Chullin 68a (סח.) — the Talmud in English

1.

An animal having difficulty

giving birth,

and

they decided to slaughter it,

And

before the slaughter

the fetus extended its hand

outside the animal’s body,

and returned it

inside its mother’s body before she was slaughtered, and afterward its mother was slaughtered: even if the fetus is found alive inside its mother’s womb, it is

permitted

for consumption,

even without slaughtering it itself, because it is permitted for consumption through the slaughter by which its mother was slaughtered [as the Gemara will expound below].

However, the hand itself that emerged is prohibited for consumption, even if it returned to the mother’s womb and was inside her at the time of slaughter. [The Gemara below will explain that a limb that emerged and returned is prohibited under the prohibition of terefa.]

2. But if

the fetus extended

its

its head

before its mother was slaughtered, then

even though he returned it

before the slaughter,

this is considered as having been born.

It is therefore no longer permitted through its mother’s slaughter, because the emergence of its head from its mother’s body is considered a birth.

Accordingly, if it happened that the fetus extended its head and returned it, and after its mother was slaughtered the fetus was found alive inside her body, it requires slaughter of its own. If it was found dead, it is prohibited as a carcass.

The Mishna presents another law:

3. If a person inserted his hand into the animal and was

cutting

a piece of a limb

from the fetus inside her womb,

leaving the piece inside her,

that part is

for consumption

permitted for consumption

through the slaughter of the animal, and it is not prohibited as the limb of a living creature, because it is stated [Deuteronomy 14:6]: “Every animal that has a split hoof and is completely cleft into two hooves, that brings up its cud, among the animals, you may eat.”

The Sages expounded the words of the verse as follows: every “animal” [mentioned at the beginning of the verse] that is “among the animals” [mentioned at the end of the verse], you may eat! For a fetus found inside an animal is permitted for consumption through the slaughter of its mother, even if it is found inside her after having been cut into pieces. 4. But if he cut

from the spleen or from the kidneys

of the animal itself, then even if he left the pieces inside her,

the cut

part is

prohibited for consumption

as the limb of a living creature, and it remains prohibited even after the animal is slaughtered.

The Mishna specifically mentions cutting the spleen and kidneys because they are limbs whose cutting or removal from the animal’s body does not render it a terefa. But cutting other limbs renders the animal a terefa.

5.

This is the general rule:

Anything

that

is cut from

the body

of the animal, even if the animal is slaughtered while it is inside her,

is prohibited

for consumption as the limb of a living creature, and is not permitted through the animal’s slaughter.

6.

However, every part that is cut,

which is not

from

the body

of the animal, but from the fetus inside her womb, and was lying inside her at the time of slaughter,

is permitted

for consumption through the slaughter of the animal.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “The fetus extended its hand and returned it—it is permitted for consumption.”

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

Only the fetus itself is permitted for consumption,

but

the

limb itself,

which the fetus extended outside its mother’s body and returned,

is prohibited.

That is, the permission for consumption stated in the Mishna applies only to the fetus itself, as will be explained below. For although the entire fetus is permitted, nevertheless, the limb that emerged and returned is not permitted through the mother’s slaughter.

What is the reason

that the limb that emerged is prohibited, despite the fact that it returned and was inside the mother’s womb at the time of slaughter, and the mother’s slaughter was effective for the fetus?

For the verse states [Exodus 22:30],

“And flesh torn in the field, you shall not eat.”

The Sages expounded that “flesh in the field” refers to flesh found outside its “boundary.” The fetus’s proper place is its mother’s womb, and not the air outside it. Therefore,

once flesh has emerged beyond its boundary,

outside the boundary of the womb into the air of the world, it is

prohibited

by the prohibition “and flesh torn in the field, you shall not eat.”

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rav Yehuda, who said in the name of Rav, based on our Mishna:

We learned: If an animal is having difficulty giving birth, and the fetus extended its foreleg and then withdrew it,

it is permitted to be eaten.

The Gemara infers this from the fact that the Mishna says “it is permitted to be eaten” after discussing the withdrawal of the foreleg:

Is it not

the foreleg,

the limb,

that the Mishna is referring to by this statement? This is difficult according to Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav, who explains that only the fetus is permitted, whereas the limb itself is forbidden.

