Chullin 3b — the Talmud in English

The Israelite examines

the

knife and gives it

to this apostate,

and it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering,

since, as he has an examined knife, he will not abandon what is permitted and eat what is forbidden; and behold, he slaughters according to halakha with the knife that the Israelite examined.

But if the Israelite did not examine

the knife

and gave it

to him—

that apostate may not slaughter,

lest his knife be defective, and that apostate will not trouble himself to look for a knife fit for slaughtering, but will slaughter with the defective knife.

And if

the apostate slaughtered with an unexamined knife,

the Israelite examines

his

knife after him

[after slaughtering]. And if

his knife is found to be sound—

it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering. And if not—

it is forbidden to eat from his slaughtering.

Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, for even after the fact it is also not

permitted for them to slaughter,

lest they pause, lest they press, and lest they bury the knife.

And we raised an objection concerning Rav Ashi’s words: According to him, the matter that the Mishna teaches, “

and all of them who slaughtered”

refers to what?

If you say: to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor,

but behold,

it is referring to them,

and if so, “

and if they slaughtered” it should have been necessary for it

to write.

Rather,

it refers

to an Israelite apostate

who slaughtered.

And the Gemara analyzes:

If it is a case where he examined the knife and gave it to him—

you have said that he may slaughter initially,

whereas the expression “who slaughtered” implies a case after the fact.

Rather, it is a case where he did not examine it.

And we refute this from either side:

If the knife is present—

let him examine it now,

and why do we need the testimony of others who saw that he slaughtered properly?

And if the knife is not present, what is it that others see him?

But behold,

perhaps he slaughtered with a defective knife?!

And we conclude:

The matter is difficult!

Ravina said: This is what it teaches: “Everyone slaughters,”

and the interpretation of

“everyone”

is: all those who are

experts,

who know the laws of slaughtering,

slaughter.

And it informs us that it is sufficient that they be

experts

in the laws of slaughtering,

even though they are not

known

established

as slaughtering according to halakha, for we have not seen them slaughter three times, whether their hands are well trained in the craft of slaughtering, and whether they do not recoil [and faint] upon seeing the blood of slaughtering and thereby come to pause.

When are these words

said, that they are considered experts?

When it is known of him

the slaughterer

that he knows how to state the laws of slaughtering. But if it is not known of him that he knows how to state the laws of slaughtering—

he may not slaughter!

And if he slaughtered—

we examine him:

If he knows how to state the laws of slaughtering—

it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering.

And if not—

it is forbidden to eat from his slaughtering!

Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, for even after the fact

and even if they know the laws of slaughtering,

it is also not

possible to validate their slaughtering, since they are always presumed likely to spoil it—

lest they pause, lest they press, and lest they bury the knife.

And the Gemara analyzes:

“And all of them who slaughtered”—to what

does it refer?

If you say: to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor?

Behold,

it is referring to them,

and if so, “

and if they slaughtered” it should have been necessary

to write!?

Rather,

it refers

to those “who are not experts,”

for if others see their slaughtering, it is valid after the fact.

And we refute this:

If we examine him

to see whether he knows the laws of slaughtering,

is that sufficient

and we do not require that they see him while he slaughters!?

And we answer: Here it is speaking of a case

where he is not present before us so that we may examine him.

And some say:

Ravina said: This is what it teaches: “Everyone slaughters”—

everyone

who is

established,

whom we have seen slaughter several times properly—

slaughters.

Established—

even though they are not experts!

For we do not know whether they know how to state the laws of slaughtering.

When are these words—

when they slaughtered before us two or three times and did not faint,

when the slaughterer did not weaken from the sight of the blood and the cutting at the time that he slaughters.

But

if

he did not slaughter before us two or three times,

and we did not ascertain whether he faints or not—

he may not slaughter,

because

perhaps he will faint

and his slaughtering will be disqualified, because he will not slaughter properly.

And if he slaughtered and said: I am certain that I did not faint—

his slaughtering is valid! Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, for even after the fact it is also not

possible to validate their slaughtering, because

lest they pause, lest they press, and lest they bury the knife.

And the Gemara analyzes: “

And all of them who slaughtered”—

to what

does it refer?

If you say: to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor—

behold,

it is referring to them,

and if so, “

and if they slaughtered” it should have been necessary

to write.

Rather, it refers to those who are not established,

for initially they may not slaughter, but if they slaughtered and others see them, their slaughtering is valid.

And we refute this:

But you said

that “

if I am certain

that I did not faint,”

is sufficient?!

