Chullin 4b — the Talmud in English

Here,

after Passover

exact page location")

it is immediately permitted

to take leaven from those transgressors and eat it, even though it is certain to us that this leaven was not baked after Passover, for there had not yet been time after Passover to bake it,

because they exchange

their forbidden leaven for the permitted leaven of gentiles [for only the leaven of an Israelite, regarding which one transgresses “it shall not be seen,” is forbidden by the law of leaven that passed over it during Passover, but not the leaven of a gentile, regarding which one does not transgress, and therefore it is not forbidden], and they do so because a person does not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden; and the fact that they kept the leaven during Passover was because they had no permitted alternative, and they did not want to lose their leaven.

And it is proved that even one who is a transgressor may be relied upon where the reasoning of “he does not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden” exists.

They thought: this

beraita

whose is it—

even according to

it is Rabbi Judah, who says:

the prohibition of

leaven

that Passover passed over it,

after Passover,

is a prohibition

from the Torah,

and nevertheless we rely upon transgressors that they exchange it, and it is permitted to eat it, for we rely upon them even with a prohibition from the Torah,

and it teaches, “because they exchange it”; evidently,

it is proved that even one who is a transgressor

does not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden.

And we reject this:

from where

that this beraita is according to Rabbi Judah?

Perhaps it is Rabbi Shimon, who says that leaven after Passover—

the prohibition

is rabbinic

is.

And when we are lenient

to rely upon transgressors,

with

rabbinic

with rabbinic prohibitions

it is with these that we are lenient, but

with

prohibitions

with prohibitions from the Torah we are not lenient.

And we challenge this rejection:

and let this also be

this beraita according to the words of

Rabbi Shimon;

but nevertheless it supports Rava. For

does it teach, “I say that they exchanged it,”

which is an expression of attributing the matter to a lenient possibility, because it is a rabbinic prohibition!? Rather,

it teaches, “because they exchange it,” meaning that they certainly exchange it,

and this is not attributing the matter to a lenient possibility.

And now this beraita properly supports Rava—

and just as with a

prohibition

rabbinic

we say

a person does not abandon

a person

what is permitted and eat what is forbidden,

for you have said that transgressors regarding leaven during Passover certainly exchange their leaven after Passover, even though according to Rabbi Shimon it is only a rabbinic prohibition; if so,

with

a prohibition

with a prohibition from the Torah, is it not all the more so

that they do not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden?

And we say further:

shall we say that it supports

Rava:

For it was taught:

Everyone may perform slaughter, even a Samaritan, even an uncircumcised person, and even an Israelite who is an apostate.

And the Gemara discusses:

This uncircumcised person

who is fit for slaughter—

what are the circumstances?

If you say

that they did not circumcise him because

his brothers died on account of circumcision,

and it turns out that he is compelled regarding his uncircumcision,

this one—

is a fully valid Israelite.

And what does it teach us by saying that he is fit for slaughter, to the point that you say, “even an uncircumcised person”?

Rather, it is obvious:

that he is

an apostate regarding uncircumcision,

who does not circumcise himself because of the maliciousness of his heart, for he spurns the mitzva of circumcision,

and this

this tanna of the beraita holds that

one who is an apostate regarding one matter is not an apostate regarding the entire Torah,

therefore that one who is an apostate regarding the mitzva of circumcision may perform slaughter, and his slaughter is valid.

And now

say the latter clause: “and even an Israelite who is an apostate,”

his slaughter is valid.

And the Gemara discusses:

This apostate—what are the circumstances? If he is an apostate regarding another matter

and is not an apostate regarding slaughter—

that is the apostate regarding uncircumcision

that it teaches in the first clause; and what has been newly taught to us by “even an Israelite who is an apostate”?

Rather, is it not so

that this “Israelite who is an apostate” means

an apostate regarding that same matter,

for eating unslaughtered carcasses out of appetite, and nevertheless we rely upon his slaughter, despite the fact that it is a mitzva regarding which he is suspect, because we say: he does not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden,

and this is like Rava’s statement.

And we reject this:

no,

prove from it. For

I can always say to you—

an apostate regarding that same matter

even one who does so out of appetite

is not

trusted regarding it.

What is the reason? Since he is accustomed to it,

for he continually transgresses the prohibition,

it appears to him like what is permitted,

and it is impossible to say regarding him, “he does not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden,” for this prohibition is considered by him like what is permitted.

Rather,

the intention of the tanna of the beraita in permitting the slaughter of an “Israelite who is an apostate” is regarding

an apostate to idolatry,

but he is not an apostate regarding eating unslaughtered carcasses out of appetite. And it was necessary to teach us that even though he is an apostate to idolatry, concerning whom we say that everyone who acknowledges it is like one who denies the entire Torah, nevertheless his slaughter is permitted.

And this is like

that which

Rav Anan said.

For Rav Anan said in the name of Shmuel: An Israelite

who is

an apostate to idolatry

only—

it is permitted to eat from his slaughter.

