rabbinic law, renders only consecrated objects impure, and not like contact with an animal carcass, which renders even unconsecrated objects impure. And although the slaughter does not permit for eating the hand that emerged outside its boundary [that is, the body of the animal], nevertheless, the slaughter is effective for purifying it from the impurity of an animal carcass. And its status is like that of a tereifa that was slaughtered, which is forbidden for eating but does not render impure like an animal carcass.

And now the Gemara proves from these matters:

In any event, it teaches in the first clause: If a fetus extended its hand, and then withdrew it, and afterward he slaughtered its mother—

it is permitted for eating!

And the Gemara infers:

Is it not,

did this statement in the beraita, “it is permitted for eating,” refer

to the limb

itself!? And this is difficult for Rav, who said, “The limb itself is forbidden”? The Gemara answers:

No.

This statement that it is permitted was not said concerning the limb, but

concerning the fetus.

The Gemara returns and raises an objection:

If

if

concerning the fetus

it was said that it is permitted,

say in the latter clause,

let him raise a difficulty from the continuation of that same beraita, in which we learned:

He slaughtered its mother, and afterward it withdrew it

the fetus withdrew the hand,

it is forbidden for eating.

And

the difficulty is:

If,

if it is speaking of

a fetus, why,

why

is it forbidden

if it did not withdraw the hand until after slaughter? After all, the entire fetus, apart from the hand, was inside at the time of slaughter, so why should the fetus be forbidden?!

The Gemara answers: It is speaking

as Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said

below,

“It was needed only for the place of the cut”

[the “boundary” between the part of the limb that emerged outside and became forbidden, and the part that remained inside and is permitted].

Here too,

so too here, the statement of the beraita, “He slaughtered its mother and afterward it withdrew it—it is forbidden for eating,”

was needed only

this statement was not said

but

in order

to

forbid

the place of the cut.

And at the beginning of the beraita, where it is explained that if he withdrew his hand before slaughter, he cuts off only the hand precisely and throws it away, while everything else is permitted for eating, including the place of the cut: Since that “place of the cut” stands at the opening of the womb, it has still not emerged outside its boundary. And since he withdrew the hand, the place of the cut returned into the animal and is permitted.

But if the fetus did not withdraw the hand before slaughter, even the place of the cut itself is forbidden. And although it was not outside the animal, nevertheless it is not considered to have been inside the animal, since it stands at the opening of the womb. And this place is considered neither the interior of the animal nor its exterior.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Is that so!

For it apparently follows that this law is not so,

but,

for

when Avimi came,

when

Avimi came from Bei Hozai, he came and brought a beraita in his hand,

he came and brought a beraita in his hand:

It is stated [Deuteronomy 14:6]: “And every animal that divides the hoof and splits the split hoof into two hooves, that brings up the cud among the animals, it you may eat.”

And the Gemara derives from this verse below [69a] that a fetus is permitted through the slaughter of its mother and does not require slaughter for itself. For at the beginning of the verse it says “animal,” and at its end, “among the animals, it you may eat,” and they expound from this that an animal within an animal—that is, a fetus—is permitted.

And from what is stated at the beginning of the verse, “hoof,” and in its continuation, “hooves,” they learn:

Sometimes you eat all the limbs of the fetus found inside its mother, and sometimes you eat only part of them.

How so?

If it extended both its hands, and

one hoof

one

it withdrew, eat

that hoof which it withdrew. And if both

hooves it withdrew, eat

both of them! And the difficulty from this is:

Is it not,

is it not explained here that if

it withdrew

the fetus

a hoof, eat the hoof!

And it implies that it is permitted?

And if so, this is difficult for Rav, who said, “The limb itself is forbidden,” whereas here it is proven that the limb that it withdrew is permitted?!

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

no,

that is not the exposition. Rather, they expound: If

it withdrew

the fetus

a hoof, eat the fetus

alone, but not the hoof that it extended and withdrew!

The Gemara raises another objection:

If

if only the

fetus

alone is permitted for eating,

why specifically,

why was it stated in that beraita

“it withdrew—

eat,” for

even

if

it did not withdraw

the fetus the hoof that it extended,

also

it too should be permitted?!

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

The statement of the beraita that if it withdrew it is permitted

, was needed only,

was not stated

but for

the matter of the law of

the place of the cut.

And this is what the beraita says: If it withdrew the hoof, the hoof itself is forbidden. And cut it off, since it is forbidden. However, eat at its place of the cut, since it withdrew the hoof.

Thus, the place of the cut too is included in the exposition of “an animal within an animal,” since it did not emerge outside the animal.

And if it withdrew both hooves, eat at the place of the cut of both of them.

