Chullin 68a — the Talmud in English

1.

An animal having difficulty

having difficulty

giving birth,

and they stood to slaughter it,

And

And before the slaughter

the fetus extended its hand

outside the animal’s body,

and returned it

into its mother’s body before she was slaughtered, and afterward its mother was slaughtered—even if the fetus was found alive in its mother’s womb, it is

permitted

for eating,

even without its own slaughter, because it is rendered permitted for eating by the slaughter with which its mother was slaughtered [as the Gemara below expounds].

However, the hand itself that emerged is forbidden for eating, even if it returned to the mother’s womb and was inside her at the time of slaughter. And below, in the Gemara, it will be explained that a limb that emerged and returned becomes forbidden under the law of the prohibition of tereifa.

B. However, if

the fetus extended

itself

its head

before the mother was slaughtered, then

even though it returned it

before slaughter,

this is considered born.

And it is no longer rendered permitted by its mother’s slaughter, because the emergence of the head outside its mother’s body is considered birth.

Therefore, if it happened that the fetus extended its head and returned it, and after its mother was slaughtered the fetus was found alive inside her body, it requires slaughter for itself. And if it was found dead, it is forbidden, like a carcass.

The Mishna brings an additional law:

C. If a person inserted his hand into the animal and was

cutting

a piece of a limb

from a fetus within her,

and left the piece inside her,

that part is permitted

that part

for eating

through the animal’s slaughter, and it does not become forbidden because of “a limb from a living creature,” because it is stated [Deuteronomy 14:6], “And every animal that brings up the cud, that has a completely cloven hoof, and is split into two hoofs, among the animals you may eat.”

And the Sages expounded the words of the verse as follows: every “animal” [mentioned at the beginning of the verse] that is “among the animals” [mentioned at the end of the verse], you may eat! For a fetus found inside the animal is permitted for eating through the mother’s slaughter, even if it is found inside her cut into pieces. D. However, if he cut

from the spleen and from the kidneys

of the animal itself, then even if he left the pieces inside her,

the cut part is forbidden

the cut part

for eating

because of the prohibition of “a limb from a living creature,” and it remains in its forbidden state even when the animal is slaughtered.

And the Mishna specifically mentioned cutting the spleen and kidneys, because they are limbs whose cutting or removal from the animal’s body does not make it a tereifa. But cutting other limbs makes the animal a tereifa.

E.

This is the general rule:

Every

thing that

was cut from

its body,

of the animal—even if the animal was slaughtered while it was inside her—

is forbidden

for eating under the law of a limb from a living creature, and it is not permitted by the animal’s slaughter.

6.

And every part that was cut,

that is not

from

its body

of the animal, but from the fetus within her, and was lying inside her at the time of slaughter,

is permitted

for eating through the animal’s slaughter.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: The fetus extended its hand and returned it—it is permitted for eating.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

Only the fetus itself is permitted for eating,

but

however, the

limb itself,

which the fetus extended outside its mother’s body and returned,

is forbidden.

That is, the permission for eating stated in the Mishna applies only to the fetus itself, as will be explained below. For although the entire fetus is permitted, nevertheless, that limb which emerged and returned is not rendered permitted by the mother’s slaughter.

What is the reason

that the emerging limb became forbidden, despite the fact that it returned and was in the mother’s womb at the time of slaughter, and the mother’s slaughter was effective for the fetus?

For the verse says [Exodus 22:30]

“And flesh in the field that is tereifa you shall not eat.”

And the Sages expounded that “flesh in the field” is flesh found outside its “boundary.” Now, the place of the fetus is in its mother’s womb, and not in the air outside it; therefore,

since flesh went outside its boundary,

outside the boundary of the womb into the air of the world, it

became forbidden

by the prohibition, “flesh in the field that is tereifa you shall not eat.”

And the Gemara raises an objection against Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav from our Mishna:

We learned: If an animal is struggling to give birth, and the fetus extended its hand, and he returned it,

it is permitted for consumption.

