Chullin 5a (ה.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Jehoshaphat was not

distancing himself and taking care to separate

himself

from

him—from Ahab—because he did not suspect that Ahab would cause him to stumble, as we will demonstrate below. Therefore, a Jew who is an apostate with regard to idolatry is not considered an apostate with regard to the entire Torah.

because he did not suspect that Ahab would cause him to stumble, as will be demonstrated below. Therefore, an Israelite who is an apostate regarding idolatry is not necessarily an apostate regarding the entire Torah.

And now we clarify:

from where

do we know that Jehoshaphat did not suspect Ahab, lest Ahab cause him to stumble by feeding him forbidden foods?

If you say it is

from what is written, that Jehoshaphat said to Ahab, king of Israel,

“Like me”—

“like you; like my people”—

“like your people,”

the implication being that one may rely upon you just as one relies upon us with regard to what is forbidden and what is permitted.

If so, from now on,

with regard to what is written later in Jehoshaphat’s words,

“Like my horses”—

“like your horses,”

does

this too

refer to what is forbidden and what is permitted?!

Rather,

Jehoshaphat intended to say to Ahab:

“What will happen to your horses,”

whatever happens to your horses during the war,

“will happen”

also

“to my horses.”

And if so,

this too—with regard to the beginning of the verse, where it is written, “Like me—like you; like my people—like your people”—

his intention was to say:

“What will happen to you and to your people”—

“will happen to me and to my people.”

The question therefore returns: From where do we know that Jehoshaphat did not suspect Ahab?

Rather, it is from here

that we derive it: from what is written there:

“And the king of Israel and Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, sat each on his throne, dressed in garments, on the threshing floor, at the entrance of the gate of Samaria.”

What is the meaning of “threshing floor”?

If you say it means a threshing floor

of grain

literally—

was the gate of Samaria a threshing floor?!

Rather,

Ahab and Jehoshaphat were sitting there in affection, friendship, and unity,

“like a threshing floor”

like a Sanhedrin sitting together in the form of half a circular threshing floor, with its members not suspecting one another.

As we learned: The Sanhedrin would sit

seated

like half of a circle, so that

all the judges

could see one another,

and each would hear the other, and they would debate among themselves until a ruling emerged from them in accordance with halakha.

Shall we say that this supports

Rav Anan, who said that a Jew who is an apostate with regard to idolatry is permitted to eat from his slaughtering, from that which is written about Elijah, when he hid from Ahab and Jezebel:

“And the ravens brought him bread and meat in the morning, and bread and meat in the evening.” And Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

“They brought them from Ahab’s slaughterhouse.”

And it is evident that Ahab’s slaughterhouse was kosher, despite the fact that he was an apostate with regard to idolatry.

And we reject this:

“By divine command”—

is different.

For the Holy One, blessed be He, explicitly permitted him to eat these foods, as it is written: “And He commanded the ravens to sustain you.” Therefore, no proof may be brought from here to a case in which there is no permission by divine command.

And now we explain this verse:

What is the meaning of “ravens”?

Ravina said: Actual ravens.

Rav Adda bar Minyomi said

to Ravina:

Perhaps it is referring to two men whose names were “Orev”

that it

says? Is it not written: “And they slew Orev at the rock of Orev, and Ze’ev,” and so forth?!

He said to him:

Ravina said to him rhetorically: It is understandable that we find one man called “Orev,” but is it possible that

the matter is being distorted so that both of them were named “Orevim”?!

And we raise another question:

Perhaps they were named after their place,

as they were from the Rock of Orev. In that case, we can indeed find several men called “Orevim,” and nevertheless they were men and not actual ravens. From where do we know that the verse is referring to actual ravens?

And the proof that Scripture calls people by the name of their place is that

is it not written: “And Aram went out in bands, and they took captive from the land of Israel a little girl.” And we have a difficulty

with this verse:

It calls her a girl,

which indicates that she had already developed two pubic hairs,

and it calls her

also

a little girl,

which indicates that she had not yet developed two pubic hairs. How can both verses be fulfilled?

And Rabbi Pedat said:

The one who was taken captive

was a little girl,

but Scripture called her a girl by the name of her place, for she was

from Ne’uran,

from a place called “Ne’uran.”

And we reject this: If these two “Orevim” were named after their place,

then

why does it call them “Orevim”? It should have

called them “Oreviim”

instead!?

Rather, it is evident that they were actual ravens who brought Elijah his food from Ahab’s slaughterhouse.

And furthermore, we say:

Shall we say that this supports

Rav Anan, who said that even an apostate with regard to idolatry does not become an apostate with regard to the entire Torah?

A beraita teaches:

Everyone may perform slaughtering, even a Kuti, even one uncircumcised, and even an apostate Jew.