However, even concerning this there is a difficulty:

But there are two verses,

two words,

that he uses for it,

the tanna expounded in the beraita for the purpose of this law:

a. “Hoof”—it withdrew—eat.

b. “Hooves”—it withdrew—eat.

And for what purpose are both needed? For since if he withdrew one it is permitted, the same law applies if he withdrew both?

Is it not,

were these two words needed for this:

one

one verse comes

to

permit the

limb

itself that emerged,

and one

the second verse comes

to

permit

the place of the cut?!

And if so, once again this is difficult according to Rav, who holds that the limb that emerged itself is forbidden?

And the Gemara answers:

No. One

exposition, “the hooves it withdrew—eat,” was needed

to

permit

the place of the cut,

for if it withdrew its hoof, the place of the cut is permitted.

And

if

one,

the second exposition, “the hoof it withdrew—eat,” is expounded

to

permit

“a kalut in a cow’s womb”

[what this is will be explained below],

and

this law is stated

according to

the method of

Rabbi Shimon.

For Rabbi Shimon said: A kalut offspring of a cow—

is forbidden!

That is, if a cow gave birth to an offspring whose hooves are closed like the hooves of a camel and are not split, which is a sign of impurity, even though it was born from a pure cow, it is forbidden.

And this matter is learned from the fact that the prohibition of a camel for eating is written twice in the Torah. [a. In the Book of Leviticus 11:4, “But this you shall not eat, of the camel.” b. In the Book of Deuteronomy 14:7].

From one place they learn to forbid a camel born from a she-camel, and from the other place they learn to forbid a camel [that is, an offspring possessing the form of a camel, whose hooves are closed] born from the cow.

And concerning this matter Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the Sages, who hold that “that which emerges from the pure is pure,” even if it possesses the form of an impure creature.

However, Rabbi Shimon too concedes that

these matters,

this prohibition of a kalut born from a cow applies only

where

when

it

has already

emerged into the air of the world.

But,

if it has not yet been born, but the kalut offspring is

in the womb of its mother

after she was slaughtered,

it is permitted.

And this is what they expound from “hoof,” as in the words of the beraita above: An offspring that has only a hoof—that is, whose hooves are not split—eat! And it is permitted.

Ulla

disagreed with the words of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav,

said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: And

if the fetus extended

a limb

and withdrew it—even the limb

itself is permitted!

Rav Yehuda said to Ulla: But Rav and Shmuel both said, “The limb itself is forbidden.”

And not as you said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan.

He said to him

Ulla:

Who will give us the dust of Rav and Shmuel, and we will fill our eyes with it

[Who will give us of their dust and we will fill our eyes with it!]

Rather,

although we honor the words of Rav and Shmuel so greatly, nevertheless, in this matter we hold like Rabbi Yohanan, for he has his reasoning with him.

Thus Rabbi Yohanan said: Everything,

all those concerning which the law of a “boundary” was stated [such as a fetus in its mother’s womb, whose boundary—the walls of the womb—permits it even without slaughter; and such as the flesh of the most holy offerings, whose boundary is the walls of the courtyard, or lesser sanctified offerings, whose boundary is the walls of Jerusalem],

was included

in the law of

“Flesh in the field, a tereifa; you shall not eat it.”

That is, when they emerge outside their boundary, their law is like that of a tereifa. And apparently, the same law applies if they returned inside their boundaries: their law would not change, and they would be tereifot.

But

when Scripture specified concerning a sin-offering that it emerged outside its boundary, and

even if

it returned

again inside the boundaries of the courtyard,

it is forbidden

[as it is stated [Leviticus 10:17–18] concerning the sin-offering goat of the additional offerings of the New Moon on the eighth day of the inauguration, which Aaron and his sons burned, and Moses became angry with them: “Why did you not eat the sin-offering? Behold, its blood was not brought inside the Sanctuary,” and they expound from this, “inside” it was—that it had not emerged outside the courtyard. And it implies from this that if the sin-offering emerged outside its boundary, it was disqualified, and it is to be burned, and its return is not effective for it. And why did the Torah need to specify that there is no remedy for it? For since it emerged outside its boundary, there is no remedy for it forever, as they learn from “Flesh in the field, a tereifa; you shall not eat it”]?

Rather, it is proven that only

the sin-offering is what the Merciful One specified concerning it.

To teach us that specifically a sin-offering is forbidden forever if it emerged outside its boundary,

but every matter,

other things that become forbidden because they emerged outside their boundaries, such as a fetus in its mother’s womb,

since they returned,

if they returned inside their boundaries,

are permitted.

This is Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning; I hold like him.

The objection was raised

to Ulla from that which was taught: It is stated [Exodus 22:30],

“Flesh in the field, a tereifa; you shall not eat it.”