And the Gemara infers from the fact that the Mishna said “it is permitted for consumption” after speaking about returning the hand:

What, is it not

the hand,

concerning the limb,

that the Mishna said this? And this is difficult according to Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav, who explains that only the fetus is permitted, but the limb itself is forbidden?

And the Gemara rejects this:

No,

this permission was not said concerning the limb, but

concerning the fetus,

concerning the fetus itself, which did not leave its boundary. But its hand is forbidden with the prohibition of a tereifa.

But the Gemara asks:

If,

if indeed the Mishna said that only

concerning the fetus

it is permitted for consumption,

why specifically,

why did our Mishna establish its ruling only in the case in which he

returned it,

in which he returned the hand before the slaughtering of the mother?

For

even

if he

did not return it

his hand,

also,

the entire fetus is likewise permitted for consumption [apart from the hand], since the fetus itself never left its boundary, and there is no reason to prohibit it?

And the Gemara answers: Indeed,

the same law applies

that the fetus is permitted for consumption

even though he did not return

the hand,

and

the reason our Mishna stated specifically the case in which he “returned it” is that

since he needed

to

teach the latter clause,

since the tannai already had to teach at the end of this section of our Mishna:

he extended

the fetus

its head; even though he returned it, it is considered born

[that is, this is the novel point: it is considered born despite his returning its head into the womb of its mother], for this reason

he also taught,

he taught also in the

first clause,

at the beginning of our Mishna, concerning the hand,

“he returned it.”

But in truth, even if he did not return its hand before the slaughtering of the mother, only the fetus is permitted for consumption, whereas the hand that extended outward is forbidden.

And the Gemara asks:

And the latter clause

of the words of our Mishna, which says that if the fetus extended its head it is permitted for consumption,

what does it teach us?

Lest you say that the intention of the Mishna is to say

, since it went out

the head of the fetus has already

become a birth,

and the fetus is no longer permitted through the slaughtering of its mother, and is fit only through its own slaughtering,

it is impossible to say this, since we have already

learned,

we have learned this law in a Mishna, as we learned:

Which is the firstborn

that is fit

for inheritance,

to take a double portion in the inheritance,

and

on the other hand he

is not a firstborn for the priests,

with regard to the requirement to redeem him from the priests?—

This is a firstborn

who comes after miscarriages

[when a woman gave birth to twins, as will be explained below], for with regard to “firstborn for inheritance,” the first child must be capable of living. And if he is not capable of living, he is not considered a firstborn for inheritance and does not prevent the son born after him from taking a double portion of his father’s estate.

For concerning an inheritance of a double portion it is said [Deuteronomy 21:17], “For he is the beginning of his strength; to him belongs the right of the firstborn.” And we learn from this that only one over whose death his father’s heart grieves and suffers is considered a firstborn for inheritance. This excludes a miscarriage, over whose death his father’s heart does not grieve as it grieves over the death of a viable son. Therefore, he is not considered a firstborn with regard to an inheritance of a double portion; rather, the son born after him is considered the firstborn for this matter.

However, with regard to the redemption of the firstborn, even a miscarriage exempts the child born after him from redemption, because the redemption of the son was not stated concerning a viable first son, but concerning the one who opens the womb, who is the first in birth. And a miscarriage is also included in the one who opens the womb. Therefore, the child born after him is not considered a firstborn for redemption.

And this is the law:

If a woman gave birth to twins, and the first was a miscarriage whose nine months of gestation had not been completed,

even though he extended his head alive,

and he returned it, and afterward his brother came out, the second is the firstborn with regard to inheritance. For even if the first had been born entirely, he would not prevent the one born after him. Since his heart does not grieve over him. But he is not the firstborn with regard to the redemption of the son. Rather, the first, the miscarriage, is the firstborn for this matter.

Or

even if the first is

a nine-month child,

of nine months of gestation,

whose head came out dead,

the one born after him is considered the firstborn with regard to inheritance, but is not the firstborn with regard to redemption.

And from these words of the Mishna the Gemara proves, and asks:

The reason,

the reason that the second fetus is the firstborn with regard to inheritance is because

the head of

the first came out when he was

dead!

