Chullin 5a — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

Jehoshaphat was not

separating himself, being cautious and keeping apart,

from

Ahab; he was careful and separated

himself from him

Ahab, for he did not suspect him of causing him to stumble, as we prove below. Thus, one who is an apostate with regard to idolatry is not an apostate with regard to the entire Torah.

And now we explain:

from where do we know

that Jehoshaphat did not suspect Ahab that perhaps Ahab would cause him to eat forbidden foods?

If you say, from what is written,

that Jehoshaphat said to Ahab, king of Israel: “

Like me —

like you; like my people —

like your people,”

and the meaning of the words is that it is possible to rely upon you just as one relies upon us with regard to prohibition and permission.

But from now,

regarding that which is written later in Jehoshaphat’s words: “

Like my horses —

like your horses,”

does this

likewise

speak with regard to prohibition and permission!?

Rather,

the intention of Jehoshaphat’s words was to say to Ahab:

Whatever happens to your horses,

whatever will happen to your horses during the war,

shall happen

also

to my horses.

And if so,

likewise,

at the beginning of the verse, where it is written, “Like me — like you; like my people — like your people,” his intention was to say:

Whatever is upon you and upon your people —

shall be upon me and upon my people.

And the question returns: from where do we know that Jehoshaphat did not suspect Ahab?

Rather, from here

we derive it: from that which is written there: “

And the king of Israel and Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, were sitting, each upon his throne, dressed in garments, on the threshing floor, at the entrance of the gate of Samaria.”

What is “threshing floor”?

If you say, an actual threshing floor

of grain,

literally —

was the gate of Samaria a threshing floor!?

Rather,

Ahab and Jehoshaphat were sitting there with affection, friendship, and in one group,

like a threshing floor

like the Sanhedrin sitting together in the form of half a threshing floor, and they do not suspect one another.

As we learned: The Sanhedrin was

sitting

like a semicircular threshing floor, so that

all the judges

could see one another,

and each would hear the other, and they would debate among themselves until a ruling according to halakha emerged from them.

Shall we say that this supports

Rav Anan, who said that an Israelite who is an apostate with regard to idolatry is permitted to eat from his slaughter, from that which is written concerning Elijah, when he hid from Ahab and from Jezebel: “

And the ravens brought him bread and meat in the morning, and bread and meat in the evening.” And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav

they brought them from Ahab’s slaughterhouse.

And it is demonstrated that Ahab’s slaughterhouse was kosher even though he was an apostate with regard to idolatry.

And we reject this:

By divine command

is different.

For the Holy One, blessed be He, explicitly permitted him to eat these foods, as it is written: “And He commanded the ravens to sustain you.” And one cannot bring proof from here to a place in which there is no permission by divine command.

And now we explain this verse:

What are “ravens”?

Ravina said: Actual ravens.

Rav Adda bar Minyomi said to

Ravina:

Perhaps it is referring to two men whose names were “Ravens”

he is saying!?

Is it not written: “And they killed Oreb at the rock of Oreb, and Ze’ev,” and so on?!

He said to him,

Ravina said to him rhetorically: It is understandable that we find one man who was called “Oreb,” but is it possible that

it happened that both of them were named “Ravens” [unclear: the source’s wording is corrupt or plays on the plural form]?

And we again ask rhetorically:

Perhaps it was after the name of their place,

for they were from the Rock of Oreb; therefore, it is quite possible to find several men who were called “Ravens,” yet they were still men and not actual ravens. And from where do we know that the verse is speaking of actual ravens?

And the proof that Scripture calls people by the name of their place is that

is it not written: “And Aram went out in raiding bands, and they took captive from the land of Israel a little girl. And it is difficult for us

with regard to this verse:

It calls her a maiden,

who had already developed two pubic hairs,

and it calls her

also

a little girl,

who had not yet developed two pubic hairs. How are the two verses to be reconciled?

And Rabbi Pedat said:

The one who was taken captive

was a little girl,

and Scripture called her a maiden after the name of her place, for she was

from “Na’uran,”

from a place called “Na’uran.”

And we reject this: If these two “Ravens” were called after the name of their place,

if so,

why does it call them Ravens? After all,

it should have called them “Ravenites”

to call them that!?

Rather, it is proven that they were actual ravens who brought Elijah his food from Ahab’s slaughterhouse.

And furthermore we say:

Shall we say that this supports

Rav Anan, that even one who is an apostate with regard to idolatry does not become an apostate with regard to the entire Torah?

As it was taught:

All slaughter, and even a Samaritan, and even an uncircumcised person, and even an Israelite apostate, may perform slaughter.

And the Gemara asks:

This uncircumcised person,

who is fit for slaughter,

what are the circumstances?

