Chullin 2a (ב.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

All are fit to perform shechita, and their shechita is valid —

except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor,

who are not fit to perform shechita,

lest they invalidate their shechita.

And all of them

as will be explained in the Gemara, who “all of them” are]

who performed shechita, and others observe them

performing it properly,

their shechita is valid.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

All are fit to perform shechita.

The Gemara analyzes this: From the fact that the tannai of the Mishna formulated the beginning of his statement

“All are fit to perform shechita,”

it appears that he intended thereby to include all those encompassed by the term “all” [such as one who is ritually impure, an apostate, or a Samaritan, as will be explained], and to say that they may perform shechita even

ab initio.

This is puzzling, since from the language of the tannai at the conclusion of his statement the opposite may be inferred, as he said:

“And their shechita is valid,”

which implies that all those included by “all are fit to perform shechita” are not fit to perform shechita ab initio, but only

after the fact,

if they performed shechita, their shechita is valid. The Gemara answers:

He said to him,

Rabbi

Aḥa, son of Rava, raised the following difficulty to Rav Ashi:

Is it the case that

everywhere that the tannai uses the expression

“all,”

“all”

is necessarily an expression of

ab initio,

so that there is no alternative way to explain that the novelty of our Mishna is that the shechita of those included by the term “all” is valid only after the fact?

If that is so,

with regard to what we learned at the beginning of tractate Temura:

“All may effect substitution”

If they brought an unconsecrated animal, placed it beside a sacrificial animal, and said: “This shall be in place of that,” the unconsecrated animal becomes sanctified with the sanctity of the sacrifice, and it is a “substitution offering”],

both men and women.

Does

here too

the expression “all may effect substitution” have to be interpreted as an expression

of permission ab initio?

But this cannot possibly be said, for

is it not written: “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute a good animal for a bad one, or a bad one for a good one”!?

Rather, it is proven that the expression “all” can also be an expression referring to a situation after the fact. If so, it is likewise possible to explain that the intention of the tannai in our Mishna is to say that the shechita of all those included in the term “all” is valid only after the fact.

Rav Ashi said to him:

There,

with regard to “all may effect substitution,”

it is different, because it is proven that it is an expression referring to a situation after the fact, as the reason is taught

in the continuation of the tannai’s statement:

“Not that a person is permitted to effect substitution; rather, if he effected substitution,”

the substitution takes effect

that is, the unconsecrated animal becomes subject to the sanctity of a sacrifice],

and he receives

the person who effected the substitution

forty lashes,

for violating the prohibition “he shall not substitute it.”

But here, the expression “all are fit to perform shechita” implies that it comes to permit their shechita ab initio. Therefore, we raise the contradiction from the latter clause, since the expression “and their shechita is valid” is an expression referring to a situation after the fact.

Rabbi Aḥa, son of Rava, asks:

Rather,

with regard to what we learned:

“All may declare valuations,”

they become obligated to the Temple treasury for their own valuation, or for the valuation of another person, according to the valuation prescribed in the Torah.

And likewise, with regard to what we learned: “All

may be subject to valuations,”

everyone has a prescribed “valuation” [for even a person afflicted with boils, who has no monetary value whatsoever for sale in the marketplace, if he says, “My valuation is upon me,” or someone else says concerning him, “His valuation is upon me,” he is obligated to give the valuation prescribed in the Torah].

And likewise, with regard to what we learned: “All

may vow”

their monetary value, or the monetary value of others, to the Temple treasury.

The difference between one who obligates himself for a person’s “valuation” and one who vows the person’s “monetary value” is that a person’s “valuation” is prescribed in the Torah, whereas the person’s monetary value is determined according to his price in the marketplace, were he to be sold as a slave.

There are several distinctions between them, such as the following: One who obligates himself for the valuation of an infant who is not yet thirty days old is entirely exempt, since the Torah prescribed a “valuation” only for an infant who is thirty days old or more. But one who vows the monetary value of such an infant is obligated to give the Temple treasury an amount corresponding to the value of that infant were he to be sold in the marketplace.

And likewise, with regard to what we learned: “All

may be the subject of vows,”

meaning that the one who vows is obligated to give the monetary value of those whose monetary value he vowed to give to the Temple treasury—

with regard to all these,

is it likewise the case that ab initio

people may declare valuations and vow!?

Is it not written

Deuteronomy 23]

“When you refrain from making a vow

there shall be no sin in you,”

which implies that the intention of the Torah is to say that it is preferable for a person not to vow, because if he vows there is concern that he will sin by failing to fulfill his vow!?

And it is also written

in Ecclesiastes [chapter 5]:

“It is better that you should not vow

than that you should vow and not pay.”

And it was taught:

It is written in Ecclesiastes [chapter 5], “That which you vow, pay,” and afterward it is written, “It is better that you should not vow than that you should vow and not pay.” The meaning of the latter verse is:

Better than this,

than one who vows and pays,

and than this,

than one who vows and does not pay, is one

who does not vow at all.

For one who is accustomed to making vows is liable to come to sin when he does not fulfill his vow;

this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The meaning of Ecclesiastes is as follows: One who vows must pay his vow, and it is preferable that he not vow rather than vow and not pay. But

better than this

is one who does not vow,

and than this

—one who vows and does not pay—is one who

vows and pays!

And even Rabbi Yehuda,

who says that one may vow ab initio,

said this only when he says, “This is”

as a sacrifice [or for charity], in which case he is not responsible for it and there is no concern that he will stumble.