Chullin 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

And from here we learned that

a sword

that touches a corpse

is

impure with a degree of impurity

like that of the corpse

itself, for all metal vessels that touch corpse impurity that is capable of rendering vessels impure [such as a primary source of impurity and a father of impurity, which are two degrees of impurity that render vessels impure; but impurity at the level of a first-degree impurity or lower does not render vessels impure] assume the degree of impurity of the source that rendered them impure. That is, if metal vessels touched a corpse, they are impure at the level of a primary source of impurity; and if they touched a father of impurity [such as a person who touched a corpse], they become a father of impurity.

If so, this is difficult: How can an impure person slaughter a sacrifice? For since that impure person, who touched a corpse and came to slaughter the sacrifice,

is a father of impurity—

he will render the knife impure

when he touches it, and the knife will become impure at the same level as he is, as a father of impurity;

and the knife will go

at the time of slaughter

and render the meat impure?!

Rather,

necessarily, this is not speaking of a case in which the impure person became impure through corpse impurity; rather, it is speaking of a case in which

he became impure through

impurity of a

creeping creature,

and he then becomes a first-degree impurity, which does not render vessels impure.

Alternatively, if you wish, say: Actually,

it is speaking of a case in which he

became impure through a corpse, and for example

he did not slaughter with a metal knife; rather, it is speaking of a case in which

he inspected a reed splinter

made of wood, which has no receptacle, and we hold that flat wooden vessels do not contract impurity,

and he slaughtered with it!

As it was taught in a beraita: With anything one may slaughter: whether with a stone

of stone,

whether with glass, whether with a reed splinter

made of wood.

Abaye said: This is what the Mishna teaches: Everyone may slaughter,

and the word “everyone” comes to include

even a Samaritan!

When are these words applicable? When an Israelite is standing over him.

But

if the Israelite did not stand over him throughout the entire slaughtering, but the Israelite was

going out and coming in, he may not slaughter

the Samaritan.

And if he slaughtered, the Israelite cuts

the Israelite

an olive-bulk of meat

from the animal slaughtered by the Samaritan,

and gives it to him

the Samaritan to eat.

If

he ate it,

the Samaritan,

it is permitted

for the Israelite

to eat from his slaughtering.

For the Samaritan is not suspected of eating unslaughtered or non-kosher animals. And since he ate it, it is proven that he slaughtered properly. But if

he did not eat it,

the Samaritan himself, one cannot rely on the fact that he feeds it to an Israelite as proof that he slaughtered properly. This is so even though it is forbidden to feed someone a forbidden thing by virtue of the prohibition, “You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind,” because the Samaritans interpret the “stumbling block” mentioned in the verse as a stone or the like, and not as an obstacle involving a prohibition. Accordingly, it is not proven from the fact that they give an Israelite meat from the slaughtered animal that they indeed slaughtered it in accordance with halakha, and

it is forbidden to eat from his slaughtering.

Except for a deaf-mute, an intellectually disabled person, and a minor, for even

if they slaughtered,

even after the fact one may not

eat from their slaughtering, because

perhaps they paused [

paused],

perhaps they pressed, and perhaps they inserted the knife beneath the relevant organs.

And the Gemara asks: According to Abaye, the statement that the Mishna teaches,

“And all of them, if they slaughtered,”

their slaughtering is valid,

to what

does it refer?

If you say

that it refers

to a deaf-mute, an intellectually disabled person, and a minor,

behold,

it refers to the preceding clause,

as this is the continuation of the discussion. If so,

“And if they slaughtered,”

with the conjunctive letter vav,

it should have

been written, and why does it state, “And all of them, if they slaughtered”?

Rather,

“And all of them, if they slaughtered,” refers

to the Samaritan,

who is included at the beginning of the Mishna in the phrase “Everyone may slaughter.”

We challenge this greatly:

You said that when an Israelite is standing over him

the Samaritan,

he may slaughter even initially,

and if so, how did you say that the statement taught at the end of the Mishna—that when others see them, their slaughtering is valid—refers to a Samaritan? And we conclude:

It is difficult

for Abaye’s interpretation.

Rava said,

expressing astonishment at Abaye:

And

when a Samaritan slaughters and an Israelite

is going out and coming in, may the Samaritan initially not

slaughter?

But we learned in the Mishna: One who leaves an idolater in his shop,

where there is wine in that shop, and

an Israelite goes out and comes in

to the shop—

it is permitted

to use the wine in the shop, and it does not become forbidden out of concern that the idolater may have poured it as an offering to idolatry.

And it is proven that the fact that an Israelite goes out and comes in removes all the concerns, and it is permitted even initially.

The Gemara rejects this:

There,

in the case of the wine,

does it state

that initially

the Israelite may leave

the idolater to remain in the shop with the wine? Behold,

“One who leaves

an idolater in his shop”

it teaches,

which is an expression of

a situation after the fact!

Rather, from here

there is a basis for refuting this:

The one guarding

the wine against contact by an idolater

need not sit and guard

the wine continuously;

rather, even though he goes out and comes in,

the wine

is permitted?!

Rather, Rava said: This is what the Mishna teaches: Everyone may slaughter, even a Samaritan.

When are these words applicable? When an Israelite goes out and comes in. But

if

the Israelite came

after the slaughtering

and found him

the Samaritan

who

had already

slaughtered, the Israelite cuts

the Israelite

an olive-bulk of meat and gives it to him

the Samaritan to eat.

If he ate it,

the Samaritan, an olive-bulk of meat,

it is permitted

for the Israelite

to eat from his slaughtering.

But if

he did not eat it, it is forbidden

for the Israelite

to eat from his slaughtering.

And the continuation of the Mishna is:

Except for a deaf-mute, an intellectually disabled person, and a minor, for even

if they slaughtered,

even after the fact one may not

validate their slaughtering, because of the concern

that perhaps they paused, perhaps they pressed, and perhaps they inserted the knife beneath the relevant organs.

And the Gemara asks according to Rava’s interpretation:

“And all of them, if they slaughtered,”

which is taught at the end, that their slaughtering is valid—

to what

does it refer?

If you say it refers to a deaf-mute, an intellectually disabled person, and a minor,

behold,

it refers to the preceding clause,

and if so,

“And if they slaughtered” should have been

written.

Rather, it refers to a Samaritan,

to say that his slaughtering is valid after the fact. But you cannot say this, because

you said

that

even

if the Israelite was not present throughout the Samaritan’s slaughtering, but only was

going out and coming in—

the Samaritan may slaughter

the Samaritan

even initially?!

And we conclude:

It is difficult

according to Rava’s interpretation.

Rav Ashi said: This is what the Mishna teaches: Everyone may slaughter, even an Israelite who is an apostate!

And we explain:

An apostate with regard to what?

An apostate

who eats unslaughtered animals out of appetite,

who, if he does not find slaughtered meat, eats the meat of an unslaughtered animal.

And this is in accordance with the statement of Rava, for Rava said: An Israelite

who is

an apostate

with regard to this matter, namely, one who

eats unslaughtered animals out of appetite,

who comes to slaughter,