What does the verse come to teach?

Why did Scripture call this matter “tereifa”? Apparently, Scripture should have said, “Flesh in the field—you shall not eat it.”

Since we find

[below it will be explained where we find this matter]

with regard to Second Tithe and First Fruits

[which were permitted for eating only within the boundaries of Jerusalem]

that even though they emerged outside their boundary, and returned

inside the city wall,

they are permitted.

Could even

the fetus

this

have its law

so,

that if the fetus brought a limb outside its boundary, and returned it, the matter would return to its original permissibility?

The verse teaches, “

flesh in the field

torn.”

That is to say: once the limb went outside its boundary, it is tereifa, and it is forbidden forever!

The Gemara discusses:

What is the basis of the teaching?

How do we learn from the fact that it was written “torn” that it has no remedy even if it returned inside its boundary?

Rabba said:

From the fact that it was called “torn,” we learn that its law is

like that of a tereifa. Just as a tereifa, once it has become a tereifa, it no longer has any permissibility

forever,

so too flesh,

a limb of the fetus’s flesh,

once it went outside its boundary,

outside its mother’s body,

it no longer has any permissibility

forever. For even if the limb returns into the womb, it remains in its prohibition.

It is explicitly established in this beraita that the limb itself that goes outside the animal is forbidden forever. Returning it does not help to restore it to permissibility, and this is difficult for the statement of Ulla according to Rabbi Yohanan, who said, “The limb itself that goes out is permitted.”

The Gemara concludes:

A refutation of Ulla; a refutation.

The Master said,

in the beraita that we learned above:

“Since we find concerning second tithe and first fruits,

that even though they went outside their boundary and returned, they are permitted.”

The Gemara asks:

Where do we find

that they are permitted?

The Gemara explains: We learn this from

as it is written [Deuteronomy 12:17]

“

“You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain,

and your wine, and your oil, and the firstborn of your cattle and your flock, and all your vow-offerings that you vow and your gift-offerings and the contribution of your hand.” “

The tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil”—this is second tithe. “And the contribution of your hand”—these are the first fruits.

And it follows that only

“within your gates,”

outside Jerusalem,

may you not eat,

as it is written, “And you shall eat before the Lord your God”; and it is forbidden to take them out from there after the boundaries of the wall have already taken hold of them.

But

if they

went outside their boundary and returned

to Jerusalem,

they are permitted.

In the West

the Land of Israel]

they taught thus,

they taught the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yohanan in the following manner:

Rav said: Birth applies to limbs.

And a limb that goes out is like one born, and returning it no longer helps to permit it through the slaughter of its mother.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Birth does not apply to limbs.

And a limb that goes out is not considered born, and once it enters again, it returns to being like a part of the fetus, and becomes permitted through the slaughter of its mother.

The Gemara asks:

What difference is there between them,

between the two explanations of the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yohanan? According to both of them, is the dispute not whether the return of the limb into the mother permits it or not? The Gemara explains:

There is a difference between them with regard to forbidding

whether one must forbid the

minority of the limb that

remained

inside,

when part of the hand remained inside.

According to the first explanation, the essence of the prohibition is the very going out of the limb outside the animal’s body. Since that minority remained inside, it should not be forbidden.

However, according to the second explanation, the reason for the prohibition is that the limb is considered born. Therefore even the minority that remained inside the animal is like something that was born, and it too is forbidden without slaughter.

The Gemara deliberates:

They raised a dilemma before them: According to the one who says that birth does not apply to limbs,

what is the law if

the fetus extended its hand, and returned it, and again extended

also

its hand

the second

and returned it,

and so it again extended each time another additional limb,

until

in the end

they completed a majority—

what is the law? Do we say, the majority has gone out,

for in the end the majority of the limbs went outside [even though they returned], and because of this the fetus is considered born, since altogether its majority was outside?

Or perhaps, since it returned,

that it returned those limbs inward,

it returned.

This return is considered a return, and the fetus is not considered born.

The Gemara discusses another dilemma arising from these alternatives:

If you should say “

since it returned

the limb returned,

it returned,”

and it is no longer like something born, one must deliberate what the law is in the following case:

If

the fetus extended its hand,

and a person came

and cut it off. And it again

the fetus

extended its hand

the other one,

and he cut it off,

a person cut it off, and the fetus again extended another limb and a person came and cut off that one as well, and so on,

until they completed a majority—

what is the law?

Do we say, this

in the end

has its majority gone out,

the majority of the fetus went outside through these cut-off pieces?

And if so, it is certainly considered born.

Or perhaps,

the emergence of the majority of its limbs in this manner is not considered birth, because the emergence of

the majority all at once is required,

in order for it to be considered birth.