And the Gemara asks:

This uncircumcised person

who is fit to perform slaughtering,

what are the circumstances?

If you say that his brothers died because of circumcision,

then

this person is a fully-fledged Jew.

Why, then, does the tanna say, “Even one uncircumcised”?!

Rather, it is obvious

that he is

an apostate with regard to circumcision,

and nevertheless he is fit to perform slaughtering.

Come and hear the latter clause: “And even an apostate Jew.”

What are the circumstances? If he is an apostate with regard to another matter—

is this not the same as an apostate with regard to circumcision?!

Why did the tanna need to repeat it?

Rather, is it not an apostate with regard to idolatry?

And it was necessary to teach us that even such an apostate is fit to perform slaughtering [as we would not have known this from the case of an apostate with regard to circumcision], in accordance with Rav Anan.

And we reject this:

No,

do not infer from here support for Rav Anan. For

I will always tell you: An apostate with regard to idolatry is not

fit to perform slaughtering, because

the Master said: Idolatry is severe, for anyone who denies it—

is considered as one who affirms the entire Torah.

It follows that anyone who affirms idolatry is like one who denies the entire Torah, and therefore he is considered an apostate even with regard to slaughtering.

Rather,

the intention of the tanna of the beraita is to say that even

an apostate with regard to that very matter,

slaughtering—meaning an apostate who eats unslaughtered carcasses out of appetite and not in order to provoke—is fit to perform slaughtering. If one gives him a checked knife, he performs the slaughtering in accordance with halakha, because he would not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden,

as

said

Rava

said: In the case of an apostate who eats unslaughtered carcasses out of appetite, one checks the knife and gives it to him, and it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering.

And it was necessary to teach this, lest we say that since he has become accustomed to it, it has become as permitted to him.

The following objection was raised

against Rav Anan, who said that an apostate with regard to idolatry is not considered an apostate with regard to the entire Torah and that it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering, from what was taught in a beraita: It is stated in the passage concerning offerings brought as vows or freewill offerings: “When a person offers

from you an offering to the Lord, from the cattle.” And we expound:

an offering to the Lord, from animals.” And we expound: “

“From you”—

but not all of you, to exclude an apostate,

whose freewill offering is not accepted.

And likewise we expound:

“From you”—

among you,

among Jews,

I have distinguished

between a fit Jew and an apostate Jew, whose freewill offering is not accepted,

but I have not

distinguished

among the nations

of the world between those who are not idolaters and idolaters. Rather, with regard to them I said “each person,” to include all the nations, even those among them who are idolaters and who make vows and bring freewill offerings like Jews; their offerings are accepted.

And likewise we expound:

“From the cattle”—

to include human beings who resemble cattle

[in that they do not fulfill mitzvot], who also bring vows and freewill offerings.

From here they said: Offerings are accepted from the sinners of Israel so that they will repent, except for an apostate, one who pours wine

for idolatry,

and one who publicly desecrates Shabbat.

This concludes the wording of the beraita.

And the Gemara discusses this:

This itself is difficult: You said, “From you”—

“but not all of you, to exclude an apostate.” And then it teaches: “Offerings are accepted from the sinners of Israel,”

which implies those who deliberately transgress the mitzvot, and that is an apostate. How, then, are offerings accepted from them?!

And we answer:

This is not difficult.

For

the first clause,

where it states, “From you—to exclude an apostate,” refers

to one who is an apostate with regard to the entire Torah,

whereas

the middle clause,

where it states, “Offerings are accepted from the sinners of Israel,” refers to

one who is an apostate with regard to a single matter.

But this is difficult:

Come and hear the latter clause: “Except for an apostate, one who pours the wine, and one who publicly desecrates Shabbat.”

This “apostate”

mentioned in the latter clause,

what are the circumstances?

If

he is

an apostate with regard to the entire Torah, this is the first clause;

what does the latter clause come to teach us?!

And if

he is

an apostate with regard to a single matter—

the middle clause is difficult,

for we said there that the sinners of Israel bring offerings, and we established that it refers to one who is an apostate with regard to a single matter?!

Rather, is this not what the tanna

of the beraita is saying in the latter clause:

“Except for one who is an apostate with regard to pouring wine

for idolatry

and with regard to publicly desecrating Shabbat. Therefore, an apostate with regard to idolatry

[as it teaches, “one who pours the wine”]

is an apostate with regard to the entire Torah,

and his slaughtering is invalid;

and this is a refutation of Rav Anan

[who deems the slaughtering of an apostate with regard to idolatry fit]—

a conclusive refutation.

We further examine this beraita:

A

since

this

principle—that offerings are not accepted from apostates—

is derived from here,

from the exclusionary derivation from “from you,”

is it derived?

But

it is derived from there:

for it is written in the passage concerning a sin offering: “And if any person sins unwittingly from among the people of the land.”