Chullin 2a — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

Everyone performs slaughter, and their slaughter is valid —

except a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor,

who are not fit to perform slaughter,

lest they invalidate their slaughter.

And all of them [

as will be explained in the Gemara, who “all of them” are]

who performed slaughter, and others see them

performing slaughter properly,

their slaughter is valid.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

Everyone performs slaughter.

And the Gemara discusses: From the fact that the tannai of the Mishna stated at the beginning of his words

“Everyone performs slaughter,”

it follows that his intention is to include by this all those who are included in “everyone” [such as one who is impure, or an apostate, or a Samaritan, as will be explained], and to say that they perform slaughter even

initially.

And it is puzzling, for from the language of the tannai at the conclusion of his words it follows the opposite, for he stated

“and their slaughter is valid,”

and this language implies that all those who were included by “everyone performs slaughter” are not fit to perform slaughter initially, but only

after the fact,

if they performed slaughter, their slaughter is valid!? And we answer:

He said to him,

Rav Aḥa son of Rav Ika posed the difficulty

to Rav Ashi:

And is it so that

everywhere

the tannai uses the expression

“everyone”

it is an expression of

initially,

so that there is no other possibility of establishing the explanation of our Mishna than that the tannai came to teach that the slaughter of those included by “everyone” is only after the fact!?

If it is so,

that which we learned at the beginning of tractate Temura:

Everyone effects substitution [

if they brought an unconsecrated animal and placed it beside a sacrifice, and said: “This shall be the substitute for that,” the unconsecrated animal becomes sanctified with the sanctity of the sacrifice, and it is a “substitution offering”],

both men and women.

Should

here too

we interpret that the expression “everyone effects substitution” is an expression

of initially!?

But this cannot be said, for

it is written: “He shall not exchange it, and he shall not substitute a good animal for a bad one, or a bad one for a good one”!?

Rather, it is proven that the expression “everyone” can also be an expression of after the fact, and if so, it is also possible to explain that the intention of the tannai in our Mishna is to say that all those who were included for slaughter — their slaughter is valid only after the fact.

Rav Ashi said to him:

There,

in “everyone effects substitution,”

it is different, for it is proven that it is an expression of after the fact, as the reason is taught

in the continuation of the tannai’s words:

not that a person is permitted to effect substitution, but that if he effected substitution —

it takes effect [

that is, the unconsecrated animal becomes caught in the sanctity of a sacrifice],

and he receives

the one who effects substitution

forty lashes,

for violating the prohibition, “He shall not substitute it.”

But here, the expression “everyone performs slaughter” implies that it comes to permit their slaughter initially, and therefore the contradiction from the latter clause is difficult for us, for the expression “and their slaughter is valid” is an expression of after the fact.

And Rav Aḥa son of Rav Ika asks:

Rather,

that which we learned:

“Everyone makes valuations,”

they obligate themselves to the Temple treasury for their own value, or for the value of another person, according to the value written in the Torah.

And likewise that which we learned, “everyone

is valued,”

that everyone has a “value” [for even a person afflicted with boils, who has no monetary worth whatsoever for sale in the marketplace, if he says, “My value is upon me,” or someone else says concerning him, “His value is upon me,” he is obligated to give his value fixed in the Torah].

And likewise that which we learned, “everyone

makes vows”

of their monetary worth, or the monetary worth of others, to the Temple treasury.

The difference between one who obligates himself for “a value” and one who vows “monetary worth” is that the “value” of a person is fixed in the Torah, whereas a person’s monetary worth is determined according to his price in the marketplace, if he were sold as a slave.

And there are several distinctions between them, such as: One who obligates himself for the value of an infant who has not yet reached thirty days is entirely exempt, for the Torah fixed a “value” only for an infant from thirty days onward. But one who vows the monetary worth of such an infant is obligated to give to the Temple treasury the monetary worth corresponding to the value of that infant for sale in the marketplace.

And likewise that which we learned, “everyone

is made the subject of vows,”

that the one who vows is obligated to give the monetary worth of those whose monetary worth he vowed to give to the Temple treasury —

In all these cases,

is it also so that initially

they make valuations and make vows!?

And it is written [

Deuteronomy 23]

“When you refrain from vowing —

there will be no sin in you,”

and it implies that the Torah’s intention is to say that it is better for a person not to vow, for if he vows there is concern that there will be sin in him when he does not fulfill his vow!?

And it is also written

in the book of Ecclesiastes [chapter 5],

“It is better that you should not vow —

than that you should vow and not pay.”

And it was taught:

It is written in the book of Ecclesiastes [chapter 5], “That which you vow — pay,” and afterward it is written, “It is better that you should not vow than that you should vow and not pay,” and the meaning of the latter verse is:

Better than this,

than one who vows and pays,

and than this,

than one who vows and does not pay, is one

who does not vow at all.

For one who is accustomed to making vows comes to sin when he does not guard his vow,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Judah says:

This is the meaning of the words of Ecclesiastes: One who vows must pay his vow, and it is preferable that he not vow rather than vow and not pay. But

better than this

is one who does not vow,

and than this

one who vows and does not pay, is one who

vows and pays!

And even Rabbi Judah,

who says that one makes vows initially,

said this only when he says, “Behold, this is,”

for a sacrifice [or for charity], in which case he is not responsible for it and there is no concern that he will stumble.