Chullin 4a — the Talmud in English

Similarly,

if

the Israelite found

the

hand

of the Samaritan

a bundle

[string]

of slaughtered birds

—

the Israelite cuts off

the

head of one of them and gives it

to the Samaritan.

If he ate

the head of the bird

it is permitted to eat from his slaughter, and if not—

it is forbidden to eat from his slaughter!

Abaye,

who said above that if the Israelite merely enters and exits, it is forbidden to eat from his slaughter—

he infers from the first clause

of the beraita in accordance with his words.

Rava,

who permitted his slaughter if the Israelite entered and exited—

he infers from the latter clause

of the beraita in accordance with his words.

And we explain:

Abaye infers from the first clause

which teaches that the slaughter of a Samaritan is permitted when an Israelite stands over him—

the reason

is

that an Israelite stands over him

that we permit it,

but

if he was only

entering and exiting—

not

do we validate his slaughter!

But

Rava infers from the latter clause: the reason that he came and found that he had slaughtered

is that he must examine him, whether he will eat [from it] or not; but if the Israelite was

exiting and entering

at the time of the Samaritan’s slaughter,

it is entirely acceptable,

and there is again no need to examine him whether he will eat from it.

And we challenge:

And for Abaye—

it is difficult

the inference that Rava infers, since it teaches

in the latter clause

that if he came and found them slaughtered, he examines the Samaritan whether he eats from his slaughter; and it implies that if the Israelite was exiting and entering at the time of the slaughter, there is no need to examine him.

And we answer:

Abaye can say:

Abaye: “

‘Exiting and entering’ is also called ‘he came and found’!

Since the Israelite was not present throughout the entire time of the slaughter, after the slaughter he is in the category of ‘he came and found them slaughtered.’”

And again we challenge:

And for Rava—

the first clause is difficult,

for it implies that it is permitted only where an Israelite stands over him, but not when he enters and exits.

And we answer:

Rava can say:

Rava: “

‘Exiting and entering’ is also

considered like ‘standing over him.’”

And now we discuss the continuation of the beraita, which teaches:

“Similarly, if he found in his hand a bundle of birds”—

“he cuts off its head

[of one of the birds and gives it to him].

And why

is it permitted to eat after the Samaritan ate the head of one of the birds?

Let us be concerned that perhaps this one,

that bird alone,

was slaughtered properly,

and therefore he ate it, since he recognized that it had been properly slaughtered by him; but it is possible that he slaughtered the other birds improperly [and he is not concerned that an Israelite will eat them]. From where may we rely on his eating the head of one of the birds to permit eating the other birds?

Rav Menashe said:

[The mnemonic is “makhnis, izmel, bizkharim”]

Here it is speaking

of the Israelite bringing them

the birds

under his wings

when he examines the Samaritan, so that the Samaritan does not know to which bird the head that he ate belongs.

And we still challenge:

Perhaps he gave him a sign

to the Samaritan

in it,

in that head of the bird, and therefore he ate it; and consequently there is no proof that the others were slaughtered properly!?

And we answer:

Rav Mesharsheya said:

Here it is speaking

of his crushing it thoroughly,

so that the Israelite crushed and pounded the bird’s head, such that even if there had been a sign in it, it would have been dissolved and could not be recognized.

And we challenge: We still ask: how can we rely on the Samaritan’s eating the bird’s head—

perhaps the Samaritans hold

that

there is no slaughter for a bird by Torah law,

since “slaughtering” was not stated in the Torah with regard to a bird, but only with regard to an animal; and if so, it is possible that he did not slaughter properly, and nevertheless he eats the head because he holds that there is no prohibition against eating a bird that was not slaughtered properly!?

And we reject this:

“And according to your reasoning,”

if you were concerned that perhaps the Samaritans hold that there is no slaughter for a bird by Torah law, then the laws of

pausing, pressing, concealment, deviating, and uprooting—

are they written?

And why were you not concerned regarding the slaughter of a Samaritan of an animal [from which he subsequently ate an olive-bulk], lest the Samaritans not be particular about these laws, when these laws are not written explicitly in the Torah, but are a halakha given to Moses from Sinai?

Rather,

necessarily,

since they had established themselves in them,

the Samaritans in observing those laws—

they had established themselves in them.

There is no longer concern that perhaps they are not particular about these laws. And if so,

here too,

with regard to the slaughter of a bird,

since they had established themselves

in the slaughter of a bird—

they had established themselves in it.

And we say: The matter that we are now discussing, whether

they established themselves

is a presumption on which one may rely,

or

whether

they did not establish themselves

[that is, although they practiced the mitzva, one may not rely on their practice of it],

in

a halakha

that is not written—it is a dispute of

the

tannaim.

As it was taught: The Samaritan’s matza—

is permitted

for eating on Passover,

and

not only that, but

a person fulfills his obligation through it

of eating matza

on

the first night of

Passover.

Rabbi Eliezer forbids

eating the Samaritan’s matza

because they are not

the Samaritans

expert in the fine details of the mitzvot of Israel,

for they do not know how to guard it so that it will not become leavened, since they do not distinguish between the levels of leavening [between an early stage of leavening and cracking, and between the dough’s surface having become silvered and its surface not having become silvered].

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Every mitzva in which the Samaritans have established themselves

they are

very particular in it,

and even

more than Israelites.

Therefore, since they established themselves in the mitzva of matza, they are expert in all its details, and Israelites may eat matza made by them.