If you say that his brothers died because of circumcision,

then

this one is a fully valid Israelite.

And why does the tanna say, “and even an uncircumcised person”?

Rather, it is obvious

that he is

an apostate with regard to uncircumcision,

and even so he is fit for slaughter.

Come and hear the latter clause: And even an Israelite apostate.

What are the circumstances? If he is an apostate with regard to another matter —

that is the same as an apostate with regard to uncircumcision!?

And why did the tanna need to repeat and teach it?

Rather, is it not an apostate with regard to idolatry?

And it was necessary to inform us that even such an apostate is fit for slaughter [for we would not have known it from an apostate with regard to uncircumcision], and this is in accordance with Rav Anan.

And we reject this:

No,

do not infer from here in accordance with Rav Anan. For

I can always say to you: An apostate with regard to idolatry is not

fit for slaughter, because

the Master said: Idolatry is severe, for anyone who denies it —

is like one who acknowledges the entire Torah.

And from here, anyone who acknowledges idolatry is like one who denies the entire Torah, and therefore he is considered an apostate also with regard to slaughter.

Rather,

the intention of the tanna of the beraita is to say that even

an apostate with regard to that very matter,

with regard to slaughter, but he is an apostate who eats unslaughtered carcasses for appetite and not in order to anger, is fit for slaughter; and if one gives him a checked knife, he performs slaughter according to halakha, for he does not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden,

as

said

Rava,

that in the case of an apostate who eats unslaughtered carcasses for appetite, one checks a knife and gives it to him, and it is permitted to eat from his slaughter.

And it was necessary to inform us that we should not say: Since he is accustomed to it, it has become for him like something permitted.

It was objected

to Rav Anan, who said that an apostate with regard to idolatry is not considered an apostate with regard to the entire Torah, and it is permitted to eat from his slaughter, from that which was taught: It is stated in the section of offerings of a vow or a voluntary offering: “When a person offers

from you

an offering to the Lord, from the animals.” And we expound: “

From you” —

and not all of you, to exclude the apostate,

whose voluntary offering is not accepted.

And likewise we expound:

“From you” —

among you,

among Israel,

I distinguished

between a valid Israelite and an Israelite apostate, whose voluntary offering is not accepted,

but I did not

distinguish

among the nations

of the world between those who are not idolaters and idolaters. Rather, I said concerning them, “each man,” to include all the nations, even those who are idolaters who vow vows and voluntary offerings like Israel, and their offerings are accepted.

And likewise we expound: “

From the animal” —

to include human beings who resemble an animal

[in that they do not observe mitzvot], for they too bring vows and voluntary offerings.

From here they said: Offerings are accepted from the sinners of Israel so that they may return in repentance, except for an apostate, one who pours wine

to idolatry,

and one who publicly desecrates Shabbat.

This is the wording of the beraita up to here.

And the Gemara discusses this:

This itself is difficult: You said, “From you” \-

and not all of you, to exclude the apostate. And then it teaches: Offerings are accepted from the sinners of Israel,

which implies that they intentionally transgress mitzvot, and that is an apostate. And how are offerings accepted from them!?

And we explain:

This is not difficult.

For

the first clause,

in which it is written, “From you — to exclude the apostate,” speaks

of one who is an apostate with regard to the entire Torah,

whereas

the middle clause,

in which it is written, “Offerings are accepted from the sinners of Israel,” speaks of

one who is an apostate with regard to one matter.

But this is difficult:

The latter clause says: Except for the apostate, one who pours the wine, and one who publicly desecrates Shabbat.

This “apostate”

that it teaches in the latter clause,

what are the circumstances?

If

he is

an apostate with regard to the entire Torah, that is the first clause,

and what does the latter clause come to teach us!?

And if

he is

an apostate with regard to one matter —

the middle clause is difficult,

for there we say that the sinners of Israel bring offerings, and we established that it speaks of one who is an apostate with regard to one matter!?

Rather, is it not that this is what the tanna is saying

in the latter clause:

Except for an apostate with regard to pouring the wine

for idolatry,

and with regard to publicly desecrating Shabbat. Thus, an apostate with regard to idolatry

[as it teaches, “with regard to pouring the wine”]

is an apostate with regard to the entire Torah,

and his slaughter is invalid,

and this is a refutation of Rav Anan

[who deems the slaughter of an apostate with regard to idolatry fit]

a refutation.

We further investigate this beraita:

And

since

this

that offerings are not accepted from apostates

from here,

from the exclusion of “from you,”

is derived?

But

it is derived from there:

for it is written in the section of the sin offering: “And if one person sins inadvertently, from the people of the land.”