Chullin 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

The Israelite examines

the knife,

and gives it

to this apostate,

and it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering,

since, as he has an examined knife, he will not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden; he slaughters properly with the knife examined by the Israelite.

But if the Israelite did not examine

the knife

and gave it

to him,

the apostate may not slaughter

with it, lest his knife be defective, and that apostate will not trouble himself to seek a knife fit for slaughtering; rather, he will slaughter with the defective knife.

And if

the apostate slaughtered with a knife that had not been examined,

the Israelite examines

his

knife afterward

after the slaughtering. And if

his knife is found to be sound—

it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering; but if not—

it is forbidden to eat from his slaughtering.

Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who may not slaughter even after the fact,

because

perhaps they will pause, perhaps they will press, and perhaps they will bury the knife beneath the סימנים.

We raised an objection concerning the statement of Rav Ashi: According to him, the phrase in our Mishna,

“and all of them who slaughtered”—with regard to what

does it refer?

If you say it refers to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor,

but

it refers back to them,

and if so,

it should have said: “and if they slaughtered”

rather than “and all of them who slaughtered.”

Rather,

it refers

to an apostate Israelite

who slaughtered.

The Gemara analyzes this:

If he examined the knife and gave it to him—

you already said that he may slaughter ab initio,

whereas the expression “who slaughtered” implies a situation after the fact.

Rather, it is referring to a case where he did not examine the knife.

We refute this from either perspective:

If the knife is available—

let him examine it now;

why do we need the testimony of others who saw that he slaughtered properly?

And if the knife is unavailable, what difference does it make that others saw him?

For

perhaps he slaughtered with a defective knife!

The Gemara concludes:

This is difficult!

Ravina said: This is what the Mishna is teaching: “Everyone may slaughter,”

and the meaning of

“everyone”

is: all those who are

experts,

who know the laws of ritual slaughter,

may slaughter.

And it teaches us that it is sufficient that they be

experts

in the laws of ritual slaughter,

even though they are not

known

to be established

as proper slaughterers: We have not seen them slaughter three times, to ascertain whether their hands are well trained in the craft of slaughtering and whether they do not recoil or faint upon seeing the blood of the slaughtering, thereby causing a pause.

When are these matters stated,

that they are considered experts?

When it is known of him

the slaughterer

that he knows how to state the laws of ritual slaughter. But if it is not known of him that he knows how to state the laws of ritual slaughter—

he may not slaughter!

And if he slaughtered—

we examine him:

If he knows how to state the laws of ritual slaughter—

it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering.

But if not—

it is forbidden to eat from his slaughtering!

Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who may not slaughter even after the fact,

even if they know the laws of ritual slaughter,

also

we do not validate their slaughtering, because they are always presumed likely to ruin it—

perhaps they will pause, perhaps they will press, and perhaps they will bury the knife beneath the סימנים.

The Gemara analyzes this:

“And all of them who slaughtered”—with regard to what

does it refer?

If you say it refers to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor,

but

it refers back to them,

and if so,

it should have said: “and if they slaughtered”

rather than “and all of them who slaughtered”?!

Rather,

it refers

to those “who are not experts,”

for if others observe their slaughtering, it is valid after the fact.

We refute this:

If we examine him

to see whether he knows the laws of ritual slaughter,

is that sufficient

and we do not require that they observe him while he slaughters?!

And we answer: Here we are speaking of a case

where he is not present so that we can examine him.

There are those who say:

Ravina said: This is what the Mishna is teaching: “Everyone may slaughter”—

everyone

who is

established

because we have seen them slaughter properly several times—

may slaughter.

Established—

even though they are not experts!

For we do not know whether they know how to state the laws of ritual slaughter.

When are these matters stated?—

When they slaughtered before us two or three times and did not faint,

meaning that the slaughterer did not become weak at the sight of the blood and the cutting while slaughtering.

But

if

he did not slaughter before us two or three times,

and we did not ascertain whether he faints or not—

he may not slaughter,

because

perhaps he will faint

and his slaughtering will be disqualified, as he will not slaughter properly.

And if he slaughtered and said: “I am certain that I did not faint,”—

his slaughtering is valid! Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who may not slaughter even after the fact

we likewise do not validate their slaughtering, because

perhaps they will pause, perhaps they will press, and perhaps they will bury the knife beneath the סימנים.

The Gemara analyzes this:

“And all of them who slaughtered”—

with regard to what

does it refer?

If you say it refers to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor—

but

it refers back to them,

and if so,

it should have said: “and if they slaughtered”

rather than “and all of them who slaughtered.”

Rather, it refers to those who are not established,

for initially they may not slaughter, but if they slaughtered and others observed them, their slaughtering is valid.