And we answer: Here it is speaking of a case

where he is not present before us so that we may ask him!

And now we explain why all these amoraim who established the words of the Mishna through several different interpretations did not answer according to the interpretations of their colleagues.

Ravina and Rabba bar Ulla—

like Abaye and Rava,

who established it as referring to the slaughtering of a Kuti,

and

like

Rav Ashi,

who established it as referring to the slaughtering of an apostate,

did not say so,

because

the following was difficult for them:

the matter that it teaches, “

and all of them”

who slaughtered and others see them, their slaughtering is valid after the fact, whereas according to them their slaughtering is valid initially [the slaughtering of a Kuti according to Abaye and Rava, and the slaughtering of an apostate according to Rav Ashi].

And likewise,

all

the amoraim

like Rabba bar Ulla,

who established it as referring to the slaughtering of a tamei,

did not say so,

because

according to that interpretation which you stated

according to Rabba bar Ulla, that

here

is the

primary

law of the slaughtering of a tamei, this was difficult for them: Behold,

on the contrary, there

in tractate Zevahim

is the primary matter, for it concerns consecrated offerings,

and it need not have been taught here.

But

according to that interpretation which you stated

according to Rabba bar Ulla, that

there

in Zevahim is the

primary

law of the slaughtering of a tamei,

and here, since it taught [the law of] a tamei concerning non-sacred animals, it also taught [the law of] a tamei concerning consecrated offerings,

this was difficult for them: the slaughtering of a

tamei concerning non-sacred animals itself was not necessary for it

to be taught at all, because

non-sacred animals prepared with the purity of consecrated offerings are not considered like consecrated offerings,

for the obligation to beware of their impurity does not apply to them, and it is obvious that a tamei may slaughter.

All

the amoraim

like Ravina did not say so. According to the interpretation that says—

experts, yes; those who are not experts, no,

these amoraim disagreed with him because they hold that

the majority of those found engaged in slaughtering are experts,

and it is not necessary to examine them.

But

according to the interpretation that says—

established, yes; those who are not established, no,

they disagreed with him because

we are not concerned that they may faint!

Rava did not say like Abaye—

because of the difficulty

that he raised against Abaye from one who leaves an idolater in his shop.

Abaye did not say like Rava,

for he proved that in a place where an Israelite enters and leaves, a Kuti may slaughter initially, from that which we learned concerning the law of wine handled by an idolater, that the guard need not sit and watch; rather, it is sufficient that he enter and leave, because he holds that they are not comparable, since

there he did not

see that the

idolater touched

the wine when the guard left, but

here he certainly touched

the animal, for once he slaughtered it, we must be concerned that perhaps within a short time he paused or pressed, and therefore the permission of an Israelite entering and leaving does not apply here.

Rav Ashi did not say like either of them,

neither like Abaye nor like Rava, because

Rav Ashi holds

that

the Kutim are “converts because of lions,”

for they converted only out of fear of the lions, and their conversion is not conversion; rather, they are gentiles, and therefore their slaughtering is invalid.

Abaye did not say like Rav Ashi

who established it as referring to an apostate, because

he does not accept Rava’s position

that an apostate who sins out of appetite examines the knife and eats from his slaughtering.

Rather, Rava—

why did he not say according to his own teaching,

that an apostate who sins out of appetite is fit to slaughter with an examined knife, and that the Mishna is speaking of an apostate, as Rav Ashi established it? And we answer:

Rava—

spoke according to Abaye’s position

[and Abaye does not accept what Rava said, that an apostate who sins out of appetite examines the knife and eats from his slaughtering], and therefore Rava said to him: Why do you not establish it as referring to one who enters and leaves, whose slaughtering is valid initially, as is demonstrated from the Mishna concerning wine handled by an idolater, that the guard need not sit and watch, but it is sufficient that he enter and leave.

But as for him

[Rava himself],

he does not accept

that it is necessary to establish it as referring to one who enters and leaves; rather, he establishes it as referring to an apostate who sins out of appetite, who examines the knife and gives it to him, and one may initially eat from his slaughtering. And if he did not examine it, he examines his knife after him, and his slaughtering is valid after the fact.

The Sages taught: The slaughtering of a Kuti—

is permitted!

When are these words said? When an Israelite stands over him

and sees that he slaughters according to halakha.

But

if he

comes and finds that he slaughtered—

the Israelite cuts

a

olive-sized piece of meat and gives it to him

the Kuti. If

he eats it,

the Kuti—

it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering, and if not—

it is forbidden to eat from his slaughtering!