But,

however, if

the head

of the first fetus came out

alive, then he is important as though he had been born,

and

the one born after him

is not a firstborn for any matter, and even

a firstborn for inheritance—

also he is not.

If so, it is explicitly explained in this Mishna that the departure of the head is considered a birth. And it is difficult: why does the tannai of our Mishna need to teach this law again?

The Gemara raises a possibility for answering and explaining why this law must be taught in both Mishnayot:

And if you would say,

lest you say in order to answer that from the Mishna in Bekhorot there

he teaches us

that

in

the birth of

a human

the departure of the head is considered a birth.

And

here

he teaches us

the tannai teaches us that this law, that the departure of the head is considered a birth, applies also

in

the birth of

an animal.

And these two Mishnayot are necessary for these two different laws, since

a human cannot be learned from an animal,

it is not possible to learn one from the other, since

an animal has no passageway.

That is, its womb is exposed, and immediately upon the departure of the head the birth is recognizable. But in a woman, her womb is not exposed; rather, her thighs are like a passageway, and the departure of the child is not clearly recognizable until most of him has come out. It would therefore have been possible to say that with the departure of the head he is still not considered born, since he is still not recognizable.

And therefore, even with regard to a human, it is necessary to teach that the departure of the head is considered a birth. For this reason it is necessary to teach this law also concerning a human. And it is necessary to teach this law concerning an animal, and we will not learn the law of an animal from a human, since

an animal cannot be learned from a human.

It cannot be learned, because if we teach this law, that with the departure of the head he is considered born, only concerning a human, we would say that this law was stated only concerning a human because

his facial features are significant,

his face has significance. Therefore, it is possible to say that with the departure of the face, this is considered the birth of the human. But concerning an animal, whose face has no significance, it would be possible to say that the departure of the face is insufficient; rather, most of its body must come out. And we would not learn this law from a human. Therefore, the tannai must teach in our Mishna that even the departure of the head of an animal’s offspring is considered a birth.

However, it is still difficult, for

but

concerning an animal

we also learned

elsewhere that the departure of the head is considered a birth, as we learned below in a Mishna:

The afterbirth

[the sac that encloses the fetus while it is in its mother’s womb]

whose part came out,

and afterward the animal was slaughtered,

is forbidden,

the afterbirth together with everything inside it

for consumption.

And even the part that was inside the animal at the time of the slaughtering is forbidden, although a fetus found inside the animal at the time of the slaughtering is permitted for consumption even without its own slaughtering.

And the entire afterbirth is forbidden for consumption, because

just as

the afterbirth constitutes

a sign

of the presence of the

offspring in a woman, so

the afterbirth constitutes

a sign

of the

offspring

that is

in an animal.

And we must be concerned that perhaps within that part of the afterbirth the head also came out, and if so, the entire rest of the fetus enclosed inside the animal is considered born in its entirety. Therefore, it is forbidden, and it is not permitted through the slaughtering of the animal.

And it is proven that the departure of the head is considered a birth even in an animal. If so, this too is difficult: why was this law taught here as well?

If you say that it is well

that the words of our Mishna, “the fetus extended its hand and returned it, it is permitted for consumption,” were said concerning the limb, that is, concerning its hand that extended outward, which is permitted for consumption, there is no difficulty at all. For according to this, the words of the Mishna, “even though he

returned it,

it is considered born,”

in the first clause,

at the beginning of our Mishna,

specifically

were said to teach that the limb itself is permitted only specifically if he returned it before slaughtering.

And if so, although the words of the Mishna later, “he extended its head; even though he returned it, it is considered born,” seem superfluous, as the Gemara asks, nevertheless it can be said:

the tannai

taught this matter in

the latter clause because of the first clause.

Since at the beginning of the Mishna the tannai taught this law concerning a limb that he extended and returned, which is permitted, the tannai returned and taught in the Mishna also the law of extending the head, that even though he returned it, it is forbidden.

Indeed, the primary source of the law that the departure of the head is a birth is not here, but below, in the law of “an afterbirth whose part came out,” as stated. Here we are discussing only the matter of returning the head.

