Chullin 4b (ד:) — the Talmud in English

Behold,

after Passover

(exact page location)

it is immediately permitted

to purchase chametz from those sinners and eat it, even though it is certain to us that this chametz was not baked after Passover, since there was not yet sufficient time after Passover to bake it,

because they exchange

their forbidden chametz for the permitted chametz of gentiles. [For only the chametz of a Jew, regarding which he transgresses the prohibition of “it shall not be seen,” is forbidden as chametz that remained over Passover, but the chametz of a gentile, regarding which one does not transgress, is not thereby forbidden.] And they do this because a person does not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden. The reason they kept the chametz during Passover is that they had no permitted alternative, and they did not want to forfeit their chametz.

And it follows that even where a person is a transgressor, one may rely on him when the rationale applies that “he does not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden.”

They thought: This

beraita

is in accordance with whom?

Even according to

Rabbi Yehuda, who says

that the prohibition of

chametz

that remained over Passover,

after Passover,

is a prohibition

by Torah law,

and nevertheless we rely on sinners that they exchange it, and it is permitted to eat it, as we rely on them even with regard to a prohibition by Torah law.

And it teaches, “because they exchange it”; evidently,

it is demonstrated that even one who is a transgressor

does not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden.

And we reject this:

From where

do you know that this beraita is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda?

Perhaps it is Rabbi Shimon, who says that chametz after Passover

is subject to a prohibition

by rabbinic law

.

And when we are lenient

in relying on transgressors,

with

prohibitions

by rabbinic law

we are lenient, but

with

prohibitions

by Torah law we are not lenient.

And we challenge this rejection:

But even if

this beraita is according to

Rabbi Shimon,

it still supports Rava. For

does it teach, “I say that they exchanged it,”

which would be language indicating that we are adopting a lenient assumption because it is a rabbinic prohibition? No; it teaches,

“because they exchange it,” that they certainly exchange it,

and this is not a mere lenient assumption.

Now this beraita properly supports Rava:

And with

a prohibition

by rabbinic law

we say

he does not abandon

a person

what is permitted and eat what is forbidden,

for you have said that sinners regarding chametz on Passover certainly exchange their chametz after Passover, despite the fact that according to Rabbi Shimon it is only a prohibition by rabbinic law; therefore,

with

a prohibition

by Torah law, is it not all the more so

that they do not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden?

And we say further:

Let us say that it supports

Rava:

As it was taught:

All may perform ritual slaughter, even a Kuti, even an uncircumcised man, and even an Israelite mumar.

And the Gemara analyzes this:

This uncircumcised man

who is fit to perform ritual slaughter—

what are the circumstances?

If you say

that they did not circumcise him because

his brothers died as a result of circumcision,

so that he is coerced with regard to his uncircumcision,

this

is a perfectly proper Israelite.

And what does it teach us by stating that he is fit to perform ritual slaughter, to the point that it says, “even an uncircumcised man”?

Rather, it is obvious

that he is

a mumar with regard to uncircumcision,

as he does not circumcise himself because of the willfulness of his heart, since he rejects the mitzva of circumcision.

And this tanna holds

of the beraita that

one who is a mumar regarding one matter is not a mumar regarding the entire Torah.

Therefore, this person who is a mumar regarding the mitzva of circumcision may perform ritual slaughter, and his slaughter is valid.

And now,

say the latter clause: “And even an Israelite mumar,”

whose ritual slaughter is valid.

The Gemara analyzes this:

This mumar—what are the circumstances? If he is a mumar regarding another matter

but is not a mumar regarding ritual slaughter,

that is the same as a mumar with regard to uncircumcision

which it taught in the first clause. What new point is conveyed by “even an Israelite mumar”?

Rather, is it not

that this “Israelite mumar” means

a mumar regarding that very matter,

namely, one who eats unslaughtered animal carcasses out of appetite, and nevertheless we rely on his ritual slaughter, despite the fact that he is suspected regarding the mitzva of ritual slaughter, because we say that he does not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden,

and this is in accordance with Rava.

And we reject this:

No,

you cannot prove it from here. For

I can say to you that in fact

a mumar regarding that very matter,

even if he sins out of appetite,

is not

trusted.

What is the reason? Since he is accustomed to it,

as he continually transgresses the prohibition,

it is like something permitted in his eyes,

and one cannot say about him, “he does not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden,” since he regards this forbidden matter as though it were permitted.

Rather,

the intention of the tanna of the beraita in permitting the ritual slaughter of an “Israelite mumar” is with regard to

a mumar regarding idolatry,

but he is not a mumar who eats unslaughtered animal carcasses out of appetite. And it was necessary to teach us that even though he is a mumar regarding idolatry—for one who acknowledges it is regarded as one who denies the entire Torah—nevertheless his ritual slaughter is permitted.

And

this is like what

Rav Anan

said in the name of Shmuel: An Israelite

who is

a mumar regarding idolatry

alone—

it is permitted to eat from his ritual slaughter.

The substance of the matter: Rav Anan said in the name of Shmuel: An Israelite

who is

a mumar regarding idolatry—

it is permitted to eat from his ritual slaughter. For we find this with regard to Jehoshaphat, king of Judah,

who was righteous, and nevertheless we find

that he derived benefit from Ahab’s feast,

despite the fact that Ahab worshipped idols. It is therefore demonstrated from here that it is permitted to eat from the ritual slaughter of one who is a mumar regarding idolatry.