We refute this:

But you said

that if he says,

“I am certain

that I did not faint,”

is that sufficient?!

And we answer: Here we are speaking of a case

where he is not present for us to ask him!

We now explain why all these amoraim, who established the words of the Mishna in several different ways, did not explain it as their colleagues did.

Ravina and Rabba bar Ulla—

like Abaye and Rava,

who established the Mishna as referring to the slaughtering of a Samaritan,

and

like

Rav Ashi,

who established it as referring to the slaughtering of an apostate—

did not say this,

because

it was difficult for them that the Mishna teaches

“and all of them,”

who slaughtered and others observed them, in which case their slaughtering is valid after the fact, whereas according to their opinions their slaughtering is valid ab initio: the slaughtering of a Samaritan according to Abaye and Rava, and the slaughtering of an apostate according to Rav Ashi].

And likewise,

all

the amoraim

like Rabba bar Ulla,

who established the Mishna as referring to the slaughtering of one who is impure,

did not say this,

because

according to the version that says

that according to Rabba bar Ulla

here

is the

primary

law of slaughtering by one who is impure, they objected:

On the contrary, there

in tractate Zevahim,

is the primary case, since it concerns consecrated animals,

and there is no need to teach it here.

But

according to the version that says

that according to Rabba bar Ulla

there

in Zevahim is the

primary

law of slaughtering by one who is impure, and

here, since the tanna taught the case of an impure person with regard to non-sacred animals, he also taught the case of an impure person with regard to consecrated animals,

they objected: The slaughtering of

an impure person with regard to non-sacred animals itself need not have been taught

at all, because

non-sacred animals prepared according to the purity of consecrated animals are not considered like consecrated animals;

the obligation to guard them from impurity does not apply to them, and it is obvious that an impure person may slaughter them.

All

the amoraim

like Ravina did not say this. According to the version that says—

“experts, yes; those who are not experts, no,”

these amoraim disagreed with him because they hold that

the majority of those found engaged in slaughtering are experts,

and there is no need to examine them.

But

according to the version that says—

“established, yes; those who are not established, no,”

they disagreed with him because

we are not concerned that they may faint!

Rava did not state his opinion like Abaye—

because of the difficulty

that he raised against Abaye from the case of one who leaves a gentile in his shop.

Abaye did not state his opinion like Rava,

for Rava proved that when an Israelite enters and leaves, the Samaritan may slaughter ab initio from the Mishna that teaches, with regard to wine of idolatrous libation, that the guard need not sit and watch it continuously; it is sufficient that he enter and leave. This is because Abaye holds that the cases are not comparable:

there, we did not

see that the gentile

touched the wine while the guard was away, but

here, the Samaritan certainly touched

the animal, since once he slaughtered it we must be concerned that perhaps, during that brief time, he paused or pressed. Therefore, the permission of an Israelite entering and leaving does not apply here.

Rav Ashi did not state his opinion like either of them,

neither like Abaye nor like Rava, because

he holds

that Rav Ashi maintains that

the Samaritans are “converts due to lions,”

as they converted only out of fear of the lions, and their conversion is not a conversion; rather, they are gentiles. Therefore, their slaughtering is invalid.

Abaye did not state his opinion like Rav Ashi,

who established the Mishna as referring to an apostate, because

he does not accept Rava’s statement

that an apostate who sins out of appetite examines the knife and then eats from his slaughtering.

Rather, Rava—

why did he not state his teaching,

that an apostate who sins out of appetite is fit to slaughter with an examined knife, and that the Mishna is referring to an apostate, as Rav Ashi established it? And we answer:

Rava

was speaking according to Abaye’s position [and Abaye does not accept Rava’s statement that an apostate who sins out of appetite examines the knife and then eats from his slaughtering]. Therefore, Rava asked him why he did not establish the Mishna as referring to a case where the Israelite enters and leaves, in which case the slaughtering is valid ab initio, as is demonstrated by the Mishna concerning wine of idolatrous libation, which teaches that the guard need not sit and watch it continuously; it is sufficient that he enter and leave.

But as for him

[Rava himself],

he does not accept

that it must be established as referring to entering and leaving. Rather, he establishes it as referring to an apostate who sins out of appetite: the Israelite examines the knife and gives it to him, and one may eat from his slaughtering ab initio. But if the Israelite did not examine it, he examines his knife afterward, and his slaughtering is valid after the fact.

The Sages taught: The slaughtering of a Samaritan—

is permitted!

When are these matters stated? When an Israelite stands over him

and sees that he slaughters properly.

But

if he

came and found that he had slaughtered—

the Israelite cuts

a

olive-bulk of meat and gives it to him

the Samaritan.

If he ate it,

the Samaritan,

it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering; but if not—

it is forbidden to eat from his slaughtering!