Rather, if you say

that the meaning of the words of our Mishna is according to Rav, who explains that the law “the fetus extended its hand and returned it, it is permitted for consumption” was said only concerning the fetus itself, which is permitted for consumption, but the limb that extended outward is forbidden, this is difficult, for necessarily

not

was the law

of the first clause,

that “if he returned it, it is permitted for consumption,” stated

specifically,

since certainly the fetus inside is permitted even if he did not return its hand.

And

if so, also

not

the law

that

is explained in

the latter clause,

that “he extended its head; even though he returned it, it is considered born,” was stated

specifically.

For it is superfluous.

And it is again difficult:

why does he need

the tannai of our Mishna

to teach it,

to teach

at all

the law of the fetus extending its head, and why is it necessary?

The Gemara answers:

No,

there is no difficulty. For

in any event

the law explained in our Mishna, that it is permitted for consumption,

concerns the fetus,

was stated, and the words of the Mishna, “the fetus extended its hand and returned it,” are specifically stated.

And as Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said

[his words were brought in the discussion of the Gemara below, 78b],

it was necessary,

the permission of the fetus was not stated

except for the “place

of the

cut.”

the place where they cut the limb.

For when the fetus extended its hand and did not return it, it is not sufficient to cut off the limb that extended and discard it [as is the law concerning a limb from a living creature, which is forbidden]. Rather, even “the place of the cut,” which is the boundary as narrow as a hairsbreadth between the part that extended [the forbidden part] and the part remaining inside [the permitted part], that narrow place too is forbidden.

And the reason for the prohibition of “the place of the cut” is that it stands at the opening of the womb and is not included in “an animal—in an animal you may eat” [which is the source for the fact that a fetus in the womb of its mother is permitted even without its own slaughtering], since the place of the cut is not actually inside it.

Here too,

so too are the words of our Mishna, “if he returned it, it is permitted for eating”

, it was necessary only

they were stated

only

in order

to

permit the

“place

of the

cut”!

And although the fetus itself is permitted without the returning of the hand, nevertheless the returning is effective for the place of the cut. Since he returned it, this place is again included in “an animal within an animal you shall eat,” because at the time of slaughter it was inside the animal.

And although the limb that emerged itself is prohibited because of “flesh in the field, tereifa, you shall not eat,” nevertheless the place of the cut is not considered to be one that emerged, since it stands at the edge of the womb. Therefore, he cuts off the limb that emerged, and everything else is permitted for eating.

And the difficulty of the Gemara is resolved: this law—that the fetus is permitted for eating—was taught here in order to permit the place of the cut.

And likewise, it is not difficult why it was necessary to state the latter clause, “if the fetus brought out its head, even though he returned it, it has the status of one born,” because the tanna taught the latter clause on account of the first clause.

The Gemara brings proof that indeed the law of our Mishna was stated only with regard to the place of the cut:

Come and hear: If an animal is having difficulty giving birth,

if

the fetus brought out its hand and returned it, and afterward a person slaughtered

a person

its mother, it is permitted for eating.

If he slaughtered its mother, and

only afterward

he returned

the hand,

it is prohibited for eating.

If

it brought out its hand and he cut it off

the hand,

and afterward he slaughtered its mother,

then the hand

that

was

outside

and was cut off

is impure

like an animal carcass!

Because it is a limb from a living creature. And below we learn that a limb from a living creature imparts impurity like an animal carcass.

And

therefore it is

prohibited

to eat the hand.

And

the entire fetus

that

was

inside

at the time of slaughter—

is pure. And it does not become impure through contact with the hand [through its connection to the hand when it was outside and became prohibited], for the hand was cut off before slaughter, and it touched it only while alive. And while alive it is not considered food, and it is not prepared to receive the impurity of food,

It does not become impure through contact with the hand [by virtue of its connection to the hand while the hand was outside and became forbidden], because the hand was cut off before slaughter, and the fetus touched it only while the animal was alive. While the animal is alive, it is not considered food and is not rendered fit to contract food impurity,

and it is permitted

for eating, for the slaughter of its mother permits it.

And if the fetus brought out its hand and did not return it, and

he slaughtered

a person

its mother, and afterward he cut it off

the hand—