The Gemara rejects this:

No;

this permission was not stated with regard to the limb, but rather

with regard to the fetus,

the fetus itself, which did not emerge beyond its boundary. But its foreleg is forbidden as a tereifa.

But the Gemara raises a further objection:

If,

if indeed the Mishna said that only

the fetus

is permitted to be eaten,

why specifically

did our Mishna establish its ruling only in a case where

it withdrew it,

where the foreleg was withdrawn before the slaughter of the mother?

After all,

even

if

it did not withdraw it,

its foreleg,

also,

the entire fetus would likewise be permitted to be eaten [apart from the foreleg], since the fetus itself never emerged beyond its boundary, and there is no reason to forbid it.

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

the same law applies

and the fetus is permitted to be eaten

even though it did not withdraw

its foreleg;

and

the reason our Mishna specifically states the case where “it withdrew it” is that

since it was necessary

to

teach the latter clause,

since the tanna already had to teach at the end of this section of our Mishna:

It extended

the fetus

its head; even though it withdrew it, this is considered a birth

that is, the novelty is that it is considered born despite having withdrawn its head into its mother’s womb—therefore

he also taught,

he taught in

the first clause,

at the beginning of our Mishna, with regard to the foreleg,

“it withdrew it.”

In truth, even if it did not withdraw its foreleg before the slaughter of the mother, only the fetus is permitted to be eaten; the emerging foreleg is forbidden.

The Gemara raises a further objection:

And the latter clause

of our Mishna, which states that if the fetus extended its head it is permitted to be eaten,

what does it teach us?

Perhaps the intention of the Mishna is to say

, that once

the fetus’s head has emerged,

it has thereby undergone a birth,

and the fetus is no longer permitted through the slaughter of its mother, but is fit for consumption only through its own slaughter.

This cannot be said, because we have already

learned,

we have learned this law in a Mishna, as it teaches:

Which is the firstborn

who is fit

for inheritance,

to receive a double portion of the inheritance,

and

yet

is not a firstborn for the priests,

with regard to the requirement that he be redeemed from the priests?—

This is a firstborn

born after miscarriages [

when a woman gives birth to twins, as will be explained below]. With regard to a “firstborn for inheritance,” the firstborn child must be viable. If he is not viable, he is not considered a firstborn for inheritance, and he does not prevent the son born after him from receiving a double portion of his father’s estate.

For with regard to receiving a double portion, it is stated: “For he is the first fruit of his vigor; the birthright is his due” [Deuteronomy 21:17]. From this it is learned that only one whose father’s heart grieves and mourns his death is considered a firstborn for inheritance. This excludes a miscarriage, over whose death his father’s heart does not grieve as it does over the death of a viable son. Therefore, a miscarriage is not considered a firstborn with regard to receiving a double portion; rather, the son born after him is considered the firstborn in this regard.

However, with regard to the redemption of a firstborn son, even a miscarriage exempts the son born after him from redemption, because the mitzva of the redemption of the firstborn was not stated with regard to a viable firstborn son, but with regard to “the one who opens the womb,” meaning the first to be born. A miscarriage is also included in “the one who opens the womb,” and therefore the son born after him is not considered a firstborn for redemption.

And this is the law:

If a woman gives birth to twins, and the first was a miscarriage whose nine months of gestation had not been completed,

even though its head emerged alive,

and she withdrew it, and afterward its brother emerged, the second is the firstborn with regard to inheritance. For even if the first had been born in its entirety, it would not prevent the one born after it from inheriting as a firstborn, since his father’s heart does not grieve over him. But he is not the firstborn with regard to the redemption of the son. Rather, the first, the miscarriage, is the firstborn in this regard.

Or

even if the first is a

nine-month

fetus,

whose head emerged dead,

the one born after him is considered the firstborn for inheritance, but is not the firstborn with regard to redemption.

From these words of the Mishna, the Gemara proves and raises an objection:

The reason

the second fetus is the firstborn with regard to inheritance is because

the head

of the first emerged while it was

dead!

But

if

the head

of the first fetus emerged

alive,

it is considered as though it had been born, and

the one born after it

is not a firstborn for any purpose, not even

a firstborn for inheritance—

it is not one either.

