Chullin 4a (ד.) — the Talmud in English

Similarly,

if

he found

the Israelite

holding

of the kuti

a bundle [

of a string

of birds

that had been slaughtered—

he cuts off

the Israelite

the head of one of them and gives it to him

the kuti.

If he ate

the head of the bird,

it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering; but if not—

it is forbidden to eat from his slaughtering!

Abaye,

who said above that if the Israelite merely enters and leaves, it is forbidden to eat from his slaughtering,

deduces from the first clause

of the beraita that it is as he says.

Rava,

who permitted his slaughtering if the Israelite enters and leaves,

deduces from the latter clause

of the beraita that it is as he says.

And we explain:

Abaye deduces from the first clause

which teaches that the slaughtering of a kuti is permitted when an Israelite is standing over him:

The reason

is because

an Israelite is standing over him

that we permit it;

but

if he was merely

entering and leaving—

not

do we validate his slaughtering!

But

Rava deduces from the latter clause: The reason is that he came and found that he had slaughtered

that it is necessary to examine him, whether he will eat from it or not; but if the Israelite was

leaving and entering

during the kuti’s slaughtering,

it is well,

and there is no further need to examine him to determine whether he will eat from it.

And we challenge this:

But according to Abaye—

there is a difficulty

with Rava’s inference, from the fact that it teaches in the

latter clause

that if he came and found them slaughtered, he examines the kuti to see whether he eats from his slaughtering; and it follows that if the Israelite was leaving and entering during the slaughtering, there is no need to examine him.

And we answer:

Abaye can say:

“

‘Leaving and entering’ is also called ‘he came and found’!”

Since the Israelite was not present throughout the entire slaughtering, after the slaughtering he is considered to have “come and found” them slaughtered.

We further challenge this:

But according to Rava—

there is a difficulty with the first clause,

as it implies that it is permitted only where an Israelite is standing over him, but not when he enters and leaves.

And we answer:

Rava can say: “

“Leaving and entering” also

is considered—

like ‘standing over him.’”

And now we examine the continuation of the beraita, which teaches:

Similarly, if he found in his possession a bundle of birds—

he cuts off the head

of one of the birds and gives it to him.

But why

is it permitted to eat after the kuti ate the head of one of the birds?

Let us be concerned that perhaps this one,

that bird alone,

was slaughtered properly,

and therefore he ate it, since he recognized that it had been slaughtered properly by him. But it is possible that he slaughtered the other birds improperly—for he does not care whether an Israelite will eat them—and from where may we rely on his eating the head of one of the birds to permit eating the other birds?

Rav Menashya said:

The mnemonic is: Makhnis, Izmel, Zekhirim.

Here we are dealing

with the case where he inserts them

the Israelite inserts the birds

beneath his wings

when he examines the kuti, so that the kuti does not know to which bird the head that he ate belonged.

We nevertheless challenge this:

Perhaps he gave him a sign

to the kuti

inside

that bird’s head, and that is why he ate it; consequently, there is no proof that the others were slaughtered properly!?

And we answer:

Rav Mesharsheya said:

Here we are dealing

with the case where he crushes it thoroughly,

where the Israelite mashed and crushed the bird’s head so that even if there had been a sign in it, it would have been obliterated and could not be recognized.

And we challenge this: How can we still rely on the kuti’s eating the bird’s head?

Perhaps the kutim hold

that

there is no Torah requirement of slaughter for a bird,

since the Torah mentions zeviḥa with regard to an animal but only with regard to an animal, and if so, perhaps he slaughtered it improperly and nevertheless ate the head because he holds that there is no prohibition against eating a bird that was not slaughtered properly!?

And we reject this:

For according to your reasoning,

if you were concerned that the kutim hold that there is no Torah requirement of slaughter for a bird, then what of the laws of

pausing, pressing, concealment, cutting beyond the proper area, and uprooting—

are they written in the Torah?

And why were you not concerned regarding the kuti’s slaughtering of an animal [from which he subsequently ate an olive-bulk], that perhaps the kutim do not observe these laws? After all, these laws are not written explicitly in the Torah; rather, they are a halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai.

Rather,

necessarily,

since they had established themselves in their observance

of those laws,

they had established themselves in their observance.

There is no longer any reason to be concerned that they do not observe these laws. And if so,

here too,

with regard to the slaughtering of a bird,

since they had established themselves

in the slaughtering of birds,

they had established themselves in its observance.

And we say: The matter that we are now examining—whether

the kutim had established

a reliable presumption on which one may rely,

or

whether

they had not established [

and although they had maintained the mitzva, one may not rely on their observance of it]—

in

a law

that is not written

is the subject of a dispute between

the tannaim.

As it was taught in a beraita: Kuti matza—

is permitted

to eat on Passover,

and

not only that, but

a person fulfills his obligation with it

of eating matza

on

the first night of

Passover.

Rabbi Eliezer prohibits

eating kuti matza

because they are not

the kutim

proficient in the fine details of the mitzvot of Israel,

as they do not know how to guard it from becoming leavened, for they do not distinguish between the various degrees of leavening [between shi’ur and cracking, and between the dough’s surface becoming pale and its surface not becoming pale].

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to every mitzva that the kutim have established themselves in observing,

they are

extremely meticulous in it,

and even

more than Israel.

Therefore, since they established themselves in the mitzva of matza, they are proficient in all its details, and Israelites may eat matza made by them.

The Master said: Kuti matza is permitted, and a person fulfills his obligation with it on Passover.

