Chullin 5b (ה:) — the Talmud in English

And we derive from that which is written

“from among the people”

[which implies: not all of the people!] —

to exclude an apostate.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei says in the name of Rabbi Shimon:

From here you learn to exclude an apostate: From that which is written concerning a sin-offering,

“that he shall not do, in error”

“and he bears his iniquity,”

and adjacent to it is written: “Or if his sin, which he committed, is made known to him, and he shall bring his offering,” which implies that only

one who would repent if he knew,

meaning that he has now learned that he sinned, and if he had known at the time he committed the sin that the act was prohibited, he would have refrained from sinning,

brings an offering

a sin-offering

for his inadvertent act.

But if

he would not repent if he knew,

rather, it may be assumed that even if he had known of the prohibition he would have sinned—for example, an apostate—

he does not bring an offering for his inadvertent act.

Therefore, if one ate forbidden fat thinking that it was permitted fat, and afterward learned that he had eaten forbidden fat, and wishes to bring a sin-offering for having eaten it inadvertently, his offering is not accepted, because even if he had known at the time of eating that the piece he ate was forbidden fat and not permitted fat, he would not have refrained from eating it.

And we say:

What is the difference between them—between the tanna kamma, who derives the law from the exclusionary phrase “from among the people,” and Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei in the name of Rabbi Shimon? For according to both of them, an apostate does not bring a sin-offering.

?

And Rav Hamnuna said: An apostate with regard to eating forbidden fat,

who acted inadvertently with regard to eating blood, and with regard to eating blood he is not an apostate,

and he brought an offering

a sin-offering

for

eating

the blood—

that is the difference between them.

According to the tanna kamma, who expounds “from among the people” to mean not all of the people, in order to exclude an apostate, all apostates are excluded. Therefore, even one who is an apostate with regard to eating forbidden fat cannot bring an offering for eating blood, although with regard to blood he is not an apostate. According to Rabbi Shimon, however, only one who is an apostate concerning that particular transgression is excluded, since with regard to it he would not repent if he knew. But an apostate with regard to eating forbidden fat who ate blood inadvertently and learned about his eating of blood would repent if he knew and is therefore liable to bring a sin-offering.

It is proven from this beraita that the exclusion of an apostate is derived either from the exclusionary phrase “from among the people” or from the teaching concerning “one who would repent if he knew.” But this presents a difficulty from what we learned in the earlier beraita, that an apostate is excluded by the exposition “from you”—but not all of you—to exclude an apostate!

And we answer:

One

verse is needed

for a sin-offering, and one

is needed

for a burnt-offering. And both are necessary.

.

Had it taught us

that an apostate is excluded from a

sin-offering,

I would have said that he was excluded only

because it comes for atonement,

and this apostate, who intends to return and repeat his sin even deliberately, is not fit for atonement.

But with regard to a

sacrifice of a

burnt-offering,

which is a

gift, say that his offering should be accepted from him.

And had it taught us about a

sacrifice of a

burnt-offering,

I would have said that an offering is not accepted from an apostate

because he is not one who is liable; but

with regard to a

sin-offering, which is an obligatory offering, say that it should be accepted from him so that the sinner should not profit. Therefore,

so that the sinner should not profit. Therefore,

it is necessary

to teach us that, both with regard to a burnt-offering and with regard to a sin-offering, an apostate cannot bring them.

And now we address what we say: “from the animal”—to include human beings who are sinners, who resemble an animal.

And

if

everywhere that “animal” is written

the expression is one of

inferiority?

But it is written: “You save man and animal, O Lord,” and Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

That which is written, “man and animal,”

refers to people who are wise in understanding

like the first man,

yet make themselves

humble in spirit, not exalting themselves,

like an animal,

and because of this the Lord saves them. This proves the opposite: that the expression “animal” indicates superiority!

And we answer:

There, “man and animal” is written;

therefore, we expound it as indicating superiority. But

here, only “animal” is written.

Therefore, we expound it as indicating inferiority.

And we challenge this:

And

if

everywhere that “man and animal” is written it indicates superiority?

But it is written: “And I will sow the house of Israel—

the seed of man and the seed of animal,”

and we expound “the seed of animal” as referring to an ignorant person, who has neither read nor studied and has not served Torah scholars!?

And we answer:

There, the verse itself divides them,

as it is written,

“the seed of man” separately and “the seed of animal” separately;

therefore, it is expounded as indicating inferiority. Only when “man and animal” are written together is it expounded as indicating superiority.

Mnemonic: Nimlaf

Rav Hanan said in the name of Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi, who said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi in the name of bar Kappara: Rabban Gamliel

the son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who was among the last of the tannaim,

and his court—

determined concerning the slaughter of a Kuti

after our Mishna had been taught, in which it is written “all may slaughter,” including a Kuti,

and prohibited it.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi: Perhaps Rabbi did not hear

[that is, Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi, who heard from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi in the name of bar Kappara] that they had determined to prohibit the slaughter of a Kuti

only when no Jew is standing over him,

but when a Jew is standing over him, his slaughter is valid. If so, this is also the law of our Mishna, and it follows that they did not determine to prohibit what our Mishna permitted. Rather, they agreed with our Mishna that the slaughter of a Kuti is permitted when a Jew is standing over him, and they prohibited it only when no Jew is standing over him.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi to Rabbi Zeira:

This one of the Sages seems

[he said this concerning Rabbi Zeira]

like people who have not learned traditions!

Is it only when

no Jew is standing over him,

the Kuti,

that it needs to be stated

that it is forbidden to eat from his slaughter? Surely it is obvious to us that the Kutim do not accept the law of “placing a stumbling block before the blind.” If the slaughter is not performed properly, they will cause us to stumble by eating an unslaughtered carcass. There was no need to teach us that they prohibited the slaughter of a Kuti in that case. Rather, necessarily, they determined to prohibit it even when a Jew is standing over him.

And the Gemara asks: Did

Rabbi Zeira accept from him

that Rabban Gamliel and his court prohibited the slaughter of a Kuti even when a Jew is standing over him,

or did he not accept it from him?

Come and hear: Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabbi Asi: I saw Rabbi Yoḥanan eating from the slaughter of a Kuti

[when a Jew was standing over him, or when he cut meat and gave it to him, and the Kuti ate it].

And Rabbi Asi, too,

himself

ate from the slaughter of a Kuti.

And Rabbi Zeira wondered

in his heart: How could Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Asi eat from the slaughter of a Kuti?

Had they not heard

what we say, that Rabban Gamliel and his court determined concerning the slaughter of a Kuti and prohibited it?

For if they had heard it, they would have accepted it

and would not have eaten from his slaughter.

Or perhaps

indeed they

had heard it—

but did not accept it?!

Then Rabbi Zeira resolved

Rabbi Zeira

for himself

the question he had pondered in his heart.

It is reasonable that they had heard it—

but did not accept it.

For if it enters your mind that they had not heard it,

and therefore ate from the slaughter of a Kuti,

and if they had heard it—

they would have accepted it—how could such a thing happen,

how could such a stumbling block have befallen these righteous men,

that they should eat something prohibited?!

But

now, even concerning the animals of righteous people,

such as the donkey of Pinḥas ben Ya’ir,

the Holy One, blessed be He, does not bring about a mishap through them,

so that the animal should eat something prohibited,

all the more so concerning the righteous themselves,

that such a mishap should not befall them!?