Thus, this Mishna explicitly establishes that the emergence of the head is considered a birth. And it is difficult: Why did the tanna of our Mishna need to teach this law again?

The Gemara proposes a way to answer this and explain why the law must be taught in both Mishnayot:

And if you would say,

perhaps one could answer that the Mishna in Bekhorot there

teaches us

that

in

the birth of

a human

the emergence of the head is considered a birth.

And

whereas here

it teaches us

that this law—that the emergence of the head is considered a birth—also applies

in

the birth of

an animal.

Both Mishnayot are necessary for these two different laws, since

the law of a human cannot be learned from that of an animal,

because

an animal has no birth canal.

That is, its womb is exposed, and the birth is evident immediately when the head emerges. In a woman, however, the womb is not exposed; rather, her thighs function somewhat like a birth canal, and the emergence of the fetus is not clearly evident until the majority of it has emerged. It might therefore have been said that the fetus is not considered born when only its head emerges, since it is not yet clearly recognizable.

Therefore, even with regard to a human, it is necessary to teach that the emergence of the head is considered a birth. For this reason, this law must be taught with regard to a human as well. And it is necessary to teach the law with regard to an animal, rather than learn the law of an animal from that of a human, since

the law of an animal cannot be learned from that of a human.

It cannot be learned because if the law that emergence of the head constitutes birth were taught only with regard to a human, we would say that this law applies only to a human because

his facial features are significant,

and therefore it can be said that with the emergence of the face, this constitutes the birth of a human. In an animal, however, whose facial features are not significant, one might say that the emergence of the face is insufficient and that the majority of its body must emerge. We could not learn the law from a human. Therefore, the tanna must teach in our Mishna that even the emergence of the head of an animal’s fetus is considered a birth.

However, this remains difficult, since

but

with regard to an animal

we also learned

elsewhere that the emergence of the head is considered a birth, as we learned in the Mishna below:

The placenta

[the sac enclosing the fetus while it is in its mother’s womb]

of which part emerged,

and afterward the animal was slaughtered,

is forbidden,

the placenta together with everything inside it

to be eaten.

Even the part that was inside the animal at the time of slaughter is forbidden, although a fetus found inside an animal at the time of slaughter is permitted to be eaten even without its own slaughter.

And the entire placenta is forbidden to be eaten because

just as

the placenta constitutes

a sign

of the presence of

a fetus in a woman, so

the placenta constitutes

a sign

of

a fetus

in

an animal.

There is concern that the head too may have emerged through that part of the placenta. If so, the rest of the fetus enclosed within the animal is considered entirely born. Therefore it is forbidden, and it is not permitted through the slaughter of the animal.

This proves that the emergence of the head is considered a birth even in an animal. If so, this too is difficult: Why was this law taught here as well?

Granted, if you say

that the words of our Mishna, “the fetus extended its foreleg and withdrew it, and it is permitted to be eaten,” were stated with regard to the limb—that is, the emerging foreleg itself is permitted to be eaten—there is no difficulty at all. According to this, the words of the Mishna, “even though it

withdrew it, it is considered born,”

in the first clause,

at the beginning of our Mishna, were stated

specifically

to teach that the limb itself is permitted only if it was withdrawn before slaughter.

And if so, although the words of the Mishna later, “it extended its head; even though it withdrew it, it is considered born,” appear to be superfluous, as the Gemara asks, nevertheless it can be said:

And if so, although the later words of the Mishna, “he extended its head; even though he withdrew it, it is considered born,” appear superfluous, as the Gemara asks, nevertheless it can be explained as follows:

The tanna

taught this matter in

the latter clause on account of the first clause.

Since at the beginning of the Mishna the tanna taught the law concerning a limb that was extended and withdrawn and is permitted, the tanna returned and taught in the Mishna also the law concerning a head that emerged: even though it was withdrawn, it remains forbidden.

Indeed, the primary source for the law that the emergence of the head constitutes a birth is not here, but below, in the law of “a placenta of which part emerged,” as stated. Here we are discussing only the withdrawal of the head.