And the Gemara asks:

Is it obvious

that a person fulfills his obligation with it? For you said that kuti matza is permitted, and if so, we rely on the fact that they established themselves in the mitzva of matza and make it according to its law!?

And we answer:

It might have entered your mind

that the kutim are indeed proficient in guarding the matza so that it does not become leavened, but

they are not proficient in guarding it

for the sake of matza used for a mitzva. And with any matza that was not guarded for the sake of matza used for a mitzva, one does not fulfill the obligation to eat matza on the first night of the festival of Passover.

It teaches us

that they are also proficient in guarding it for the sake of matza used for a mitzva.

And likewise the Master said:

Rabbi Eliezer prohibits

eating kuti matza

because they are not proficient in the fine details of the mitzvot.

And the Gemara explains:

He holds

that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the kutim

are not proficient in guarding

the matza from becoming leavened.

And likewise the Master said:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to every mitzva that the kutim have established themselves in observing, they are extremely meticulous in it, more than Israel.

And the Gemara asks: This statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

is it

in accordance with the view of

the first tanna,

as the first tanna also validates kuti matza for fulfilling the obligation to eat matza!?

And we answer:

The difference between them

concerns a mitzva

that is written

in the Torah,

but

we do not know whether the kutim

established themselves in it

or not.

The first tanna holds: Since it is written

in the Torah, they certainly established themselves in it, and we do not need to know whether they established themselves in it. Therefore, the beraita teaches that one fulfills the obligation with kuti matza, and the same applies to all the mitzvot written in the Torah: we rely on them,

even though we do not

know whether they

established themselves in it

or not, for since it is written in the Torah, they certainly established themselves in it.

But Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that even if they established themselves in it, we do not rely on them, because they are not proficient in the fine details of the mitzvot.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds—

if

we know about them that they

established themselves

in the mitzva—

yes,

we indeed rely on them; but

if not

we know whether they

established themselves—

no,

we do not rely on them.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if we explained that the first tanna includes all the mitzvot written in the Torah, relying on the assumption that the kutim observe them properly; that Rabbi Eliezer does not rely on them at all; whereas Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel distinguishes between cases where we know that they established themselves in the mitzva and cases where we do not know whether they established themselves in it—why does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel say, “

Every mitzva that the kutim have established themselves in,”

which implies from this wording that he comes to include more than the first tanna by saying “every”? Yet we have now said the opposite: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel limits his statement, as the first tanna holds that one may rely on the kutim with regard to every mitzva written in the Torah, whereas Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel adds a condition—that one may rely on them only if we know that they established themselves in the written mitzva; but if we do not know whether they established themselves in it, one may not rely on them even with regard to mitzvot written in the Torah!

And if so, the difficulty is: “

If they established themselves”—

he should have said

so, in order to indicate that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees with both of them: he disagrees with the first tanna, who says that it is unnecessary for them to have established themselves in it, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel comes to say that one may rely on them only if they established themselves in it. And he also disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer, who does not rely on them at all, whereas according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, if they established themselves in it, one may rely on them.

Rather,

we retract this explanation, that the difference between them concerns something written in the Torah in which they did not establish themselves, and we say:

The difference between them

concerns something

that is not written in the Torah, but in which they established themselves.

The first tanna holds: Since it is not written in the Torah,

then

even though they established themselves in it—

also not

do we rely on them. But with regard to matza and the like, which are written in the Torah, we rely on them whether they established themselves in them or whether they did not establish themselves in them.

And Rabbi Eliezer holds that even when it is written in the Torah and they established themselves in it, we do not rely on them.

Whereas

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Since they established themselves—

they established themselves.

That is, we rely on the fact that they established themselves in it, even where it is not written in the Torah.

And this is the dispute between the tannaim mentioned above: with regard to a mitzva that is not written in the Torah but in which they established themselves, the tannaim disagree; for here we find a dispute between the first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel as to whether one may rely on them when they established themselves in a mitzva that is not written in the Torah.

The substance of the matter: Rava said: An Israelite who is an apostate,

who

eats unslaughtered animals because he craves them—

an Israelite examines

the Israelite

the knife and gives it to him

to slaughter.

And it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering.

What is the reason

that we rely on the slaughtering of an apostate who eats unslaughtered animals because he craves them?

Since both what is permitted and what is prohibited

are before him—for he can slaughter properly, and he can render the animal an unslaughtered carcass—

he will not abandon what is permitted and eat what is prohibited,

but will slaughter properly.

And the Gemara asks:

If so,

if you say that wherever what is prohibited and what is permitted are before him, he will not abandon what is permitted and eat what is prohibited, why is it necessary for an Israelite to examine the knife for him? After all,

when he did not examine

the knife, the Israelite

also

should rely on the apostate’s examination and slaughtering, since he will not abandon what is permitted and eat what is prohibited!?

And we answer: We are concerned that if he examines the knife himself and finds it defective, he will not seek another suitable knife, because

he will not trouble himself

to look for another knife in order to eat what is permitted.

The Sages said to Rava: It was taught in a beraita that supports you,

that we rely on a transgressor who does not transgress defiantly, but only because he craves the prohibited, for if what is permitted is before him, he will not abandon what is permitted and eat what is prohibited.

As it was taught in a beraita: The leaven of transgressors

who do not remove their leaven before Passover because they do not wish to lose it, and the leaven thereby becomes forbidden for benefit under the law of “leaven that remained over Passover,”