The master said: The Samaritan’s matza is permitted, and a person fulfills his obligation through it on Passover.

And the Gemara asks:

It is obvious

that a person fulfills his obligation through it, since you said that the Samaritan’s matza is permitted, and if so, we rely on the fact that they established themselves in the mitzva of matza, to make it according to its halakha!?

And we answer:

It might have been said

that indeed the Samaritans are expert in guarding the matza so that it will not become leavened, but

they are not expert in guarding

it for the sake of matza of the mitzva. And with every matza that was not guarded for the sake of matza of the mitzva, one does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza on the first night of the festival of Passover.

It teaches us

that they are also expert in guarding it for the sake of matza of the mitzva.

And likewise the master said:

Rabbi Eliezer forbids

eating the Samaritan’s matza

because they are not expert in the fine details of the mitzvot.

And the Gemara explains:

He holds

that Rabbi Eliezer holds that the Samaritans

are not expert in guarding

the matza from becoming leavened.

And likewise the master said:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Every mitzva in which the Samaritans have established themselves, they are very particular in it, more than Israelites.

And the Gemara asks: That which Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said

is namely

like the words of

the first tanna,

since the first tanna also validates Samaritan matza for fulfilling through it the obligation to eat matza!?

And we answer:

There is a difference between them

with regard to a mitzva

that is written

in the Torah,

and

we do not know concerning the Samaritans whether

they established themselves in it

or not.

The first tanna holds: Since it is written

they certainly established themselves in it, and we do not need to know whether they established themselves in it. Therefore the beraita taught that one fulfills his obligation with Samaritan matza, and the same applies to all mitzvot written in the Torah: we rely on them,

even though we do not

know whether they

established themselves in it

or not, for since it is written, they certainly established themselves in it.

But Rabbi Eliezer disagrees, and holds that even if they established themselves in it, we do not rely on them, because they are not expert in the fine details of the mitzvot.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds—

if

we know concerning them that they

established themselves

in the mitzva—

yes,

indeed we rely on them, but

if not

we know whether they

established themselves—

no,

we do not rely on them.

And we challenge:

If so,

since we established that the first tanna includes all mitzvot written in the Torah, on the assumption that the Samaritans perform them according to their halakha, while Rabbi Eliezer does not rely on them at all, whereas Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel distinguishes between when we know that they established themselves in it and when we do not know whether they established themselves in it, why did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel say,

“Every mitzva in which the Samaritans have established themselves,”

for this wording implies that he comes to include, by saying “every,” more than the first tanna? Yet we now say the opposite: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel limits his statement, for the first tanna holds that one may rely on the Samaritans regarding all mitzvot written in the Torah, whereas Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel adds a condition, that one may rely on them only if we know that they established themselves in the written mitzva; but if we do not know whether they established themselves, one may not rely on them, even regarding mitzvot written in the Torah!

And if so, it is difficult: “

‘If they established themselves’”—

he should have needed

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to say, for this wording indicates that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees with both of them: he disagrees with the first tanna, who says that we do not require that they established themselves, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel comes to say that only if they established themselves; and he also disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer, who did not rely on them at all, whereas according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, if they established themselves, we rely on them.

Rather,

we return to the matter where we established that the difference between them concerns something that is written but in which they did not establish themselves, and we say:

There is a difference between them—

something

that is not written, but in which they established themselves.

The first tanna holds: Since it is not written,

then

even though they established themselves in it—

also not

do we rely on them. But with regard to matza and the like, which are written, we rely on them whether they established themselves or whether they did not establish themselves.

And Rabbi Eliezer holds that even when it is written and they established themselves in it, we do not rely on them.

Whereas

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Since they established themselves—

they established themselves.

That is, we rely on the fact that they established themselves, even where it is not written.

And this is the dispute of the tannaim, for above we said that regarding a mitzva that is not written but in which they established themselves, the tannaim disagree; now we find a dispute between the first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel whether one may rely on them when they established themselves in a mitzva that is not written.

The body of the matter: Rava said: An Israelite apostate,

who is

one who eats unslaughtered carcasses out of appetite—

he examines

an Israelite

knife and gives it to him

to slaughter.

And it is permitted to eat from his slaughter.

What is the reason

that we rely on the slaughter of an apostate who eats unslaughtered carcasses out of appetite?

Since there is what is permitted and what is forbidden

before him, for it is in his power to slaughter according to halakha and it is in his power to render it an unslaughtered carcass—

he does not leave what is permitted and eat what is forbidden,

but slaughters according to halakha.

And the Gemara asks:

If so,

since you say that wherever what is forbidden and what is permitted are before him, he does not leave what is permitted and eat what is forbidden, why is it necessary for the Israelite to examine his knife? For

when he did not examine

the Israelite

also

should rely on the apostate’s examination and on his slaughter, since he does not leave what is permitted and eat what is forbidden!?

And we answer: We are concerned that if he examines the knife himself and finds it defective, he will not return to seek a proper knife, because

he does not trouble himself

the apostate to search for another knife in order to eat what is permitted.

The Sages said to Rava: It was taught [in a beraita] that supports you,

that we rely on a transgressor who does not transgress out of spite, but only out of appetite: if what is permitted is before him, he does not leave what is permitted and eat what is forbidden.

As it was taught: The leaven of transgressors

who do not destroy their leaven before Passover because they do not wish to lose it, and the leaven becomes forbidden in benefit under the law of “leaven that remained over Passover,”