But, if you say

that the meaning of our Mishna is in accordance with Rav, who explains that the law “the fetus extended its foreleg and withdrew it, and it is permitted to be eaten” applies only to the fetus itself, which is permitted to be eaten, whereas the emerging limb is forbidden, it is difficult, since perforce

the law

of

the first clause,

that “if it withdrew it, it is permitted to be eaten,” was not stated

specifically,

since certainly the fetus inside is permitted even if it did not withdraw its foreleg.

And

if so,

the law

also

that

is stated in

the latter clause, that “it extended its head; even though it withdrew it, it is considered born,” was not stated

specifically

either, since it is superfluous.

The difficulty therefore recurs:

why did the tanna need

to

the tanna of our Mishna

teach it

to teach

at all

the law concerning a fetus that extended its head, and why was this necessary?

The Gemara answers:

No,

there is no difficulty, because

indeed

the law stated in our Mishna, that it is permitted to be eaten,

was stated with regard to the fetus, and the words of the Mishna, “the fetus extended its foreleg and withdrew it,” are specifically stated.

And as Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said

[his words were cited in the Gemara’s discussion below, 78b]:

[his statement is cited in the Gemara’s discussion below, on 78b],

it was necessary—the permission of the fetus

was stated only with regard to the “place of the cut”

where

the

“cut”

the limb was severed.

For when the fetus extended its foreleg and did not withdraw it, it is insufficient merely to cut off the emerging limb and discard it [as is done with a limb from a living creature, which is forbidden]. Rather, even “the place of the cut”—the precisely defined boundary, as thin as a strand of hair, between the emerging part [which is forbidden] and the part remaining inside [which is permitted]—that precise place is also forbidden.

The reason for the prohibition of “the place of the cut” is that it stands at the opening of the womb and is not included in “an animal within an animal you may eat” [which is the source for permitting a fetus in its mother’s womb even without its own slaughter], since the place of the cut is not actually inside it.

Here too,

so too, the statement of our Mishna, “If they withdrew it, it is permitted to eat,”

, was necessary

was not stated

except

in order

to

permit

“the place

of the

incision”!

Although the fetus itself is permitted even without withdrawing the hand, nevertheless, withdrawing it renders the place of the incision permitted. Once they withdrew it, this place is again included in “an animal within an animal you shall eat,” since at the time of slaughter it was inside the animal.

Although the protruding limb itself is forbidden because of “You shall not eat flesh torn in the field,” nevertheless, the place of the incision is not considered part of what protruded, since it stands at the opening of the womb. Therefore, he cuts off the protruding limb, and everything else is permitted for consumption.

The difficulty raised by the Gemara is thereby resolved: The statement that the fetus is permitted for consumption was taught here in order to permit the place of the incision.

Nor is it difficult why the latter clause was necessary—“If the fetus brought out its head, even though it withdrew it, it is considered as born”—because the tanna taught the latter clause on account of the first clause.

The Gemara brings proof that the law of our Mishna was stated only with regard to the place of the incision:

Come and hear: If an animal is having difficulty giving birth,

if

the fetus brought out its hand, withdrew it, and afterward a person slaughtered

its

mother, it is permitted for consumption.

If he slaughtered its mother, and

only afterward

withdrew

the hand,

it is forbidden for consumption.

If

he brought out its hand and cut it off

the hand,

and afterward slaughtered its mother,

the hand that

was

had been

outside

and was severed

is impure

like an unslaughtered carcass!

Because it is a limb taken from a living creature. And below we learn that a limb taken from a living creature imparts impurity like an unslaughtered carcass.

And

therefore it is

forbidden

to eat the hand.

And

the entire fetus that

was

was

inside

at the time of slaughter is

pure. It does not become impure through contact with the hand [by virtue of its attachment to the hand while the latter was outside and became forbidden], since the hand was severed before slaughter, and it came into contact with it only while the fetus was alive. While alive, it is not considered food and is not rendered fit to contract the impurity of food,

It does not become impure through contact with the hand [by virtue of its connection to the hand while the hand was outside and became forbidden], because the hand was cut off before slaughter, and the fetus touched it only while the animal was alive. While the animal is alive, it is not considered food and is not rendered fit to contract food impurity,

and is permitted

for consumption, since the slaughter of its mother renders it permitted.

And if the fetus brought out its hand and did not withdraw it, and

he slaughtered

its

mother, and afterward cut it off

the hand—