Chullin 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

However,

if

he said, “It is incumbent upon me”

to bring an offering [or to give charity], as there is concern that perhaps he will act negligently and fail to fulfill his vow,

Rabbi Yehuda

did not say that one may make vows ab initio.

If so, this presents a difficulty for Rav Ashi, who said: Wherever the Mishna teaches “all,” its intention is that the matter may be done ab initio. For in Arakhin and Nedarim, a person accepts a monetary obligation upon himself; he does not vow a specific object to the Temple. If so, everyone agrees that this should not be done ab initio, and yet the Mishna teaches: “All assess and vow”! However, Rav Ashi refuted this argument from the opposite direction:

And

wherever the Mishna teaches

“all,” is it not

necessarily

a ruling that applies ab initio?

Is it not possible that the tanna should use this expression in a ruling that does apply ab initio?!

Rather,

with regard to that which we learned in tractate Arakhin [3b]:

“All

[this comes] to include a minor;

all”

[this comes] to include a minor,

“are obligated in sukka. All are obligated in tzitzit” —

should

we likewise

say that the tanna’s intention is

that this does not apply ab initio?!

Rav Aha, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: “All

are obligated”—

I did not say

that this is an expression referring to a matter done after the fact, for when the tanna says “are obligated,” it is evident that this is a ruling applying ab initio, since they are obligated to perform it.”

Rav Ashi said to him:

“But from now on,”

with regard to that which is taught in tractate Menahot [93a]:

“All

[even heirs]

perform semikha

on an offering,

both men and women,”

should

we likewise

say

that it does not apply ab initio

?

But it is written, “And he shall place his hand”—

“and it shall be accepted”?!

Rav Aha, son of Rava, said to him:

Yes!

Indeed,

there are

places where the tanna uses the expression

“all”

that is

applicable ab initio, and there are

places where the tanna uses the expression

“all”

that is

applicable only after the fact!

Rather, this is what I find difficult in your words: The expression

“all”

that the tanna teaches

here

in the Mishna—

from where

do you know that it is an expression

applying ab initio,

so

that it poses a difficulty for you

because of the contradiction between the beginning and the end of the tanna’s statement?

Perhaps

here “all” is an expression

applying only after the fact, and it poses no difficulty for you

at all?!

Rav Ashi said

to him:

“I,”

it is from the fact that the tanna wrote

“their slaughter is valid”

that I

find difficulty.

For

since it teaches, “their slaughter is valid,”

which is an expression

applying after the fact—

by inference

you learn

that

the statement taught at the beginning,

“all

slaughter,” is

applicable ab initio, for if

“all slaughter” were also an expression

applying after the fact,

it would pose the difficulty to you:

Why do I need two expressions referring to a matter done after the fact?!

Therefore, what I find difficult is the implication of the beginning—that slaughter may be performed ab initio—contradicting the implication of the end, that their slaughter is valid only after the fact.

Rabba bar Ulla said: This is what it teaches:

the distinction between ab initio and after the fact in the Mishna is as follows:

“All slaughter”

ab initio, meaning that

even

a

ritually impure

person, who can slaughter

non-sacred animals.

And we are astonished:

A ritually impure

person who can slaughter

non-sacred animals—

what is the point of stating this?

What does the Mishna teach us by stating that he may slaughter? After all, Israel was not cautioned against eating ritually impure non-sacred meat!

And we explain: The novelty is that a ritually impure person is permitted to slaughter even

non-sacred animals prepared with the level of purity required for sacred food,

as there are people who undertake to observe ritual purity when eating non-sacred food just as when eating sacred food, so that if they eat sacred food they will be practiced in safeguarding it.

And the tanna

of the Mishna holds

that non-sacred food prepared with the level of purity required for sacred food—

is considered like sacred food.

One who undertakes to eat non-sacred food with the level of purity required for sacred food is obligated to safeguard it from impurity as though it were genuinely sacred. Nevertheless, a ritually impure person may slaughter such non-sacred animals ab initio with a long knife, and we are not concerned that perhaps he will touch the animal and render it impure.

How does he do so,

to slaughter without rendering it impure?

He brings a long knife and slaughters with it, so that he does not touch the meat.

This concludes the explanation of the beginning of the Mishna: “All slaughter” ab initio.

As for that which it teaches, “And if they slaughtered, their slaughter is valid,” implying that it applies only after the fact, the intention of the Mishna is that

with regard to consecrated animals,

that is, offerings,

he should not slaughter

while ritually impure, even with a long knife, because

perhaps he will touch the meat.