As it is stated: “And Ahab slaughtered for him

[for Jehoshaphat]

sheep and cattle in abundance, and for the people who were with him, and incited him to go up against Ramot-gilead.”

And we challenge this:

Perhaps

indeed

Ahab slaughtered a sacrifice

for Jehoshaphat because Ahab assumed that Jehoshaphat would eat from his ritual slaughter, but Jehoshaphat himself

did not eat;

for the ritual slaughter of one who is a mumar regarding idolatry is invalid!?

And we answer: “

And he incited him

to go up against Ramot-gilead”

is written,

and incitement can take place only through a feast.

And we challenge this:

Perhaps

he incited him

with words

alone, and in fact Jehoshaphat did not eat from Ahab’s sacrifice!?

And we answer:

There is no “incitement” with words

except through a feast.

And we challenge this:

But

is it the case that

no

“incitement” can take place through words alone?

But is it not written: “If your brother incites you,”

which implies that he incites you through his words!?

And we answer: Here too, the verse is speaking of incitement

through eating and drinking.

And we challenge this:

But it is written

in the Book of Job, where the Holy One, blessed be He, addressed the Satan and said to him: “

And you incited Me against him

[against Job]

to destroy him for no reason,”

and it is demonstrated that there is incitement through words alone, since with regard to the Holy One, blessed be He, incitement through eating and drinking is not applicable.

And we answer: Incitement

above—

is different.

With regard to the Holy One, blessed be He, there is no relevance to inciting Him through eating and drinking, but only through words; whereas with regard to a person, who needs to eat and drink, the primary form of his incitement is through eating and drinking, and not through words alone.

And we challenge further: Who tells us that Jehoshaphat ate from Ahab’s sacrifice?

Perhaps

Jehoshaphat

drank, he drank

from Ahab’s wine, but

he did not eat

from his sacrifice!?

And we answer:

What is different about drinking

that we say that it is permitted to drink his wine, and we are not concerned that perhaps he poured it as a libation for idolatry, thereby rendering the wine forbidden for drinking and deriving benefit from it? It is because

we say that a mumar regarding idolatry is not a mumar regarding the entire Torah.

If so, with regard to the law of

eating as well,

we should say:

A mumar regarding idolatry is not a mumar regarding the entire Torah.

And we challenge this:

Is that comparable?!

How can you compare eating from the sacrifice of a mumar to drinking his wine?

Drinking

his wine is like drinking

“ordinary wine”

of gentiles,

which was not yet forbidden

in the time of Jehoshaphat—“ordinary

wine”

[when we had not seen him pour it as a libation for idolatry]

of gentiles. But as for eating

from his sacrifice,

I can say to you

that Jehoshaphat did not eat, since

a mumar regarding idolatry is a mumar regarding the entire Torah,

and his ritual slaughter is invalid!?

And we answer:

Alternatively, it is not the practice of a king to drink

wine

without food. And alternatively, “And he slaughtered—

and he incited him” is written,

and the meaning of the verse is:

With what did he incite him

Ahab incited Jehoshaphat to go up against Ramot-gilead?

Through slaughtering.

We still inquire: From where do we know that Ahab slaughtered that sacrifice?

Perhaps Obadiah,

who was a prophet of the Lord,

slaughtered it?!

And we answer: “

In abundance” is written,

and if so,

Obadiah would not have been able

to slaughter many sacrifices.

We still inquire:

Perhaps

those

seven thousand

men who had not bent the knee to Baal

slaughtered them? For it is written: “And I shall leave in Israel seven thousand—

every knee that has not bent to Baal”?!

And we answer: Those seven thousand certainly did not slaughter, because

they were hiding themselves

from Jezebel so that she would not kill them.

We still inquire:

Perhaps Ahab’s men were

people

of worth,

and only Ahab worshipped idols, while they slaughtered the many sacrifices in accordance with halakha!?

And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

that Ahab’s men were fit.

For it is written: “A ruler who heeds the word of falsehood

has all his servants as wicked men.”

We still inquire:

Perhaps

only Jehoshaphat was righteous, but

perhaps Jehoshaphat’s men also were not

people

of worth,

and therefore that which was

slaughtered by Ahab’s men was

eaten by Jehoshaphat’s men,

and they were the many sacrifices mentioned in that verse, whereas this one that was

slaughtered by Obadiah was

eaten by Jehoshaphat!

And in fact, you cannot prove from here that a mumar regarding idolatry is not a mumar regarding ritual slaughter.

And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

that Jehoshaphat’s men were people lacking worth, since

from “A ruler who heeds the word of falsehood

has all his servants as wicked men”

we must also infer the converse:

But

a ruler who heeds

the word of truth—

all his servants are righteous.

We still inquire:

Perhaps

this is how they acted with regard to that sacrifice:

The sacrifice slaughtered by Ahab’s men—

Ahab and his men ate

of Ahab.

The sacrifice slaughtered by Jehoshaphat’s men—

Jehoshaphat and his men ate

of Jehoshaphat!?