The body of the matter: Rav Anan said in the name of Shmuel: An Israelite

who is

an apostate to idolatry—

it is permitted to eat from his slaughter. For thus we find regarding Jehoshaphat, king of Judah,

who was righteous, and nevertheless we find

that he benefited from the feast of Ahab,

even though Ahab worshipped idols; and it is proved from here that it is permitted to eat from the slaughter of one who is an apostate to idolatry.

As it is stated: “And Ahab slaughtered for him [for

Jehoshaphat]

many sheep and cattle, and for the people who were with him, and he incited him to go up to Ramoth-gilead.”

And we challenge this:

but perhaps

indeed

Ahab slaughtered a sacrifice

for Jehoshaphat, because Ahab thought that Jehoshaphat would eat from his slaughter, but Jehoshaphat himself

did not eat,

because the slaughter of one who is an apostate to idolatry is invalid!?

And we answer: “

And he incited him

to go up to Ramoth-gilead”

is written,

and incitement is possible only through a feast.

And we challenge this:

but perhaps

he incited him

with words

alone, and Jehoshaphat never ate from Ahab’s sacrifice!?

And we answer:

there is no “incitement” with words

except through a feast alone.

And we challenge this:

But

why

and is it not

possible for “incitement” to be with words alone?

But is it not written, “If your brother incites you,”

which implies that he incites you with his words!?

And we answer: Here, too, it is speaking of incitement

through eating and drinking.

And we challenge this:

but is it not written

in Job, where the Holy One, blessed is He, addressed the Satan and said to him: “

And you incited Me against him [against

Job]

to destroy him without cause,”

and it is proved that there is incitement through words alone, for with the Holy One, blessed is He, there is no incitement through eating and drinking.

And we answer: Incitement

above—

is different.

For with the Holy One, blessed is He, there is no relevance to inciting Him through eating and drinking, but only through words alone; whereas with a person, who needs to eat and drink, the principal form of his incitement is through eating and drinking, and not through words alone.

And further we challenge: And who tells us that Jehoshaphat ate from Ahab’s sacrifice?

But perhaps

Jehoshaphat

drank,

from Ahab’s wine, but

he did not eat

from his sacrifice!?

And we answer:

What is different about drinking

that we say it is permitted to drink his wine, and we are not concerned that perhaps he poured it as a libation to idols and the wine thereby became forbidden in drinking and benefit? It is because

we say that an apostate to idolatry is not an apostate regarding the entire Torah;

if so, regarding the law of

eating as well

we say—

an apostate to idolatry is not an apostate regarding the entire Torah.

And we challenge this:

Is this comparable?!

How can you compare eating from the sacrifice of an apostate to drinking his wine? For

drinking

from the wine of an apostate is like drinking

“their ordinary wine”

of gentiles,

and “their ordinary wine” had still not been forbidden

in the time of Jehoshaphat—“their ordinary

wine” [when

we had not seen him pour it as a libation to idols]

of gentiles. But eating

from his sacrifice—

I can say to you

that Jehoshaphat did not eat, for

an apostate to idolatry is an apostate regarding the entire Torah,

and his slaughter is invalid!?

And we answer:

If you wish, say: it is not the practice of a king to drink

to drink wine

without food. And if you wish, say: “And he slaughtered—

and he incited him” is written,

and the meaning of the verse is:

with what did he incite him

Ahab incite Jehoshaphat to go up to Ramoth-gilead?—

Through slaughtering.

And we still inquire: From where do we know that Ahab slaughtered that sacrifice?

But perhaps Obadiah,

who was a prophet of the

Lord, slaughtered?!

And we answer:

“In abundance” is written,

and if so,

Obadiah would not have been sufficient

to slaughter many sacrifices.

And we still inquire:

But perhaps

those

seven thousand

men who did not kneel to Baal

slaughtered?! For it is written, “And I shall leave in Israel seven thousand—

all the knees that did not kneel to Baal”?!

And we answer: Those seven thousand certainly did not slaughter, because

they were hiding themselves from Jezebel

so that she would not kill them.

And we still inquire:

But perhaps Ahab’s men were

people

of worth,

and only Ahab worshipped idols, while they slaughtered the many sacrifices in accordance with halakha!?

And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

that Ahab’s men were fit.

For it is written, “A ruler who listens to a matter of falsehood—

all his servants are wicked.”

And we still inquire:

But perhaps

only Jehoshaphat was righteous, but

Jehoshaphat’s men also were not

people

of worth,

and therefore that which

Ahab’s men slaughtered—

Jehoshaphat’s men ate,

and these were the many sacrifices mentioned in that verse, whereas that which

Obadiah slaughtered—

Jehoshaphat ate!

And in fact you will not prove from here that an apostate to idolatry is not an apostate regarding slaughter.

And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

that Jehoshaphat’s men were people who were not of worth, for

from “A ruler who listens to a matter of falsehood—

all his servants are wicked,”

we must also infer the opposite:

this means:

a ruler who listens

to a matter of truth—

all his servants are righteous.

And we still inquire:

But perhaps

this is how they conducted themselves at that sacrifice:

What Ahab’s men slaughtered—

Ahab and his men ate

of Ahab.

What Jehoshaphat’s men slaughtered—

Jehoshaphat and his men ate

of Jehoshaphat!?