He is under a Torah prohibition to safeguard sacred food so that it does not become impure. Therefore, the Sages decreed that he should not slaughter even with a long knife, in order to distance a person from transgression.

And if he slaughtered,

the ritually impure person,

and says, “I am certain that I did not touch it,”

and did not render the meat impure—

his slaughter,

after the fact,

is valid.

Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who even with regard to entirely non-sacred animals

[which he had not undertaken to eat in ritual purity], if they slaughtered,

even after the fact, it is not

deemed that their slaughter is valid.

For one does not entrust a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor with slaughter, even when others are watching them.

Perhaps they will delay

during the slaughter and will not perform it in one continuous movement;

or

perhaps they will press,

pressing down forcefully on the knife until the סימנים are severed, rather than moving the knife back and forth;

and perhaps they will conceal,

slaughtering by inserting the knife beneath the skin or between the two סימנים.

Since they are prone to invalidate the slaughter, to the extent that one does not entrust them with slaughter even when others watch it, if they slaughtered, their slaughter is invalid even after the fact because of these concerns.

We learned in the conclusion of the Mishna:

“And all of them who slaughtered,”

when others are watching them—their slaughter is valid.

And the Gemara analyzes:

To whom

does this statement, “And all of them who slaughtered,” refer?

If you say

that it refers

to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor,

and because

it refers to them,

as it continues the law of the deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor, who were mentioned in the Mishna immediately beforehand, then this is difficult: Why does it teach, “And all of them who slaughtered, their slaughter is valid”? This expression includes additional slaughterers besides the deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor. Since it refers to the deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor, it should have written:

“And if they slaughtered,”

rather than “and all of them.”

Rather, it refers to a ritually impure person with regard to non-sacred animals,

that if ritually impure people slaughtered, their slaughter is valid after the fact.

And we refute this: A ritually impure person with regard to non-sacred animals—

did you not say that he may slaughter even ab initio?!

Rather,

it refers

to a ritually impure person with regard to consecrated animals,

who should not slaughter ab initio, but if he slaughtered and others watched him to ensure that he did not touch the meat, his slaughter is valid.

And we are astonished: If the Mishna is speaking of a ritually impure person slaughtering consecrated animals, why do we require “and others are watching them”?

If he is certain

and the slaughterer claims that he did not render them impure,

is that not sufficient?!

And we answer: The Mishna is speaking of a case

in which he is not present

so that the slaughterer

is before us and we can ask him.

And the Gemara analyzes: Is it really the case that

this

law, that a

ritually impure

person should not slaughter

consecrated animals

ab initio, but if he slaughtered his slaughter is valid, is it

from

the Mishna

here that we derive it? That is, did Rabbi anonymously formulate this law in our Mishna? But

? In other words, did Rabbi state this law anonymously in our Mishna? But

from

the Mishna

there,

in tractate Zevahim,

we derive

this law!

For we learned: “All those disqualified

for the Temple service

who slaughtered

an offering—

their slaughter is valid,”

because

slaughter is valid

with regard to sacred offerings even when performed

by non-priests, by women, by slaves, and by ritually impure persons

[despite their being disqualified for other Temple services],

and even

if those disqualified persons slaughtered

the

offerings that are

most sacred offerings—

their slaughter is valid!

Provided that the ritually impure persons do not touch the meat,

so that they take care not to render it impure and disqualify it!

It is therefore evident that the slaughter of ritually impure persons with regard to consecrated animals does not apply ab initio, for it teaches, “Their slaughter is valid,” which is an expression applying after the fact?!

And we answer:

Here,

Rabbi taught

the essential

law, because this chapter deals with the laws of slaughter, whereas

there

Rabbi taught this law

because he taught the other disqualified persons,

and therefore

he also taught the ritually impure person with regard to consecrated animals.

And if you wish, say

that you should explain it in the opposite manner:

There,

in tractate Zevahim, Rabbi stated

the essential

law, since it is discussing sacred offerings, whereas

here, since he taught

the law of

a ritually impure person with regard to

the slaughter of

non-sacred animals, he also taught the ritually impure person with regard to consecrated animals!

We further consider this matter:

This ritually impure person—

through what did he become impure?

If you say that he became impure through a corpse,

and thereby became impure at the level of a primary source of impurity [for the corpse itself is at the level of a father of the fathers of impurity], then when he touches the knife he renders it impure with an impurity as severe as his own, for

“through a corpse by the sword

or through a corpse,”

the Torah states,